THE DISCOURSE OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY:

The International Politics of Turkish National Identity Formation

(2002-2017) by TETIK, MUSTAFA,ONUR
Durham E-Theses
THE DISCOURSE OF CHANGE AND
CONTINUITY: The International Politics of Turkish
National Identity Formation (2002-2017)
TETIK, MUSTAFA,ONUR
How to cite:
TETIK, MUSTAFA,ONUR (2018) THE DISCOURSE OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: The
International Politics of Turkish National Identity Formation (2002-2017), Durham theses, Durham
University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12897/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP






THE DISCOURSE OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY:                                                              











Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 




School of Government and International Affairs  





























The Turkish society and state have been subjected to significant and complex social, 
economic and political transformations since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
came to power in 2002. These seismic and puzzling changes also projected themselves 
in the national self-perception and foreign affairs of the Turkish nation-state. Turkish 
foreign policy (TFP) has gradually deviated from its traditional trajectory and has 
displayed a salient change in certain international issues and areas. In order to make 
sense of the transformation in Turkey’s external state actions, this thesis aims to provide 
an account of the discursive transformation of the Turkish national self-image. It 
responds to the question of ‘how’ the discursive (re-) formation of the Turkish national 
identity took place between 2002 and 2017, and made certain paradigmatic changes in 
the field of foreign policy ‘conceivable’. Turkey’s political relations with the Kurdistan 
Regional Government, the European Union and Egypt within the given time span are 
employed as case studies. 
This study has two main theoretical and empirical objectives designed to make original 
contributions to International Relations (IR) and TFP literatures with a theory-driven 
perspective. Firstly, the thesis proposes a ‘modular’ post-structural constructivist 
approach. It invokes nationalism and discourse theories and embeds them in an IR 
framework in order to theorise the national identity-international relations nexus. 
Secondly, this research combines analysis of AKP discourses on Turkish national 
identity with historical/institutional analysis of TFP. Even in the most constructivist IR 
works on Turkey, scrutiny of national identity narratives appears to be lacking. Rather 
than scrutinising the identity transformation process, change (mostly and simply from 
‘pro-Western to pro-Islamic’) is accepted as an axiomatic assumption before applying 
an identity-driven analysis to TFP. This study gives equal empirical weight to national 
identity construction and international relations aspects, allowing the reader to follow 
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“It’s naïve to believe that our image is only an illusion that conceals our selves, as the 
one true essence independent of the eyes of the world. The imagologues have revealed 
with cynical radicalism that the reverse is true: our self is a mere illusion, ungraspable, 
indescribable, misty, while the only reality, all too easily graspable and describable, is 
our image in the eyes of others. And the worst thing about it is that you are not its 
master. First you try to paint it yourself, then you want at least to influence and control 
it, but in vain: a single malicious phrase is enough to change you forever into a 
depressingly simple caricature.” 




“The Turkish nationalist will walk in harmony with other modern nations in his 
international relations and on the way of development and progress. Nevertheless, he 
will also protect the characteristics and independent personality of the Turkish nation. 
The Turkish nationalist will respect to the rights and freedom of other nations. And only 
in doing so, he will be respected by other nations. We do not have an eye on others’ 
territory because every nation’s homeland is sacred. The Turk will use his great power 
only if somebody attacks his rights.” 






























1. 1 The Research Puzzle 
Today, there is significant political and academic consensus on the idea that 
Turkish foreign policy (TFP) has gradually deviated from its overwhelmingly pro-
Western traditional trajectory and displayed a paradigmatic change since the beginning 
of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) rule in 
November 2002 (Kanat, 2012, p. 230-231). Yet, there has been virtually consensual 
continuity in some foreign policy areas. Overall, the literature on TFP asserts that 
Turkey’s foreign policy shifted from being cautious and uni-dimensional to being active 
and multi-dimensional (Aydın Çakır and Arıkan Akdağ, 2016, p. 1). This thesis aims to 
illustrate ‘how’ this supposed transformation in TFP correlates with a changing Turkish 
national self-perception. It raises two major research questions and tries to address them:  
(1) How was Turkish national identity discursively transformed between 2002 and 
2017? 
(2) What are the implications of this national identity formation for the change in TFP? 
In addition to these empirical objectives, the theoretical goal of this thesis is to 
contribute to the constructivist literature in International Relations (IR) via a post-
structural model. The second section of this chapter concisely introduces the concept of 
‘historic bloc’ and describes the main socio-political dichotomous division in Turkey 
through this analytical lens, which is a pivotal distinction throughout the thesis. The 
third section explains why this thesis matters and how this study distinguishes itself 
from other constructivist/identity-driven approaches. This chapter also includes a brief 
outline of the thesis as a preparatory guide for the readers in the fourth section.  
1. 2 Secular and Conservative Historic Blocs in Turkey 
 Ahmet Davutoğlu, the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and an AKP 
Member of Parliament (MP), and Şükrü Elekdağ, a Republican People Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) MP and a prominent retired diplomat, addressed 
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contemporary issues of TFP in a Turkish parliamentary session on the 1st of July 2010. 
Both orators conveyed and exchanged their narratives on Turkey’s national interests in 
general and in the context of the protracted Israel-Palestine conflict in particular. 
Although it was not a historically eminent session, the wide and irreconcilable ideational 
chasm between their definitions of national interest was striking. Their articulate 
elucidations of their subject positions helped to convey the very distinct understandings 
of the Turkish national-self informing their respective foreign policies. Davutoğlu 
passionately delivered his speech and voiced his party and constituent social camp’s 
ideational position:  
Mr. Elekdağ, Al-Quds [Kudüs/Jerusalem] is our cause… Eastern Quds is not 
part of Israel as you think… Al-Aqsa Mosque is in Eastern Quds. Al-Aqsa 
Mosque is not an Israeli land and it will never be!... [strong aphoristic tone] 
Eastern Quds is our cause today as it was in the past… The destiny of Al-Quds, 
Baghdad, Bishkek, Semerkand, Sarajevo is our destiny. Anatolia [Turkey] 
would be the leader if there is order in those places. We cannot live in peace in 
Anatolia if there is chaos in those lands.1 
This powerful narrative equated the fate of Turkey with several other countries by using 
cities as synecdoche, as these nations were reckoned as somehow (e.g., through religion, 
ethnicity, common history) related to the Turkish nation culturally. According to this 
understanding of the national-self, engagement in the predicaments of those countries is 
in Turkey’s national interests. Şükrü Elekdağ’s response countered this vision of 
national-self and the world: 
…Turkey needs to determine its priorities. If you equate the fate of Al-Quds 
with the fate of Istanbul, you would not only shift the whole axis of Turkish 
foreign policy but also transform it completely. I said this is not a rational 
approach. Al-Quds is a very important place for Muslims… However, it is also 
a very important place for Christians and Jews… This is a very intricate issue. Is 
it rational for Turkey to be involved in this? Al-Quds, surely, is an important 
aspect of multi-dimensional Turkish foreign policy… But if you say that ‘Al-
Quds is the most important case of Turkish foreign policy’ and equate Al-Quds 
																																								 																				
1 Online official parliament proceedings: 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20711&P5=B&page1
=90&page2=90 , Video: “Davutoğlu. Doğu Kudüs İsrail’in Toprak Parçası Değildir. 




with Istanbul and Ankara, this would be a grave mistake. This would get Turkey 
into big troubles and catastrophes…2 
According to him, the AKP’s understanding of the national-self and foreign policy 
aimed at becoming an important political actor in the Middle East by leaving the 
founding principles of the Republic, distancing the nation from secularism 
(laiklik/laïcité), promoting Muslim nationhood (ümmet/ummah), and irrationally 
pursuing foreign policy with religious motivations rather than in the national interest, 
which endangers national security.3 As illustrated in this verbal quarrel, the political 
representatives of two major political parties personified the main axis of social factions 
and schools of thought in Turkey perceived and portrayed very distinct and 
irreconcilable understandings of the very same nation which compelled these 
antagonistic subjects to pursue disparate foreign policy agendas. Even though, 
conventionally, the international relations of a nation-state have been reckoned more or 
less as a bipartisan field prioritising the interests of a nation in its entirety, this 
difference in perspectives made one man’s national interest another’s national security 
concern. 
 These speeches and similar antagonistic rhetorical examples prompted me to 
delve into the Turkish national identity issue and the contestation of hegemony over its 
meaning and symbols as a source of change in TFP. Therefore, the principal objective of 
this thesis is to understand and explain the major changes in Turkey’s international 
relations between 2002 and 2017 through the prism of the hegemonic conflict between 
these irreconcilably divergent perspectives of the Turkish national-self. The research 
presented here aims to theoretically elucidate the international politics of the discursive 
construction of Turkish national identity by the hegemonic subject position during the 
given time span. This work expounds ‘how’ this transformation became discursively 
possible instead of questioning ‘why’ this change occurred that would usher the enquirer 
																																								 																				
2 Online official parliament proceedings: 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20711&P5=B&page1
=91&page2=91  







towards straightforward causal narratives. Similar to the illustrative excerpts above, this 
thesis analytically accepts as valid the assumption that there are two major socio-
political camps in Turkey stemming from cultural divisions. These socio-political camps 
are defined as “historic blocs”, a term drawn from Antonio Gramsci (1971) because this 
category is analytically more consistent with the culturally saturated socio-political axis 
in Turkey. The Gramscian historic bloc is a holistic concept that includes political, 
cultural, ideological and economic spheres of activity, thereby avoiding reductionism. 
The collective ideational consciousness of historic blocs bundles people from different 
socio-economic classes together that compete with each other for hegemony (Cox, 1993, 
p. 56-57). It is an integration of material, institutional, ideological, economic and 
cultural capacities, which organically binds the political sphere with civil society (Okur, 
2008, p. 32) and predicates it upon a basis of ideational antagonism between blocs.  
 This work makes the taxonomical distinction between Turkish ‘secular(ist)’ and 
‘conservative’ blocs. This categorisation is not ontological, but an analytical ideal-type 
(Weber, 1949) in this study for social research purposes. In Turkey, the ‘secular(ist) 
historic bloc’ hegemonised a vast terrain of socio-economic and political spheres, 
national identity and foreign policy in Turkey during most of the 20th century (Tugal, 
2009, p. 36) by wielding Turkey’s “ideological and repressive state apparatuses” 
(Althusser, 2014), despite the overwhelming success of political parties representing the 
‘conservative bloc’ in electoral politics. The conservative bloc has gradually begun to 
institutionally dethrone the traditional hegemons, especially after 2007 when the AKP 
retained the majority in parliament for the second time, through multifaceted and highly 
complex political, social and economic processes. The discursive transformation of the 
national-self and the paradigmatic change in TFP have occurred in tandem with this 
gradual institutional power shift. This thesis is an attempt to analyse ‘how’ this 
paradigmatic foreign policy change became ‘conceivable’ via the discursive (re-
)formation of Turkish national identity by the emerging hegemony of the conservative 
bloc.   
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1. 3 The Argument and Significance of the Thesis 
 This study’s empirical objective is to make an original contribution to the TFP 
literature with a theory-driven perspective. With a few exceptions, scholars conducting 
research in international relations on Turkey apply the existing theories and “had little 
impact on the mainstream conceptual and theoretical developments in the field” (Quartet 
and Sayari, 2003, x; Sayari, 2003, cited in Somer, 2014, p. 1-2; Ciddi and Levin, 2014). 
The explanations of TFP are mostly studied by means of detailed empirical narratives 
via the prism of established theories. However, as Murat Somer (2014) argues, the 
example of Turkey can be a theory-developing critical case, as it enables the drawing of 
nomothetic conclusions. Analysing TFP through the established ‘universal’ paradigms 
in international relations (IR) or foreign policy analysis (FPA) without theoretical 
adjustments depending on the peculiarities of the Turkish case may potentially and 
unnecessarily assimilate local specificities into such supposed universality. As a 
contribution to the TFP literature, this thesis analyses the change in TFP with a post-
structural constructivist model devised through the Turkish experience as opposed to the 
rigid theoretical universalism’s subordination of particularities. This is specifically 
important for a constructivist work because studies relevant to contextual meaning 
production have to accredit originality and dissimilarities of the subject of analysis. 
Therefore, this work is distinguished from other theory-driven works on TFP by its 
original theoretical framework that is more responsive to Turkey’s peculiarities.    
This thesis’s main original contribution, however, is not only to the TFP 
literature because it derives a modular theory for the field of IR using the Turkish 
experience as a theory-developing critical case study rather than relying on existing 
theories as they stand. The work pragmatically combines the IR, nationalism studies and 
discourse theory literature along with empirical observations from the Turkish case in 
order to reach a meta-theoretically eclectic and analytically modular post-structural 
constructivist framework. It pragmatically uses nationalism and discourse literature as 
an a la carte menu of employable concepts and perspectives rather than adopting a 
certain approach as a whole package and situates them into an IR framework. It offers a 
conceptually pragmatic and modifiable “discourse-historical analysis” (Wodak, 2001) 
model for the international relations-national identity nexus. This is not a claim for a 
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solid theoretical universality because a modular approach (analytical modifiability) 
recognises its theoretical limits and empirical case-specificities apart from its semi-
universal meta-theoretical premises. Therefore, this study also principally aims to 
contribute to the literature on international relations theory (IRT) together with an 
epiphenomenal contribution to the constructivist approaches in FPA. Even though IRT 
and FPA are deemed distinct subfields, with their own research programmes, post-
structural frameworks like the one employed in this thesis bring these fields together by 
intentionally blurring the systemic and state-level distinction of mainstream rationalist 
theories (Kubalkova, 2001; Smith, 2001). 
At this point, it is necessary to address why a theoretical model derived from the 
single Turkish case would matter beyond its particularity. A single case study might be 
considered as case-specific and idiosyncratically designed for particularities of an 
individual unit instead of general and nomothetic conclusions. However, a single critical 
case study can guide an inductive and heuristic theory-building process that might be 
generalisable (with modifications) depending on spatiotemporal qualities of a case. 
Turkey’s presumed historical and contemporary qualities and status (e.g. ‘Muslim-
majority’, ‘developing’, ‘culturally torn/dualistic’, ‘bipolar/conflictive public sphere’, 
‘former imperial centre’, ‘state-oriented political culture’) enable the researcher to reach 
some theoretical principles and conclusions for alternative cases bearing the same or 
similar qualities. For instance, the study’s post-structural constructivist theoretical 
model can be extended to Russia as a ‘culturally torn’ and ‘state-oriented’ country with 
locality-receptive modifications but it might not be apt to Scandinavian countries. 
Moreover, sometimes conjunctural and contemporary developments in a country 
preceded similar occurrences in other ones can permit the use of a single critical case 
beyond idiosyncratic explanations and descriptions. For instance, even though Turkey is 
not a ‘super-power’ capable of deeply influencing political trends universally, recent 
global developments like the rise of ‘strongmen’ in politics, right-wing parties, domestic 
dichotomous socio-political polarisations and inflammatory and divisive rhetoric make 
Turkey a socio-political laboratory. Besides, rapid socio-political changes during the 
studied time span make Turkey an empirically fertile soil to infer theoretical 
propositions or postulates.    
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 Beyond these factors, the originality that empirically distinguishes this thesis 
from alternative constructivist works is that it aims to combine the discursive analysis of 
a substantial amount of empirical data on national identity with an analysis of Turkey’s 
international relations. What appears to be missing in the most of the constructivist IR 
works on Turkey is scrutiny of national identity narratives. In the constructivist IR 
works, Turkish national identity is generally treated as a ‘closure’ or a ‘condition’ 
instead of ‘fluidity’ or a ‘process’. The existence of a change (mostly and simply from 
‘pro-Western to pro-Islamic’) is accepted as an axiomatic assumption before applying 
an identity-driven analysis to TFP, rather than scrutinising the identity change process. 
The discursive data used by the constructivist analyses of TFP remains either at an 
anecdotal level or is unsystematic. On the other hand, in some works carried out in 
different fields such as sociology and linguistics, the discursive analysis of the formation 
of Turkish national identity appears as the sole objective of research (Koyuncu, 2014; 
Küçükali, 2014). This study gives equal empirical weight to national identity 
construction and international relations aspects. Therefore, the reader can follow both 
analyses separately and the interplay between them in this work. Providing an 
empirically rich and systematic account of Turkish national identity discourses and 
analysing paradigmatic TFP changes in relation to these discourses make this thesis a 
candidate to be a reference source for future scholars interested in studying TFP during 
the AKP era.   
1.4 A Brief Outline of the Thesis 
 This thesis is composed of seven chapters. The second chapter is devoted to a 
literature review on identity in IRT. It delves into IR literature regarding the 
international relations-identity nexus in order to discover the most convenient theoretical 
position, framework and conceptual tools. It starts to explore the literature with 
rationalist theories (neo-realism and neo-liberalism) which are conventionally deemed 
the dominant perspectives within the field. After examining their theoretical indifference 
to the national identity question, Chapter 2 goes over the constructivist literature on the 
topic. The (meta-)theoretical strength and shortcomings of constructivist approaches 
regarding the identity issue are presented by touching on intra-paradigm divisions within 
the constructivist IR literature. Subsequently, post-structural approaches towards the 
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identity problematic are critiqued and their theoretical capabilities and inadequacies are 
discussed. This review chapter concludes that the (meta-)theoretically eclectic approach 
of post-structural constructivism has the analytical competency to theorise the change in 
external actions of states in regard to national identity transformations.  
 The objective of the third chapter is to theorise a post-structural constructivist 
theoretical framework of national identity change in international relations. In order to 
accomplish this objective, besides the IRT, Chapter 3 examines the academic literature 
on nationalism and discourse theory. Invoking the nationalism literature is crucial to 
understand the nature of national identity informing the foreign policies of nation-states. 
After defining the national identity construction process as a discursive formation, this 
chapter buttresses the theoretical framework by appealing to the discourse theory 
literature. It addresses some fundamental issues like the human agency question vis-à-
vis structural limitations and locates nodal points constituting the single discursive 
system of national identity formation. Finally, this chapter fits the discursive formation 
of national identity into a post-structural constructivist IR framework, which links the 
identity phenomenon with international politics.  
 The fourth chapter is allocated to the methodology that connects the theoretical 
framework with the empirical study. The chapter starts by laying the meta-theoretical 
foundations of the study by specifying its ontological and epistemological positions. 
Afterwards, the fundamental concepts of discourse and discourse analysis are clarified 
as they are operationalised in the thesis. Lastly, Chapter 4 presents the specific methods 
of data collection and analysis applied in the work. The discourse-historical analysis of 
Ruth Wodak is introduced as the main methodological approach. Although being written 
up as separate chapters, Chapter two, three and four offer the interlinked theoretical 
foundations of this research. They should be taken as complementary parts of a 
theoretical whole (modifiable depending on the case study), since they are conceptually 
intertwined. This theoretical package is also designed to frame the two broad empirical 
chapters. 
 The fifth chapter explores the national identity discourses of AKP politicians as 
the political representatives of the conservative historic bloc via the discursive strategies 
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that they have adopted. It begins with a brief historical context as a preparatory step to 
discourse analysis. After this preliminary phase, the first half of the chapter is dedicated 
to the deconstruction strategies through which the conservative political elites 
discursively dismantled the hegemony of the established national identity formation 
which, later, enabled them to construct a new one in accordance with their ideological 
position. The chapter then examines the constructive strategies in the national identity 
discourses of the AKP elites in order to reveal the discursive patterns within the new 
hegemonic understanding and construction of the Turkish national-self. These 
deconstructive and constructive discourses provide the social cognitive horizon and 
discursive medium of ‘conceivable’ foreign policies in relation to Turkish national 
identity. Chapter 5 is thus devoted to the discourse analysis of Turkish national identity 
formation between 2002 and 2017 by AKP politicians through analytical discursive 
strategy categories.  
 The sixth chapter of the thesis analyses the change in TFP in accordance with 
the national identity formation through pairing three different case studies, namely 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), European Union (EU) and Egypt, with three 
nodal points (ethnic/cultural, civilisational and governmental) located within national 
identity discourses. It begins with providing a brief categorical review of the TFP 
literature on the supposed paradigmatic shift in Turkey’s international relations. The 
chapter aims to illustrate how the discursive formation of the Turkish national-self 
between 2002 and 2017 made Turkey’s foreign policies towards the selected 
international units ‘conceivable, thinkable or implementable’. By applying the post-
structural constructivist optic elaborated in the theoretical parts, Chapter 6 focuses on 
the interplay between identity-driven discourses of the AKP government towards these 
units and its institutional/extra-discursive reflections in the field of foreign policy. This 
chapter employs discourse analysis techniques contextualising and situating national 
identity discourses within the historical/institutional analysis of TFP during the AKP 
period until 2017. Therefore, it combines discursive and historical/institutional foreign 
policy analysis of Turkey in the specified time period.  
 The concluding chapter provides a brief overview of the empirical chapters 
along with a table of discursive nodal points constituting national identity formation in 
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relation to TFP changes. Turkey’s relations with the KRG, the EU and Egypt between 
early 2017 and mid-2018, which is beyond the temporal scope of the thesis, are briefly 
reviewed in conjunction with the national identity discourses. The chapter presents 
Turkey’s conceivable policies towards these international units in the foreseeable future. 
Finally, the possibilities of furthering this empirical research in different planes and the 
potential general applicability of the post-structural constructivist framework with 















LITERATURE REVIEW: IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
We can trace the roots of academic interest in identity in International Relations 
(IR) back to “the context of early integration studies published by Karl Deutsch (1957) 
and Ernst Haas (1964) in the 1960s” (Altoraifi, 2012, p. 27). Identity has been a 
conceptual shooting star in IR scholarship and began to pervade the literature in the 
1990s (Berenskoetter, 2010, p. 3595). Since the Cold War’s binary power politics 
broadly eclipsed the culture and identity dimensions of international politics, the demise 
of this dualistic international scheme sparked debates on identity within the IR 
discipline. The growing interest in identity, which was “strikingly evident in post-cold 
war IR theorising” (Lapid, 1996, p. 3), was designated as the “return” (Lapid and 
Kratochwil, 1996) or “discovery”	(Berenskoetter, 2010, p. 3596) of the concept. Pivotal 
political incidents subsequent to the end of the Cold War, such as national awakening in 
the post-Soviet geography, the bloody fragmentation of Yugoslavia along ethno-political 
lines, the rise of extremist figures and movements in some Muslim-majority countries, 
and the growing revival of ethnic consciousness in various regions of the world, have 
driven IR scholars to reconsider their conventional theoretical toolsets. As O’Hagan 
(2004, p. 27) puts it, “events in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia have 
increasingly drawn attention to the importance of how communities perceive themselves 
and others”. The seismic shifts in the perceptions of communities and states have 
naturally echoed in their foreign affairs which made identity a crucial notion in IR 
theorising.  
This chapter is devoted to the review of international relations theory (IRT) 
literature through the prism of the notion of identity. It consists of five sections. In the 
second section following this preliminary part, the role of identity within the IRT 
literature is sought among the ‘rationalist theories’ traditionally deemed as indifferent to 
the notion. The third section of the chapter examines the popular paradigm of social 
constructivism. The tenets of the constructivist ‘establishment’ are critiqued regarding 
28	
	
the identity problematic. Then, the fourth section puts a spotlight on the post-structural 
approaches to international relations in the context of identity. The strengths and 
shortcomings of both constructivist and post-structural theories in the case of identity 
formation are discussed. The chapter, in the fifth section, concludes that a meta-
theoretically eclectic post-structural constructivist approach towards the national identity 
issue is not only a possibility but a necessity in order to make better sense of the identity 
and international relations nexus.   
2.2 Rationalist Theories 
 The term realism in IR conjures up certain robust concepts and images such as 
“power politics”, “balance of power”, “anarchy”, “the national interest”, and “the 
security dilemma” (Ashley, 1981, p. 204). Realist theories of IR dominated the field 
during the Cold War Era, especially in the United States (Telbami, 2002, p. 158), 
because they provided simple, powerful and coherent theoretical tools in order to 
explain international politics under the hegemony of the bilateral structure of US-Soviet 
competition (Walt, 1998, p. 31). Since “the dramatic events of 1989-91 are widely 
recognised to have ushered in a new era in international relations” (Lebow, 1994, p. 
249), the postulates and core hypotheses of realist theories have been reconsidered, 
scrutinised and critiqued in the light of new developments. The relatively stable and 
enduring power politics of the Cold War era, which were consistent with the repetitive 
depiction of actors’ behavioural patterns and the static characterisation of the 
international system by realism, were replaced by more fragile and hot war-prone world 
politics, which required the examination of unit-level specificities in order to understand 
and explain regularities in the system.   
 Liberalism has also been one of the leading theoretical frameworks of IR 
alongside realism. Liberalism is accepted as an intra-paradigm challenge to realism 
since “both theories share a common underlying model of international politics based on 
the assumption of rational state action in international bargaining, but shifting 
preferences” (Moravcsik, 2001, 37). The ‘neo’ variants of realism and liberalism have 
occupied the centre stage of IRT since 1980 (Ruggie, 1998a, p. 3). These two theories 
have followed similar trajectories during the 1980s that culminated in a common 
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rationalist research programme, shared understanding of science and the same 
theoretical premises like the anarchical character of the international system and the 
rationality of actors (Wæver, 2008, p. 163). This commonality between these two 
theories is labelled as “neo-utilitarianism”, (Ruggie, 1998a) “neo-neo synthesis” 
(Wæver, 2008), “rationalist orthodoxy” (Suganami, 2006) or “rationalist theories” 
(Keohane, 1988). This section demonstrates their general indifference to the role of 
national identity in international politics by examining them under the umbrella term of 
“rationalist theories (RT)”.  
RT share a vision of a world composed of “self-regarding units whose identity is 
assumed given and fixed, and who are responsive largely if not solely to material 
interests” (Ruggie, 1998a, p. 3). States are monotype units of the anarchical international 
system which structurally imposes self-help logic to them in order to guarantee their 
survival, which is the main driver of states. Since there is not a strictly legitimate 
hierarchy and division of labour in international politics as in national orders, all states 
operate as lone wolves that are always an existential threat to one another. To Kenneth 
Waltz (2010, p. 93), the leading scholar of neo-realist theory, “the states that are units of 
international-political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they 
perform” but instead by their material capabilities. Robert Keohane, a prominent scholar 
of neo-liberal theory in IR, argues that “realism is a necessary component in a coherent 
analysis of world politics because its focus on power, interests, and rationality is crucial 
to any understanding of the subject” (Keohane, 1986b, p. 159).  
 According to RT, the structure is what matters to understand and explain the 
regularities of state actions within the system. Waltz (2010) distinguishes “systemic 
theories” from “reductionist theories”, arguing that while reductionist theories are 
concerned with particularities of units that can be grasped through national level 
politics, systemic theories set out the constraints and limitations of the structure on the 
state action. Rationalist theories give us explanations through an outside-in model of 
causation depending on an anarchical/Hobbesian narrative of modern international 
politics and to do so, deliberately disregard unit-level diversifications including national 
identities. The structure becomes a sole but strong variable which externally influences, 
if not determines (Waltz, 1986, p. 343), the probability of specific state actions within 
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the international system. This approach bestows to “the international political system 
absolute predominance over the parts” (Ashley, 1986, p. 288) and does not take 
“intentionality and the goaldirectedness of human action into account” (Kratochwil, 
1984, p. 306) because it argues that “states’ behaviour is not guided by their norms and 
goals, but rather by structures beyond their control” (Milner, 1991, p.70).    
 RT sharply dissociate the international system from the domestic realm (Milner, 
1991, p. 75) as if they have an independent and isolated existence from each other. 
While the sphere of domestic politics is “the domain wherein the intersubjective 
foundations of action lend authority [order] to the state” as “the ultimate agent of 
rational action on behalf of society [nation] as a whole”, the sphere of international 
politics is a pluralistic sphere of multiple competing vantage points (anarchy) of 
independent rational actors (states) (Ashley, 1987, p. 412). The uniformity of units in 
the rationalist view of international politics necessarily causes intentional omission or 
subordination of interaction between these two spheres and national differences. “The 
dimension of differentiation of units drops out” in the state of anarchy because “they are 
functionally alike” (Keohane, 1986a, p. 14). Hence, since the RT of IR dichotomise 
domestic and international politics and intentionally trivialises the former, they take 
national interests and the identities of states as constant and depending merely on 
material capabilities, which in return determines the dispositions of units vis-à-vis each 
other. In rationalist accounts, identities and interests are imposed on these functionally 
identical states by the structure and are thus exogenous to states’ interaction. However, 
“it is the politics of identity rather than the logic of anarchy that often provides a better 
understanding of which states are viewed as a potential or immediate threat to the state's 
security” (Barnett, 1996, 401). As Jeanne Klotz (2008, p. 51) simply puts it, “apartheid 
should not have been an international issue if the Realist building blocks of IR, such as 
sovereignty and balance of power, were accurate”. 
 The mechanical understanding of the RT does not consider the role of human 
agency on national identities, interests and preference shifts in state actions stemming 
from ideas, ideologies and cognitive structures, which make politics only a pre-
determined technical vocation (Ashley, 1986, p. 292). The axiom presuming an ultimate 
‘order’ in domestic politics is also elusive due to ideational and institutional conflicts 
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within units. Since “Waltz's neorealist model is physicalist [individualist ontology] in 
character”, “ideational factors make only cameo appearances in it” (Ruggie, 1998b, p. 
865). Waltz (1986, p.329) states that “in self-help systems, the pressure of competition 
weighs more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures”. 
Rationalist approaches, especially realism, are weak when it comes to explaining 
dramatic external policy changes of states because they disregard the agency of 
domestic components and emphasise repetitions of the system (Keohane, 1986b, p. 
159). “Realist arguments preclude any meaningful role for human reflection or political-
ideological contention in (re)shaping actors' conception of interests” (Herman, 1996, p. 
279).  
RT propose a positivistic understanding of theory attempting to unveil law-like 
regularities of an objectified reality out there by imitating the natural sciences (Ashley, 
1981, p. 215). RT are mainly useful when the policy choices of units and regularities of 
the international system are relatively stable. Hence, RT do not have much to say about 
the functions of the notions of national identity, interest and change in international 
politics, which are going to be the focal point of this work in order to explain the impact 
of Turkish national identity construction process on external state actions. The critique 
of RT above does not indicate that these theories are dysfunctional, but they are not 
sufficient to explain the cases of international politics in which identity issues are 
pertinent and irregularities are taking place as in the Turkish example during the last 
decade. Otherwise, some fundamental concepts of RT are undeniably and inevitably 
embedded within most international relations analyses, including this work. 
2.3 Constructivist Theories 
 2.3.1 STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS THE ESTABLISHMENT  
 The problematisation of identity in IR has been initiated by critical/post-
structural approaches, which are also sometimes considered within the category of 
constructivism (Ruggie, 1998b, p. 881). Nevertheless, the identity problematic has 
become mainstream with the rise of social constructivism within the discipline (Ulusoy, 
2005, p. 58), concomitant with colossal changes in international politics during the 
1990s. The constructivist theory of IR has responded to the emerging problems and 
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incidents of the post-Cold War era better than rationalist theories due to its broader 
conceptual spectrum and inter-subjective and ideational ontology. It has theoretically 
enhanced itself more dynamically than RT because rationalist theories of IR do not 
provide useful analytical tools to scrutinise national identity, interests and changes in 
state behaviour in the international system (Wendt, 1994). Therefore, the constructivist 
theorising has been moved from the margins to the heart of IRT. “The constructivist 
turn” has expanded the theoretical contours of IR due to the fact that it has diversified 
interest areas and moved the identity question, which had mainly been the concern of 
postmodern scholars, into mainstream discussions (Checkel, 1998, p. 325). It has been 
argued that constructivism has appeared as a “middle ground”	(Adler, 1997) or “middle 
way”	(Wendt, 1999, p. 2; Smith, 2000, p. 151) between post-structuralist and rationalist 
approaches. Constructivists rely on a conceptualisation that views structures and agents 
as linked in a dialectical synthesis (Kowert and Legro, 1996, p. 488). Constructivists’ 
emphasis on the process of interplay between agents and structures and their mutual 
constitution, along with the rejection of the individualist ontology of RT (Wendt, 1987), 
made it possible to take differentiation of units into consideration.   
Alexander Wendt (1999) is rightfully accepted as the most prominent 
constructivist scholar in IR along with Nicholas Onuf (1989). Taking Wendt’s systemic, 
positivistic and state-centric approach as the only valid representative of social 
constructivism and reserving the term of constructivism exclusively for Wendt’s 
approach (Zehfuss, 2004, p. 7) as the ‘establishment’ of the constructivist theorising in 
IR unfairly homogenises the variety of approaches (Reus-Smit, 2002, p. 491). There are 
different categorisations of the constructivist theorising: namely modern – postmodern 
constructivism (Reus-Smit and Price, 1998), critical – conventional constructivism 
(Hopf, 1998), and neo-classical – postmodernist – naturalistic constructivism (Ruggie, 
1998a). I am going to call Wendtian constructivism ‘structural constructivism (SC)’ as 
he referred to it himself (Wendt, 1994, p. 385), as opposed to post-structural 
constructivism which is the theoretical position adopted in this thesis. According to 
Wendt (1999, p. 1), constructivism in IR has two basic tenets: “(1) that the structures of 
human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, 
and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these 
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shared ideas rather than given by nature”. He argues that the main discrepancy between 
the RT and constructivism stems from the fact that, while the former has a materialist 
ontology which takes the material capabilities as its focal point, the latter has an idealist 
one that prioritises ideas.  
This idealist ontology of SC necessarily draws attention to the subjective 
character of parts (states) and the inter-subjectivity of the whole (international system). 
The subjectivity issue requires the analysis of the differentiation of units constituting the 
system because the international system does not have a given nature which pressures 
units to act in the same way and makes them alike. However, another question arises at 
this point: What are these parts? Wendt’s (1999, p. 9) answer to this question is as 
follows: “Since states are the dominant form of subjectivity in contemporary world 
politics this means that they should be the primary unit of analysis for thinking about the 
global regulation of violence”. Therefore, the ideationally constructed purposive actors 
of the international system are states which have their own personality and agency even 
though it does not mean that non-state actors do not entirely matter. To him, “states are 
unitary actors to which we legitimately can attribute anthropomorphic qualities like 
identities, interests, and intentionality” (Wendt, 1999, p. 43). Wendt “consciously stays 
within the identity-defining parameters of the discipline” (Guzzini and Leander, 2006, p. 
74) of IR by operationalising states as the main actors. 
2.3.2 LEVEL OF ANALYSIS PROBLEM 
 According to Wendt (1999, p. 224), identity is “a property of intentional actors 
that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions”. Identities are the central 
ground upon which national interests are erected along with the structural limitations of 
international interactions. He states that “interests presuppose identities because an actor 
cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying 
degrees of cultural content so will interests” (Wendt, 1999, p. 231). Wendt divides the 
identity of states into two main categories: Corporate and social identities. “Corporate 
identity refers to the intrinsic, self-organising qualities that constitute actor 
individuality” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). The corporate identity refers to “the internal 
human, material, ideological or cultural factors that make a state what it is”	(Reus-Smit, 
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2002, p. 495). This identity of states is pre-social since it does not entail interaction with 
other states to develop. However, self-interests cannot be understood only via corporate 
identity’s subjectively defined interests that disregard social environment and other 
actors in the system. It is impossible because units are necessarily social entities which 
generate their social identity through inevitable socialisation dynamics of the 
international system, and “how a state satisfies its corporate interests depends on how it 
defines the self in relation to the other” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Hence, to SC, the social 
identity of states must be the subject of analysis for IR. 
  “Social identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while 
taking the perspective of others” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Social identity refers to “the 
status, role or personality that international society ascribes to a state”	(Reus-Smit, 2002, 
p. 494). This division of identity into two categories is related to the very core of 
structural theorising in IR. Firstly, it still presumes a separation of domestic and 
international realms, as RT do, and accepts the relative autonomy of the international 
system from other domains (Campbell, 2001a, p. 441). Even though it has been argued 
that constructivism is ontologically agnostic to such divisions, which potentially exclude 
some variables (Hopf, 1998, p. 194), SC predicates its arguments on this distinction. 
While the formation of the corporate identity becomes a matter of domestic politics, 
social identities stay pertinent to international politics as unitary external identities 
which are constructed through interactions within the system. Secondly, SC deliberately 
brackets off domestic components and searches for the roots of identity and interests of 
units embedded in the international system in order to produce a systemic theory 
(Wendt, 1999, p. 244), although domestic factors “are in fact much more important 
determinants of states' identities and interests than are systemic factors” (Wendt, 1992, 
p. 423).  
If we entirely bracket off domestic structures, actors or processes, units and 
interests are merely dependent variables of an outside-in causation. The process of 
domestic internalisation of inter-subjectively shared ideas necessarily demands scrutiny 
of domestic factors that have already been bracketed off by SC. One of Wendt’s main 
criticisms of neo-realism is its omission of agency and prioritisation of the structure with 
an individualist ontology (Wendt, 1987). Yet SC is working in a similar fashion by 
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bracketing domestic determinants of identities and interests. SC supposes that the 
identity of states within the system is primarily “produced through interaction with other 
states not with its own societies” (Hopf, 2002a, p. 83). Wendt’s constructivism has a soft 
individualist ontology despite its claim of having a holist one and thus the difference 
between his position and RT is only a matter of degree (Suganami, 2006, p. 60). By 
restricting theory to international interaction and excluding domestic politics, Wendt 
accepts Waltz’s structuralism while only contesting his conclusions (Lynch, 1999, p. 
19). SC’s intentional omission of domestic factors does not stem from its idealist 
ontology or epistemology but its application of the creed of constructivism to a systemic 
theory which converts its allegedly holistic approach to an individualist one. SC falls 
into the same trap as other ‘systemic theories’ which simplify and categorise complexity 
away, make a priori assumptions about the nature of its units and their interactions, and 
fail to include the domestic face of the state (Hopf, 2002a, p. 288-289). Kratochwil 
(2006, p. 33) argues that “the self still has to take, reject, or modify the identity which 
the others have ‘cast’ for it, but his interactionism leads Wendt to identify the 
representational practices of others—rather than the actual choice of an identity by the 
actor—as the important puzzle”. The internally constructed subjectivity of states which 
resides in their cultural self-perceptions is mostly sacrificed for the theoretical 
convenience of a systemic theory. For that reason, SC fails to theorise subjectivity and 
agency adequately (Smith, 2000, p. 152).  
Furthermore, the corporate identity of SC emerges from “the features of state 
actorhood” (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996, p. 58) or general institutional 
properties of a state rather than the cultural self-understanding or the 
particularity/singularity of a society which it represents. However, nation-states do not 
only seek their institutional interests or survival as a sort of political organism (state), 
but also define and pursue their interests as political representatives of a cultural entity 
(nation). Hence, the identity of nation-states should not only be explored as an acultural 
political institution but also as a political embodiment of a social collectivity, and the 
identity of this social collectivity lies in the national/cultural self-perception of the state. 
The concept of culture is used here as a term revealing the distinctive collective traits, 
traditions, values and the overall mindset of a certain society. Nations as political 
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totalities of groups of people have identities which “define the boundaries and 
membership criteria of the people belonging to them” (Cederman and Daase, 2006, p. 
120). The principal claim of nation-states is having a monopoly on the legitimate 
political representation of their people’s cultural identity and state identities cannot, 
thus, be taken without invoking national self-images.  
For instance, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, 
explicitly stated that the foundational basis of the Turkish state was the Turkish culture 
(Turan, 1989, p. 451). In that sense, the national representation of cultures by states 
“influences behaviour, constitutes the meaning of behaviour and even constructs 
identities and interests”	 (Guzzini and Leander, 2006, p. 86). National identity and its 
construction are inseparable from the question of how a nation-state perceives itself 
prior to interaction (corporate identity) and how it defines itself within a social 
environment (social identity). Wendt (1992, p. 397) enunciates that “states act 
differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening 
and friends are not” (1992, p. 397). This friend-enemy distinction of nation-states is also 
located in their cultural understanding of themselves. For instance, “France and Britain 
did not perceive the superior American power at the end of World War II as threatening, 
because they considered the U.S. as part of "us"; Soviet power, however, became 
threatening precisely because Moscow's domestic order identified the Soviet Union as 
the other”	 (Risse-Kappen, 1996, p. 367). Likewise, the sense of common “we-ness” of 
the Anglo-American relationship helped to have a security community among 
themselves (Mattern, 2005, p. 12). If the nation-state is a purposive actor which has its 
own agency, national self-perception would influence its interests, enemy/friend 
distinction and behavioural patterns. Since SC disregards this ‘national’ dimension of 
state identity, its theoretical tools are not adequate to apprehend and assess the changes 
in patterns of external state actions which are rendered possible via the national identity 
construction process. 
2.3.3 EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
The difference remaining between RT and SC is that for the former, the system 
only regulates behavioural patterns of units through distribution of material capabilities, 
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while the latter argues that the international system not only has regulatory influence on 
units but also constitutes identities and interests through the distribution of ideas 
(Wendt, 1999, p. 248). SC asserts that states had ‘egoistic’ identities in the beginning 
and trapped in a ‘Hobbesian dilemma’ (Kratochwil, 1995, p. 113), even though these 
identities were transforming into more collectivist ones over time. Wendt is “unwilling 
to challenge the neorealist description of the contemporary state system as a competitive 
self-help world” (Inayatullah and Blaney, 1996, p. 73). SC self-consciously mirrors RT, 
but supplement it with its corrective and complementary contributions (Campell, 2001, 
p. 440). Apart from these concessions, the aforementioned outside-in causation indicates 
an epistemological parallelism between structural theories of realism and 
constructivism. The marriage between idealist ontology and causal epistemology in 
structural constructivism make ideas simply another causal factor beside material 
capabilities. Wendt avoids the epistemological critique of rationalist theories	with the 
argument of priority of ontology over epistemology, which reduces “constructivism to 
an argument about the significance of ideas for the conduct of international politics” 
(Behnke, 2006, p. 50). Wendt’s SC challenges the empiricism of science with the 
assistance of scientific realism which argues that it is legitimate to infer the existence of 
unobservables “as the cause of certain observable effects” (Suganami, 2006, p. 60) and 
still clings on to a causal epistemology.  
Wendt (1999, p. 83) delicately distinguishes constitutive theorising from causal 
theorising and argues that they are incommensurable because of the different 
epistemological necessities of “why” and “how possible” questions. However, “when he 
moves to flesh out his allegedly constitutive thesis regarding the relationship between 
international political cultures and state identities what he ends up offering is a number 
of straightforwardly causal narratives” (Suganami, 2006, p. 69). He is also criticised for 
not being clear about the relationship between causal and constitutive theorising 
(Guzzini and Leander, 2006, p. 80). Singling out causal narratives blurs the borders 
between RT and constructivist theorising. After all, RT do not assert that ideas do not 
matter causally for the actors of the international system but instead assert that “ideas 
are causally epiphenomenal to more fundamental underlying influences on state 
behavior” (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 674).  
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Since SC takes identity as a causal category and focuses on the international 
level of analysis, the identity of states also becomes an effect of structural causes 
(Zehfuss, 2006, p. 113). However, ideas and identities cannot be considered simply 
causes or effects by themselves but the mediators (making them conceivable) of causal 
relations. Firstly,	 ideas held by actors are unobservable and can be inferred from the 
behaviours of units (Copeland, 2000, p. 201) including speech-acts. Secondly, as a 
consequence of the first point, causes and effects of ideas and identities can hardly be 
subjected to positivistic or statistical measurement. Hence, reflexivity and interpretive 
epistemology come into play when positivist epistemology fails to capture empirical 
causality stemming from ideas and identities. Whereas constructivist theorising is 
supposed to be primarily based on an “interpretative or hermeneutical understanding of 
science” (Guzzini, 2000, p. 160), SC stays within the positivist causal paradigm of RT 
(Smith, 2001, p. 45). This choice does not provide sufficient analytical tools to explain 
the international politics of national identity transformation because it “privileges a 
scientific realist epistemology over a constructivist one” (Sárváry, 2006, p. 159). 
“The physicalism of Wendt’s explication of social action renders it impossible to 
analyse identity formation as a discursive process” (Zehfuss, 2004, p. 60). If physical 
behaviours of states are taken as the axis of identity inference, then it can be argued that 
behaviours themselves become the subject matter rather than the identity supposed to 
precede behaviour (Zehfuss, 2004, p. 62). Discourses are, indeed, a way of signifying of 
unobservable ideas. In that sense, discourses can be considered as physical gestures 
unravelling the ideas of agents. Nevertheless, discourses as “performative utterances” 
(Austin, 1962) are not only signifiers of unobservable ideas but also producers of those 
ideas, identities, meanings and perceptions of empirical reality. “Discourses shape 
people’s mindsets, worldviews, and goals, leading them to act through habit and 
influencing their conscious choices” (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 47). National identity 
discourses produced by states are also performative in the sense of the self-other 
construction and perceptional reality of the international environment. SC’s 
subordination of interpretative epistemology has largely taken the constitutive role of 
discourses in the identity problematic out of the picture (Guzzini and Leander, 2006, p. 
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86) and has prevented the development of a language-based approach which is crucial to 
“establish an actor’s place in the world”	(Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 44). 
2.4 Post-Structural Approaches  
2.4.1 PROMISE OF POST-STRUCTURALISM 
 Post-structuralism is a critical attitude towards universal objectivity, truth and 
meaning claims. It challenges the hegemonic socio-political thought by advocating 
relativist, binary and oppositional thinking (Schrift, 1995, p. 7) and has permeated most 
of the social science disciplines. It seeks to unsettle entrenched conceptual conventions 
about the social world and science. It problematises most taken for granted knowledge, 
reality, concepts, social institutions and traditions in order to expose	 either their 
historicity (Ashley, 1989, p. 272) or conceptual invalidity. The theoretical categorisation 
of post-structuralism, which is sometimes used interchangeably with the label of post-
modernism, has generally been associated with post-modern thinkers such as Foucault, 
Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray or critical theorists of the Frankfurt School like 
Horkheimer and Adorno (Agger, 1991). Post-structuralism conducts meta-theoretical 
enquiry in order to deconstruct	 assertions of scientific objectivity in structuralist 
approaches.  
Post-structural approaches in IR are sometimes considered within the theoretical 
circle of constructivism as well as critical theory. Post-structuralism as an approach can 
be found within different theoretical perspectives of international politics because its 
non-teleological, anti-essentialist and critique-based modus operandi allows it to be 
ubiquitous throughout IRT. Post-structuralism’s theoretical focus is on the ‘how’ 
question instead of ‘why’ question as it is in constructivist theorising because “it wants 
to know how sovereign subjects of history, competent to inscribe and interpret narrative 
structure of history, are imposed, undone, and imposed anew”	 (Ashley, 1989, p. 281). 
There are not constants, fixed meanings, secure grounds, final structures or stability	 in 
post-structural visions of social inquiry. Therefore, it does not approach the line of 
demarcation between domestic and international realms as if they are fixed and 
unproblematic and does not prioritise any individually distinct realm (Ashley, 1987, pp. 
408-410). Contrary to SC, this flexible stance towards the level of analysis problematic 
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appropriates endogenisation of domestic politics for the identity issue in international 
politics. “The appropriate ‘place’ of post-structuralism in the study of global politics is 
neither domestic nor international” but the "non-place" (Ashley, 1989, p. 285). 
In post-structuralist accounts, theories of international politics are at the service 
of the “practical and epistemological interests of their creators” (Alker, Biersteker and 
Inoguchi, 1989, p. 136). Even though there is not a standard theoretical or 
methodological stance among post-structural theorists, the general epistemological 
interest is nested in discursive webs and language. Constructivist theorising in IR, 
including the structuralist one, also emphasises discursive and linguistic praxis as 
performative utterances or speech-acts. Nevertheless, “post-structuralist modes of 
analysis emphasise ‘discourse’ rather than language because the concept of discourse 
implies a concern with the meaning- and value-producing practices in language rather 
than simply the relationship between utterances and their referents” (Shapiro, 1989, p. 
14). Therefore, post-structural understanding of discourse is a promising analytical 
approach for the national identity construction-external state actions nexus. 
2.4.2. IDENTITY AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
(1) Prioritising the ‘Other’ at the Expense of the ‘Self’ 
The notion of identity is pivotal in post-structural approaches due to the 
constructed character and constitutive role of the self-other binaries. Most of the identity 
theorists treat “the relationship between the self and the other as inherently conflictual” 
(Hopf, 2002a, p. 263), but these binaries could be either dialogical depending on rational 
communication or dialectical based on antagonisms (Neumann, 1996, p. 141). Contrary 
to mainstream constructivist theorising, post-structuralists also argue that identities “are 
context-bound instantiations, and so they cannot be stable” (Neumann, 1999, p. 212). 
“Identities do not exist as objective accounts of what people and places ‘really are,’ but 
as continuously restated, negotiated, and reshaped subjects and objects” through 
references to something they are not (Hansen, 2006, p. 6). Post-structuralism does not 
ascribe an ontic nature to assumed self-other binary. On the contrary, it deconstructs 
identity discourses by unveiling ‘unnatural’ and ‘fluid’ condition of these binary 
discursive constructions. The conceptual fluidity and constructedness of antithetical 
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binaries constituting ‘things’ or ‘subjects’ are widespread themes in post-structural 
identity studies.   
David Campbell (1992) argues that external state actions serve the iterative 
reproduction of state identities via discursive praxis. He focuses on discursive national 
identity construction’s contingency upon danger, threat and difference. According to 
him (1992, p. 54), “the nation-state requires discourses of danger or threat to provide a 
new theology of truth about who and what we are by highlighting who or what we are 
not, and what we have to fear”. The discursive construction of danger or ‘foreign’ 
hinges on the imposition of a certain interpretation which also demarcates the 
boundaries of inside-outside and domestic-international binaries (Campbell, 1992, p. 
69). Although Campbell (1992, p. 78) points out that there will always be domestic 
contestation over ‘true’ identity, he mostly treats the identity of the United States as 
coherent in the sense that a unitary raison d’état uses identity discourses instrumentally 
in accordance with rationally calculated necessities. However, the discursive 
construction of national identities flows from ideologically charged and conflictual 
perceptions of historic blocs. Besides, Campbell’s particular focus on differences 
through fear and danger does not allow for adequately assessing the role of friendly 
commonalities with other nation-states in the discursive construction of the self. He 
(1992, p. 77) admits that he “downplays the role of affirmative discourses such as claims 
to shared ethnicity, nationality, political ideals, religious beliefs or other commonalities” 
by arguing that the difference is the existential requirement of identity. However, despite 
the fact that an identity of being a thing depends on not-being something, shared 
qualities and identical features of being with some other fellow nation-states are also 
constitutive as not-being. Hence, a more comprehensive analysis of the role of identity 
in international politics obliges us to take the discursive construction of commonalities 
into account.  
Iver B. Neumann (1999) also deploys the conceptual pair of the self-other 
distinction in the discursive formation of European identity in relation to Turkey and 
Russia. In addition, he concentrates on internal ‘others’ in the process of identity 
construction. The existence of the other is an ontological and epistemological necessity 
of the self because “there is no inclusion without exclusion” (Neumann, 1999, p. 15). 
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Neumann deliberately attributes an ontological status to the self-other binary. Since self-
other binary relations are intrinsic to collective identity formation and inclusion which 
naturally brings exclusion, “the issue here is not that exclusion takes place but how it 
takes place” (Neumann, 1999, p. 37). Nevertheless, despite the fact that Neumann’s 
work provides an archaeology of the self-other binary in international relations, it does 
not offer a theoretical model to analyse the role of identity in international politics.  
As in the example of Campbell, Neumann’s focus is also centralised in the 
process of exclusion and the other. If what ontologically matters is the self-other binary, 
and not only the other, then the construction of the other according to the self is as 
important as vice versa. As Roxanne Doty (1996, p. 10-12) emphasises, the ‘logic of 
equivalence’ is simultaneously at work with the ‘logic of difference’ in the process of 
discursive identity construction. Identical properties of units (the logic of equivalence) 
do not cancel out the constitutive role of the ‘other’ or differences but point out the 
function of similarities or equivalence of subjects in relation to a common other. This 
perspective puts self-defined commonalities into the picture, that loosens the ties of 
identity construction with an exclusive and rigid self-other binary process. Therefore, 
the discursive inclusion of commonalities between nation-states such as shared ethnic, 
governmental, religious and civilisational backgrounds is a necessary component of an 
identity analysis in international politics and should not be overlooked.  
(2) Meta-theoretical Rigour 
Lene Hansen (2006) takes important steps towards providing a methodologically 
rigorous post-structural theoretical model of identity in IR. She states that although post-
structuralism in IR is positioned against methodology, now it is time for post-
structuralism to take methodology back. The post-structural theorists’ traditional 
omission of methodological rigour does not necessarily mean that the construction of 
such a post-structural model is not feasible. Lene Hansen (2006, p. 9) states that “in 
contrast to conventional constructivism’s embrace of causal epistemology, for post-
structuralists what constitutes ‘proper knowledge’ is not a theory’s ability to uncover 
causal truths as knowledge is historically and politically situated”. This epistemological 
position is valid in this research as the role of identity cannot be analysed simply by 
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considering it as a variable of a causal relation. Thus, the discursive and interpretivist 
epistemology of post-structuralism can be conveniently appropriated to the national 
identity formation process and its relationship with the international politics. 
The absence of positivist and causal epistemology, and the refusal of 
methodological limitations in post-structural approaches can easily be represented as a 
scientific anarchy. However, “if the link between methodology and positivist 
epistemology is loosened”, “then a post-structuralist methodology is not only possible, 
but also desirable” (Hansen, 2006, p. 1). Structuralist and post-structuralist positions on 
the issues of epistemology and methodology can be incommensurable, but denying 
scientific validity of one another merely depending on meta-theoretical antagonisms 
would not be justifiable. If these two approaches are recognised as incommensurable, 
then their scientificity can only be tested according to their own research programmes. 
Theorising the relationship between foreign policy and identity in non-causal terms does 
not imply a lack of structure (Hansen, 2006, p. 15). The post-structuralist agenda has its 
own scientific limitations and advantages as much as structuralist ones, which either 
enable or prevent them from being responsive to certain questions. However, “adopting 
a non-causal epistemology does not imply an abandonment of theoretically rigorous 
frameworks, empirical analyses of ‘real world relevance,’ or systematic assessments of 
data and methodology” (Hansen, 2006, p. 4).   
Hansen emphasises that “the strategy of discourse analysis is to incorporate 
material and ideational factors rather than to privilege one over the other” (Hansen, 
2006, p. 20) because arguing that “there is no ‘extra-discursive’ materiality is not to say 
that the material has no importance, but rather that it is always discursively mediated” 
(Hansen, 2006, p. 22). Ideational factors as unobservables can be a subject for scientific 
inquiry through their empirical manifestations, which are inferred from behaviours and 
discourses. Discourses are material things that we are able to sense or perceive and then 
put into interpretative arguments. Post-structural epistemology is not anti-empirical but 
opposes causal empiricism. Therefore, the dichotomisation of material and ideational 
factors, as if they are ontologically equivalent and have an independent existence from 
each other, is not coherent with the post-structural epistemology. Ideas cannot direct a 
researcher towards a certain epistemological route by themselves but can constitute the 
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ontological aspect of a theory. Since identities have an ideational ontology, an 
international theory engaging with identity issues needs to establish its arguments on 
idealist ontology as well. In this account, the idealist ontology of mainstream 
constructivist theorising provides better ontological assumptions, despite its 
epistemological handicaps.  
(3) Human Agency Problem 
What Hansen brings	 to post-structural identity theorising in IR is the emphasis 
on ‘human agency’ which is mostly disregarded by post-structural theorists. She argues 
that, even though discursive structures are constraining, they are dependent on human 
agency for their reproduction and on humans, particularly those in politics, media, and 
academia (Hansen, 2006, p. 188). Nevertheless, she has not elaborated the human 
agency question and not systemised the role of it. In post-structural philosophy, “neither 
Heidegger nor Foucault, for instance, nor many of their subsequent interpreters, have 
dealt with questions of agency in an explicit and systematic way” (Bleiker, 2004, p. 12). 
The absence of human agency, captured as ‘strategy without strategist’, obscures the 
culpable ‘subjects’ who exert discursive power over people. Bleiker defines post-
structural apathy towards the agency as the “annihilation of the subject” (Bleiker, 2004, 
p. 38). Post-structural conceptualisation of discourse has been criticised because 
intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity, the autonomy of the subject and even the 
subject itself are dissolved in the post-modern narrative (Benhabib, 1995, p. 20). 
Discursive power relations are conceptualised as “intentional but non-subjective” 
(Hicks, 2003, p. 98). Drefyus and Rainbow (1983, p. 187) argue that, in the post-
structural vision, “there is a push towards a strategic objective, but no one is pushing”. It 
has been argued by some post-structural analysts that “the overall strategy was 
constructed historically but not intentionally” (Powers, 2001, p. 17).  However, 
ascribing intentionality to a non-subjective historicity is oxymoronic. Intentionality has 
to presume subjectivity and agency. This intentionality might gain a spill-over 
momentum independent from the particularistic attitudes of individual agents after a 
while but still, it can only be reproduced through the agency of subjects. The goal-
oriented aspect of human agency is generally the missing element of post-structural 
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approaches and analyses including those in IR. Roland Bleiker (2004, p. 12) contends 
that “this omission has often been equated with an image of the world in which human 
beings are engulfed by discursive webs to the point that action becomes no more than a 
reflection of externally imposed circumstances”. In that sense, there is an ironic kinship 
between structural realism and post-structural approaches. Structructual realism also 
mostly disregards intentional human agency and considers it as restricted by structural 
limitations depending on the anarchical character of the international system.  
Nonetheless, discourse is “a concept that can be highly useful to theorise human 
agency” (Bleiker, 2004, p. 13).	 Human agency and intentionality are indispensable 
components of discursive identity construction. “Roland Bleiker has recognised that the 
idea of human agency (to wield power, among other activities) is not actually 
theoretically incommensurable with the kind of sociolinguistic framework that post-
structuralists adopt” (Mattern, 2005, p. 72). Discourses, identity discourses	in particular, 
do not come ex nihilo but they have an interlaced correlation with ideas. There is a sort 
of ‘chicken-egg’ connection between ideas and discourses which hampers the neat 
application of causal mechanisms to them. Discourses simultaneously emanate from 
(passive) and format (active) ideas, and vice versa. Since these ideas and discourses are 
purpose-saturated phenomena which are inseparable from human agency and its 
intentionality, treating discourses as if they come into being out of a vacuum and 
disregarding the intentionality behind them causes deflection and ambiguity which 
impedes a proper theoretical framework on identity construction. The ontological 
essence of discourses is ideas, as constructivism preaches, radiating from the 
intentionality of human agency. Human agency and intentionality issues become more 
important in the national identity construction cases because the discursive role of 
people with power, like political elites, is more obvious and more easily located.  
2.5. Conclusion 
Social constructivism and post-structuralism in IR yield functional theoretical 
tools and mechanisms for analysing the role of national identity construction in 
international politics. However, there are also certain complexities which need to be 
remedied in order to have a better theoretical framework of identity construction for 
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international politics in general and for the Turkish example in particular. The SC’s 
exclusion of domestic politics stemming from the international-domestic dichotomy 
disregards local socio-cultural elements. Its commitment to causal epistemology hinders 
the examination of the constitutive and the mediating role of identity entrenched in 
discursive praxis. These inadequacies cause complications in analysing the ‘national’ 
side of state identities. Dynamic intra-national antagonisms in national self-perceptions 
entail the endogenisation of domestic politics. Therefore, the question of national 
identity in IR demands a post-structural understanding of the constructivist approach. 
The post-structuralist negation of the spatial international-domestic dichotomy 
enables research to be more holistic and incorporate domestic politics into international 
politics. However, the ontological value and priority that post-structuralism ascribes to 
discourses and to the ‘other’ within the self-other throws up some theoretical 
complications. Discourses cannot be treated as ends in themselves because they are 
rather means of ideational ontology. Discourses do not have their own agency and 
historical intentionality per se. Discourses mutually constitute each other with ideas that 
are functions of the human agency. Hence, they should form the epistemological aspect 
of a theory, not an ontological one. This discursive epistemology arises from the 
ideational and intersubjective ontology preached by SC. The ontological priority given 
to ‘the other’ or to differences within identity construction processes potentially 
trivialises the role played by similarities or commonalities reinforcing national identity 
construction. “There is no justification for assuming that the identity of a state can be 
constructed only vis-à-vis other states” (Hopf, 2002a, p. 263) because being the self 
does not necessarily have to originate from the other (Steele, 2008, p. 32).  
Furthermore, the conception of human agency and intentionality are mostly 
disregarded by post-structural approaches. This omission obliterates the possibility of 
intentional human action and subjugates units to the structural limitations of discursive 
webs which has similarities with the more or less deterministic character of the 
structural theories. Nevertheless, since a post-structural constructivist approach would 
bear ideational ontology, it would necessarily assume intentionality of human agency. 
The ontological strength of mainstream constructivism and epistemological advantage 
of post-structural approaches are coherent with their priorities; whereas the former 
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prioritises ontology over epistemology, the latter emphasises discursive epistemology. 
This review of IRT literature regarding the concept of identity is aimed at establishing a 
theoretical gateway to theorise a post-structural constructivist approach in IR. In the 
next chapter, the impact of the national identity construction process on international 
politics is theorised by using a combination of discourse theory and nationalism 
literature along with IRT. Since this work’s main research-based objective is the 
explanation of Turkey’s international relations, this approach is primarily designed in 
accordance with the peculiarities of the case studies which, however, do not eradicate its 
general and modifiable applicability to alternative cases. 














A POST-STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTIVIST FRAMEWORK: THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF DISCURSIVE NATIONAL IDENTITY 
FORMATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The concepts of nation and state constitute an integral totality for international 
politics in the modern era, which cannot adequately be understood without taking one or 
another into account. Rodney Bruce Hall (1999, p. 10) argues that “a more coherent 
theory of international politics must be predicated, in part, on an adequate theory of 
nation-state”. The main and general shortcoming of IR theories is their failure to address 
the ‘national’ side of nation-states. Most studies emphasising the social construction of 
identities and interests within IR theory “do not actually investigate how this occurs, 
focusing instead on the impact of these identities and interests” (Rae, 2002, p. 12). On 
this account, studies on nationalism are useful sources for IR theory because they have 
potential to allow us to understand the links between national identity construction and 
foreign policy preferences, especially in times of paradigmatic changes. Nationalism is 
important for IR because it is “a way of talking and thinking and seeing the world – a 
world made up at one basic level of nations and their international relations” (Calhoun, 
1997, p. 1). Nationalism has a universalistic framework in the sense that it conceives of 
an international world of nations which deem other fellow nation-states as moral equals 
along with national particularities. Although minority nationalisms are a threatening 
phenomenon for the traditional international system, the self-determination principle of 
nationalism is a constituent norm of the modern political world system (Woodwell, 
2007, p. 19).   
The main motive behind external state actions rests on the idea that states pursue 
the interest maximization of their nations as a whole irrespective of whether these 
actions are egoistic or altruistic vis-à-vis other units. Therefore, foreign policies as 
nation-states’ external actions within the international society or system are, in a sense, 
nationalistic behaviours. It is a sort of “banal nationalism” (Billig, 1995) that is deeply 
embedded in social cognitive structures as ‘common sense’ rather than a particularistic 
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ideology. Foreign affairs are not necessarily recognised as a part of an ideological 
nationalistic agenda. They are rather ‘banal’ behaviours and habits in the daily social life 
of states, in which external state actions “cease to appear as nationalism, disappearing 
into natural environment of societies” (Billig, 1995, p. 38). Foreign policies, which 
define/redefine outside-inside, friend-enemy and we-they binaries, are implicit 
instruments of maintenance and reproduction of national identity. Since foreign policy is 
a sort of nationalist performance by definition, it is necessary to look to nationalism 
literature to make sense of foreign policy changes via national identity construction. 
Furthermore, IR theory or external state actions are also related to the theories of 
nationhood and nationalism because “the nation is always a nation in a world of nations” 
(Billig, 1995, p. 61) in which “nationhood is pervasively institutionalised in the practice 
of states and the workings of the state system” (Brubaker, 2009, p. 21). Nations are not 
only constructions of social processes but are also derived “from the political structuring 
of the world-system” (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 80). As Craig Calhoun (1997, p. 93) argues, 
“the idea of nation is also inherently international and works partly by contraposition of 
different nations to each other”.  
This chapter aims to propose a post-structural constructivist framework for 
national identity-international relations nexus through the prism of nationalism and 
discourse theory literatures. It is composed of six sections. The second section begins 
with some conceptual clarifications about the nation and the state. It problematises the 
nation and state dualism by expounding the conceptual interplay between them. Then, it 
delves into nationalism literature in order to pinpoint the most compatible approach 
within the field of foreign affairs. It does not suggest a novel theory of nations or 
nationalism but attempts to situate insights from nationalism literature into the context 
of international relations. The third section begins with defining national identity as a 
discursive formation. Craig Calhoun’s (1997) Foucauldian approach to nationalism is 
applied here. Subsequently, Laclau and Mouffe’s (2014) ‘nodal points’ are incorporated 
into this discursive formation as partially fixed points within national identity 
discourses. The fourth section discusses the role of human agency and discursive ways 
of identity formation. The significance of the locational discourses which flow from an 
identifiable hegemonic centre is demonstrated. The question of why political elites’ 
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discourses are particularly relevant regarding national identity and foreign affairs is 
answered via Foucault’s subject qualifications. The unstable and conflictual character of 
discursive hegemony is explained as an extension of antagonism between historic blocs 
within a national territory. The discursive macro-strategies of political elites/historic 
blocs are put forward as the formative apparatuses of national identity construction 
during relatively stable times. The fifth section lays out a framework for the national 
identity formation – international politics nexus. The non-essentialist/constructed 
character of the concept of ‘national interest’ in IR, which is strictly bounded up with 
the national self-perception, is identified. The discursive contestation and hegemony of 
particularist national self-images of historic blocs are situated within an IR framework 
and the historical narrative of the national-self is linked to the external state actions. 
Finally, it is proposed that national identity discourses are not ‘causes’ of precise foreign 
policies but a medium or conduit which makes certain national foreign policies 
‘conceivable, thinkable or implementable’. The sixth section concludes this theory 
chapter with a brief summary of the main arguments and linkage to the following 
methodology chapter.    
3.2 The Nature of Nations and National Identity  
  3.2.1 IS IT THE NATION OR THE STATE? 
 It is crucial to comprehend the concept of nation as the theoretical starting point 
in order to demonstrate how national identity changes occur. It is hard to define nation 
because it “never functions alone”, but “always as part of a conceptual chain” which is 
“constantly being enriched” (Balibar, 1991a, p. 46). The conceptual complexity and 
opacity of nation and nationalism make national identity a “notoriously slippery 
concept” (Kowert, 1999, p. 4). “National identity and the nation are complex constructs 
composed of a number of interrelated components — ethnic, cultural, territorial, 
economic and legal-political” (Smith, 1991, p. 15). What we understand from the 
concept of nation has been evolving in due course. The nation endures because it is a 
modifiable entity (Kristeva, 1993, p. 5). Therefore, we need to clarify what we 
understand by the term ‘nation’, its relation to the ‘state’ and explain its nature in the 
context of international relations.  
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There is a conceptual tension between the nation as a political association and as 
a cultural community (Breuilly, 1985, p. 65). In many cases, it is really hard to locate 
the frontline between ethnicity/culture and nation owing to the ethno-nationalistic 
discourses. It is also impossible to grasp the formation of national identity without 
exploring its social and cultural matrix (Smith, 1991, p. 71). Nevertheless, a nation does 
not have to be one or another but it is a marriage of these two components. The nation 
can be defined as ‘a politically associated cultural/historical community or 
culturally/historically associated political community’. The nation “signifies a cultural 
and political bond, uniting in a single political community” (Smith, 1991, p. 14). Even 
though the political expression of nationhood is not always equated with independent 
statehood today by contemporary nationalist movements (Sutherland, 2001, p, 3), the 
fusion of will, culture and polity is the norm for nations which cannot be easily or 
frequently defied (Gellner, 2006, p. 54). 
Nations are cognitive and cultural totalities which maintain and perpetuate their 
existence as unitary subjects in the world of ‘nations’ through their political and legal 
status. Anthony Smith (1991, p. 9) argues that “national identity involves some sense of 
political community” implying “at least some common institutions and a single code of 
rights and duties for all the members of the community”. The units interacting with the 
international system on behalf of nations are nation-states or other forms of national 
polities. Walker Connor (1978, p. 382) argues, “The state is perceived as the political 
extension of the nation, and appeals to one trigger the identical, positive psychological 
responses as appeals to the other” although he dismisses this theoretical fusion. This 
knitted usage of the state and the nation is not a delusion or false consciousness but a 
natural result of their intermingled emergence narrative and historical trajectory. As 
people attained civil and political citizenship, the state became their nation-state, an 
“imagined community” (Anderson, 2006) to which they developed loyalties whose 
“power, honour, humiliations, and even material interests came to be sensed as their 
own” (Mann, 2003, p. 74). The concept of nation’s close connection with the state is a 
consequence of its interchangeable usage with citizenship and people who abstractly 
own internal and external national sovereignty. For example, being a part of the Turkish 
nation is defined as equal to being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey in the sixty-sixth 
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article of the Turkish constitution. Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, stated that the 
Turkish nation, unconditional owner of the sovereignty (Tuğrul, 2013, p.78) is those 
people who established the Republic of Turkey (Kılıç, 2007, p. 120) regardless of all 
kind of sub-national differences. Normative objections against this conceptual marriage 
spreading out from the representational rift between national masses and statecraft are 
major problems of democratic theory. In terms of interrelations of national totalities, 
nation-states are legitimate delegates of nations as long as the world order and states are 
able to maintain their stable and coherent existence. 
Nationalist movements or stateless cultural/ethnic groups can perfectly claim that 
they are nations but solely a group’s subjective self-ascription cannot make them a 
subject of international politics until they achieve de jure or sometimes de facto 
existence which provides practical instruments and legitimate diplomatic base for 
conducting their foreign affairs. “A collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated 
territory” needs to have a sovereign and unitary governmental body –not necessarily an 
independent nation-state– monitored by other states to be referred as a nation in 
international politics (Giddens, 1989, p. 116). If a group of people which brand itself as 
a ‘nation’ conduct its foreign relations as a part of another national totality, its claim of 
nationhood becomes irrelevant for the international politics because it is not a separate 
unit that operates in the system with its own agency but another sub-national/domestic 
factor which influences the broader nation’s identity and external state actions. 
Nevertheless, an independent nation-state is not a must for a nation to formally exist and 
interact with other national polities as in the cases of Scotland, Catalonia, Kurdistan etc. 
If a sub/quasi/proto state/polity representing a ‘nation’ conducts its foreign policy (semi-
)independently and becomes a subject of ‘inter-national’ law, system, politics and 
agreements, this political body can be taken as a ‘national’ unit as in the case of Turkey-
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) relations. Likewise, a supra-national 
organisation, as in the case of Turkey and the European Union (EU), might bear some 
hallmarks of a federal/multi-national nation-state which has a similar operative logic 
with the other main actors of the system. These kinds of sub/supra-national groups and 
institutions holding cultural collective identities (e.g. Kurdish and European) enjoy 
state-like but limited recognition, sovereignty, prerogatives, authorisation and functions 
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including the use of legitimate violence. Thus, they can fairly be taken into account as 
nation-state like ‘polities’ operating with their own agencies in the context of 
international politics.  
If we affirm that nation-states and other forms of national polities are the main 
subjects of inter-group relations of the modern world order, the pertinent identity 
becomes the national identity. It is “as a nation with a distinctive national identity that 
people could claim a right to self-determination and to government in their interests” 
(Calhoun, 1997, p. 75). Nation-states and other forms of national polities are not only 
bureaucratic machines but also the identity carrier of these cognitive and cultural 
totalities, namely national societies. The concept of nation is not only a 
political/constitutional construct implying a merely legally bonded totality, as Habermas 
proposes (Habermas, 1994), which is highly connected with the existence of political 
institutions, but also a culturally saturated sociological term including the Turkish 
context. “People are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the 
nation as represented in its national culture” (Hall, 1996, p. 612). The solidarity of 
citizenship, so the political constructs, requires shared myths, memories, symbols and a 
standard language, namely cultural homogeneity (Smith, 1988, p. 136). The main 
function of nationalism as an ideology is the interpellation/constitution of individuals as 
the subject of ‘national man’ (Hatzopoulos, 2008, p. 9) both in legal-political and 
cultural terms. A nation as a social formation only reproduce itself repeatedly through 
the “instituted individual”, homo nationalis, within “a network of apparatuses and daily 
practices” (Balibar, 1991b, p. 93). The formation of this homo nationalis through the 
national identity construction has been the factor widely disregarded by IRT because of 
overemphasis on the state as the operating agent. Dialectical interactions between state 
and national identity can be an object of analysis in another investigation but “so long as 
the nation-state remains the defining actor in international relations, then, investigations 
of national identity must reckon with both the nation and the state” (Kowert, 1999, p. 6). 
Therefore, nation-states’ cultural perception and formation of the national-self is crucial 




3.2.2 WHO ‘IMAGINES’ THE NATION? 
 Nationalism “enforces the eternalisation of a historically constructed 
phenomenon” which is not “actually grounded in ‘the nature of things’” and whose 
existence “cannot be traced at the beginnings of human history” (Hatzopoulos, 2008, p. 
32). The primordialist approach to the nation is used to describe the belief that 
“nationality is a ‘natural’ part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and 
that nations have existed from time immemorial” (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.49). However, the 
claims of naturalness and antiquity are inextricable components of national identity 
discourses as a legitimation tool rather than a scientific approach. John Coakley (2013, 
p. 153) fairly argues that the primordialist approach is an ingredient of nationalism 
rather than a theoretical approach to nationalism because it is “now virtually impossible 
to find a social scientist who openly defends a primordialist position” (Chandra, 2001, p. 
8, cited in Coakley, 2018, p. 327). This outlook asserts that “nations are part of human 
nature, that they can be found anytime, everywhere and that the emergence of a nation is 
often explained as an ‘awakening’ of a dormant entity” (Ichijo and Uzelac, 2005, p.51). 
Primordialist thought subordinates the integral position of states regarding the nature of 
nations because it grants an ontological omnipresence to nations as eternal, self-reliant 
totalities. Hence, primordialism’s priority is the national/cultural community as a 
necessarily existing sociological totality which precedes its political association or the 
state. The attribution of ontological omnipresence and essentialist consistency to nations 
explains away the pivotal role of modern nation-states in the international system. This 
understanding of nation does not provide an appropriate theoretical departure point in 
order to analyse the repercussions of national identity transformation in foreign affairs.  
 The modernist approach argues that nations and nationalism “are the products of 
specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialisation, urbanisation, secularism, 
and the emergence of the modern bureaucratic state” (Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 72). 
According to this understanding, modern states played an important role in the process 
of national revival during the modernisation era in Europe. Since nations are products of 
modernity, they are space and time-bounded constructions which do not have 
essentialist characteristics. This approach explains “the emergence of nation as a result 
of agents’ interests and agendas” which were “unconstrained by previous social 
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structures or cultures” (Ichijo and Uzelac, 2005, p. 13). According to the modernist 
understanding of the nature of nations, political association precedes the cultural 
community, which is only ‘invented’, ‘imagined’ or ‘false consciousness’ as a totality. 
Their approach to the nature and birth of nations seems more consistent with the 
narrative of state-centric modern international system. Even though modernists do not 
necessarily ignore cultural and historical markers or symbols as tools of invention of 
tradition, rigid modernists are prone to consider “the new community of the nation is 
created ab ovo” (Ichijo and Uzelac, 2005, p. 13). However, national identities are 
“imagined in ways that draw on actual shared cultures and histories, rather than being 
merely invented” (Rae, 2002, p. 52). The historiographical narratives rooted in 
alternative interpretations of actual past experiences play a significant role in 
constructing national identities. For instance, the ‘conquest of Constantinople’ by the 
Ottoman Turks in 1453 is an important theme within the conservative-driven historical 
narrative of the Turkish national-self. The historiographical value of this event in 
national identity construction does not make it less real or “invented”. Therefore, a rigid 
modernist position does not enable us adequately to unfold nation-states’ modus 
operandi in the international system via a cultural identity of the national-self. 
Moreover, the claim of ‘false consciousness’ about nationhood and nationalism is 
problematic since the modernist approach accepts that nationalism generates distinct 
national and international effects and impacts on the social field (Rampton, 2010, p. 22-
23). 
Benedict Anderson (2006) defines nation as an “imagined community”. 
According to him (2006, p. 6), nations are imagined because members of even the 
smallest nation “will never know most of their fellow-members”, “yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion”. The “imaginedness” of nation does not mean 
falsity or fabrication – he specifically underlines the organic role of languages – but he 
points out its ‘constructed’ nature as an extension of modernisation processes, unlike 
Ernest Gellner who thinks that nations are artificial inventions of nationalism as “false 
consciousness” even though he admits the necessity of “pre-existing differentiating 
marks” (Gellner, 1965, p. 168). In Anderson’s point of view, newspapers and novels 
“provided the technical means for re-presenting the kind of imagined community that is 
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the nation” (Anderson, 2006, p. 25). Especially newspapers as non-fiction texts talking 
about real world events caused a sense of fictive simultaneity. Mass media has become a 
very important tool for the dissemination of discourses throughout elite milieux and the 
public in the process of cognitive construction process of nations and their identities. 
This is not merely because mass media creates the feeling of concurrence. The 
fabrication of discourses in newspapers through the ‘we’ and ‘others’ binary also 
reinforces the imagined borders of the nation and its identity. Therefore, discourses, 
which spatiotemporally synchronise individuals of a society, play a major role in 
Anderson’s model of national formations.  
 The rise of nations and national identity constructions are not solely random 
social or economic processes of the modernisation age which incidentally ended up with 
the phenomenon of the nation. There is intentional state planning behind the scenes for 
the sake of nation-building as in the cases of the nationalisation of the education system 
and administrative regulations (Anderson, 2006, p.  114). Nations are not autogenous 
cognitive and social structures freed from voluntaristic interventions of their own states. 
Thus, “the issue is not just whether cultural commonalities exist”, but also “how they are 
constructed and reconstructed as they are called into action by leaders and ideologues” 
(Calhoun, 1997, p. 32). Even though national institutions and elites of states do not 
come into being in a cultural vacuum, they have re-formed, framed, interpreted and 
standardised cultural traits that are scattered among cultural communities. This situation 
draws attention to the rational agency of relevant individuals, specifically political and 
economic elites, and state institutions. Their positioning in relation to the national self-
perception has consequential effects on how nations are ‘imagined’. 
Anthony Smith (1988, p. 3), the leading scholar of the ethnosymbolist position 
towards the nature of nations and nationalism, argues that “while we can no longer 
regard the nation as a given of social existence, a ‘primordial’ and natural unit of human 
association outside time, neither can we accept that it is a wholly modern phenomenon”. 
The modernist Ernest Gellner thinks that nationalism as an ideology engenders nations. 
Nevertheless, he admits that “nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited 
proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it 
most often transforms them radically” (Gellner, 2006, p. 54). In that regard, a nation-
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state has always been “a nationalising state” to some degree and to some extent 
(Brubaker, 2009, p. 106) as well as being ‘a nationalised state’. The formation of nation-
states and their identities are a mutually reinforcing process because traditions, cultures 
and self-perception of social totalities are not invented out of nothing but moulded by 
state elites. In other words, the cultural self-understanding of a nation comes into a state 
elite’s hands as a raw material, is processed by them and distributed to people again as 
the final good as in the nation-building process of Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s.  
Existing cultural values and “social cognitive structures” (Hopf, 2002a) set limits 
to political elites. They cannot ‘invent’ a culture but interpret and construct it 
discursively in a certain way. National identity as a social “cognitive structure” serves as 
a point of reference to answer questions about the meanings of entities surrounding the 
subject, that is a medium to perceive the ‘reality’ (Berzonsky, 2004, p. 304-305). Some 
nationalism scholars like John Hutchinson (1987, p. 486) contends that the construction 
of the national-self does not have to be a state-driven project but, “as a distinctive 
historical community”, “can only be re-animated from below” as an organic collectivity 
that is historically shaped by unpredictable social occurrences rather than being an 
artificial invention of modern nationalism or state elites. This cultural self-understanding 
of a national community, as a collective-social cognitive structure which might be a 
product of ethnic characteristics in la longue durée (Hutchinson, 2000, p. 651), may 
challenge a political elite-driven top-down/modernist national identity formation (e.g. 
the Pan-Turkist – culture/ethnicity driven – nationalism in the 1940s was one of the 
earliest resistances against the modernising top-down national identity project of the 
Turkish Republic).  
Likewise, Azar Gat fairly claims that pre-modern states also had national 
qualities. Ethnic properties have always been political in the sense that “ethnicity made 
the state and the state made ethnicity, in a reciprocal and dialectical process” (Gat, 2013, 
p. 3) and “thus, ethnicity has always been highly significant in determining identity, 
solidarity, and political organisation within and between states” (Gat, 2013, p. 5). To 
him, primordial kinship relations played a significant role in the formation of modern 
nations. The modernist Hobsbawm also conceded to the argument that “while 
governments were plainly engaged in conscious and deliberate ideological engineering, 
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it would be a mistake to see these exercises as pure manipulation from above. They 
were, indeed, most successful when they could build on already present unofficial 
nationalist sentiments” (Hobsbawm, 2000, p. 92) and these sentiments embedded in 
social cognitive structures. Therefore, even though they have the leading role in nation-
building processes, the construction of national identity is not a blank check given to 
state elites or politicians because social forces and cognitive structures set limits on the 
extent of their social and political engineering. 
 “The field of cultural production” (Bourdieu, 2004), conventional mass media, 
civil society, contemporary online venues and so on are the other major mediums in 
which the cultural understanding of a national-self is constantly (re-)produced. The 
degree of constructive role played in the production of national self-image by state elites 
or civil society would depend on how much a particular country’s political culture is 
state or civil society oriented. The ‘cultural hegemony’ of a historic bloc might be a 
centre of resistance to a political hegemony or vice versa. The social forces and 
subaltern actors might resist the reproduction of the national identity constructed by the 
state/political elites. This can be observed in the enduring secularist domination of the 
field of cultural production despite the new political hegemony of the conservative bloc 
in Turkey. The politically hegemonic conservative elites of Turkey admitted that even 
though they acquired the political power in the country, they failed to hegemonise the 
social field and the field of cultural production due to the lack of human capital or 
qualified human resources (Hürriyet, 2017d). Nevertheless, even though there are 
always subaltern actors who claim “proximity to the ideological substance of nationalist 
symbols and motifs” (Rampton, 2010, p. 16), since Turkey’s political culture is highly 
state-centred (this is evidenced in its revolutionary state/elite-driven route of 
modernisation and nation-building rather an evolutionary bottom-up process), political 




3.3 National Identity as a Discursive Formation 
 3.3.1 A FOUCAULDIAN ACCOUNT OF DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
Inspired by Michel Foucault, Craig Calhoun (1997) defines nationalism as a 
‘discursive formation’, which is “the group of statements that belong to a single system 
of formation” (Foucault, 2010, p. 107). According to Calhoun (1997, p. 6), nationalism, 
in a discursive sense, is “the production of a cultural understanding and rhetoric which 
leads people throughout the world to think and frame their aspirations in terms of the 
idea of nation and national identity, and the production of particular versions of 
nationalist thought and language in particular settings and traditions”. National identity 
is not out there, waiting to be discovered, but what is ‘out there’ are identity discourses 
(McSweeney, 1999, p. 77). According to Julia Kristeva (1993, p. 43-44), a nation can be 
a totally discursive being, a language act or a symbolic body. “Nations are not simply 
political formations but systems of cultural representation through which national 
identity is continually reproduced as discursive action” (Barker and Galasinski, 2001, p. 
124). Discursive performances produce the culture-driven national identity narratives of 
a state because	 “identities are not merely social constructs” but also “sociolinguistic 
constructs” (Mattern, 2005, p. 71).  
The nation-state is a concept that refers to an administrative institution, but 
national identity, for the purposes of this study, is understood as a form of imagined 
identification with the symbols and discourses used by the nation-state. According to 
Michel Foucault (2010, p. 45), relations between institutions and techniques as non-
discursive ‘primary relations’ are different from discursive formations. Analysing 
discourses is fundamental to revealing the specificity of discursive relations and their 
interplay with extra-discursive terrains. Therefore, state-building is a different field of 
research as a non-discursive sphere than the discursive formation of national identity. 
What is pertinent here is to demonstrate the interplay between state institutions, political 
elites and national identity discourses. If the construction of national identity is regarded 
as a discursive formation, it is necessary to demonstrate regularities of the national 
identity discourses in order to point out the cultural self-identification of the nation-
state. The task is not treating national identity discourses only as a group of signs 
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(“signifying elements referring to contents or representations”), but also “as practices 
that systematically form” the national identity itself (Foucault, 2010, p. 49).  
Nations “exist only when their members understand themselves through the 
discursive framework of national identity” (Calhoun, 1997, p. 99). Hence, it is crucial to 
understand ‘how’ these discursive frameworks are established in order to observe the 
practical horizon of foreign affairs of a nation-state. Nationalism discourse is universal 
in legitimating the modern international system and particularistic in national contexts, 
appearing in miscellaneous guises in various territories. The internal nature of nations is 
varied but “they share a common external frame of reference” (Calhoun, 2007, p. 56). 
Since our aim here is to offer a post-structural constructivist model of the identity-
external state action nexus, the pattern of particularistic discursive formations is relevant 
to this work. This particularity can be applied in alternative settings because the nation-
state system is not holistic but modular, but since this theoretical model is an ideal-
typical construct, it is not the perfect representation of reality by definition.  
Calhoun’s discursive approach to nationalism is especially appropriate today 
since many nation-states’	institutional bases, official symbols and technical aspects have 
already been established. Michael Billig (1995) distinguishes “established nations” from 
others. According to him, “the established nations are those states that have confidence 
in their own continuity, and that, particularly, are part of what is conventionally 
described as 'the West'” (Billig, 1995, p. 8). Nevertheless, being a Western nation is not 
a necessity to be an “established nation”. The institutional establishment of national 
symbols was more pivotal in the nation-state building processes as a transition to the 
system of nation-states or the adoption of principles of this system. However, once the 
technical infrastructure of the state, and national symbols are institutionalised more or 
less, discursive formation or re-formation becomes more applicable in political analyses 
since henceforth what is changing is not mostly institutions itself but discourses on and 
interpretation of these institutions. Nevertheless, it is important to note that being an 
‘established nation’ is not a closure in identity-wise because nationhood is a perpetual, 
dynamic and non-teleological ‘process’. Nation-building is not simply a matter of 
establishing the appropriate institutions which constitute an extra-discursive space in the 
Foucauldian sense but it is a recurrent activity which involves ceaseless re-
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interpretations, reconstructions and refashioning national institutions which can serve to 
the aspirations of the hegemonic social groups (Smith, 1988, p. 206). Although national 
institutions are also subjected to transformation or demolition, national identity 
discourses which give meaning to these institutions are more amenable to change 
depending on alternative perceptions of the very same national identity by different 
historic blocs in a society.  
Calhoun (2007, p. 164) argues that “all identities are in some degree chosen in 
competition with other possible ways of forging personality and social ties”. In that 
sense, nation-states and construction of their identities are inherently open-ended and 
incomplete projects which are maintained and transformed discursively	(Doty, 1996, p. 
6). “Identity is an identification process, not an identity condition” (Mattern, 2005, p. 
38) because there is not an ultimate national identity but a hegemonic one for an 
unknown but limited time period. The linguistic construction of national identity is by 
definition inexhaustible (Balibar, 1991b, p. 98). National identity discourses consist of 
both the impossibility of ultimate closure and the fact of partial fixation (Doty, 1996, p. 
45). Smith (1988, p. 212) similarly argues, “nations are not static targets, to be attained 
once-for-all”, that “they are processes, albeit long-term ones”, and that “these processes 
of mobilisation and inclusion, territorialisation, politicisation and autarchy are never 
concluded and always subject to redefinition in each generation”. National identity as a 
discursive formation is flexible and fluid and thus contingent. A discursive formation 
does not “freeze time for decades or centuries”, but it determines a temporal regularity 
of discourses and “presents the principle of articulation between series of events, 
transformations, mutations and processes” (Foucault, 2010, p. 74). The contingency of 
discursive national identity formation can be a consequence of volatile domestic and 
global structural settings and/or ideational contestation – and political as an extension of 
it – on the cultural content of a national identity.	 Research on transformation in 
structural settings might bestow on us the ways to understand ‘why’ a certain discursive 
formation takes place rather than an alternative one within the pertinent unit or why it 
occurs in a specific time. For instance, a structural and institutional analysis of Turkish 
domestic politics can answer the question why the Justice and Development Party’s 
(AKP) national identity discourses dominated the Turkish political landscape in a 
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particular time period. Nevertheless, in order to understand paradigmatic changes in the 
behavioural patterns of a nation-state in the international system, it is necessary to 
explain ‘how’ national identity is constructed discursively. 
3.3.2 NODAL POINTS IN THE DISCURSIVE FORMATION OF NATIONAL 
IDENTITY 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2014) reject the Foucauldian dichotomy of 
discursive/non-discursive spheres. To them, identities and every object are relational and 
constituted as an object of discourse. There are not total exteriorities or interiorities of 
the social totalities because “in order to be totally external to each other, the entities 
would have to be totally internal with regard to themselves: that is, to have a fully 
constituted identity which is not subverted by any exterior” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 
p. 97). They argue that all identities are relational since they are “achieved by 
differentiation from other identities rather than by reference to any positive 
characteristics” (Norval, 2000, p. 328). However, ‘the other’ is also not a stable fixity, in 
the same way as ‘the self’. Thus, the construction of the self cannot rely on an essential 
and steady other. They are mutually formed in a volatile field of discursivity. Yet, to 
Laclau and Mouffe, there are still “nodal points” which are the privileged discursive 
points of partial fixations. “Any fixing of a discourse and the identities that are 
constructed by it can only be of a partial nature” because it is “the overflowing and 
incomplete nature of discourses that opens up spaces for change, discontinuity, and 
variation” (Doty, 1996, p. 6).  
Nodal points enable us to locate the partially fixed discourses which are 
constituted as an “attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of 
differences, to construct a centre” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, p. 98-99) and to 
hegemonise a content, which amounts to fixing its meaning around a nodal point 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 28). Mouffe (1999, p. 317) argues, “this dialectics at nonfixity/fixation 
is possible only because fixity is not given beforehand, because no center of subjectivity 
precedes the subject's identifications”. If a discursive formation is a regularity in a group 
of statements whose objective is becoming the hegemonic discourse on a subject’s self-
identification, nodal points can be considered as partially fixed clusters of statements 
63	
	
within this formation. In other words, discursive hegemony around nodal points 
constitutes a discursive formation within the relevant domain, such as the national 
identity of a certain people. In that sense, a nodal point can be operationalised as a sub-
category of discursive formation because the consistent unification of different, partially 
fixed nodal points is the objective of a discursive formation. Regular statements 
coalesce around nodal points, constituting a single system of discursive formation. 
Claire Sutherland (2005) takes the nation as a nodal point which is rearticulated 
by nationalist ideology in a hegemonic fashion in order to construct the nation. Even 
though the nation or national identity itself can be deemed a nodal point around which 
“identities were fixed, ‘knowledge’ was produced, and subjects were positioned vis-à-
vis one another” (Doty, 1996, p. 42), research on the discursive formation of a national 
identity entails situating nodal points within this interminable formation process. Just as 
“‘the body’ is a nodal point around which many other meanings are crystallised” in 
medical discourses, ‘the people’ in national discourses or ‘democracy’ in political 
discourses	(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 26), there are different nodal points within 
national identity discourses. Nodal points are more durable and fixed in relation to 
discursive formations although “the primacy of a specific nodal point is always 
temporary” (Smith, 2003, p. 98) because whereas nodal points are battlegrounds which 
are waiting to be conquered, discursive formations are ideological opponents which can 
be deconstructed and reformed generationally. For example, the struggle between neo-
conservatism and social democracy centres on the nodal point of 'freedom': neo-
conservatives emphasise that the welfare state is against the individual ‘freedom’, while 
social democrats stress that the individual ‘freedom’ must be based upon the equality of 
economic opportunity (Zizek, 1989, p. 96). Nodal points within the discursive formation 
of a national identity need to be detected in order to demonstrate how a Turkish national 
identity was discursively reconstructed between 2002 and 2017 and how it has affected 
the change in its international relations. Discourses over the national nodal points will 
show us the cultural self-identification of the Turkish nation-state, and the international 
relations of the Turkish national identity will be examined through those nodal points 
within this discursive formation.  
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“Some unusual discursive formations may tend to be organised around a single 
and relatively stable nodal point”, but “most will be organised around a complex 
constellation of multiple and shifting nodal points” (Smith, 2003, p. 98). Smith (1991, p. 
14) argues that “a national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be 
reduced to a single element” and that it cannot, thus, be organised around a single nodal 
point. Since there are not any quantitative or measurable ways of locating nodal points, 
they need to be ideal-typical theoretical assumptions based on subjective categorical and 
analytical constructions. One can identify different nodal points within a discursive 
formation of national identity from the ones identified in this work. Therefore, the 
national nodal points which are going to be presented here are not exhaustive but open 
to expansion or replacement with others. Within Turkish national identity discourses, 
three main nodal points are identified around which statements amalgamate regularly to 
form a single discursive system: These are the (1) Ethnic/cultural nodal point, (2) 
Civilisational nodal point and (3) Governmental nodal point. Discourses around these 
nodal points give us insights into the cultural self-identification of the Turkish nation-
state and how it positions itself in relation to other units in the international system. 
These nodal points derived from the Turkish case study might be generalisable for some 
other countries and national identities, but they can be substituted by alternative key 
nodal points depending on the peculiarity of another case. Moreover, the discursive 
frontiers of these nodal points are not solid but statements can flow from one to another. 
For instance, a statement on a governmental nodal point might refer to statements 
converging around the civilisational nodal point as in the discursive link between 
“democracy” and “Western civilisation”.        
(1) Ethnic/Cultural Nodal Point 
The distinction between ethnic and political identities often disappears because 
there is a dynamic oscillation between ethnic and political identities (Ratuva, 2005, p. 
188) as in the Turkish case. National identity as a kind of political identity is intensively 
informed by ethnic identities. Socially defined ethnic characteristics and cultural values 
are resourceful bases to construct political national identities. The claim of national 
sovereignty for a group of people within a given territory is rooted in the claim of 
ancientness and continuity. Just as the ethnosymbolist and some modernist nationalism 
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theories argue, the historical records of ethnic pasts and self-defining cultural values 
provide a legitimation tool for the discursive formation of national identities by nation-
states. “It is impossible to dissociate national discourses entirely from ethnicity” but “it 
is equally impossible to explain it simply as a continuation of ethnicity” (Calhoun, 1993, 
p. 235). Ethnic and cultural discourses are means of social differentiation which have 
the potential to challenge and deconstruct existing national identities as well as being a 
constitutive instrument of the very same national identities. “Ethnicity is a matter of 
cultural differentiation and identification” which “always involves a dialectical interplay 
between similarity and difference” (Jenkins, 2008, p. 14). It is commonly accepted that 
ethnicity and culture, as social categories and totalities, have been “constructed during 
some identifiable period in history” (Hale, 2004, p. 461). They are ontologically 
different concepts than national identity since their existence is not necessarily relying 
on the ideational ground because ethnicity mostly refers to more primitive communities 
which are also objects of analysis in the anthropology discipline. Ethnic groups are able 
to perpetuate themselves without voluntaristic interventions from outside (a state) or 
intergroup social interactions. Identifying the self with an ethnicity and taking part in a 
collective action on behalf of this ethnicity are sometimes signposts of a ‘national(ist) 
movement’ whose aim is the discursive formation of a culturally distinct group as a 
nation. Such consciousness might lead people to discursively construct their social 
group as a ‘nation’ rather than an ‘ethnicity’ which can be regarded as an intentional 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Paul Brass (1991, p. 20) points out that “nations may be created by the 
transformation of an ethnic group in a multiethnic state into a self-conscious political 
entity or by the amalgamation of diverse groups and the formation of an inter-ethnic, 
composite or homogeneous national culture through the agency of the modern state”. In 
that account, it can be argued that there are two universal taxonomical courses of talking 
about the national-self in terms of ethnic/cultural nodal point: Multi-ethnic/cultural and 
mono-ethnic/cultural. Statements coalescing around ethnic/cultural nodal point might 
define the national-self as either a unity of heterogeneous plurality or a monistic 
homogenous body. Even though most nation-states are de facto polyethnic/multicultural, 
statements on the ethnic/cultural nodal point generally form the national identity through 
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the medium of the ethnic core, called “the dominant ethnie” by Anthony Smith (1991, p. 
39). “Dominant ethnicity refers to the phenomenon whereby a particular ethnic group 
exercises dominance within a nation and/or state” (Kaufmann, 2004, p. 2). National 
identity construction processes, using the cultural characteristics and historiography of 
the dominant ethnie as the discursive source, perceive and present the nation as mono-
cultural/ethnic, and attempt to assimilate the peripheral ethnic cultures into the 
mainstream. “The culture of the new state's core ethnic community becomes the main 
pillar of the new national political identity” in the dominant ethnie model (Smith, 1991, 
p. 110).  
A national identity can also be formed through multi-ethnic/cultural discourses 
over the ethnic/cultural nodal point. The national identity can be conceived and 
discursively formed as a coalition of ethnic groups or unification of cultural groups on 
the same national identity as a political common ground. In this mode of formation, 
ethnic/cultural references do not disappear but are diversified or subordinated. Monistic 
discourses on the ethnic/cultural nodal point might be replaced by a pluralistic one over 
time, or vice-versa, as a consequence of historical developments, drastic interruptions 
such as military coups, revolutions, insurgencies, mass immigration etc. or power shifts 
between elite groups. For instance, the dominant ethnies, which attire nation-states with 
an ethno-cultural outfit, “have recently come under pressure from liberal-multicultural 
norms and global migration” (Kaufmann and Haklai, 2008, p. 763). This situation also 
pushes nation-states to discursively reconstruct their identities in a more pluralistic 
fashion. The temporal fixity of statements is the ethnic/cultural nodal point itself, not 
how to speak about it, and thus the mono-multi dichotomy on this nodal point is not 
stable but always open to challenges, re-interpretations and re-formations. Turkey, as the 
country of the analysis, is one of the examples which has undergone such 
transformations in national identity discourses over the ethnic/cultural nodal point and 
has begun to identify itself in more pluralistic terms regarding ethnicity and culture 
during the last decade. In other words, the multi-ethnic/cultural Turkish national identity 
discourses have begun to hegemonise the field of discursivity by repressing the monistic 
discourses and incorporating “peripheral ethnies” (Smith, 2004) with regard to the 
ethnic/cultural nodal point.  
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(2) Civilisational Nodal Point 
Even though the concept of civilisation “is one of those great Stonehenge 
figures looming over our mental landscape” (Mazlish, 2004, p. 160), there is no 
consensus on a fixed and precise definition of it owing to “the plurality of meanings and 
intellectual legacies” (Hall and Jackson, 2007, p. 2). In the context of intergroup 
relations, the concept of civilisation is a way of talking about a collective identity in a 
proud fashion in order to distinguish them from inferior ones (Elias, 2000, p. 7) as in the 
example of the mission civilisatrice – as ‘the White Man’s burden’ – which “has 
contributed in a decisive way to moulding the modern notion of the supranational 
European or Western identity” (Balibar, 1991a, p. 43). The word civilisation clearly 
carries normatively positive connotations representing something valuable and superior, 
and so necessarily discrediting the other as inferior, as well as being a neutral and vague 
self-identification category which could be used as analytical or descriptive ideal-types 
to formulate general theoretical conclusions about human behaviours and human 
societies (Goudsblom, 2006, p. 289-291). The pertinent form in our case is the later one 
in spite of the fact that civilisational self-identifications generally implicate a boasting 
practice.  
Civilisations, as a social scientific category, are simply “distinct societal-cultural 
units which share some very important, above all cultural, characteristics” (Eisenstadt, 
2001, p. 1916). Since the concept of civilisation is a means of self-identification, self-
other and the inside-outside binary relations come into play. Even though borders of 
civilisations are sometimes drawn in an essentialising way, boundaries separating 
civilisations are not solid, impermeable and clear-cut but are always subjected to 
redefinition (Huntington, 1996, p. 43). The essentialist approach divides “the world into 
mutually exclusive communities characterised by deep-essential differences” (Hall and 
Jackson, 2007, p. 1). However, civilisation is “an amalgam of certain coherent social 
forces and ideas” which continually change and develop, and thus civilisations are 
contested spheres of inter-subjectivity which reside “in the mind rather than on the 
ground” (Cox, 2002, p. 143 cited in Hall and Jackson, 2007, p. 5). Huntington (1996, p. 
43) argues, “civilisations are the biggest “we” within which we feel culturally at home 
as distinguished from all the other “thems” out there”. However, this broader “we” than 
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the national/cultural self is not something as materially determinable and stable as the 
nations which often have their states and polities. Civilisations are nebulous and almost 
entirely an ideational construct manifesting itself within identity discourses.  
Patrick Jackson argues that civilisational identities, as larger, older and superior 
ones, trump merely national ones (Jackson, 2007, p. 46) because nations are nested in 
supra-national civilisations (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996, p. 47-51). However, 
civilisational self-identifications are nested in the singularity of national identity 
discourses due to the fact that civilisational identities would only be able to exist as long 
as individual nations desire to discursively sustain them through political elites, popular 
imagination or the actors of cultural and scientific production. In that sense, discourses 
of civilisational identities are integral parts of discursive formation of national identities, 
which constitutes the civilisational nodal point in our theoretical framework. It is 
because there is a partial fixation of statements on civilisational self-identification 
within national identity discourses. These fixations do not grant us the so-called 
essential characteristics or frontiers of civilisations but their narrational 
operationalisation of them by nations in a broader discursive context of the self-other 
binary. Discourses on national identity almost always invoke civilisational references in 
order to situate the national-self interior to a broader cultural category which relates the 
self to others as well as in contrast to some in the international system. The concept of 
civilisational identity provides a particular interpretive framework to an identity-centred 
mode of explaining world politics in the era of globalisation (Bettiza, 2014, p. 6), which 
helps us understand how agents locate their identities in broad, transnational, 
transtemporal cultural identities and provides a powerful resource for framing identity 
and interests which influence the interaction patterns of units (O’Hagan, 2007, p. 16-19). 
The accumulation of identity discourses on the civilisational nodal point help distinguish 
both the national-self from others and the right from the wrong (Katzenstein, 2010, p. 
12), which directs the actions of states as nations’ political agents by virtue of 
civilisation’s moral connotations (Bettiza, 2014, p. 10). Civilisations do not have an 
agency themselves since there are not unified representative polities or actors in the 
international system operating on their behalf but, they are cultural and discursive 
contexts through which nation-states conceive themselves (Jackson, 2007, p. 33).  
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These clusters of statements around “civilisation” are specifically pertinent to 
the “torn countries” (Huntington, 1996) like Russia (Akhiezer, Klyamkin and 
Yakovenko, 2006; Tsygankov, 2008) or Turkey (Duran, 2013; Atay, 2013) with regard 
to foreign policy preferences because a supposedly deep cultural chasm among domestic 
populations precipitates oscillations in external state actions. Therefore, the 
civilisational nodal point within a discursive formation of national identity is highly 
relevant to this work. It has been widely argued that a renewed discourse of civilisation 
has been employed by Turkish political elites in the last decade (Duran, 2013; Yeşiltaş, 
2014), who envisioned a more Islamised Turkish national identity than a westernised 
one (Saracoglu and Demirkol, 2015). This new mode of discursive formation intensified 
identity discourses around the civilisational nodal point and attempted to reformulate 
them. Therefore, the old hegemony over the field of discursivity has been challenged, 
which makes our theoretical framework well-adapted to the Turkish case.  
(3) Governmental Nodal Point 
Government types and state identities such as being liberal, democratic and 
socialist, and their specific versions like welfarist democracy, democratic socialism and 
secularist republicanism are mostly not considered as part of national identity discourses 
because of the assumption that what defines a nation is its sociological presence, which 
makes culture and civilisation more relevant than a particular model of governance. The 
question of how a nation governs itself is detached from the identity of this nation. 
However, as in the ethnic/cultural and civilisational aspects, this question is also 
germane to national identity construction in many cases because the form of self-
governance is one of the factors which distinguish the national-self from others. 
Anthony Smith (1992, p. 60) argues that “the possession by all members of a unified 
system of common legal rights and duties under common laws and institutions” is a 
dimension of a national identity. The implementation course of this unified system is 
necessarily part of national self-identification because the universal dissemination of 
certain models of political and economic governance that are affiliated with the national-
self can be part of the political purpose of a nation (Clunan, 2009, p. 31).  
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National internalisation of a certain state model or a political ideology is 
competent to create international self-other binaries as in the most important example of 
the Cold War in which the “free” world distinguished itself from the nations behind the 
iron curtain. Governmental type can be considered as nations’ habitual practice or 
lifestyle in the political sense. How nations govern themselves is one of the 
qualities/properties making them what they are. Furthermore, political models can 
sometimes have cultural connotations as in the examples of ‘Islamic law (sharia)’, 
‘liberal values’ or ‘socialist culture’. Thus, discourses on national governmental types or 
their moral and practical merits of them are intertwined with a nation’s cultural self-
identification. Since preferred government types are an extension of the political culture 
of a nation, governmental discourses are also a way of talking about the national culture. 
Almond and Verba (1989, p. 11) state that political culture is not same as “the national 
character”, but that political culture as a discursive practice influences political 
performances (Kidwell, 2009) and informs national self-identification.  
The role and pertinence of political values in national identity discourses vary 
across the world. Emphasis on a government type is not an indispensable constituent of 
national identity discourses. They are more salient and relevant for some nations than 
others. For instance, discourses of democracy and liberal values in governance are an 
integral part of the American (Lipset, 1963, cited in Fukuyama, 2006) and British 
national identities (McCrone, 1997; Parekh, 2000; O’Hagan, 2007, p. 26). The rise of 
Taiwanese national identity consists of democracy discourses helping to distinguish it 
from the identity of the People’s Republic of China (Hwang, 2007; Shen, 2013). The 
project of creating “New Soviet Man” as the multi-ethnic national identity of USSR – 
along with the clear cultural Russian domination – mostly depended on the construction 
of socialism at home, which enabled the Soviet Union to posit its national-self in 
opposition to the capitalist, imperialist other (Hopf, 2002a, p. 75-85). The question 
arises as to how to locate the governmental discourses of nations which do not have an 
independent state. National movements or nations in the making aiming for a sort of 
political recognition or a fully independent nation-state sometimes ideologically adopt 
political models and values as in the instances of the socialist tone of the anti-colonial 
nationalist movements or Irish republicanism.  
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These discourses about political self-governance or government and regime type 
as an extension of culture to the political realm constitute the governmental nodal point	
within the discursive formation of national identity. The assemblage of irregular 
statements around the governmental nodal point might be seen as inconsequential for 
Turkish politics since ethnic/cultural and civilisational discourse seems to overwhelm 
the field of discursivity. However, a more diligent and closer review of discursive 
materials has the potential to highlight the significance of the governmental nodal point 
within the discursive formation of Turkish national identity. Republicanism and 
secularism are defined as natural concomitants of Turkishness in its early republican era 
because the discourses of republican and secular Turkish national identity were a ticket 
for acceptance by the West and a way of situating the national-self within the Western 
civilisation (Glyptis, 2007, p. 18). In a famous video recording4 addressing the 
American nation in 1925, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk states that “the Turkish nation is 
democratic by nature”, which qualifies democracy as immanent to Turkish national 
identity. The transformations in the Turkish political system and discourses about it 
during the last decade have initiated debates about the transition from secularist 
republicanism to majoritarian democracy (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010) as part of 
governmental self-identification. Therefore, the formation of Turkish national identity 
must be subjected to discourse analysis with regard to the governmental nodal point. 
3.4 Agency in National Identity Formation 
3.4.1 LOCATIONS IN DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
Hitherto the concept of nation has mostly been treated as if it has its own 
personality because nationalist thoughts always contain an assumption of human agency 
which is attributed to the nation (Hall, 1999, p. 68). However, even though the agency 
resides in the nation-state within the international system, the nation is not a conscious 
entity per se. The nation-state is a giant empty vessel that is filled according to the 
preferences of pertinent actors. One cannot explain or theorise change without 
presuming and locating the human agency or taking it as constant because 
																																								 																				




transformations in national identities and international politics are results of intentional 
actions of relevant agents. Human agency is immanent to discursive formations as in the 
rest of other intentional human performances. An identity “lasts only as long as authors 
keep authoring it, sharing it with others, and collectively believing in it” (Mattern, 2005, 
p. 9). Therefore, there is a necessity to determine relevant agents in the process of the 
discursive formation of national identity.  
A discursive formation is not random speeches bundled up together incidentally 
but performative utterances (Austin, 1962) or speech-acts (Searle, 1971) stemming from 
ideas and shaping them as common sense. The location where those regular statements 
emerge from is crucial because the subject of discourses is decisive in whether they are 
perceived as noteworthy or repugnant to the public. Focusing only on ‘discourse’ begs 
the question of the location of discourses and the relationship between agents and social 
structures because discourse can only ‘frame political action’ (Gagnon, 1996, p. 31) if it 
has a way of resonating for at least a significant section of the population (Rae, 2002, p. 
44). The locational discourse means that discourses in certain field disseminate from 
identifiable institutional sites or individuals like hospitals and doctors for medical 
discourses. In order to analyse a discursive formation, it is necessary to weigh the value 
of statements. This does not reside in their accuracy and “is not gauged by the presence 
of a secret content”, but rather by their location, “their capacity for circulation and 
exchange” and “their possibility of transformation” (Foucault, 2010, p. 120). According 
to Foucault (2010, p. 50-55), there are three factors that we need to clarify in order to 
discover the law operating behind all diverse statements and weigh the value of them. 
Firstly, (1) the identity of the subject has to be identified in terms of status in order to 
know if the subject is qualified or prestigious enough to make such ‘true’ statements. 
For instance, the status of medical doctors enables them to talk about health owing to 
their presumed competence and knowledge. Secondly, (2) it is essential to describe the 
institutional sites from which the subject speaks. It is the hospital or other medical 
institutions which makes the discourses of doctors more relevant than any other 
institutional site. Lastly, (3) the positions of the subject within the pertinent situation 
have to be taken into account. The subject must be the sovereign, direct questioner, the 
observing eye, the touching finger etc. for the medical example.  
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Political elites bear these three subject merits	 to a certain extent, depending on 
the post that they hold. For Ernesto Laclau, since politics have primacy and political 
articulations determine our actions and thoughts and thereby how we create society 
(Laclau, 1990 p. 33, cited in Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 34), political elite 
discourses are very important. These subject properties are not impeccable and justified 
by the whole populations. However, all-inclusivity of the public is practically 
impossible and epistemologically irrelevant for the discursive approach in which the 
field of discursivity is hegemonic and thus agonistic, not consensual. Henrik Larsen 
(1997, p. 26) argues that focusing on political elite discourses is epistemologically 
incorrect for the discursive approach because discourse is not a locational concept. 
However, Foucault heeds the locus where discourses ‘disperse’ because it contributes to 
specifying regularity behind discursive multiplicity and contradictions. “Everyone does 
not have equal access to all discourses. For instance, television news reports often 
incorporate comments from non-journalists, but some commentators are accorded 
‘expert’ status and make statements with authority that clearly embody truth-claims. 
Others are positioned as ‘ordinary people’, their comments framed as ‘opinions’, not 
truths” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 142). Discursive locations are various, and all 
of them can be subjected to a scientific analysis in different theoretical frameworks. 
Discourses flowing from newspaper editorials, op-eds, novels, artistic performances, TV 
programmes, academic works, official history books, contents of curricular education, 
etc. can perfectly be the alternative venues of discourse analysis as well as the verbal or 
written discourses of political elites. However, the subject qualities of these locations 
vary and hinge on their relevance to the particular case of analysis which is international 
politics in this work. The political elites in Turkey relatively more capable to address 
these qualifications, because Turkey’s highly politicised, ideologically polarised and 
state oriented society increases the value of political elite discourses comparing to less 
politicised, consensual and civil society oriented societies. 
3.4.2 POLITICAL ELITES AND SUBJECT QUALIFICATIONS 
(1) The Status of the Subject 
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Political elites are qualified and prestigious enough to make supposedly ‘true’ 
statements on national identity because the national representative status of elected 
politicians, the technocratic merits of national bureaucrats or historical and ceremonial 
allegiance to their inherited positions (monarchs) enables them to be perceived as having 
competence and knowledge on the question of who ‘we’ are as a nation. What matters is 
not the actual, personal and technical capabilities of political elites in terms of their 
competence and knowledge, but how they are perceived from the social environment in 
which they are embedded. Discourses of political elites are regarded as newsworthy by 
the media, as trustworthy by followers, and reliable and credible by the general public 
due to social hierarchy seeming “to be reproduced in the rhetorical hierarchy of 
credibility and reliability” (Van Dijk, 1988, p. 87). The acquired status of political elites 
accredits them with the perception of competence because elected politicians are 
approved by the public itself, appointed bureaucrats are ‘experts’ (as in the doctor 
example) in the service of the nation and the inherited elites represent historical 
continuity and the unity of nations.   
It might be argued that political elites’ level of credibility is dubious in different 
societies. This credibility can be challenged for two main reasons. Firstly, there are 
alternative self-images within national identity discourses which are not compatible with 
the hegemonic discourses of dominant elites. Even though hegemonic political elites’ 
discourses on the national-self are not credible for the antagonistic historic bloc within a 
society, the alternative historic bloc has its own political elites who contribute to shaping 
their distinct image of the national-self. This is the reason why national identity has 
ideational ontology, and a discursively constructed and contested nature, not an 
essentially fixed character. Secondly, the corrupted image of politicians might damage 
their reliable status and diminish political trust. This perception is not germane to the 
national identity question because corruption allegations are related to the personalities 
of politicians as individuals but not with the posts/status they hold. Consistent and 
legitimate public trust resides in the official posts and status, not in the individuality of 
political elites. In the Turkish case, the widespread corruption allegations against the 
AKP elites starting from 2013 did not meaningfully diminish the political trust of their 
constituency and conservative bloc in Turkey since they perpetuated their representative 
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power through electoral means in the following years and kept institutionalising their 
hegemony.   
(2) The Institutional Site of the Subject 
The second qualification attributed to the subject by Foucault is the institutional 
sites through which they speak. Political elites are not only popular characters who have 
the potential to lead public opinion but they also possess official entitlements depending 
on the institutional site to which they belong. The nation-state is the most important 
institutional site for the discursive formation of national identity because “the state 
moulds mental structures and imposes common principles of vision and division” of 
national identity via various means like bureaucratic procedures, educational structures 
and social rituals (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 7-8). Governments, parliaments, political parties 
and bureaucracies are deeply involved in the discursive practices of policy debates 
concerning national identity (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 49). Even though literary figures, 
public intellectuals, think tanks or other sorts of subjects are involved in the same 
debates, the democratic endorsement (elected) or implicit consent (appointed/inherited) 
given to existing politicians buttresses the power of political elites’ discourses.  
The state’s administrative authority and sovereignty, and the highest 
organisational legitimacy within society make individual discourses of political elites, 
who speak from the inside of the state, more cogent than those speaks from the outside 
of it. A president can be a “conceiver and strategist of the national discourse, who 
creates realities by means of symbols” (Kristeva, 1993, p. 75).  A head of a state is 
expected to address issues as the national ‘preacher’ and a kind of voice of the nation in 
both domestic and international settings by promoting sameness and harmony of the 
nation (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 2009, p. 72). Discourses become 
hegemonic only if they are transformed into the dominant policy discourse and action by 
political authorities (Buonfino, 2004, p. 30). Subjects who speak on behalf of the nation-
state from the state’s institutional site are officially the most capable and entitled ones to 
do so. Since political elites are part of the discursive formation of national identity from 
the inside of the most authoritative institutional site, namely the state, their agency 
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within national identity discourses is more determining and significant than other 
actors’. 
(3) The Position of the Subject 
Lastly, Foucault points out the importance of the position of the subject. 
Although literature, films, newspaper editorials, novels, academic writings, public 
debates etc. are parts of the discursive formation of national identities and can be an 
object of the analysis of identity and external state action nexus (Hopf, 2002a), 
discourses of political elites are more relevant especially when it comes to changes in 
foreign policy preferences. This is because political elites not only lead the discursive 
formation of national identity but also make policies, take decisions and determine 
interests on behalf of the national identity which they play an important part in 
conceiving and constructing. “Politico-hegemonic articulations retroactively create the 
interests they claim to represent” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, p. xii). If a head of a state 
or a prime minister gives a political speech within an international environment, it is not 
just that particular person speaking but symbolically and bindingly the whole nation 
through her or his lips. Political elites have this legitimate representative role especially 
in the case of foreign affairs. They have entitlements to speak on behalf of the state and 
so the nation.  
Political elites dominate the field of discursivity by using state apparatuses and 
deriving legitimacy for their particularistic discourses on the national-self from the 
prevalent legitimacy of the state. This positional legitimacy merges with the entitlement 
of taking and making decisions on foreign affairs in the international system. In this 
sense, it can rightfully be argued that political elites have ‘the policymaker’ position as 
well as that of ‘the discourse maker’ with regard to the international politics of national 
identity. This position in this particular case – external state actions – empowers the role 
of political elites as the subject. In addition to these three subject qualities, “political 
figures may show up anywhere, at any time, doing anything, without being thought odd, 
presumptuous, or in any way out of place. Which is to say, they have become 
assimilated into the general television culture as celebrities” (Postman, 2006, p. 132). In 
other words, “politicians become stars, politics become a series of spectacles and the 
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citizens become spectators” (Street, 2004, p. 441, cited in Wodak, 2011, p. 19). One of 
the reasons behind this sort of omnipresence of politicians is that “broadcasting 
technology has obviously transformed the nature of political communication by enabling 
politicians to air their views before a much larger audience than ever before” (Atkinson, 
1984, p. xiii.). Public opinions “are jointly constructed by political elites and diffuse 
audiences from” the published (or broadcasted) opinions and polled opinion statistics 
(Habermas, 2006, p. 417). These new and wide broadcasting opportunities generate the 
same sense of simultaneity among citizens as Benedict Anderson’s newspaper example 
for the earlier days of nation-states (Anderson, 2006). Discourses flowing from political 
elites have a great potential to lead other subjects, such as intellectuals, artists, novelists, 
newspaper editorials, bureaucrats etc., in the process of discursive formation as well as 
vice-versa. 
3.4.3 NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES OF ANTAGONISTIC HISTORIC 
BLOCS  
“Identity construction is a political project, where states distinguish the ‘we’ as a 
basis for social action” (Steele, 2008, p. 30). National identity is the answer to who ‘we’ 
are as a nation. “‘We’ is constructed and re-constructed infinitely via discursive praxis 
despite nationalists would claim that national identity is categorical and fixed” 
(Calhoun, 2007, p. 86). This claim of fixity is part of the discursive formation of 
national identities. However, it would be false to see the discursive formation of national 
identity as an attempt for “totalitarian periodisation” whereby everybody would 
conceive of national identity in the same way during the given time span (Foucault, 
2010, p. 148). “At particular historical moments, certain discourses can seem to be 
natural and can be relatively uncontested”, “but the naturalised discourses are never 
definitively established” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 47). The discursive formation 
of national identity “is an open process which depends on multiple hegemonic 
articulations” within a given space at the same time (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, p. 131). 
The nation is not a closed or finalised entity but is always potent with new meanings 
through new contestations that challenge the modernist model of national identity 
(Rampton, 2010, p. 21-22). National identity is subjected to a constant contention 
between alternative images of the relevant community. There are infinite discursive 
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possibilities for talking about 'us' and 'them' (Billig, 1995, p. 87). The struggle over 
national identity between opposite social and political poles is mainly discursive, 
specifically for the ‘established nations’, since they have already passed, more or less, 
the ‘nation-building’ phase and have sufficiently operating national institutions as a non-
discursive field.  
There is a confrontation between historic blocs’ alternative and antagonistic 
national identity discourses in order to hegemonise the cultural self-identification of a 
nation-state. There is a competition to create new meanings and new frames for action 
based on identities even though “actors inevitably draw, albeit selectively, on elements 
within the existing cultural repertoire” (Rae, 2002, p. 45). The field of discursivity 
contains a “wide range of mutually [antagonistic] nationalising stances adopted by 
differently positioned” organisations, parties, movements, or individual figures within 
and around a single state (Brubaker, 2009, p. 65). These antagonistic national self-
images of historic blocs are conceived as alternatives to each other and aim to transform 
the meanings ascribed to the national identity. Furthermore, a change is possible if the 
lines of contestation between various discourses are allowed to an extent that enables a 
discursive shift (Diez, 1999, p. 606). Therefore, the contestation between multiple 
national identity discourses become more pertinent and have a better transformation 
capability within the countries having accessible public spheres in which discourses can 
be circulated.  
Ideational socio-political camps, understood as Sorel and Gramsci’s “historic 
blocs” or Laclau and Mouffe’s “subject positions”, might have and represent manifold 
national self-images. These national self-images are substitutable, even though they use 
the same nation-state framework and have overlapping points in their national visions. 
The political elites of distinct historic blocs “may advocate a particular vision of who 
'we' are, and what 'we' should be like; but they are not creating the 'we', nor the 
homeland in which 'we' locate 'ourselves'” (Billig, 1995, p. 103). The ‘identity’ of a 
subject is always contingent and “dependent on the various subject positions through 
which it is constituted within various discursive formations” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 318). 
These social and historical blocs have their intellectuals, artists, bureaucrats, 
businessmen etc. whose discourses can also be subjects of analysis. “The hegemonic 
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discourse functions as the political ‘glue’ that holds the historic bloc together as it stands 
in opposition against its enemy bloc” (Smith, 2003, p. 165). National identity “depends 
upon the process of formation and maintenance of hegemony” (Balibar and Wallerstein, 
1991, p. 4). Historic blocs also (re-) produce themselves in opposition to their 
antagonistic bloc(s) through the discursive means of self-other binary.  
There is also an active interaction between the represented (the public) and 
discourses	of representatives (political elites)	on national identity which is a discursive 
field of contention to be the hegemonic discourse. The public’s ideational preferences of 
the public tacitly limit or broaden politicians’ discourses because they want to maintain 
popular legitimacy. State actors feel that they must justify and explain their actions in 
the forum of public to secure their discourses’ legitimacy (Lynch, 1999, p. 39). A 
discursive formation of national identity should be accepted by the public, at least, 
implicitly, because even the liberal principle of national “daily plebiscite” (Renan, 1997) 
does not actually refer to regular voting but rather to the public’s implicit consent to the 
relevant identity. As Habermas (2006, p. 418) argues, “from the viewpoint of responsive 
governments and political elites, considered public opinions set the frame for the range 
of what the public of citizens would accept as legitimate decisions in a given case”. 
Even though politicians have discursive conduits to transform the national identity, they 
need to be responsive to the social cognitive limits set by the public when they intend to 
change national identity discourses. These social cognitive structures embedded in the 
society level broaden or narrow down discursive possibilities and interventions of 
political elites. For instance, the Turkish Islamic elites’ short-lived attempt to use the 
word ‘Türkiyeli (from Turkey)’ as a replacement of ‘Türk (Turkish)’ as a linguistic 
signifier of ‘Turkish citizens’ mostly failed since it did not widely resonate in the public 
and civil society.  
The existence of “rival cultural repertoire” (Hutchinson, 2005, p. 5) within a 
national society makes the political elites responsive to social forces and subaltern 
actors. Therefore, political elites’ voluntaristic interventions into national identity 
discourses are not entirely unbounded by embedded social cognitive structures which 
might be either an outcome of ‘supposed’ ‘organic’ historical collective memory or 
shaped by previous hegemonic national identity discourses. However, still, the social 
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field’s restrictive role is not free from the discursive formations since non-political 
social actors/forces like scholars, novelists, poets, columnists, artists, various public 
figures, ordinary citizens and subaltern actors are also co-producers of discourses 
depending on their ideological positions and affiliations; thus, their ‘agency’ may ally 
them with a national historic bloc. Social cognitive structures are not organically fixed 
conditions stemming from the historical experiences of cultural/ethnic groups that 
unconsciously determine the form of national identity. They are also receptive to 
intentional rhetorical manipulations and consistent discursive interventions. In the 
context of the political elites’ interactions with the subaltern actors and national masses, 
political elites can be “best seen both as shapers of specific public opinions and 
interests, and as seismographs, that reflect and react to the atmospheric anticipation of 
changes in public opinion and to the articulation of the changing interests of specific 
social groups and affected parties” (Wodak, 2001, p. 64).  
3.4.4 STRATEGIES OF DISCURSIVE NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION 
In democratic countries, political elites are free to convey their own national 
identity narratives and attempt to unsettle entrenched national identity formation but 
they have to take a possible public backlash and resistance into account. A discursive 
structure is a 'cognitive' or 'contemplative' entity as well as an ‘articulatory practice’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, p. 82). The limits of the national identity construction carried 
out by political elites embedded in the horizon of societal cognitive structures: “Every 
society is bounded by a social cognitive structure within which some discursive 
formations dominate and compete” (Hopf, 2002a, p. 1). According to Anthony Smith 
(1988, p. 18), pre-modern ethnic roots and histories set limits to elites attempting “to 
manipulate and mobilize populations in their strategies of national construction”. 
However, ethnicity or history is not an ‘objective’ category in itself to limit national 
identity construction because they are also constructions themselves. “The ‘rediscovery’ 
or ‘invention’ of history is no longer a scholarly pastime; it is a matter of national 
honour and collective endeavour” (Smith, 1988, p. 148). Therefore, contemporary 
cognitive preferences of existing populations are what draw discursive borders for 
political elites rather than the ‘objective’ category of ethnicity or ‘invented’ history. 
Such ‘objective’ categories are “themselves fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous” 
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(Hobsbawm, 2000, p. 6). The historical records of ethnic pasts are also subjected to 
multiple and flexible interpretations because although there are archaeological proofs or 
archives for the study of history, discursive usage of these elements are also dependent 
on political preferences. Some authentic events or personalities in history can be 
intentionally disregarded or distorted while some are prioritised on behalf of ideological 
agendas. Political elites’ selective historical references are instrumental components of 
the discursive formation of national identity in order to capture nodal points within it.  
The inventors and promoters of the hegemonic project of national identity 
formation need to shape the cognitions and values of people in order to seek their 
political purposes (Lustick, 2002, p. 27). Political elites can transgress cognitive limits 
but such an enterprise entails diligent and evolutionary effort because it is hard to 
deconstruct the old, venerable and hegemonic national identity discourses which have 
turned into common sense among a significant part of the public. In times of 
institutional stability, hegemonic national identity discourse is likely to endure relative 
to times of crises (Clunan, 2009, p. 40). “Typical events that generate profound changes 
in the cultural contents of such identity include war and conquest, exile and 
enslavement, the influx of immigrants and religious conversion” (Smith, 1991, p. 26). 
Identities are prone to shift primarily during moments of crises and “unsettled times” 
(Mattern, 2005), when they lose their ‘taken for granted’ quality (Lynch, 1999, p. 12). 
Besides, legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1992) might also be a reason behind 
fundamental changes in existing national self-identifications. However, an institutional 
crisis is not necessary to reformulate an identity, because national identity can be 
constructed via well-calculated and rigorous discursive macro-strategies by political 
elites in the absence of such consequential events. The discursive formation of national 
identity entails taking “strategic actions” (Habermas, 1989). Discursive strategies are 
employed by political elites in order to seize the meanings of nodal points within the 
national identity discourses which, then, enable them to govern the trajectory of state 
actions both domestically and internationally. The transgression of existing cognitive 
limits via discursive strategies aims to “interpellate” (Althusser, 2014) the public into 




3.5 National Identity in International Politics 
3.5.1 NATIONAL INTEREST FORMATION AS AN EXTENSION OF IDENTITY 
 Discourses on “nation and national identity always imply a linguistic 
construction of international differences” (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 114). A nation’s 
perception of the self has implications for its apprehension of other nations as threats, 
allies or irrelevant (Hopf, 2002a, p. 208) and thus it is tightly bound up with 
international affairs. National security, vulnerabilities and threats are primarily a matter 
of the perception of the collective self (McSweeney, 1999, p. 74). “The identity 
narrative brings forth a new interpretation of the world in order to modify it” (Martin, 
1995, p. 13). A new interpretation of the world will necessarily feed the politics of 
national identity within the international system. The concept of ‘national interest’ is a 
crucial mediatory term and a link to capture this nexus between national identity and 
international politics. Since a nation’s identity implies its interests, national interests 
should be derivable from national self-identification which is embedded in social 
cognitive structures (Hopf, 2002a, p. 16). If the definition of interests depends upon the 
articulation of national identity, a theory of identity formation is necessary in order to 
understand how interests are acquired from this identity (Lynch, 1999, p. 10).  
National interests cannot be defined without a sense of national identity because 
sub-national interests like commercial or non-national ethnic interests would otherwise 
dominate the field of external state actions of a given society (Huntington, 2004, p. 102). 
Discourses on national identity are used for all citizens of a country as a whole and 
attempt to encompass sub-national and sectional categories within a nation. “The idea of 
nationality is a sort of trump card in the game of identity” (Calhoun, 1997, p. 46). 
National interests of any nation-state within the international system are tightly bound 
up with the formation of its national identity which unearths “the country’s political 
purpose and international status” (Clunan, 2009, p. 3). An existential foreign policy 
crisis which threatens the survival of the self is not always a fact but a political act of 
national interests constructed by political elites in order to reproduce national identity 
because these are mutually constitutive (Weldes, 1999, p. 219-223). 
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Identity-based arguments in world politics claim that specific behaviours are 
associated with certain identities taken for granted (Crawford, 2002, p. 25). The 
empirical conditions of the outside world and material capabilities of rival units are 
always subjected to the individual interpretation of nation-states. Therefore, national 
interests do not necessarily stipulate a predetermined or predictable behaviour in a given 
condition and thus external state actions cannot straightforwardly be derived from 
identified national interests. National interests cannot be the object of rational 
determination without defining what is ‘national’ for a country because there is no 
collective action which can be defined scientifically as a consequence of plurality in 
political goals and outside factors (Aron, 2003, p. 285). National interests are not 
mechanical calculations which presume an essentialist vision of needs and desires, and 
fixed meanings but they include national and cultural values which are “intangible 
national interests” and so important to the sense of who ‘we’ are (Nye, 2002, p. 139). 
National self-understandings influencing state behaviours “cannot be explained solely 
by recourse to the prescriptions of rational instrumental action” (Hall, 1999, p. 27). 
Therefore, the diagnosis of national interests as the mental impetus of external state 
actions is contingent and, so, constructed depending on the perception of the national-
self.  
3.5.2 POLITICAL ELITES, SELF-IMAGES AND DISCURSIVE 
CONTESTATION 
The state and its elites “play a special role in constructing the meaning of 
national interests quite simply because identifying and securing the national interest” is 
their business (Weldes, 1999, p. 108). National interests are not something we can find 
in nature as they are, but are discursively and mutually constructed via political elites’ 
formation of the national-self. National interest is constructed “as a meaningful object, 
out of shared meanings” and representation of international context by political elites 
(Weldes, 1996, p. 277). National interests are discursive constructions which legitimise 
external state actions from the angle of the national identity formed by political elites 
because national identity defines societal needs and desires as well as how it relates 
itself to the world (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 147, cited in Weldes, 1999, p. 10). National 
interests are not defined through the national-self as an extension of monolithic and 
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coherent raison d’état which is considered as “the state’s first law of motion” 
(Meinecke, 1962, p. 1) but as part of ‘contested’ discursive formation of national 
identity. Russell Hardin argues that political identity can strategically be chosen from 
the menu of possible identities of “the multiple self” (Elster, 1995) in order to maximise 
interests (Hardin, 1995, cited in Lynch, 1999, p. 14). However, if we accept such a claim 
as valid, there should still be a core and coherent understanding of the national-self on 
which interests are erected and that uses other alternative identities subsequently 
depending on interests defined in line with a particular vision of national identity. Even 
though nations are inclined to act in the international system according to their interests, 
those interests are not “assigned by the omniscient objective observer” (Hopf, 2002a, p. 
18). 
According to the theory of “aspirational constructivism” developed by Anne 
Clunan (2009), national identities and interests are historical aspirations as well as 
intentional constructions of political elites which impact behaviours of states within the 
international system. She argues that different groups of political elites (historic blocs in 
our study) propagate various “self-images” of national identity, or the historical self-
perception of a nation, that compete with each other to define ‘the’ national identity and 
thereby determine national interests and external state actions. According to Clunan, one 
of the alternative self-images of the national-self overrules other interpretations and 
becomes ‘the’ national identity as the legitimately presentative self-image. She argues 
that national identities are products of political elite debates and she presumes an 
ultimate consensus on a form of identity in a temporal frame. She assumes a space of 
rational deliberation or persuasion like the Habermasian public sphere (Habermas, 1991) 
or Dahl’s hegemony which “could refer to the predominance of a particular consensual 
understanding of a certain reality” (Dahl, 1971, cited in Hopf, 2002b, p. 406). Marc 
Lynch (1999) also has the same understanding of consensual national identity 
production through public deliberation and persuasion in an accessible public sphere in 
his international theory of the public sphere. Clunan’s example is the Russian elite 
consensus on the ideas that Russia’s historical past is a culturally distinct civilisation 
destined to be separated from Europe and the great power status of Russia (Clunan, 
2009, p. 59, 107).  
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However, the assumption of consensual national identity formation is not valid 
for many cases like Turkey. The hegemonisation of the field of discursivity is not 
consensual but agonistic, conflictual, dominating or suppressive (Mouffe, 2009, 2013) 
vis-à-vis antagonistic discourses about the national-self, even though the tools of this 
domination and suppression vary from the discourse of ‘political correctness’ to brute 
force. The field of discursivity is ambivalent and oscillating, and thus constant 
contestation is immanent to its ontology. It is “an always contested and shifting field of 
play in which nationalism is always in a process of becoming and never in that sense a 
fait accompli” (Rampton, 2010, p. 23). Temporal discursive fixity over the meanings of 
ethnic, civilizational and governmental nodal points is not a closure even within the time 
span of hegemonisation by a certain self-image of the national-self. There is never a 
discursive rigidity stemming from a rational consensus on national identity even in a 
temporary fashion, but the hegemonisation of the field through appropriation of nodal 
points within the national identity discourses for a certain amount of time which 
includes antagonistic discourses concurrently. The alternative/antagonistic self-images 
or counter national identity discourses do not disappear but are side-lined or made 
subaltern by the hegemonic national identity discourses. The existence of alternative 
self-images within national identity discourses is also endorsed by Clunan (Clunan, 
2009, p, 29-30) but her periodisation of discourses (putting them in a timescale) and her 
subordination of discursive resistance to the hegemonisation of the field of discursivity 
presupposes the irrelevance of perennial contention within the discursive formation of 
national identity and external state actions. The assumption of a rational consensus 
relying on political elite debates presumes absorption of contestant discourses into the 
hegemonic one in a deliberative way. 
The discursive formation of national identity depending on subject positions 
among political elites is not only contingent on the external others (other nations, 
civilisations, cultures etc.) but also internal others which are representatives of 
alternative self-images (Hopf, 2002a, p. 10). Antagonistic political elites/historic bloc(s) 
who also perpetually challenge the hegemonic formation of national identity, not for 
‘emancipation’ but in order to dominate the field of discursivity themselves, are 
sometimes portrayed as ‘the fifth column’ or ‘collaborators’ of external others/enemies. 
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While the discursive formation of national identity creates national differences with 
others within the international system, it also creates others inside, or international 
sameness discourse excluding people inside (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 188). Therefore, a 
historic bloc’s formation of national identity would not seek a consensus with the 
antagonistic ones but hegemonise the field of discursivity that would broaden or narrow 
down the toolset of possible external state actions. The consensual understanding of the 
national-self and thus foreign policy would eclipse the role of hegemonic power shifts 
between historic blocs on external state actions. 
3.5.3 HISTORICAL IDENTITY NARRATIVE AND EXTERNAL STATE 
ACTIONS 
Political elites do not approach international politics with a tabula rasa but they 
are “thrown” (Heidegger, 2001) into the pre-existing structure of world politics. Jutta 
Weldes states that political elites “approach international politics with an already quite 
comprehensive and elaborate appreciation of the world, of international politics, and of 
the place of their state within the international system” (Weldes, 1999, p. 9). According 
to Clunan (2009), history shapes the aspirations of political elites in the national interest 
construction process because history shapes individuals’ identity preferences and 
historical legacies influencing these aspirations are an integral part of national identity. 
However, since history mostly functions as a discursive construction and is a matter of 
interpretation itself, it cannot be treated as if it has its own agency to lead political elites 
to a predictable direction in international politics. Historical aspirations are not 
themselves independent variables but instrumental and mediatory rhetorical devices 
because “every nation needs a ‘usable’ past” (Hopf, 2002a, p. 55). Historical 
appropriateness of a national self-image does not reside in history itself but in 
historiography as a constructed narrative at political objectives’ behest. Political elites 
instrumentalise historiography in their discursive strategies in order to define nodal 
points within national identity discourses consonantly with their subject positions.  
“History as that which ‘actually happened’ is nothing apart from history as ‘our 
accounts’ of these events” (Ringmar, 1996, p. 28) that only have meaning in a context of 
narrative, because language is not a tool of signification of ‘reality’ but “a practice 
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through which people perform ‘reality’ into existence” (Wittgenstein, 1958, cited in 
Mattern, 2005, p. 71). History cannot be taken as the ideational limits for the formation 
of national identity since that it moulds and is moulded by political elites’ ideological 
perceptions of national self-images. “An historical drama that gives us our identities and 
values, must do two things: it must define the entity or unit of which it narrates the 
drama; and it must direct the entity or unit towards a visionary goal.” (Smith 1988, p. 
182). National histories are collective beliefs which are not “contingent on the presence 
or availability of supporting evidence” (Lustick, 2002, p. 24). Therefore, instrumental 
and rhetorical usage of history in the formation process of national identity has a 
discursive ontology which is historically and ideologically contingent because a 
particular national identity formation privileges some historical memories over others 
and prescribes what states can and should do in a historical context (Clunan, 2009, p. 
36).  
Success or failure of a discursive formation of national identity does not reside in 
congruence with objective history or historicity but in social cognitive structures 
influenced by subjective, instrumental and discursive historiography in aid of capturing 
nodal points. Therefore, since historical memory is a social and discursive construction, 
the applicability of certain external state actions is not dependent on historical 
aspirations but on how these actions are put and signified in a historiographical context 
of the discursive formation of national identity. Clunan (2009, p. 42) also argues that the 
practicality/efficiency or success/failure of external state actions depending on a certain 
self-image of the national-self is a parameter for the domination of particular national 
identity discourses. However, the practicality or efficiency of external state actions as 
the praxis of the national identity within the international system is a matter of 
interpretative performance. A failure of an international venture or initiative can 
perfectly be construed in discourses as an inevitable and indispensable moral 
responsibility of the national identity rather than deficiency of a certain perception of 
national identity because the national-self is a moral construction (Campbell, 2001b, p. 
106). National identity might compel states to pursue actions that are seemingly 
irrational but honourable or non-shameful that provides the “ontological security” to the 
national-self because external state actions should be congruent with the self-
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identification even if those actions are counterproductive in an economic or security 
sense (Steele, 2008, p. 3).  
The diplomatic isolation which Turkey has faced during the Syrian Civil War 
was discursively constructed as “valuable solitude” by the hegemonic political elites, for 
instance. They imputed the consequences of their Syrian policy to the ethical superiority 
of the hegemonic understanding of the Turkish national-self which ascribes itself 
“historical responsibilities” within the post-Ottoman regions. Nevertheless, the political 
elites who represented the opposing, the pro-western oriented self-image of Turkish 
national identity defined the situation as a “middle east quagmire” which was not a 
justifiable situation for this perception of the national-self. These interpretations fit with 
how these opposite poles define the civilisational nodal point within national identity 
discourses. Abortive external state actions can be justified as a higher moral purpose of 
the legitimate national identity (Lynch, 1999, p. 93) or can be deemed as a deviation 
from it. Critical situations in international politics can discursively be constructed in a 
strategic way in order to locate the situation within the narrative of the self (Steele, 
2005; 2007). However, these actions would only be purposeful for the intersubjective 
web of meanings within the pertinent national society (Steele, 2008, p. 26) because 
“behaviour has no meaning at all outside of discourse” (Doty, 1996, p. 25). The 
consequences of external state actions, regardless of whether the society practically 
suffers from it or benefits, will gain a positive or negative meaning according to how 
they are situated within the national identity narrative. 
The domination of the field of discursivity enables hegemonic agents, political 
elites in this case, to interpret and represent even the aftermath of failed external state 
actions as noble ordeals which need to be shouldered because the national identity 
sometimes demands it. Besides, political elites might also be slaves of their discourses 
on the national-self when it comes to external state actions because their audience, the 
nation, as a moral community may shame and shackle them (Steele, 2008, p. 54-56) if 
they do not act consistently with the national identity. Political elites might be pressured 
from below by societal norms of nationalism (Woodwell, 2007, p. 6). Social cognitive 
dissonance caused by incongruence or lacuna between the discursive formation of 
national identity and external state actions is sustainable only to some extent. For 
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instance, a possible political crisis between Turkey and Azerbaijan would not be 
sustainable for long and would cause social cognitive dissonance unless Turkish 
national identity discourses are changed considerably and systematically since these two 
countries are always discursively framed as “one nation, two states” by Turkish political 
elites. Hence, the success or failure of external state actions is not a criterion of the 
discursive formation of national identity, but rather how successfully they are 
contextualised within the national identity narrative.  
 3.5.4 FROM CAUSALITY TO ‘CONCEIVABILITY’  
Ted Hopf (2002) rejects intentionality or rational deliberation in the discursive 
formation of national identities and thus human agency per se. According to him, even 
though national identities as discursive formations constitute social cognitive structures, 
these identities cannot be manipulated or formed intentionally and strategically. Rather, 
they are routine, repetitive, habitual and customary (Hopf, 2002, p. 3-4). For instance, he 
argues that Russians’ rejection of their Soviet past in a variety of texts, including high 
school textbooks, novels, monographs, film reviews and newspaper articles, did not 
spread from a certain location or through particular intentional, strategic planners (Hopf, 
2002a, p. 160). In this point of view, national identity is a habitus (Bourdieu, 1990) 
entrenched in social cognitive structures within “the lifeworld” (Habermas, 1989) which 
is experienced unconsciously depending on everyday reproduction of the national-self 
and other via unintentional and unthinking actions. Social cognitive structures give 
meaning to certain performances like external state actions. Otherwise,	in the absence of 
such structures, meanings would have to be continuously renegotiated (Hopf, 2002a, p. 
23).  
Even though Hopf’s social cognitive and discursive approach, which can be 
meta-theoretically counted under the category of post-structural constructivism, offers 
convenient tools to explain paradigm changes in external state actions as an extension of 
the discursive formation of national identity, his omission of strategic intentionality in 
national identity construction makes his argument problematic. This is especially 
apparent in the case of Turkey due to the exclusion of adversary historic blocs’ and 
political elites’ deliberate competition over capturing nodal points within national 
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identity discourses. In culturally ‘torn’ countries like Turkey (Huntington, 1996), the 
intentional actions of subjects in order to form the national identity depending on 
sectarian perspectives are more salient and easier to observe and thus discourses are 
more locational – spread from identifiable locations – than other countries. In addition, 
since meanings are subjected to ceaseless discursive renegotiation and temporally 
hegemonic in a limited given time and space, social cognitive structures do not have 
secure meanings independent from discursive interventions. Since social cognitive 
structures are products of discursive formations in the case of national identity, 
stemming from intentional human agency and also set borders to discourses of political 
elites, there is an interminable mutual constitution in operation, specifically in the case 
of political elites as intentional actors. 
Nonetheless, Hopf does not offer a causal storyline to argue that certain 
understandings of the national-self lead to particular external state actions, but he 
suggests another epistemological approach to analyse relations between national identity 
and international politics. According to him, the function of rhetorical deployments is, 
then, to ‘naturalise’ particular social arrangements and subject-positions from which 
courses of action appear acceptable (Jackson, 2007, p. 44; Hopf, 2002b). By that he “has 
sought to unravel the ‘thinkability’ and ‘logicability’ of what is possible in the 
construction of identity and one’s interests” (Seabrooke and Bowden, 2006, p. 211). 
This differs from Anne Clunan’s and structural constructivists’ causal narratives of the 
national identity and international politics interface. Language defines the range of 
possible utterances and hence the range of possible actions because discourses enable 
the actor to conceive and undertake actions (Yee, 1996, p. 94-95). According to Derrida, 
the dominant signifier of discourses that occupies the centre of a discursive structure 
makes the structure possible and limits it (Derrida, 1978, p. 352, cited in Doty, 1996, p. 
33). For Foucault, discourse constructs, defines and produces objects of knowledge in an 
intelligible way while at the same time excluding other ways of reasoning as 
unintelligible (Foucault, 1973, cited in Barker and Galasinski, 2001, p. 12). Social 
cognitive structures govern social contexts which make the operations of actors 
intelligible and particular social practises thinkable (Hopf, 2002a, p. 14-15). The cultural 
self-identification of a nation is “both those shared meanings and values which provide a 
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framework for action and practices through which, over time, agents remake their own 
social and cultural context” (Rae, 2002, p. 47). In that sense, the discursive formation of 
national identity does not make particular external state actions necessary or inevitable 
but it makes them conceivable for the national-self in a specific socio-political context.  
For instance, a pro-Islamic self-perception of Turkish national identity would not 
escalate tensions with Israel, which is one of the most demonised countries in Islamist 
discourses, as an unavoidably determined practice but it would make such disagreement 
conceivable in terms of the national identity. Defining the civilisational nodal point in a 
more pro-Islamic fashion would make virulent policies towards Israel eligible, not 
inexorable. Likewise, the approximation of different self-identifications of states does 
not automatically cause rapprochement between states, as in the example of the Soviet 
Union’s relations with Yugoslavia, which were both Slavic-majority and socialist, or the 
People’s Republic of China. A common Arabic and Islamic identity do not necessarily 
make those countries friends or foes because ‘the closest others’ might be the biggest 
threat to the national-self (Hopf, 2002a, p. 265; Darwich, 2014). The discursive 
formation of the national-self in a particular way makes certain perceptions of others in 
world politics possible (Hopf, 2002a, p. 261) but not inescapable because “saying that 
something could happen is not the same as saying that it will happen” (Jackson, 2011, p. 
111).  
Nonetheless, the replacement of causality with “conceivability” does not make 
discourses epiphenomenal because they are central to making the practices of particular 
foreign policies implementable (Doty, 1996, p. 48). Discourses maintain “a degree of 
regularity in social relations” which produce “preconditions for action” (Neumann, 
2008, p. 62) since discourses are the medium for social actions in the extra-discursive 
lifeworld. An investigation into the discursive formation of national identity asks ‘how’ 
questions rather than ‘why’ questions. “‘How’ questions examine how meanings are 
produced and attached to various social subjects and objects, thus constituting particular 
interpretive dispositions that create certain possibilities and preclude others” (Doty, 
1996, p. 4). “‘Why’ questions generally take as unproblematic the possibility that 
particular policies and practices could happen” and “presuppose the identities of social 
actors and a background of social meanings” (Doty, 1996, p. 4). Hence, this research 
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into the international politics of Turkish national identity construction aims to reveal 
‘how’ the new discursive hegemony made the significant foreign policy changes 
towards the selected units ‘conceivable, thinkable or implementable’.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 Nationalism literature is a rich resource to begin with in order to offer an 
identity-driven explanation of foreign policy transformations since external state actions 
are anchored in national self-perceptions. If we affirm that nations are the main subjects 
of inter-group relations in the modern world order, the pertinent identity becomes the 
national identity. This chapter attempted to build a post-structural constructivist model 
of this national identity-international politics nexus which endegonised domestic politics 
into an international relations framework. Nationalism literature was explored in order 
to determine a valid and theoretically appropriate approach towards national identity 
construction in relation to international affairs and the discursive approach was preferred 
as the most explanatory model for the fluid nature of identity.  
The national-self can be designed and re-interpreted repeatedly through 
discursive (re)formation. What is relevant in the national self-identification is how 
people perceive themselves cognitively because national identity is not inherited through 
genes or by birth but rather by cultural environment and discursive webs in which 
people are embedded. Therefore, the compatibility of various discourse theories with the 
national identity formation was discussed and an eclectic perspective was adopted. Since 
the self-understanding of nations are not static but open to an endless transformation, the 
dynamic framework of discourse theory provides a better conceptual tool-set to theorise 
national identity changes within international settings. National identity construction 
was identified as a discursive process in which complementary nodal points reside. 
Ethnic/cultural, civilisational and governmental nodal points were spotted within 
national identity discourses, which will be junctions for linking Turkish national identity 
to its external state actions in the case studies.  
Human agency immanent to change in national identity discourses is attributed 
to the political elites of historic blocs within a society because they are both discourse 
and foreign policy producers. Their subject qualifications make their position highly 
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relevant to the objective of this research. Political elites realise the goal of national 
identity formation by hegemonising the field of discursivity through discursive 
strategies. These will be analysed in the case of Turkey in order to reveal their interplay 
with foreign policy actions and discourses.	 Political elite discourses are not merely 
neutral signifiers of ideas but also speech-acts which construct reality around us. Even 
though there is one nation-wide ‘hegemonic’ discursive formation within a given space 
and time, there will always be alternative national self-images of the antagonistic 
historic bloc(s) to construct the national identity discursively on the same spatiotemporal 
plane. National identity discourses do not create consensual hegemony into which every 
individual of a society is entirely interpellated. There are almost always challenging 
discourses. This hegemonic national identity formation does not only construct the 
national-self in a pre-social manner but also situates the nation-state into a certain 
international context through a historical narrative of the present self which informs its 
external actions in the system.  
Nevertheless, discursive transformations in national identity do not guarantee or 
cause precise external state actions but rather, they make them conceivable. The 
discursive formation of national identity is not a stimulant or stipulation of specific 
external state actions but a social cognitive horizon which demarcates the mental 
frontiers of conceivable policies. It sets, broadens or narrows down the horizon of social 
cognitive structures which enables certain foreign policy actions to be implemented. 
This is parallel with the ontology of discourses which is not necessarily a ‘cause’ but a 
‘medium’ for actions. National identity discourses condensed around partially fixed (1) 
ethnic/cultural, (2) civilisational and (3) governmental nodal points make some specific 
external state actions towards relevant units within the system conceivable in terms of 
social cognitive structures. In this regard, what will be claimed and investigated in this 
work is that the discursive formation of Turkish national identity by political elites of 
the conservative historic bloc between 2002 and 2017 made certain external actions of 
the Turkish state conceivable. In order to do so, after presenting the strategies of Turkish 
national identity discourses, the nexus between external state actions and statements 
concentrated around these three nodal points will be exemplified by linking them to 
Turkey’s relations with three different units of analysis (sub-national: KRG / supra-
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national: EU / national: Egypt). The next chapter is dedicated to building a 
methodological framework as an extension of this post-structural constructivist model. 
The methodology chapter is directly interlinked with the theoretical framework 
























 This chapter aims to link the post-structural constructivist theoretical framework 
to the empirical data. Its principal objective is to provide an applicable methodology to a 
post-structural framework generally deemed as epistemologically or methodologically 
anarchic. The second section discusses the meta-theoretical/philosophical foundations 
of the research’s methodology, which flows from its theoretical framework. It also 
unpacks the main concepts of discourse and discourse analysis. After this transitional 
and theory-driven section of the methodology, the third section presents specific 
methods as the technical instruments of empirical research. The procedural 
configuration of methods is divided into two phases: Data collection and analysis. The 
data collection sub-section shows the discursive plane in which speeches and texts are 
pursued and located and identifies the relevance parameters of texts and speeches. The 
data analysis sub-section presents the specific analysis techniques which help to narrow 
the gap between abstract theories of discourse and empirical data. It introduces Ruth 
Wodak’s discourse-historical approach and the discursive strategies and how these were 
applied in this study as a roadmap for this research. The sub-section also reveals the 
positionality of the researcher and case studies. The fourth section finalises the chapter 
with a brief summary and concluding remarks. 
4.2 Meta-Theoretical Foundations and Discourse Analysis 
According to Hollis and Smith (1992, p. 1), there are two main scientific 
traditions in IR: positivism and interpretivism. The positivistic (outsider) approach 
operationalises the empirical social research like in the natural sciences aiming to 
provide explanations and predictions. The interpretivistic (insider) approach aims to 
clarify what international events mean which is distinct from unearthing the ‘laws of 
nature’. As Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2011) argues, the former assumes a dualist 
position which isolates the researcher from nature in a Cartesian way between who 
knows (thought) and what is known (things), as if the knowing subject is not part of the 
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same nature and can reach fully ‘objective’ results. The latter takes a ‘monist’ position 
which accepts that the researcher is embedded in the environment which it investigates; 
so, pure ‘objective’ scientific knowledge is impossible (Jackson, 2011, p. 36). 
Intepretivist approaches to social research, which reject dualism, might also offer 
explanations and predictions but in a ‘perspectival’ and indeterministic way which 
concedes to the methodological premise that “the social sciences cannot be to neutrally 
reflect an externally existing world” (Jackson, 2008, p. 147) and must embrace its 
‘partial’ character. Post-structural approaches, including this study, mainly take a 
monist/interpretivist position that avoids “the thing/thought dichotomy altogether, 
concentrating instead on those practical (worldly) activities that give rise to both ‘things’ 
and ‘thoughts’” (Jackson, 2008, p. 133) and that dismisses the universal objectivity 
claim by acknowledging its perspectival nature. 
The justification for practical choices in empirical social research resides in its 
methodology anchored to its ontological and epistemological premises. The research 
sequence “runs from ontology (…) to epistemology (…) and only then methodology 
(…)” (Jackson, 2011, p. 26). Patrick Jackson (2009; 2011, p. 190) argues that “the 
abandonment of a quest for universal foundations should place an obligation scientific 
researchers to be more explicit about their philosophical commitments, so that readers 
can better appreciate the basis on which subsequent knowledge-claims are advanced”. 
The discipline of IR is still under the sovereignty of positivistic/structural/realist 
approaches which sideline interpretivist and post-structural approaches by characterising 
them as lacking proper methodology (Klotz and Prakash, 2008, p. 2). However, there is 
no universal consensus on the criterion to recognise what is ‘scientific’ in IR (Jackson, 
2011, p. 11). Discursive approaches have emerged as a critical movement against the 
imposition of mainstream research programmes which, at least in the beginning, did not 
propose a systematic approach or programme for scientific inquiry. Yet, it later started 
to produce its own alternative systematic, scientific research agenda and paradigm 
(Miliken, 1999). When it comes to research on national identities and interests and their 
linkage with external state actions, discursive approaches become more relevant 
(Wæver, 2002) because language is “a crucial means by which the world is historically 
and socially (re)presented and (re)constructed” (Yongtao, 2010, p. 92). “Language 
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‘makes’ rather than ‘finds’ and representation does not only ‘picture’ the world but also 
constitutes it” (Barker and Galasinski, 2001, p. 29). 
 “In language, there are important connections among saying (informing), doing 
(action), and being (identity)” (Gee, 2011, p. 2). Identity is “a process, as a condition of 
being or becoming, that is constantly renewed, confirmed or transformed, at the 
individual or collective level” via discourses (Wodak, 2011, p. 13). Hence, discursive 
practices cannot be taken for granted as merely a neutral tool for communication, “an 
independent instrument or simply a mechanism for description” (Edelman, 1984, p. 45). 
Since this work’s theoretical framework has taken ‘a’ – not ‘the’	 – post-structural 
constructivist stance, which combines an idealist ontology with a discursive 
epistemology in order to generate an alternative explanation for the paradigmatic change 
in Turkey’s international relations, discourse analysis is used in accordance with its 
meta-theoretical position. The meta-theoretical position of post-structural constructivism 
argues that it is possible to be a constructivist without scientific realism or 
epistemological positivism and to be post-structuralist without a total scientific and 
ontological relativism. Since there is not a particular ‘constructivist methodology’ 
(Jackson, 2011, p. 205) and post-structuralism rejects ‘empiricism’ – though it does not 
reject empirical research (Shapiro, 1984a, p. 11) – post-positivist/interpretivist and 
qualitative methods of discourse analysis become relevant for a post-structural 
constructivist study. Succinctly, post-structural constructivism combines an ideational 
ontology with a discursive-interpretivist epistemology in order to introduce an 
applicable methodology.  
 The concept of ‘discourse’ has been gradually becoming mainstream as a 
fashionable and vague term (Widdowson, 1995, p. 158, cited in Meyer, 2001, p. 17) in 
social sciences and an alternative emerging academic orthodoxy which is critical of 
‘conventional’ and ‘positivistic’ scientific approaches.  Even though we rarely find 
systematic definitions of the concept (Wodak, 2008, p. 1), there are several modes of 
operationalisation coming from divergent interpretations. The meaning, scope and 
application of the concept are relative to the theoretical framework in which it is 
embedded (Connolly, 1993, p. 10-44; Howarth, 2000, p. 3; Jorgensen and Phillips, 
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2002, p. 141). Different approaches to discourse analysis are not just methods for data 
analysis, “but theoretical and methodological whole[s] – a complete package” which 
contains “philosophical (ontological and epistemological) premises regarding the role of 
language in the social construction of the world” because, “in discourse analysis, theory 
and method are intertwined” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 4). Discourse has 
generally been considered as the ontological dimension of research because, according 
to this perception of discourse, “it is necessary to focus on language as a structured 
system in its own right, and discourse analysis unravels the conceptual elisions and 
confusions by which language enjoys its power” (Parker, 1992, p. 28). This 
understanding causes general dysfunctionality in terms of explanatory power because it 
strictly detaches the discursive realm from ‘the lifeworld’ (Habermas, 1989) and 
obfuscates agency from which discourses flow. To post-structuralist theorists such as 
Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida, since “the subject is itself a discursive construct”, 
their approach “precludes a systematic methodology for reading” (Sutherland, 2001, p. 
77).  
However, discourses are not ends in themselves or an insular transcendental 
realm independent from intentional human actions, but rather they are a way of 
producing and acquiring knowledge about things and happenings within the lifeworld. 
Ascribing an ontological status to discourses is an obstacle which causes complications 
in social research procedures. Discursive approaches should be taken as an 
epistemological dimension of social research instead, since discourses have an 
ideational ontology. In a nutshell, discourses make and are made by ideas. There is an 
apparent reflexivity between ideas and discourses. It does not necessarily mean that 
discourses are nothing but the expressions of unobservable ideas because discourses 
constitute a domain in which ideas have productive power and are products themselves. 
Michael Shapiro (1984b, p. 229) states that an 'idea' does not exist objectively “outside 
of language waiting to be expressed or spoken about” because thought and language 
cannot be separated. Therefore, the relation between ideas and discourses is not merely 
epistemological but ontological with regard to a post-structural scientific inquiry.  
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Despite the fact that discourses themselves are observable “performative 
utterances” (Austin, 1962) or “speech-acts” (Searle, 1971), they are not simply material 
occurrences but also constitute a medium between unobservable ideas and observable 
materiality. For instance, research on ‘homo sapiens sapiens’ or the conceptualisation of 
it as a biological subject is different from researching the ‘modern human’ which is a 
philosophical, sociological, psychological subject. Discourses make the constructed 
reality/knowledge of what is ‘human/humane’ or what are the ways of acting like one. 
Like the paradox of Theseus’s ship, if a thing is discursively constructed in an entirely 
different way, is it possible to count it as the same thing? Siegfried Jager (2001, p. 43) 
points out that “if the discourse changes, the object not only changes its meaning, but it 
becomes a different object; it loses its previous identity”. Discourses	can be understood 
as sui generis material realities and determine reality, always of course via intervening 
active subjects in their societal contexts as (co-)producers and (co-)agents of discourses 
and changes (Jager, 2001, p. 34-36).  
Since discourse has an ideational ontology, it enables us to understand and 
explain paradigmatic changes. Socio-political changes arise from “antagonistic tensions 
between structure and agency” (Wodak, 2011, p. 16). Resistance to the hegemonic 
discourses which break the conventions of relatively stable discursive practices flows 
from ideational creativity (Fairclough and Kress, 1993, p. 4ff., cited in Wodak, 2001, p. 
3), and, so, from human agency. If it is ontologically assumed that subjects are entirely 
entrapped by discursive systems, then there will be no room for explaining any change 
by any sort of analytical method.	Socio-political transformations can hardly be theorised 
without the creativity of ideas, human consciousness and intellectual activity. Discursive 
approaches gain their theoretical and methodological momentum from their capacity to 
explain dramatic alterations. This receptivity of discourse analysis to change results 
from the ontological status given to the creative-productive power of ideas and human 
agency, which are the forces enabling change. Furthermore, (national) identity – and 
discourses on it – are also an ontologically ideational and epistemologically discursive 
concept, which makes this work’s post-structural constructivist approach more relevant 
and discourse analytical methods more applicable to the case.    
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In (critical) discourse analysis, “theory formation, description, problem 
formulation and applications are closely intertwined and mutually inspiring” (Van Dijk, 
2001, p. 96). Therefore, a dynamic methodology of discourse analysis is used, drawn 
from grounded theory, (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) which envisions an interactive 
relation between data and theory. “Grounded theory as a systematic approach to 
qualitative data collection and analysis to be carried out with the explicit purpose of 
discovering new theory from data or building new theory from the ground up, rather 
than by logical deductions from a priori assumptions” (Spencer, Pryce and Walsh, 2014, 
p. 85). Discourse analysis is more in the tradition of grounded theory “where data 
collection is not a phase that must be finished before analysis starts but might be a 
permanently ongoing procedure” (Meyer, 2001, p. 18). This helps us establish the link 
between the theoretical framework and the empirical data in a more consistent way. 
Moreover, studying the Turkish case as a “theory-developing critical case study” 
(Somer, 2014) compels the researcher to anchor their approach in grounded theory. 
4.3 Methods 
There are two main processes within social scientific inquiry, including 
discourse analysis, which entails specific methods: (1) Data Collection and (2) Data 
Analysis. Since discourse analysis does not constitute a well-defined typical empirical 
method and places its methodology in the hermeneutic and grounded theory, “no clear 
line between data collection and analysis can be drawn” (Meyer, 2001, p. 25). The 
adjustment of methodology “over the course of a project facilitates new learning or new 
insights to adapt to unanticipated challenges, obstacles, or opportunities” and this 
malleability “is a strength of this approach to knowledge generation” (Leavy, 2014, p. 
4). For instance, I planned to support the discursive data with interviews as a method of 
verification. However, the research process drove me to readjust this plan and focus on 
the political elites’ speeches in greater depth instead of interviewing people from the 
same political party for its own sake, which would be a sort of self-referential 
empiricism. Interviewing the politicians in power might have supported the argument of 
the thesis but would be the reproduction of the data collected from speeches. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to have preliminary and precise methodical tool sets both in 
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data collection and analysis processes within this interactive methodological process 
because otherwise intelligibility and rigour, and so the quality of a work might diminish. 
The methodical schema should be flexible in order to approximate theory with data and 
vice-versa but also systematic to make analysis more robust.      
4.3.1 DATA COLLECTION 
Discourse analysis “mostly deals with small corpora which are usually regarded 
as being typical of certain discourses” (Meyer, 2001, p. 25). This typicality stems from 
regularity and prevalence of identical discourses. “In any practical sense there is no such 
thing as a ‘complete’ discourse analysis: a ‘full’ analysis of a short passage might take 
months and fill hundreds of pages. Complete discourse analysis of a large corpus of text 
or talk, is therefore totally out of the question” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 99). Since discourses 
are never complete and always on-going processes, analysis of discourses will never be 
complete and could always be added to (Leander, 2008, p. 22). The selection of 
discourses as data is, therefore, always “somewhat arbitrary” (Doty, 1996, p. 12). 
Nonetheless, “the most important rule for all data collection is to report how the data 
were created and how we came to possess them” (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p. 
51). In order to respond to the questions of how complete discourse analyses are, “how 
representative, reliable and generally valid they are” (Jager, 2001, p. 51), it is necessary 
to be specific and precise on the process of discursive data collection and sources.  
“First, one needs to delimit the discourse to a wide but manageable range of 
sources and timeframes” (Neumann, 2008, p. 63). It is inescapable to focus (at least 
initially) “on one discourse plane, for instance, the media” (Jager, 2001, p. 52) to make 
the collection of data specific and doable. I used the nation-wide Turkish daily 
‘Hürriyet’ newspaper as the discursive plane in order to locate pertinent texts and 
analyse them as the textual source. There are three research-driven reasons behind the 
selection of this specific newspaper as the main discursive plane: (1) It is a mainstream 
middle-market newspaper which does not have an embedded clear-cut ideological 
position and was not run or backed by a political organisation during the specified time 
span (The newspaper was bought by an ‘allegedly’ pro-government company in March 
2018). Even though “the self-descriptions of newspapers, for example, as ‘independent’ 
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or ‘non-partisan’ should always be regarded with distrust” (Jager, 2001, p. 50), Hürriyet 
newspaper’s ideological ambiguity between historic blocs in Turkey helped me to avoid 
possible selective quotations of the sources as much as possible. It is also necessary to 
note that the newspaper’s potentially subjective editorial position is not relevant here 
since what is acquired as a primary source is the direct quotations of political elites, not 
processed information. (2) Overall, it is the biggest and highest-circulation ‘mainstream’ 
newspaper during the time span of the research (Koyuncu, 2014, p. 12; Sezgin and Wall, 
2005, p. 787). Being the highest-circulation newspaper broadens the publicity of the 
analysed speeches towards different segments of the Turkish society. Discourses spread 
by the highly circulated mainstream media help the formation of discursive hegemony 
more than less publicised statements. (3) Hürriyet newspaper’s online coverage contains 
the full texts of prominent political elites’ speeches (not every single speech) in its 
archive. I started the data collection phase of research in the Turkish National Library, 
Ankara since it possesses the archives of nation-wide newspapers. However, the hard-
copy archive of the newspaper in the library does not have full texts of speeches. 
Therefore, I readjusted the research plane from the library archive to the online archive 
of Hürriyet newspaper5. The online archive enabled me to read speeches in their entirety 
rather than very limited quotations in the hard-copy archive. Going over news and 
speeches day by day between 2002 and 2017 by using online archives was also more 
time-efficient. In addition, there were direct quotations of Turkish politicians from 
various sources like think-tank reports or academic articles and theses which were used 
for Turkish foreign policy analysis. I also used these supplementary quotations 
throughout the analysis.  
“Another common way of delimiting research is to focus on a single order of 
discourse” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 142). What this work focuses on is Turkish 
national identity discourses within the political field in general and the international 
political field in particular. I did not use a systematic toolset to decide whether a 
statement belongs to the order of national identity discourses. The interpretivist 
epistemology applies here since the author decides this classification by using some 
																																								 																				
5 Sources collected from the Hürriyet online archive are categorised separately at the end of the thesis’s 
bibliography section.  
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indicators in the language. These indicators were the “linguistic means of realisation” 
that help to locate national identity discourses such as using pronouns signifying the 
nation, anthroponymic generic terms, spatial reference through persons, 
toponyms/geonyms or descriptive sentences regarding the nation (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 
35). Using keywords systematically to decide whether a statement related to national 
identity would be misleading since there is no strict standard of “linguistic means of 
realisation” or expressions. Nevertheless, foreign policy discourses within the 
international political field were easier to locate because orators directly target the 
relevant unit or individual actors in the system. I used the names of international units or 
prominent individuals as keywords in order to find relevant statements within the whole 
texts of speeches (not a general keyword search in the whole archive but in individual 
texts).   
Another way of limiting the scope of discourses is to focus on certain subjects’ 
discourses. Since this work’s subject of analysis is political elites, all speeches of 
dominant political elites (the AKP government) on national identity since the beginning 
of their rule in 2002 were within the range of research interest. However, since national 
identity discourses of AKP elites constitute a massive amount of data, I selected the 
most typical ones which represent “historical moments” (Dunn, 2008, p. 86) displaying 
regularity-perpetuity within discourses. Historical moments can be considered as 
dramatic ruptures from ongoing hegemonic discourses. Clear disjunctions between old 
hegemonic discourses and emerging discourses are accepted as linchpins if the same 
discourses are long-lasting and meaningfully reflect themselves in the socio-political 
context. As Ruth Wodak (2011, p. 2) states, “There are no ‘objective’ criteria by which 
one can ‘measure’ the relative effectiveness of a given particular speech” but “its impact 
can only be assessed in relation to a much larger socio-political context”.  
Discourses need to be chosen within a reasonable timeframe. The research 
process showed me that even though the AKP came to power in 2002, deconstructive 
discourses towards the dominant national identity formation intensified after the 
beginning of their second term in 2007 due to the gradual consolidation of institutional 
power. The influence of centrifugal powers like the bureaucracy, military and judiciary, 
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which were the bastions of the ‘secularist/progressive’ bloc in Turkey and impeded 
power concentration in the hands of the so-called ‘reactionary/counter-revolutionary’ 
politicians, has diminished gradually. This structural power shift between political 
institutions as a contextual event within the non-discursive realm has enabled discursive 
ruptures from the habitual dominant discourses of the past. Therefore, the selection of 
particular speeches or texts and data collection is more concentrated after 2007 without 
ignoring the first ruling period of the government. Moreover, since the discursive 
formation of national identity by AKP political elites is still an on-going process due to 
the fact that they still hold the political power and rule the country, I set the ending date 
of the timeframe as the beginning of 2017. I chose January 2017 as the ending date for 
research-driven reasons (I completed the discursive data collection phase of research 
roughly around the beginning of 2017) and thus, it was not a historically or politically 
significant date. 
In order to build a data corpus, firstly, it was necessary to identify the material 
that potentially constituted the data of the project and, secondly, to select a relevant, 
homogenous and representative corpus or sample stemming from the arguments and 
theoretical framework of the project (Mautner, 2008, p. 35-37). I scanned and examined 
every single news page under the newspaper’s category of ‘agenda (gündem)’ in the 
online archive, which is the category for political news (it includes news of the 
economy, pop-culture or even a sporting event if they are politically significant), instead 
of filtering news and speeches by searching keywords. I collected over 3.000 speech 
texts found in the news among over 20.000 of online archive pages of the Hürriyet Daily 
between November 2002 and January 2017. This textual data was composed of 
discourses including speeches related to Turkish national identity and the selected 
international units (KRG, EU and Egypt). Then I categorised the data corpus depending 
on the discursive strategies of national identity formation employed within the speeches. 
I did not categorise speeches and statements chronologically but thematically (strategy 
themes) in order to demonstrate longevity, stability, and ubiquity of such discourses in 
the fifth chapter (national identity formation). For instance, the reader can see references 
from 2005, 2010 and 2015 under the same strategy in the national identity formation 
chapter. I noted if a discursive pattern is particular to a certain historical setting or 
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audience because sometimes tones and emphasis might change depending on the 
context. However, considering the enormous amount of data to analyse and the question 
of relevancy, I did not specify historical settings and audience for each speech or 
statement. Besides, I did not design the fifth chapter through discursive nodal points like 
the sixth chapter since a discursive strategy might contain statements related to multiple 
nodal points. This helped me to analyse national identity discourses more holistically 
since discursive strategies enabled me to present more a detailed and nuanced account of 
national identity discourses. 
I also categorised the discursive data in line with the case studies relating these 
national identity discourses in the fifth chapter to the post-structural constructivist IR 
framework. The sixth chapter was designed through discursive nodal points in order to 
demonstrate the national identity discourses in relation to the case studies. I scanned and 
examined all news pages and speeches in them related to the KRG, the EU and Egypt 
between 2002 and 2017, day by day. I sub-divided the data related to the case studies 
into different themes appearing in speeches, roughly in a chronological way, since a 
theme was generally concentrated around a specific time period although the same 
discursive theme occasionally appears at different times disorderly. Since the sixth 
chapter employing both discourse and historical-institutional foreign policy analyses 
was more context and path-dependent, the analysis of case studies was both 
chronological and theme-oriented. Narrowing the body of speeches down step by step 
depending on their particularities (recurring discursive themes, sub-themes and 
strategies and statements related to specific international units) enabled me to map the 
regularities and consistencies of scattered articulations as a single system of a discursive 
formation. I mostly disregarded exceptional speeches and statements making cameo 
appearances in discourses depending on very specific contextual settings in order to 
avoid cherry picking since they did not display regularity. Furthermore, relating to the 
case studies, academic articles, unpublished PhD and Master’s theses, books and various 
reports on the relevant issues and units were collected in order to link the discursive data 
with the institutional and historical context which was accepted as the analytical non-
discursive terrain.   
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4.3.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
“Since data do not ‘speak for themselves’ but are always the subject of 
interpretation” (Barker and Galasinski, 2001, p. 84), the methods of analysis need to be 
presented. Foucault (1984, p. 127) states, “We must not go from discourse towards its 
interior, hidden nucleus, towards the heart of a thought or a signification supposed to be 
manifested in it; but, on the basis of discourse itself, its appearance and its regularity, go 
towards its external conditions of possibility, towards what gives rise to the aleatory 
series of these events, and fixes its limits”. What is relevant as data for critical discourse 
analysis is the principle of discursive exteriority rather than interior or supposed esoteric 
implications. What is aimed by analysis of discourses is not “deciphering the texts to get 
at the true intentions of the authors” (Doty, 1996, p. 147), but demonstrating discursive 
regularities and disruptions on the surface within dominant national identity discourses 
between 2002 and 2017 in Turkey. Therefore, it is not an attempt to reveal the hidden 
agenda of AKP political elites by seeing beyond what they say, but, on the contrary, it is 
an analysis of what is uttered performatively and transparently.  
(1) Discourse-Historical Approach 
Laclau and Mouffe’s and Foucault’s discourse theories, which are an important 
part of the thesis’s theoretical basis, do not provide elaborated methodical tools to 
analyse discourses. Therefore, a methodological supplement is necessary for the 
analysis. The main analytical method of this thesis is based on Ruth Wodak’s discourse-
historical approach. The discourse-historical approach (DHA) to discourse analysis is 
highly relevant when it comes to the social construction of national identities. Ruth 
Wodak’s DHA, which takes the interpenetration of discursive and non-discursive 
practices and domains into account, is specifically appropriate for this work because 
“when studying processes of change from the perspective of critical discourse analysis, 
it is important to bear in mind that discursive practices always function in a dialectical 
interplay with other dimensions of social practices, and that the other dimensions can set 
structural limitations to the ways in which the discourses can be used and changed”	
(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 139). In the DHA, “discourses as linguistic social 
practices can be seen as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and, 
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at the same time, as being constituted by them” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005, p. 36). The 
DHA pays attention to the significance of non-discursive historical contexts which gives 
us the institutional settings of a specific period. Non-discursive contexts “are crucial 
because they are the interface between mental information (knowledge and so on) about 
an event and actual meanings being constructed in discourse” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 110-
111). “Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship 
between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social 
structure(s) which frame it. the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes 
them” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 258). In this work, I analysed Turkish national 
identity discourses in relation to the international politics fields as the non-discursive 
terrain. Therefore, the discourse-historical approach is a coherent methodology for the 
post-structural constructivist theory. This thesis’s theoretical framework approaches 
discourse in an epistemological way and makes an analytical distinction between 
discursive and non-discursive (context) spheres but not entirely and ontologically 
separates them.  
Wodak (2001, p. 65) argues, “In investigating historical, organisational and 
political topics and texts, the discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate a large 
quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the 
social and political fields in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded”. Since “discourse 
analysis is always a movement from context to language and from language to context” 
(Gee, 2011, p. 20), “meaning [semiotics] and materiality [context] must be studied 
together” (Neumann, 2008, p. 74). Even though contextualisation might be a discursive 
product itself, the illustration of institutional settings as an analytically non-discursive 
realm is necessary to explain the interplay between particular articulations and 
environment, time and institutions. Wodak’s discourse-historical approach tries to 
develop conceptual frameworks for political discourse using a pragmatic approach and it 
combines historical analysis with specific methods of discourse analysis because it 
understands context historically (Meyer, 2001, p. 22) and integrates discourses into 




Setting the contextual stage is a crucial part of discourse-historical analysis. 
Hence, according to the discourse-historical approach, the extra-linguistic 
social/sociological influences, “the history and archaeology of texts and organisations” 
and “the institutional frames of the specific context of a situation” are required to be set 
during the analysis process (Wodak, 2011, p. 38).	Providing a historical context is a 
tricky business for a discourse analyst because falling into a historiography trap is a hard 
one to avoid. In order to circumvent such a pitfall, I avoided using normative and value-
laden expressions and described the contextual background of a specific situation as 
succinctly as possible. The context issue was more relevant to the sixth (international 
politics) chapter since it integrated historical-institutional TFP analysis with discourse 
analysis. I laid out a succinct and precise historical context in the beginning of the fifth 
chapter regarding national identity debates and historic blocs in Turkey. I also provide 
brief historical background knowledge when it is essential in order to relate the specific 
statements to broader political context throughout the analysis. I used and analysed 
various academic articles, books, PhD and Master’s theses and reports in order to lay out 
the institutional and historical context as the analytical non-discursive terrain.  
(2) Discursive Strategies 
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart elaborated a comprehensive, consistent 
scheme of macro-strategies in the process of discursive formation of national identities 
drawing on Leszek Kolakowski’s work (Kolakowski, 1995, cited in Wodak et al., 2009) 
which enables discursive data to be analysed systematically and completely (Wodak et 
al., 2009, p. 25). Instead of applying Wodak et al’s model straightforwardly, I refined, 
simplified and modified it pursuant to the peculiarities of the Turkish case. Their ideal-
typical categorisation of the strategic means of discursive national identity formation is a 
modular one in spite of the fact that it is designed to explain a particular example (the 
Austrian national identity). They divide the discursive macro-strategies of national 
identity construction into five main categories whose frontiers are not solid. These are 
strategies of (1) justification and relativisation, (2) construction, (3) perpetuation, (4) 
transformation and, (5) demontage and destruction (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 36-42). In 
order to make discourse data easier to follow, these categories are divided into 
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deconstructive and constructive macro-strategies of discursive national identity 
formation.  
I integrated the internal components of other categories into this pair in order to 
make these categories more comprehensive and inclusive in a conceptually pragmatic 
way. For instance, the category of constructive strategies subsumes linguistic factors 
within positive representation strategies like justification, and the deconstructive 
strategies contain elements from negative strategies like relativisation. Additional 
discursive strategies which are particularly apt to the Turkish example are introduced 
during the analysis of the data because ideal-typical or analytical categories like this 
“are means for constructing case-specific explanations, and not ends in themselves” 
(Jackson, 2011, p. 152). Grounded theory applies here since the collected discursive data 
helped readjust some theoretical details like alternative discursive strategies derived 
from the Turkish case as a “theory-developing critical case study” (Somer, 2014). I 
presented the discursive strategies and themes located in Turkish elites’ discourses via 
Wodak and et al’s framework in the following chapter and throughout the analysis as 
separate sub-sections. Even though the national identity discourses were analysed 
through the category of strategies and linguistic tools drawn from Wodak and her 
colleagues instead of nodal points, the three aforementioned nodal points were linked to 
the strategies within the content of analyses in the fifth chapter.  
Wodak and her colleagues used commemorative public speeches of political 
elites and focus group and semi-private interviews as their discursive data corpus. Their 
triangulation enabled them to have social level verification for the influence of political 
speeches. However, their public discursive data corpus consisted of 22 commemorative 
speeches, major policy addresses or declarations, and one lecture (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 
74). This size of data corpus of political elite speeches would be very limited to assess 
the discursive and foreign policy transformation in Turkey. Therefore, this thesis only 
focused on public speeches of political elites but in much greater depth. I used 
approximately 800 different speeches of Turkish political elites between 2002 and 2017. 
As a linguist, Wodak et al’s approach also provided detailed linguistic ‘means of 
realisation’ and ‘figures of speeches’ such as synecdoche, metonymy, metaphors, 
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allegories and pronouns. In this work, I sometimes used linguistic concepts drawn from 
their work in analysing of the discursive data but they were not detailed or systematised 
theoretically and methodologically since this work’s main concern is not the linguistic 
aspect of discourse analysis but its political aspect.  
(3) Intertextuality and Positionality 
 “The changeable, contingent nature of identity does not mean that people start 
all over again with new identities every single time they speak. The identity that is 
articulated at a given time can be understood as the sedimentation of earlier discursive 
practices” (Wetherell and Potter 1992, p. 78, cited in Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002, p. 
112). This situation necessitates the ‘intertextual’ analysis method, which “refers to the 
linkage of texts [discourses] to other texts, both in the past and in the present” (Wodak, 
2011, p. 39). Intertextuality is methodologically significant because it is necessary to 
locate ‘pioneer texts (discourses)’ and historical events that foreshadow a given 
representation of the national-self which establishes itself out of the prior discourses 
(Neumann, 2008, p. 72). “The assumption of intertextuality makes manifest the 
historicity of texts”, which are “the product of other culturally situated discourses 
combined into a new structure” (Barker and Galasinski, 2001, p. 69). For instance, Iver 
Neumann states that one needs to understand where the reference to “‘I have a dream’ (a 
speech by Martin Luther King, Jr), ‘beam me up, Scotty’ (a line from the television 
show Star Trek) or ‘I pledge allegiance’ (to the flag)” is coming from in the American 
context and the particular connotations which this expression has in order to conduct a 
proficient discourse analysis (Neumann, 2008, p. 64). Hermeneutics and positionality 
are highly relevant here because linking a discourse with pioneer discourses requires 
cultural competence. One can hardly identify intertextuality if the speaker or author does 
not directly reference the original possessor of texts or speeches or does not elaborate 
the connotations of the historical event referred to. Identifying intertextuality without 
direct quotations	could only be possible if one has proper and substantial knowledge of 
the relevant cultural environment. Norman Fairclough (2003, p. 47) fairly argues that 
intertextual elements may not be identified with great precision because they are 
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extensive and complex “but it is analytically useful to begin with some rough idea of 
them” to locate other included or excluded texts and voices.  
As a Turkish citizen who has grown up in a ‘nationalist’ political atmosphere, I 
am in an ideal situation to penetrate and analyse semiotics, symbolisms, intertextuality 
and context with regard to the Turkish national identity formation owing to my language 
skills, cultural competence and personal environment. Cultural competence enables a 
researcher to effectively “use tools of discourse analysis to demonstrate variations in 
meanings and representations” (Neumann, 2008, p. 63). It is an undeniable fact that 
meanings and semiotic processes cannot be grasped without deep involvement in the 
socio-linguistic culture of the relevant society – being an internal part of the society is 
the best way – but it always contains the risk of entrapment by the discursive webs 
which are to be analysed. Hence, there is a dialectical tension between the hermeneutic 
approach (Gadamer, 2006) which needs to be –partly, if not entirely– embedded within 
the relevant discursive environment and discourse analysis which entails distancing 
oneself from the discursive system analysed and mitigating ‘home blindness’. My 
positionality and embeddedness in Turkish society carry the risks of ‘home blindness’ 
which I attempted to avoid or minimise through my commitment to the methodological 
agenda and data scrutiny discussed above. Besides, the socio-political climate in which I 
grew up was neither entirely pro-Islamic/conservative nor pro-secularist/western but a 
mixture of them both. As a person with a secular lifestyle who comes from a religious 
family, I am deeply involved in the discourses of both sides in my personal life. This 
helps me to distance myself ideologically from and penetrate into both historic blocs in 
Turkey at the same time. Besides, this thesis does not put forward a positivistic scientific 
objectivity claim as it is an interpretivist study. It accepts the premise that this is an 
interpretation of what has happened, aiming to be a better interpretation than its 
alternatives. 
(4) Vocabulary 
Understanding the political and cultural connotations of vocabulary used in 
speeches is crucial for discourse analysis. Some words and expressions might be more 
relevant than others depending on the pertinent topic, such as pronouns, because words 
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such as ‘I’, ‘We’ or ‘They’ are directly related to identity construction (Barker and 
Galasinski, 2001, p. 74). Defining certain words in different manners is an important 
aspect of vocabulary. Words are signifiers whose meanings are temporarily fixed in 
certain contexts which enables communication between subjects sharing the same 
contextual space. The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe uses the term ‘floating 
signifiers’, which are “the signs that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning 
in their own particular way”, or those elements which are “particularly open to different 
ascriptions of meaning” (Laclau 1990, p. 28; 1993, p. 287, cited in Jorgensen and 
Phillips, 2002, p. 28). For instance, the meaning of the word ‘Türk’ is an important case 
because it might be defined simultaneously as ‘a citizen of the Republic of Turkey’, ‘an 
inhabitant of Turkey whose ancestors came from the historical Turkestan region’, ‘a 
Turkic speaking person’ or ‘a Muslim inhabitant of Anatolia’. Therefore, as Marianne 
Jorgensen and Louise Phillips (2002, p. 30) suggest, identifying important floating 
signifiers over which discursive competition of meaning takes place within national 
identity discourses is another crucial aspect of this work’s methods of analysing 
discursive data. 
Vocabulary as a linguistic means is particularly significant in the discursive 
formation of national identity because “the discursive construction of identities, of in- 
and out-groups, necessarily implies the use of strategies of positive self–presentation” 
(Wodak, 2011, p. 40) as distinguishing between the supremacy function and the 
negative presentation of others as “unifying devil-function” (Burke, 1984, p. 64). For 
example, in the Turkish political context, defining any political activity with the word 
‘darbe’, which can be translated into English with words related to ‘strike/beat/coup’, 
derogates that activity because this word is generally deployed to indicate a ‘coup 
d’etat’. For instance, defining an annulment verdict of the Constitutional Court of 
Turkey against a law amendment of the legislative body as ‘darbe’ aims at discrediting 
the court’s particular decree discursively. This implies the court’s violation of and 
penetration into the political space which is supposed to be beyond its juridical 
authority. My positionality helped me to be familiar with alternative meanings and 
connotations of floating signifiers in discourses depending on different contextual 




A qualified discourse analysis entails engagement with the textual materials in 
their own languages because, otherwise, cultural nuances might be lost and thus research 
quality might diminish in an academic work based on translated/processed data. Since 
the language of the textual data corpus of this research is in its original language, 
namely Turkish which is the researcher’s native language, translation to English plays a 
major role in the analysis process. A combination of ‘faithful’ and ‘communicative’ 
methods of translation is applied here in order to capture the meaning of the ‘source 
language’ and transfer the substance of the text to the ‘target language’ in a 
comprehensible way. The translation method adopted in the analysis “attempts to render 
the contextual meaning of the original” in an “acceptable and comprehensible” way to 
the readership (communicative) and, “transfers cultural words and preserves the degree 
of grammatical and lexical abnormality” to a limited extent (faithful) (Newmark, 1988, 
p. 40-41). 
(6) Case Studies 
Research with case studies does not offer particular methods or epistemology, 
but it can be employed within both positivist and interpretivist or qualitative and 
quantitative approaches (Simons, 2014, p. 458). Using different cases in order to make 
arguments buttresses the reliability and cogency of a piece of research and enables a 
researcher to move from an idiosyncratic understanding and explanation of a case to 
more or less nomothetic generalisations. For instance, Turkey’s relations with particular 
international units examined in this study give us a general idea about the rising trend in 
Turkey’s international relations. Since, generally, it is impossible to cover all cases 
related to a research topic, we select cases as samples. In this work, the case studies aim 
to demonstrate the interplay between the discursive formation of Turkish national 
identity and external state actions of the Republic of Turkey within ‘the field of action’ 
of international politics through ‘nodal points’ within the national identity discourses. 
Therefore, we need illustrative and relevant foreign policy cases in relation to Turkish 
national identity and those nodal points. Some particular events or actors might not be 
particularly germane to national identity. For instance, since Turkey’s interrelations with 
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some countries such as South American nations are hardly framed in Turkish national 
identity discourses in a positive or negative way, certain events or general relations 
between Turkey and those nations cannot be proper cases to analyse external state 
actions through national identity formation. Discourses towards less relevant countries 
in terms of national identity are generally framed in a more traditionally diplomatic way, 
or the theme of mutual interest is prevalent in reciprocal statements.  
The case studies (the KRG, the EU and Egypt) singled out from the universe of 
potential actors are closely relevant to the current international relations of Turkey and 
national identity narratives. These cases are correlated with	the ethnic, governmental and 
civilisational nodal points. Nodal points were separately analysed in the case studies as 
the junction points bridging national identity discourses with the foreign policy 
discourses towards the selected international units. The main reason behind preferring 
these actors is that they are descriptive and admissible actors to each nodal point. After 
revealing how the dominant political elites of the AKP government employed macro-
strategies in the discursive formation of the Turkish identity process through redefining 
nodal points within national identity discourses, I showed the operationalisation of those 
captured nodal points within the historical context of the field of international politics 
and how they made certain external state actions conceivable. I analysed the discursive 
data related to the case studies collected from the Hürriyet daily newspaper and situated 
them into the historical-institutional analysis of TFP. The historical analysis of TFP, as 
the non-discursive terrain and context, in relation to simultaneous national identity 
discourses relied on secondary sources. 
These three global units are pragmatically selected as “crucial/most-likely cases” 
that “must have to fit a theory” (Eckstein, 1975, p. 118 cited in Gerring, 2008, p. 659) in 
order to achieve theoretical objectives of the research. They are logically selected cases 
in relation to the theoretical framework for theory development and heuristic purposes 
(George, A.L and Bennett, A., 2005, p. 251) as opposed to universally exhaustive case 
sampling (Eckstein, 1975 cited in Demetriou and Roudometof, 2014, p. 51). They are 
not selected for a causal inference or theory testing that would make these cases 
representatives of the universe of all other international actors. This is an idiosyncratic 
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selection for correlating TFP with the nodal points within the Turkish national identity 
discourses which necessitate a priori assumption of relevancy of the cases depending on 
various indicators in the socio-political context. This a priori case selection has also 
been verified or refuted throughout the data collection phase. For instance, Israel was 
the targeted unit for civilisational nodal point because Turkey’s relations with it 
dramatically deteriorated during the AKP’s tenure which was a clear rupture from 
traditional policies and because of Israel’s discursive role as a ‘unifying evil’ within 
universal Islamist discourses. However, the data collection process showed that even 
though Israel is still relevant to the civilisational nodal point, the EU is a more 
illustrative and empirically rich case than Israel. Therefore, the case selection is also a 
posteriori verified. 
Firstly, the KRG is selected for the ethnic/cultural nodal point because the ethnic 
Kurds constitute the second populous ethnic group within the country whose ethnonym 
appears most within the AKP discourses comparing other cultural groups within Turkey. 
Turkish Kurds are imagined as the ethnic relatives of the Kurds in the KRI (Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq) that makes the KRG highly relevant case than other examples. 
Nevertheless, Turkic countries or ethnic Turks/Turkmens in adjacent countries like Iran 
for instance could have also been illustrative cases to demonstrate ethnic/cultural 
discourses’ mediatory role on TFP, but what was a significant rupture from traditional 
discursive hegemony was not rhetorical emphasis on Turkicness of the Turkish nation 
but the conceived and constructed ethnic/cultural plurality of it which made Kurdishness 
more apparent and relevant within the Turkish public sphere. Likewise, the significant 
Turkic minority in the neighbouring Iran (almost consensually estimated over 10 million 
Turkic people who mainly live in so-called ‘South Azerbaijan’/‘Cənubi-Güney 
Azərbaycan’ that officially belongs to the Islamic Republic of Iran) has never shown a 
noteworthy appearance in both secular and conservative historic blocs’ hegemonic 
discourses that set the official discursive habitus of the Turkish nation-state. This 
‘Turkic brotherhood’ theme with the Iranian Turks mostly appeared in the peripheral 
discourses of Turkic nationalists in Turkey. Besides, Turkey’s momentous foreign 
policy changes towards the KRG also make it a “crucial” case in the service of the 
theoretical objectives of the work. 
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Secondly, the EU is accepted as the most pertinent case for correlating the 
civilisational nodal point with TFP because of Turkey’s historical and still enduring 
close interrelations (dates back to the Empire era) with the European nations as a loosely 
associated totality which has widely been framed as a civilisational whole 
(Western/European). This supposed civilisational totality is discursively concretised in 
the legal personality of the EU as the institutional representative of the ‘Western 
Civilisation’ in opposition to the ‘Islamic Civilisation’ within the international system. 
Moreover, since Turkey’s membership bid for the EU, which has been the unfaltering 
foreign policy objective of the Turkish Republic, become questionable as a significant 
policy rupture and Turkey’s relations with the EU countries underwent noteworthy 
fluctuations within the studied time span, the EU become the “most-likely” illustrative 
case for civilisational discourses’ mediation role on TFP.  
Finally, Turkish-Egyptian relations are employed as a representative case for the 
discursive role of the governmental nodal point because the Arab Spring and its social 
and political reverberations in Egypt were discursively framed by the AKP elites 
through the prism of Turkey’s new governmental self-understanding of majoritarian 
democracy. The AKP elites’ combination of democracy rhetoric with Islamic motifs and 
representing the Turkish governmental model as an ‘inspiration’ for other Muslim-
majority countries made Egypt case a logical exemplification for the governmental 
nodal point’s correlation with TFP. Even though alternative cases like Syria, Tunisia or 
some other Muslim-majority countries could have also been potential candidates for the 
theoretical objectives of this study, Turkey’s relations with Egypt during the AKP era is 
a more clear-cut and “crucial/most-likely” case to demonstrate significant ruptures in 
TFP in relation to governmental self-understanding because of dramatic oscillations 
within the interrelations.  
As Brent J. Steele (2008, p. 12) listed in his work, the objectives, which are 
going to be accomplished with the discourse-historical analysis of the selected cases, are 
these: (1) How political elites “connect a policy choice with a particular narrative about 
self-identity”. (2) How political elites create meanings around threats and interests to the 
national-self. (3) How the discursive formation of national identity made some specific 
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external state actions ‘conceivable’ which were not options before.	Discourse constraints 
“what is thought of as possible, and what is thought of as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a 
given situation. but discourse cannot determine action completely. There will always be 
more than one possible outcome and thus employing discourse-historical approach aims 
at specifying the bandwidth of possible outcomes” (Neumann, 2008, p. 62). Identities 
“narrow the range of conceivable options” and “thus play a ‘causal’ role in the sense of 
making certain choices more likely” (Klotz, 2008, p. 50). Since “a representation of 
national identity can make room for several different actions” (Neumann, 2008, p. 76), a 
discourse-historical analysis of the representations of Egypt, Kurdistan or the EU does 
not thereby constitute an exhaustive analysis of the international relations of Turkey. 
The discursive data analysis on which the historical-institutional foreign policy analysis 
in the case studies is based does not explain why particular Turkish external state actions 
are taken towards specified international actors, but how these particular actions become 
possible through a certain projection and discursive medium of the national-self.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 Post-structural approaches are mostly deemed theoretical but not methodological 
(Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989). However, a post-structural approach can reclaim 
methodology. This chapter aimed to design a methodological approach to a post-
structural model, and concretised this study’s abstract theoretical framework. This is a 
transition phase to the empirical work whose goal is to unpack the specificity of the 
Turkish example. The theoretical concepts of this research did not make only cameo 
appearances but also guided the methodology because theory and methods come as a 
whole package, especially in research regarding discursive approaches. Even though this 
theory-driven methodological framework is idiosyncratically designed to explain the 
Turkish example, since it has modular modus operandi, it can be applied to other cases 
with modifications which are discussed in the concluding chapter. These three 
theoretical chapters (literature review, theory, methodology) are an interlinked whole 
which guides the reader throughout the empirical parts of the study. The next chapter is 
the first empirical chapter which sets the discursive context of Turkish national identity 
between 2002 and 2017. It is devoted to analysing the national identity discourses of the 
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AKP elites through the discursive strategies adopted, in order to demonstrate their 






















DISCURSIVE FORMATION OF TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY (2002-2017) 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter aims to unveil the discursive strategy patterns residing in the Justice 
and Development Party’s (AKP) political elites’ speeches. The AKP challenged the 
hegemonic national identity formation of the secular bloc by discursively separating the 
nation from the state which was supposedly not representing the nation. One of their 
main claims was that they were reconciling the Turkish nation with its state that was 
alienated from its own national society. They did not challenge the Turkish nation-state 
itself, but they targeted how it was constructed. Therefore, the AKP remained in the 
global discursive and institutional framework of nation-states. As the political agents of 
the conservative historic bloc in Turkey, AKP politicians’ objective was to deconstruct 
the hegemonic national identity discourses of the secular bloc and construct a new 
discursive hegemony in parallel with their national self-perception. They employed 
various discursive strategies to achieve this goal, which are compiled and presented in 
this chapter. 
Discursive strategies for national identity formation do not manifest themselves 
in the political arena as they are because the political elites would not articulate that they 
use linguistic tools to transform national self-perception. They are analytical ideal-types 
constructed by a researcher in order to make sense of outwardly messy and scattered 
statements in a given time and place that constitute a single system of formation. Some 
of the constructive and deconstructive strategies in this chapter are counterparts and 
follow-ups of each other since the constructive strategies are operationalised to fill the 
discursive vacuum caused by the deconstruction strategies. Moreover, some 
construction and deconstruction strategies might have the same function since a 
statement can be both constructive and deconstructive at the same time. Similarly, 
sometimes the same themes can be seen within different strategy categories because 
“although analytically distinguishable from one another, these strategies occur more or 
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less simultaneously and are interwoven in concrete discursive acts” (Wodak et al., 2009, 
p. 33).   
Some discursive strategies might not seem directly relevant to national identity 
construction. However, these strategies can be considered as part of this single system of 
formation since they have various operational functions such as discursively targeting 
the established national institutions or ad hominem attacks to the agents of the opposite 
historic bloc in order to invalidate the legitimacy of the hegemonic order from which 
national identity discourses flow. There are some clearly contradictory remarks of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) elites within the national identity discourses. 
However, these contradictory statements do not necessarily debunk each other. These 
logical contradictions are mostly parts of the discursive formation since they exemplify 
discursive ruptures. In some cases, these contradictions are historically contingent and 
complementary to each other. Besides, these contradictions are sometimes the outcomes 
of particular settings and audience or political conjuncture and realpolitik tactics which 
are specified when it is relevant. The speech-acts exhibited in the chapter are not 
exhaustive. A researcher can find many other similar performative utterances of AKP’s 
political elites that are not quoted in the study. AKP politicians’ block quotations in the 
chapter are predominantly illustrative fragments to analyse their discourses.  
This chapter is longer than usual since it is a bundle of a brief historical context 
and two main broad sections, deconstructive (the third section) and constructive (the 
fourth section) strategies. Providing a contextual-historical background, which is 
inevitably essential for social research purposes, is a sort of ‘true’ knowledge claim that 
should be minimised in a post-structural framework in order to avoid ideological, 
discursive and historiographical reproduction of past events. Therefore, the contextual 
background was kept short and precise in the second section and was spread throughout 
the chapter. After the brief historical context, two long sections are subsumed under 
several sub-sections and a discursive strategy assigned to each of these sub-sections. 
These two broad sections are not divided into separate chapters since they constitute a 
mutually complementary whole, which aims to preserve continuity and permeability 
between them, and make arguments easier to be followed by the reader. The fifth 
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section concludes the chapter with evaluative final remarks and linking it to the next 
chapter.  
5. 2 A Brief Historical Context  
 We can trace the historical roots of the national identity question of Turkey and 
the embryonic precursors of contemporary conservative and secular historic blocs back 
to the last century of the Ottoman Empire which was replaced by the Turkish Republic 
in 1923. Tarık Zafer Tunaya defines the political experience of Turkey from the 
declaration of the second Ottoman constitutional monarchy in 1908 to the Republican 
era as a “laboratory” for Turkish politics (Alkan, 2004, p. 476) since the same 
ideological debates are still taking place in Turkey. The emergence of nation-states 
within Europe and the former Ottoman territories urged the Ottoman elites to initiate a 
multi-cultural nation-building project in order to address the national question of the 
time. In his seminal long article in 1904, called “Three Types of Policy (Üç Tarz-ı 
Siyaset)” (Akçura, 2005), Yusuf Akçura, a young Tatar intellectual who later settled in 
Turkey, systematically articulated three main national self-image propositions and 
ideologies produced for the survival of the Empire and adaptation to the modern nation-
state system. These are multi-cultural/religious Ottoman identity (Ottomanism), Islamic 
identity (Pan-Islamism) and Turkic identity (Pan-Turkism) (Lewis, 1968, p. 326-327; 
Kösebalaban, 2014, p. 71-72). However, none of them was able to prevent the inevitable 
disintegration of the Empire. The new Republic which inherited the institutions and 
elites of the Empire based its modernisation and nation-building project on the secular 
Turkish identity.  
 The early and middle 19th century Ottoman elites were already aware of the 
necessity to reorganise and modernise the statecraft according to contemporary 
developments. Attempts to construct a multi-cultural Ottoman nation and identity to 
maintain the independence and integrity of the Empire concretised itself in these words 
of the Sultan II. Mahmud (reign: 1808–1839), who was a pioneer in reforms: “I 
distinguish the Muslims among my subjects only in the mosque, the Christians—in the 
church, the Jews—in the synagogue; there is no other difference among them. My love 
and justice are strong for all, and all are my true sons” (Sultan II. Mahmud cited in 
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Stephanov, 2014, p. 141). This statement was one of the earliest expressions of the 
construction of a multi-cultural Ottoman identity (Kara, 2005 cited in Koyuncu, 2014, p. 
36). The inter-cultural/religious equality under the banner of ‘Ottoman nationhood’ was 
to be institutionalised by profound reform projects like the Edict of Gülhane (1839 – 
Tanzimat Fermanı) and the Imperial Reform Edict (1856 – Islahat Fermanı). This 
proposed multi-cultural Ottoman identity or patriotism was also preserved and promoted 
by the Young Ottomans/Turks during the declaration of first (1876) and second (1908) 
constitutional monarchy. However, this multi-cultural/ethnic/religious proposition failed 
to congregate the peoples of the Empire together under the Ottoman political umbrella 
that was also under the unwavering military and political pressure of the Western 
European powers and the Russian Empire. The non-Muslim ethnic groups of the 
Ottoman territory gradually established their own independent nation-states.  
 The Islamic identity was also conceived and proposed by the Ottoman elites to 
rescue the Empire from disintegration. The emergence of modern Islamism as a form of 
nation-building project had root in the thoughts of the late 19th century Ottoman 
revolutionary intellectual-bureaucrats and of famous Muslim thinkers like Jamaluddin 
Afghani. The Sultan II. Abdulhamid (reign: 1876-1909) also pursued an active policy of 
pan-Islamism/caliphate in order to consolidate the Empire’s power. Likewise, the Union 
and Progress Committee-Party (Ittihad ve Terakki), which played a vanguard role in the 
second declaration of the constitution and deposition of II. Abdulhamid, also 
instrumentally resorted to Islamic themes and policies especially after the devastating 
Balkan Wars in 1912-1913. However, due to the failure of Ottoman declaration of ‘holy 
war/jihad’ to fight the ‘Entente Powers’, the policy and project of Islamic nationhood 
could not bring the glorious days of the Empire back and prevent the large portion of 
non-Turkish Muslims to seek their futures under alternative political settings. The 
catastrophic defeat of the Empire in the Great War whose aftermath was the invasion of 
the capital Istanbul and Anatolia by the allied powers and later the successful 
independence struggle led by the ‘Turkish nationalist’ forces under the leadership of 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) ended up with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that 
internationally recognised the Turkish sovereignty over the Anatolian peninsula. The 
accumulation of power in the hands of ‘secular nationalists’ after the ‘independence 
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war’ enabled them to set the foundational characteristics of the nascent ‘Turkish’ state 
and modern Turkish ‘nation’.   
 Turkey’s modernisation project going back to the 18th and 19th centuries 
dramatically gained momentum after the establishment of the secular Turkish nation-
state. Even though there were elements of continuity between the Empire and the 
Republic (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 46) such as population, institutions, elites, territory, 
public debts which practically makes the Turkish Republic as the successor of the 
Empire, the regime as a ‘nationalising, modernising and secularising state’ sidelined the 
Ottoman legacy and subordinated the cultural belongingness to Islam, which was led by 
its founding leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the last name means the Father of Turks). 
Nevertheless, the new secular Republic did not take an entirely anti-Islamic position but 
attempted to limit its impact on the public sphere and took it under the state’s control 
through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) which was 
established in 1924. Since Atatürk considered the aforementioned three nation-building 
projects maximalist and beyond the capability of the country, his Turkish nationalism 
focused on people living in the Anatolian peninsula and extracting a modern secular 
nation-state from what was left from the Empire. He desired “a strong break from the 
past” through reforms “constituted a coherent and systematic inclination towards the 
West” because, according to him, the contemporary Western civilisation, for his era, 
was representing the most advanced stage that the humanity reached in thousands of 
years (Demirağ, 2006, p. 157). This nation-building project reflected itself in TFP as an 
“active isolationism” (Kösebalaban, 2014, p. 120-121) via the peace treaties like the 
1934 Balkan and 1937 Saadabad Pacts which were signed with the neighbouring 
countries in order to focus on the domestic transformation and construction project. The 
principle and motto of TFP in the early republican era was an Atatürk’s saying: “Peace 
at home, peace in the World”.  
 Although the contestation between different national self-images dates back to 
the late Empire period, “this contestation was interrupted with the establishment of the 
Republic in 1923” (Gülseven, 2010, p. 76). The founding party of the Republic and the 
main political representative of the secular bloc, the Republican People Party (CHP), 
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defined the ‘Turk’ in its party programme as such (cited in Zürcher, 2010, p. 217): “Any 
individual within the Republic of Turkey, whatever his faith, who speaks Turkish, grows 
up with Turkish culture and adopts the Turkish ideal, is a Turk”. Atatürk stated, “the 
people of Turkey who established the Republic of Turkey is called as the Turkish 
nation”6. The new Republic’s understanding of the Turkish nation was based on both 
culture and citizenship. Radical secularising, modernising and nationalising reforms 
(e.g. the change of alphabet from Arabic to Latin, full women’s suffrage, the abolition of 
the Caliphate, secularism as a constitutional principle, the usage of the “Turkishness” as 
constitutional nationym, the establishment of Turkish official history and language 
associations) under the one-party rule of the CHP implemented the secular nation-
building project without a significant disruption and public resistance until the country’s 
permanent transition to the multi-party system. The new Republic pursued a strict 
programme in order to nationalise and modernise Turkish society through various 
“ideological state apparatuses” (Althusser, 2014) such as community centres 
(Halkevleri), village institutes (Köy Enstitüleri), curricular education, Turkish history 
and language associations and so on. However, the memories of Ottoman legacy and the 
strong sense of belongingness to Islam have never faded away from the public’s and 
certain elites’ consciousness. The social division, alternative national self-images and 
discontent towards the CHP rule among the Turkish public and political schisms dating 
back to the Empire era which was eclipsed by the secularist hegemony in the early 
republican years visibly surfaced after the rise of opposition parties in the 1950s.  
This discursive habitus or limits perpetuated by the secular bloc’s institutional 
hegemony over the political field have a connection with the nodal points within 
national identity discourses. Even though an elaborated and systematic analysis of 
secular bloc’s national identity discourses is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
necessary to briefly specify this former hegemonic national self-perception regarding the 
nodal points asserted in the thesis: (1) the ethnic/cultural nodal point (monistic or blind): 
The secular bloc’s discursive “regime of truth” has consistently ignored and did not 
																																								 																				
6 Gürbüz D. Tüfekçi, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği [Atatürk’s View on Nationalism], T.C. Atatürk 
Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi [The Republic of Turkey, 




acknowledge a cultural/ethnic diversity in its perception of the Turkish national-self. 
The secularist establishment institutionally and discursively recognised only the non-
Muslim communities as separate cultural and ethnic minorities compared to the 
mainstream nation. Nevertheless, they are also legally accepted as ‘Turkish’ in the 
citizenship and legal sense. Therefore, the Republic turned the blind eye to the cultural 
diversity of Muslim population on its territory, and the historiographical narrative of 
Turkish culture was set as ‘default’ identity settings of the country that approximates the 
“dominant ethnie model” (Smith, 1991). This adopted cultural Turkishness was not, 
however, beyond the Republic’s territory as it can be seen in the widely omission of 
‘Turkicness’ of the Turkish national-self until the 1990s when the majority of the Turkic 
Republics gained independence (for instance, pan-Turkists who challenged the 
hegemonic identity project of the secularist elites (Uzer, 2002; Aytürk, 2011), were put 
on political trials and prisons in 1944 and the 1980s), thereby connecting Turkey with 
the Turkic peoples living the historical Turkestan region (roughly Central Asia). Only 
Turk/Turkmen communities in the immediate vicinity of the country (Iraq, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Cyprus and Syria) sporadically appeared as ethnic/cultural relatives in a non-
irredentist way. The secular bloc’s overall approach of not recognising intra-national 
cultural differences was normatively presented as a natural outcome of ‘equal 
citizenship’ principle (similar to the French model) that avoids discrimination against 
sub-national particularities. This has been perceived by the challenging bloc and some 
other subaltern groups as ‘forced assimilation’ because it supposedly does not officially 
recognise the cultural existence of groups other than Turks/Turkmens. This thesis 
analytically classifies the secular bloc’s approach to the ethnic/cultural nodal point as a 
particular form of ‘monism’ or ethnic/cultural blindness without normative 
connotations.  
 (2) The civilisational nodal point (pro-Western): the early Republican elites’ 
robust modernisation programme that is also understood as Westernisation as a 
civilisational relocation project that includes embracing cultural motifs and elements of 
the West like dress styles, headgears, music, alphabet etc. The floating signifier of 
‘civilisation’ was defined in close relation to ‘Western civilisation’. For instance, Ziya 
Gökalp, a Turkish intellectual who deeply influenced Atatürk, the founding elites and 
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Turkey’s modernisation program, had delicately distinguished the concept of culture, 
which was supposed to be ‘Turkish’, from civilisation and was explicit about defining 
Turkey within the ‘Western civilisation’. The secularist establishment endured this 
‘Western’ national self-perception consistently throughout the Republican years. This 
assumption of that the secular bloc pursued a civilisational ‘Westernisation’ path and 
identity has been almost ubiquitously accepted as valid. This perception and 
construction are situated into our theoretical framework as ‘pro-Western’ ‘privileged 
partial fixity’ in national identity discourses with regard to the civilisational self-
understanding. 
 (3) The governmental nodal point (secular republicanism): the Republic’s 
modernisation project inevitably needed to emphasise the merits and virtue of the new 
political system and despise the ancien régime in order to legitimise the regime change. 
Therefore, the discursive and institutional veneration of the Republican way of 
governance has been omnipresent in Turkey. The ‘republican values’ have been a sacred 
notion embedded in the Turkish national-self narratives of the secular bloc. Besides, 
secularism (laiklik/laïcité – it became a constitutional principle in 1937 and still defines 
the Turkish Republic in Article 2 of the constitution) has been the most discursively 
emphasised and defining aspect of the new republican regime against ‘reactionaryism’. 
The secularism aspect was not only crucial for a governmental self-definition but also as 
a token of rupture from the Islamic identity civilisationally. Secularism’s defining status 
in national-self narratives played an important mediatory role to appropriate 
civilisational ‘Westernness’ without adopting the West’s religious values. Therefore, the 
secular historic bloc’s self-perception regarding the governmental nodal point 
operationalised in this framework as ‘secular republicanism’.  
  After the introduction of multi-party democracy, the Democratic Party 
(Demokrat Parti, DP) came to power in the first free and fair elections in 1950. The 
political parties, which were supposedly the carriers of the demands of the citizens with 
traditional values, have dominated the electoral politics vis-à-vis the secularist CHP 
since then. The conservative bloc’s understanding of the Turkish national-self had more 
Islamic and Ottoman-friendly tones than the secular bloc, which was more coherent with 
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the traditional understandings of the religious Muslim majority. However, the activity 
sphere of electoral politics was limited by the bureaucratic state institutions (military 
and civilian bureaucracy and judiciary) which had traditionally been supposed as the 
‘guardians’ of the founding principles and continuity of the new regime whereby the 
secularist bloc perpetuated its hegemony. The political representatives of the 
conservative bloc predominantly complied with habitus (Bourdieu, 1990) of the Turkish 
political “field” (Bourdieu, 1984). “This habitus acts as the ground that shapes social 
and state practice and sets discursive limits” (Rampton, 2010, p. 46-47). The field had 
been hegemonised by the secularists via the bureaucratic state institutions. The 
conservative/right-wing politicians mostly reproduced the discourses of the Western-
oriented Turkish national-self with minor policy and discourse deviations. This 
preserved pro-Western stance was in coherence with Turkey’s anti-Soviet position 
during the Cold War (Yılmaz and Bilgin, 2005, p. 51). Therefore, the mainstream 
political representatives of the conservative bloc, which are generally centre-right 
parties, hardly challenged the discursive formation of the Turkish national identity by 
the secular elites.   
The secular bloc’s “regime of truth” and institutional hegemony, albeit a 
noteworthy success to interpellate a significant portion of the Turkish population and 
elites, were not able to eradicate alternative national self-images and prevent them from 
circulating among the public, to attract the audience and to challenge their form of 
national identity construction. There were also weak and ‘marginal’ voices among the 
secular bloc that contradicted the hegemonic discourses. There has been the opposition 
of the Turkish socialist left and nascent left-wing Kurdish ethno-nationalism to the 
hegemony of the secularist nationalism (roughly ‘Kemalism’) as the so-called ‘official 
ideology’ of the state since especially 1970s. However, the secular nationalist statecraft 
also suppressed these weak challenges coming from other secularist subject positions. 
The 1982 Turkish constitution, drafted under the auspices of the Turkish Armed Forces 
(TSK) because of the 1980 coup d’état, contained a principle stating that the Republic of 
Turkey was “loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk”7 in the second article, which is still in 
																																								 																				
7	Full Text: https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf 	
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place today. This article aimed to institutionalise the delegitimisation of the other forms 
of nationalisms and national identity perceptions that would challenge the hegemonic 
formation. It is necessary to highlight here that there were also politically less significant 
socio-political groups which were still using Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist discourses 
within the conservative bloc that targeted the secular bloc’s construction of the Turkish 
national-self.  
 The development of a conservative middle class and bourgeoisie; the vibrant 
activity of conservative intelligentsia and academic circles; gradually increasing 
conservative cultural production and presence in bureaucracy; and the flux of 
conservative masses into industrial urban areas from agricultural countryside were some 
of major domestic social and economic developments which made the institutional and 
discursive hegemony of the secular bloc less sustainable without resorting to hard power 
for consent production and strengthened the conservative bloc as a rising subjectivity 
specifically during the 1990s. Turgut Özal’s era is important here to underline as an 
episodic disruption. Turgut Özal, as the prime minister (1983-1989) and the president 
(1989-1993), challenged the hegemonic national self-understanding of the secular bloc 
by attempting to transform the Turkish national identity depending on culturally 
pluralist Ottoman and Islamic references. His attempt was sometimes referred to as Neo-
Ottomanism that also influenced foreign policy preferences of Turkey (Laçiner, 2003). 
He tried to incorporate supposedly marginalised groups like Islamists and Kurdish 
ethnicists into the system by defining the national-self in a broader way (Gülseven, 
2010, p. 90) to which the secularist-nationalist establishment resisted. The institutional 
power and discursive superiority of the secular bloc prevailed and this transformation 
initiative remained as an episodic venture.  
This rising inter-bloc antagonism made itself crystal clear in the so-called “post-
modern coup” on the 28th of February 1997. The secularist Turkish military issued a 
memorandum against “reactionaryism” that instigated the process ended up with the 
resignation of the Islamist-led (the Welfare Party / Refah Partisi) right-wing coalition 
government. The Welfare Party as a supposedly marginal (Islamist) faction of the 
Turkish conservatives was shut down by the Constitutional Court which was also under 
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the influence of the secular bloc. After this experience of the Turkish Islamists, the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) flourished from the ideological split between 
reformist and traditional factions of Turkey’s legal political Islamist tradition. The 
reformist Islamist cadres with politicians from various factions of Turkey’s conservative 
spectrum, mainly from centre-right parties, founded the AKP on the 14th of August 2001 
under the leadership of the former mayor of İstanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The AKP 
elites positioned themselves more at the centre in order to claim the mainstream 
representation of the conservative bloc rather than staying as ‘marginal’ Islamists. The 
AKP came to power on the 3rd of November 2002. It won the majority in the parliament 
in 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015 (November) general elections. The June 2015 parliamentary 
election in which the AKP lost the majority was repeated in the November 2015 snap 
election because the coalition attempts failed. The AKP did not leave the power between 
June and November 2015 as the Turkish constitution mandates the existing governments 
to remain until the new government is formed in order to guarantee the governmental 
continuity. The AKP won the parliament majority again in few months. In the June 2018 
election, the AKP lost the majority of the parliament with the small margin. However, 
since Turkey changed its parliamentary system to a presidential one in the 16 April 2017 
referendum, Erdoğan’s presidential victory in June 2018 has secured the AKP’s 
hegemonic position. By the summer of 2018, the AKP is still in power without a 
noteworthy interruption since the 2002 general election in Turkey.  
5.3 Discursive Deconstruction of Turkish National Identity 
5.3.1 HISTORIC BLOC FORMATION: DOMESTIC ‘WE’ AND ‘THEY’ 
BINARY 
 A discursive formation of a national identity envisages the national-self as a 
whole vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Deconstructing the existing discursive formation 
entails fracturing this conceived totality. A historic bloc challenging hegemonic national 
identity discourses needs to dissociate itself from the hegemonic subject position and to 
construct itself as a distinct and antagonizing entity. Since, besides their practical 
existence within the non-discursive terrain as a conglomeration of intellectuals, artists, 
businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, institutions, etc., historic blocs are also imagined 
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totalities, they need to be constructed via discourse as wholes regardless of the targeted 
people ‘really’ forms a coherent totality in the lifeworld. The discursive construction of 
social antagonisms in order to create internal frontiers within a society (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2014, p. xiii) is a precondition to deconstruct the hegemonic image of the 
national identity. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded as an outcome 
of schism within the Milli Görüş Hareketi (the National Outlook Movement), which is 
the mainstream Islamist movement in the Turkish legal political realm. The founder 
cadre of the AKP mainly consisted of Islamic-oriented politicians. However, in order to 
position themselves in opposition to the hegemonic secular bloc as the main 
representative of the historical conservative bloc, they redefined themselves as 
‘conservative democrats’ rather than Islamists (Gumuscu and Sert, 2009) who have 
mostly been at the fringes of political spectrum. This self-redefinition enabled them to 
conform to the Turkish political “field” (Bourdieu, 1984), whose rules and borders were 
determined by the secular bloc dominating the military-judiciary bureaucracy and made 
them the primary carrier of the demands and desires of the conservative bloc within the 
field.  
   The political elites of the AKP antagonised and dichotomised the Turkish 
society and politics in order to fragment the totality of the hegemonic national identity 
narrative. They presented themselves as the inheritor of the mainstream centre-right 
political parties like the Democratic Party of Adnan Menderes, the former Prime 
Minister who was executed after the 1960 coup, and the Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi, ANAP) of Turgut Özal as part of the internal self-other narrative (Koyuncu, 
2014, p. 137). The AKP elites presented these two political figures and parties as the 
conservative pole of the supposed antagonism and relentless struggle of the main 
historic blocs. They are imagined as the genuine and oppressed representatives of the 
nation and the political predecessors of the AKP. Menderes and Özal’s personalities are 
used as political symbols against the assumed internal ambiguous foes that supposedly 
oppress the national will. This parallelism between those parties/personalities and the 
AKP is one of the themes employed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, mainly in election 
campaigns which helps him consolidate his party’s popular support: 
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What did the deceased Menderes say when he began his way, he said: “Enough! 
The word [right to speak] belongs to the nation”. We added something else to 
this. What do we say? We say: “Enough! The choice also belongs to the nation”. 
Menderes gave his heart, his body to this cause. We also gave our life, our heart 
to this cause in the same manner and we cried out and are still crying out that 
“That’s enough! That’s enough! (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2010a) 
Erdoğan emphasised the continuity between the AKP’s and Menderes’s political aims 
and delineates his cause as the extension of the discontent of the DP with the secular 
bloc’s establishment. Nevertheless, the emphasis is generally on the personality of 
Menderes rather than the DP. Erdoğan has often depicted Menderes’s personality as a 
victim of the secular bloc in order to demonise it and instrumentalised him by using 
personal analogies:  
‘They’ despotically overthrew Menderes whom they could not beat at the ballot 
box, scraped off from the heart of the nation. ‘They’ slandered him severely as 
they do the same to ‘us’ today. ‘They’ lost their honour to the extent that they 
libelled the family of Menderes. ‘They’ do the same to ‘us’ today. ‘They’ 
mobilised the streets. ‘They’ are doing the same today. ‘They’ blocked him to 
serve to the nation. ‘They’ are doing the same today… They intimidated the 
nation with despotism, guns, jails, martial law at that day but today, Turkey 
would not make a concession from its ideals, would not leave a treason 
unresponded to (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014a). 
As can be seen in this example, even though there is always a strong emphasis on the 
we-they binary and harsh vocabulary against the antagonistic secular bloc – words such 
as traitors, despots, dishonourable, thieves – the subjects constituting ‘they’ are not 
generally well specified. Erdoğan mostly preferred leaving the content of ‘they’ 
ambiguous by sometimes using expressions such as ‘the known circles’ or ‘the 
same/rotten/oppressive mindset/mentality’ (Hürriyet, 2014b, 2013a, 2012a). However, 
sometimes the other has been concretised via the secular bloc’s traditional political 
party, the Republican People Party (CHP), by designating the abstract enemy as “the 
CHP mindset/mentality”, especially during the election campaigns: “Who slandered 
Menderes, provoked Menderes, put the streets on fire, applauded the 27 May coup 
[1960]? CHP. Who helped the execution of Menderes and his friends? CHP. Shame on 
you! You slandered him even after the coup” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014d). A 
pejorative continuity and an organic relation are pointed out between the interventions 
of the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) into the political realm at 
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different times by using the pronoun ‘they’ ambiguously in order to denounce the 
hegemonic historic bloc (Hürriyet, 2010b).  
This hegemonic secular bloc is discursively formed as the internal foe of ‘the 
nation’ and ‘national will’ due to their supposed enmity against the elected politicians. 
The overemphasis on the electedness of the conservative bloc vis-à-vis the secular bloc 
turns democratic legitimacy into a matter of numbers, which leads to the majoritarian 
perception of the national political culture. This strong emphasis on electoral democracy 
has implications for the governmental nodal point of national identity discourses 
because the quantitative majority of the people who have voted for Menderes and AKP 
are defined as ‘the nation’ itself, which excludes their opponents from ‘the nation’. 
These majoritarian arguments lead to majoritarian democracy to be part of the 
governmental self-perception of the nation.  
 The personality of Menderes is glorified as a hero and martyr of democracy 
because he and his friends represented “the free will of the nation” (Hürriyet, 2009b). 
Besides, he is glorified from an Islamic perspective as well. He was praised by Erdoğan 
due to softening bans against religious practices set by the hegemonic secular bloc:  
He [Menderes] protected the faith of the nation. CHP turned the Azan [the text 
recited out loud from minarets to call people to the mosque for praying which is 
Arabic universally] into Turkish. Menderes turned it back to its original Arabic 
version. Is this a crime? (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2011a) 
Even though it was also a matter of discussion during the late imperial era of Turkey, 
the lyrics of the Azan were translated to and recited in Turkish between 1932 and 1950 
as part of Atatürk’s secularising and nationalising reforms. This policy caused 
considerable discontent among the religious public against the new secular regime 
(Dikici, 2006). Conceiving the Turkification of the Azan as a negative move or 
blasphemy against the nation’s faith gives a hint about the emerging national self-
understanding of the conservative bloc. The AKP praised the conversion of the Azan 
into Arabic in order to emphasise the Islamic face of the nation as they saluted the 
change as a ‘religious freedom’. Menderes’s attitude towards religious ‘freedoms’ is 
portrayed as the AKP’s forerunner (Hürriyet, 2012a). 
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 Discursively constructing the secular bloc through its supposed political 
representative, the CHP, as anti-democratic and anti-Islamic were the two main themes 
used by the politicians of the AKP. These themes were prevalent and frequently 
repeated in different forms within the political rhetoric of various AKP politicians. To 
them, the secular bloc “cannot distinguish Atatürk and the prophet Mohammed” 
(Hürriyet, 2008a), indicating their	supposed sacralisation of Atatürk and apathy to Islam, 
and thinks that the nation should be herded like livestock (Hürriyet, 2008b). In 2007, 
Abdullah Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2007a), the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, claimed, 
“There are ‘some people’ who want to bypass the sovereignty of the nation”. To Bekir 
Bozdağ (cited in Hürriyet, 2012b), the Deputy Prime Minister in 2012, the CHP is 
disturbed by mosques, minarets, teaching of the Holy Quran and the life of the prophet. 
To Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2015b), they are even against the holy Kaaba. These 
discursive demonisations of the antagonistic bloc mostly coalesced around 
governmental (majoritarian democracy) and civilisational (Islamic) nodal points.  
To Bülent Arınç (cited in Hürriyet, 2009a), one of the founders of the AKP, 
“‘some people’ miss the sound of boots”, through which Arınç indeed relates the 
politicians of the secular bloc to a coup d’état, but again, via the ambiguous expression 
of ‘some people’. Relating the past coup d’états in Turkey to ‘they’, ‘the certain/known 
circles’ or the CHP is also another frequently repeated rhetorical tactic to characterise 
the antagonist bloc as an anti-democratic force and thus not entitled to represent the 
national-self.  For example, to Egemen Bağış (cited in Hürriyet, 2013d), the EU affairs 
minister in 2013, “the CHP has a coup-supporter mentality in its genetic codes”. 
Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014e) explicitly said, “The CHP was the architect behind 
the curtains in every coup d’état” and that “was involved in all of them”. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2014g) has repeated the same claim: “There is a coup 
mentality in the ideational roots of the CHP”. The AKP’s politicians have equated coup 
d’états of the supposedly ‘secular army’ with the main secular party and so portrayed 
them as an organically bounded secular bloc that is an enemy of ‘the nation’.  
The AKP has sometimes personified the secular bloc via certain public and 
political figures or incidents (Hürriyet, 2006a, 2013c, 2014c). Some expressions of 
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certain secular journalists, columnists or TV figures were deployed within discourses in 
order to discredit the opposite bloc as if there was a coherent unity among those people 
from different branches of social life: “‘They’ called the nation ‘bin heads’ [stupid]. 
What did ‘they’ say? They said ‘a man who scratches his belly’ [uneducated/vulgar]. 
They said a farmer’s vote is not equal to a professor’s. They are still insulting the 
nation” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2010d). Even though these were the particular 
expressions of certain public figures, Erdoğan blended them and rhetorically presented 
them as a manifestation of a coherent ‘CHP mindset/mentality’ (Hürriyet, 2010e, 
2013e). This populist and anti-elitist rhetoric targeted the secular bloc through the CHP 
or certain personalities and institutions in order to discursively construct them as a 
monolithic bloc which wants “chaos, pessimism, treason, extortion of the national will” 
(Hürriyet, 2010c) and lacks any “divinely inspired value” (Hürriyet, 2011b). The 
rhetorically unclear but monolithic ‘they’ was depicted as “the enemy of peace, the 
nation and the state” (Hürriyet, 2009c). The secular bloc’s CHP was defined as the 
symbol of “the coups, assimilation, corruption, enmity of religious and national values” 
(Hürriyet, 2014f). The AKP and so ‘their’ nation (the conservative bloc) appeared in 
discourse as the opposite camp which “proudly carries all the burden of democracy 
regardless of how heavy it is” (Hürriyet, 2007b) and “fights against the gangs which 
attempt to extort the national will” (Hürriyet, 2013e). This widespread demonisation of 
the opposite bloc (Hürriyet, 2013b, 2015a) has discursively consolidated the solidity of 
the borders between ‘enemy’ blocs. This division and estrangement strategy has assisted 
the AKP politicians both to perpetuate and deepen their power via elections and to 
fracture the hegemonic national self-image constructed by the secular elites. Employing 
the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy by adopting this accusatory rhetoric has fortified the 
frontiers of “the two nations of Turkey” (Mardin, 1989) along the lines of supposed 
secularist-Westernist/anti-democratic and conservative-Islamic/democratic dichotomy.  
5.3.2 CASTING DOUBT ON THE ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS AND 
TRADITIONS  
Institutions and traditions are the main pillars of political orders. Armed forces, 
judiciary or bureaucratic institutions, foreign policy traditions are some examples. In the 
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Turkish case, the bureaucratic state institutions are traditionally considered as the 
‘custodians of the secular regime’ vis-à-vis ‘reactionary’ ideologies and politicians. 
These institutions and traditions are naturalised – at least supposed as naturalised – by a 
nation through discourses. They are generally conceived and discursively formed as de-
politicised and impartial entities towards the particularities of citizens. A partisan action 
can be expected from a political figure whereas those ‘national’ state institutions and 
customary practices are supposed to represent the nation as a whole. Therefore, their 
functions or supposed neutrality are rarely problematised before the public by 
mainstream actors within politics. However, if a challenging historic bloc wants to 
unsettle the established political order, it needs to target these main pillars in both 
discursive and non-discursive ways. Realising some practical moves to dismantle certain 
established institutions, they need to be discursively delegitimised first by casting doubt 
on their functions and impartiality. The discursive degradation of the established 
institutions and traditions enables the challenging bloc to deconstruct the national 
identity discourse flowing from the hegemonic bloc through these institutions. Since 
states and their institutions are presumptively nations’ legitimate representational 
organisations both internally and externally, official discourses flowing from those 
‘impartial’ institutions are highly relevant and binding for the national-self narratives.  
 The civil bureaucracy, military and judiciary of Turkey are widely accepted as 
the bastions of the secular bloc, through which it defines the frontiers of democratic 
politics in order to keep the country in the track of secularisation (Mason, 2000; 
Hermann, 2003; Özyürek, 2004; Somer, 2007) and to maintain the nation’s secular 
identity. These institutions are especially vital for the secular bloc because secular 
political parties are not popular among voters as much as conservative parties which 
usually dominate the parliament since the introduction of the multi-party system in the 
1950s. This situation makes the state institutions and customary practices the only 
practical bulwark to keep the hegemonic national self-identification in line with the 
secular bloc’s ideological position. The discursive delegitimisation of these institutions, 
for that reason, becomes a must for the conservative historic bloc in order to transform 
the national identity narrative and dominate the field of discursivity. While the AKP 
political elites were undermining the legitimacy of the main institutions of the secular 
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establishment via discourses, they were also attempting to transform the ideological 
position of these institutions by means of new appointments and structural changes such 
as the subordination and reformation of the role of the ‘National Security Council’ 
which was supposed to be a legal mechanism of the “military tutelage” or restructuring 
the judicial system. 
 Erdoğan conceptualised the civil bureaucracy as “the bureaucratic oligarchy” 
and used it different times in order to denounce it as an obstacle in the way of national 
economic development. The AKP discursively portrayed this supposed bureaucratic 
oligarchy as something crucial to fight against domestically even though this oligarchy 
represents itself as ‘patriotic or nationalist’ (Hürriyet, 2005a). To Erdoğan, this 
bureaucratic oligarchy/mentality is the reason why governmental economic initiatives 
are prone to fail because it ties the hands of the politicians (Hürriyet, 2004b). According 
to the AKP, the bureaucratic oligarchy was fighting fiercely against democratic politics 
(Hürriyet, 2004c), twisting politicians around its finger (Hürriyet, 2003c) and must, thus, 
change (Hürriyet, 2006e). Portraying bureaucracy as the ruling oligarchy and the 
opposite force of democratic politics aims to emphasise how a favoured minority cause 
problems for the majority in order to keep their privileged positions. The AKP has 
presented traditional bureaucratic structures as an agency working against the material 
interests of the nation.  
 The AKP elites specifically problematised some of the verdicts of Turkish 
judiciary institutions in order to undermine their impartial image. For instance, in the 
case of a woman who was dismissed from a trial by the judge in 2003 because she was 
wearing a headscarf in the Court of Cassation (Yargıtay), Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 
2003d) slammed this decision by declaring it an “inconsistent, personal and ideological 
attitude”. Erdoğan condemned a verdict of the Council of the State (Danıştay) by 
declaring it “unlawful” and “against religious freedoms” which was also about a ban on 
wearing the headscarf (Hürriyet, 2006c). He defined the Council of the State as part of 
the bureaucratic oligarchy (Hürriyet, 2006d). A statement by the then Deputy Chairman 
of the AKP, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, which addressed these two institutions over their 
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attitudes and specific declarations, exemplifies AKP discourse circulating about the 
judiciary: 
Attempting to lead politics via the judiciary, politicising the judiciary, more than 
these, making the judiciary a political side are arbitrary moves. The 
independence of the judiciary is not only about its independence from a political 
power. The independence of the judiciary is also about having no ideological 
baggage and accepting general principles of law above everything … A judiciary 
making political statements is a jurisdiction that has lost its independence and 
neutrality. The nation is following the Court of Cassation and the Council of the 
State, whose constitutional responsibility is only to pass verdicts, with 
astonishment. Those who signed these declarations did lose their impartiality 
(Fırat cited in Hürriyet, 2008c).      
 The AKP politicians announced their discontent with the judiciary with strong 
delegitimising words and discursively deconstructed the ‘national’ status of the judicial 
institutions. They were conceived as the ‘ideological apparatuses’ of the secular bloc, 
used to perpetuate its hegemony via ‘undemocratic’ interventions. These ‘national’ 
institutions, which supposedly pursue political ends in favour of the secular bloc’s 
ideological agenda, were discursively particularised. In 2008, the chief public prosecutor 
of the Court of Cassation presented an indictment to the Constitutional Court to close 
the AKP for violating the secularism principle of the constitution. The closure trial gave 
an opportunity to the AKP elites to undermine the legitimacy of the judiciary by using 
majoritarian democracy arguments. To them, this attempt was not legitimate in the 
public conscience (Hürriyet, 2008d), overruled the national will (Hürriyet, 2008e) and 
was an anachronistic move which represented Turkey as backward (Hürriyet, 2008f).  
The AKP steadily delegitimised the judiciary by portraying it as overreaching its 
entitlements (Hürriyet, 2007c, 2008g), passing political verdicts (Hürriyet, 2010f) and 
losing its trustworthiness (Hürriyet, 2010g), labelling different institutions and judges as 
ideological (Hürriyet, 2014i), a “juristocracy” (Hürriyet, 2010h) and even “terrorists 
with gowns” in one particular context (Hürriyet, 2015c). Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 
2014j), quoting Atatürk, stated, “Sovereignty does not belong to the juridical and 
military bureaucracy. It does not belong to the Constitutional Court either. ‘Sovereignty 
unconditionally belongs to the nation’”. All these individual statements focus on a 
certain discursive nodal point: the question of popular legitimacy of the judiciary. Since 
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the judiciary does not consist of democratically elected members but appointed ones 
depending on personal credentials or merits, who generally come from secular 
backgrounds, it is an easy target for majoritarian democracy arguments. In that sense, 
Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2011f) summed up the AKP’s goal on the judiciary with one 
sentence: “We will avoid the judiciary being the backyard of ‘someones’ and, instead, 
turn the judiciary into the front yard of the nation”.  
The AKP also delegitimised severely the existing constitution, the primary 
official text of a political order and the national-self. The existing constitution has been 
designated and denounced occasionally as an anti-democratic ‘coup d’état constitution’ 
since it was drafted after the 1980 coup under the supervision of the perpetrators of the 
coup (Hürriyet, 2016a). In 2015 Efkan Ala, the then Minister of the Interior, declared in 
the parliament that he did not ‘recognise’ the validity of the constitution which 
supposedly ‘extorts’ the national will, because the constitution said that sovereignty was 
embodied in ‘constitutional institutions’ instead of representatives or referendums 
(Hürriyet, 2015d). If this powerful statement is understood literally, it might seem 
contradictory and absurd since ‘parliaments’ and ‘referendums’ are also constitutional 
institutions, and he personally holds his minister position based on the constitution that 
he does not ‘recognise’. However, he actually tried to point out with extremely strong 
words that the existing constitution was not legitimate and that popularly elected 
officials and elections or referendums were ultimately superior to merit-based officials 
and institutions or processes. This perspective leads again to majority fetishism with a 
staunch anti-elitist populism within discourse, which exhibits the cognitive structure of 
the AKP political elites and moulds the self-image of the nation in terms of 
governmental issues.  
      The AKP’s political elites have been more cautious and hesitant in their 
remarks when it came to the armed forces, although they were relatively silent and 
sometimes supportive of the judiciary while the army’s secular-nationalist generals were 
being jailed as a result of the infamous Ergenekon (2007) and Balyoz [Sladgehammer] 
(2010) investigations which was a boon for the AKP to entrench its institutional power.	
A motley collection of people, mostly military officers, had been formally charged with 
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allegedly plotting to use violence to try to destabilize and to stage a coup against the 
government of the AKP (Jenkins, 2011). Even though civilians and the members of the 
TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) who were accused of these crimes were finally acquitted 
because it came out that the executors of trials were members of the Gulenist Movement 
which was later designated as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, this process has 
weakened the institutionally strong position of the Turkish army. The AKP officials 
discursively targeted the TSK on some occasions, especially as a reaction to certain 
declarations of the TSK officials. For instance, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2006f) 
responded to a statement of Hilmi Özkök, the then Chief of the General Staff, as 
follows: “This is a bullet which shot the executive branch. Institutions cannot 
overshadow each other… People who have responsibilities need to know what they are 
saying”. The AKP administration slammed the TSK’s 2007 online memorandum 
warning against the ‘reactionary’ actions of ‘some circles’ that are against secularism 
because it was not the army’s business and it should know its place (Hürriyet, 2007d). 
Bülent Arınç (cited in Hürriyet, 2009d) denounced the activities of the Turkish military 
during the Ergenekon Trials process by blaming them to plot against their government.   
 Again, the statements regarding the TSK were mostly about its intervention into 
the political sphere which was supposed to be exclusive to popularly elected 
representatives. Furthermore, the AKP politicians sometimes casted doubt on 
universities, foreign policy traditions or some institutional implementations like the 
abolished ‘student pledge’. The student pledge, a text that used to be recited every day 
in elementary schools, was branded as a monistic, imperious and fascistic 
implementation (Hürriyet, 2013h), which coerced pupils to say that ‘I am Turkish’ every 
morning (Hürriyet, 2013i) and symbolised an archaic mentality whose abolition would 
not harm national unity (Hürriyet, 2013j). The pledge supposedly aimed to form the 
society like Hitler and Stalin, was introduced by anti-Islamic racists and could not turn a 
non-Turk into a Turk (Hürriyet, 2013t). Especially in the context of headscarf ban in 
Turkish universities, some university presidents were blamed for acting ideologically 
(Hürriyet, 2005b), universities and other scientific institutions were described as 
ideological (Hürriyet, 2008j) and the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) was accused 
of being discriminatory (Hürriyet, 2005c). The traditional foreign policy of Turkey was 
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despised for being pacifist, and the secular-minded traditional diplomats and foreign 
policy doyens were accused of acting like a ‘monşer’ which is the Turkified version of 
the French ‘mon cher’ insinuating aristocratic inertia and elitism within the socio-
political context of Turkey (Hürriyet, 2009e, 2010i, 2011g). Traditions and institutions 
like these examples were problematised regularly in order to cast doubt on their popular 
legitimacy, functions and necessity. This deconstructive discourse paved the way for the 
transformation of traditions and institutions in order to construct a novel national self-
image in parallel with the understanding of the historic conservative bloc. Discourses 
within this strategy overwhelmingly coalesced around the governmental nodal point 
since they promote electoral/majoritarian legitimacy.   
  5.3.3 SCAPEGOATING, VICTIMISATION AND PERPETRATOR INVERSION 
Ruth Wodak and Anton Palinka (2009, p. 33) state that “scapegoating, blaming 
the victim, victim-perpetrator reversals, trivialization, and denial are among the most 
common argumentative strategies used to convince” audiences of the necessity of 
certain political measures. These strategies are mostly used by privileged classes against 
stigmatised, disadvantaged groups like immigrants in order to divert attention from their 
responsibilities onto social-political ills (O’Flynn, Monaghan and Power, 2014). 
Nevertheless, this is not always the case because, for instance, a challenging bloc needs 
to scapegoat some features, institutions or figures of the hegemonic antagonistic bloc in 
order to deconstruct discourses flowing from the hegemonic centre. Subaltern discourses 
always need to resort to the strategy of scapegoating in order to portray the hegemonic 
system as the cause of its problems and alterity. The strategy of scapegoating is 
connected with the discourse of victimhood because scapegoating also appears as a way 
of blaming the victim instead of the offender (Flowerdew, Li and Tran, 2002, p. 328, 
336). This is what Wodak calls “victim-perpetrator inversion” (Wodak, 1997). The 
discursive strategy of victimisation aims to represent a specific group in a society or the 
rest of a society other than ‘elites’ as victims and the targeted group which is the 
hegemonic bloc as the villain. A challenging bloc needs to be discursively self-
victimised against the ‘repressive’ hegemonic bloc in order to legitimise its 
deconstructive manoeuvres.  
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The AKP politicians scapegoated many institutions, actions or figures of the 
hegemonic bloc as the causes of misery and sorrows of the nation. There are different 
entities and characters deployed in this strategy. The deployment of the personality of 
İsmet İnönü, the second President of the Republic (1938-1950) and a symbolic name for 
the secular bloc, within political discourses is an illustration of the scapegoating strategy 
used on a political figure in order to denounce what he symbolises. Erdoğan compared 
him with Adolf Hitler (Hürriyet, 2010j, 2010k, 2011b), blamed him for betraying the 
legacy of Atatürk (Hürriyet, 2014k, 2014l) and defined him as a friend of Italian 
fascism, who oppressed religious people and the Kurds, which the AKP considered as 
the root cause of many problems today (Hürriyet, 2011h, 2014m). The AKP also 
accused him of being a coup supporter in the 1960 coup and of handing fellow Turkic 
‘brothers’ to Stalin’s USSR, who sought asylum in Turkey and were slaughtered after 
their extradition (Hürriyet, 2014n, 2014o, 2014p). İnönü was repeatedly denounced and 
demonised as the villain who embodies the historical secular bloc. This scapegoating 
strategy also helped draw domestic frontiers in the discursive formation of the historic 
blocs in which the secular side was depicted as ‘anti-democratic’.  
The rhetorical usage of the Islamic headscarf issue is another theme used in this 
scapegoating strategy. The Islamic headscarf ban in the state institutions might be the 
most controversial and criticised implementation of the secular bloc/statecraft, which 
was applied through bureaucratic hegemony. The secular bureaucratic hegemony 
restricted wearing headscarf in public institutions because the secular bloc has been 
seeing “veiling, and particularly its new urban style, as a threat to the republic, its ideal 
citizen, the modern way of life” and failure “to assimilate [women] effectively into the 
nation’s secular culture” (Göle, 1996, cited in Gokariksel and Mitchell, 2005, p. 148). 
AKP politicians inverted the headscarf question “from being a private matter of piety to 
a public question of freedom of religious expression” (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008, 
p. 514). The AKP used the discursive strategy of victimisation as leverage against the 
secular establishment in Turkey via the reversal of the discourse of emancipation. The 
headscarf and veiling were conceived in nation-wide discourses of the secular bloc as a 
supposedly repressive tool against women, and women wearing them were thought to be 
the victims of a reactionary mentality. In the discourses of the AKP, the perpetrators 
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were changed and the secular bloc was portrayed as the villain which victimises women 
who wear headscarves by preventing them from enjoying their freedom of religious 
expression. In 2008, Erdoğan delivered a speech that sparked a controversy at the time 
and which reformulated the discourse against the headscarf ban by employing the 
strategy of victimisation: 
Even if it [headscarf] is worn as a political symbol, can you accept wearing a 
political symbol as a crime? Can you ban symbols? Is there such a ban in any 
other place in the world regarding freedoms?... The women with headscarves can 
study freely at universities in Europe, the US or other countries. There is not any 
problem in those places but in my country, where 99 per cent of the population is 
Muslim, there is such a problem (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2008h). 
To Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2007e), everybody has to respect women’s 
decision to cover or uncover their heads. The AKP also defined the headscarf ban as the 
persecution of Muslims several times (Hürriyet, 2013k, 2014r, 2014s). As can be 
deduced from these statements, the victimisation discourse has both religious and 
democratic freedom connotations. To Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2014q), it is 
not only a religious practice but also a symbol of the national-self because, in his view, 
the nation waged the national independence war also for the sake of protecting the 
headscarf which was once targeted by the invaders and, now, by the secular bloc. This 
statement also likens the opposite bloc to the ‘Western invaders’. Erdoğan (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2015e) praised the lifting of the headscarf ban: “We abolished the oppression 
of our female students by putting an end to the headscarf ban in elementary and high 
schools… Now, everybody obtained the right to live as they believe in all spaces”. This 
last sentence is a perfect example of the perpetrator inversion strategy because, whereas 
the wearing of the headscarf used to be conceived as a tool of female oppression by the 
so-called ‘reactionary’ perpetrators, this sentence reverses it by defining the right of 
female pupils to wear Islamic headscarves in elementary schools as emancipation. This 
makes the secular bloc the perpetrator.   
The AKP applied a similar perpetrator inversion strategy to the so-called 
Kurdish question or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane, PKK) 
/ terrorism problem. The PKK is a self-proclaimed ‘socialist’ militant organisation that 
is designated as ‘terrorist’ by the USA, the EU, the UK, Turkey and etc., supposedly 
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aiming to extract a Kurdish homeland from Turkey’s territory. In the headscarf issue, 
there was only a perpetrator transposition because the victim (women with headscarves) 
was the same in both discourses. However, there is a victim-perpetrator inversion for the 
PKK case. The PKK used to be widely deemed as the cause of terrorism in Turkey. The 
AKP transposed the role of PKK terrorism and certain actions of the state regarding the 
so-called Kurdish question in order to undermine the legitimacy of the secular statecraft 
from an ethnic angle and portrayed it as the oppressor of the Kurds as well as pious 
Muslims. Transposing the causality between the state’s actions and the PKK’s terrorism 
diminished the legitimacy of the state run by the hegemonic elites and opened a space of 
legitimacy for the PKK. Bülent Arınç (cited in Hürriyet, 2009f) questioned the rationale 
behind the military campaign of the PKK: “Won’t we think about the reasons that made 
them go to the mountains [referring to the PKK bases]?... It is mostly mistreatment, 
torture, and anxiety for the future… There are many reasons. You can make it easy for 
the people to leave the mountains if you work to remove these reasons”. This speech 
explicitly validates the fighting rationale of the PKK against the state. In another speech 
he declared that he would “go to the mountains” (this expression refers to joining the 
PKK) if he was in their shoes by referring to the life of a certain person: 
If you deny the existence of Kurdishness and put the ones who say it exists in 
jails, there is no solution to this problem… Since she [a Kurdish-origin MP] was 
exposed to extremely immoral torture in the Diyarbakir Prison when she was 
only seventeen, I would go to mountains if it came to my mind. More than the 
half of the people who had been released from the Diyarbakir Prison went to the 
mountains (Arınç cited in Hürriyet, 2012e). 
 This victim-perpetrator inversion strategy towards the so-called Kurdish problem 
deconstructs the supposedly monistic national identity narrative of the hegemonic 
secular bloc. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014t) claimed, “Rejection, denial and 
assimilation policies have been implemented against our Kurdish brothers who have 
been a constitutive component of this country, until ‘our’ era”. This kind of expression 
directly broaches the secular bloc’s monistic narrative of the national-self and the 
ethnic/cultural nodal point within national identity formation. According to the AKP, 
secular perpetrators victimised Kurds by using the enforcement power of statecraft, 
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which ended up with that Kurds ‘going to mountains’, and the conservative bloc 
politically represented itself as the liberator of Kurds.   
5.3.4 DUALITIES AND BALANCING AS THE MIDDLE GROUND  
Objectivity claims and the nation-wide legitimacy of a historic bloc might entail 
representing the national situation in a conflict between opposite parts and portraying 
the historic bloc as above these dualities as the mediator or a justified side of this 
conflict. Like news discourses, a historic bloc challenging the discursive hegemony 
either needs to presuppose “various standpoints in conflict” and ensure that “they appear 
to be balance with one another” (Cramer, 2011, p. 71) or isolate itself from both sides by 
depicting them as equally wrong. The discourse of balancing helps “frame controversial 
issues in simplistic terms” and marginalise opposing voices (Clare, Krogman and Caine, 
2013, p. 48) or deconstruct the discourse of homogeneity. Moreover, some public 
figures, institutions and concepts can be portrayed as in conflict and crisis which, then, 
implies the necessity of a change in status quo in order to solve problems. 
Balancing the judiciary with the legislature or executive powers was one of AKP 
politicians’ commonly used strategies. Instead of considering the judiciary as a 
complementary part of accountable governance, they were discursively positioned on 
the opposite side of democratic procedures. The judicial interventions were represented 
as against legislation and its implementation and thus against democracy and ‘the 
national will’, which was a prevalent ‘floating signifier’ throughout the AKP discourses. 
Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013l) stated, “We have two qualities at the same time 
which are the legislature and executive branches. I believe in this: ‘The sovereignty 
unconditionally belongs to the nation’; it does not belong to the judiciary”. In another 
speech, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2010n) claimed that the legislature and executive 
branches were besieged by the judiciary. The following press release of the AKP in 
2010 is a good illustration of this strategy of balancing: “The duty of the ones who use 
judicial powers is not to legislate but to implement the laws accepted by the parliament. 
No body, branch or institution can give a command or directive to the parliament” 
(Hürriyet, 2010l).  
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Balancing the appointed judiciary with the elected legislature also aims to 
position the judiciary in opposition to the nation itself since there is no 
popular/majoritarian/elected representation in the judiciary, as this is explicit in a 
statement of Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2010m) against the main opposition party: 
“Farewell! ‘You’ go to the court [the Constitutional] and ‘we’ go to the nation. This is 
the difference between the AKP and the CHP”. AKP politicians furthered such a 
dualism also for balancing ‘the state’ with ‘the nation’ since secular statecraft was 
conceived as an oppressive tool. They assumed that there was a chasm between the state 
and the nation, and they discursively located them at opposite poles and declared that 
they were the ones who made the state ‘embrace’ its nation by uniting and making peace 
between them: 
The boycott began when the republic met with its ‘public’. They were not on the 
same page as the nation yesterday and they are not today as well. We defend the 
union of the state and the nation. We defend this at all levels. We can only speak 
of the brotherhood of 73 million [estimated population of Turkey] when we 
attain this aim. (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2010o) 
 The AKP bound itself up with ‘the nation’ and the hegemonic other, the secular 
bloc with the state in this nation vs. state pendulum because “the CHP has always been 
against democracy, ignored the demands of the people and took sides with the state” 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014v). To Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2014u), “there are 
people who want to prevent the union of the state and the nation”.  As opposed to the 
pro-state secular bloc, the AKP supposedly “always prioritised the nation over the state” 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2012f). However, this does not mean that the AKP 
politicians demonised or othered the state but rather they treated it as a captive in the 
hands of the internal foe: “…‘they’ were not prioritising the people but the state. ‘We’ 
are saying the human is the first and then the state. Don’t worry, if people of a country 
are powerful, happy and peaceful, then, the state will be strong as well” (Erdoğan cited 
in Hürriyet, 2011i). Another theme within the AKP’s balancing strategy relevant to the 
state-nation relations is the republic-democracy duality. The AKP did not denounce the 
concept of the republic but depicted it as inadequate without democracy:  
Republic is meaningful and a ‘virtue’ only with democracy… The republic is 
strong with democracy. The republic is pro-freedom, egalitarian and inclusive 
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only with democracy. Democracy, as ‘someones’ has been claiming for years, is 
not the opposite or the enemy of the republic but its supplement and complement 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013k). 
 The emphasis on the term virtue was a reference to Atatürk who defined the 
republic with one word: Virtue (Erozan, 2016, p. 433). Erdoğan was discursively 
reshaping a foundational motto by adding democracy to it, which distinguishes the new 
national identity narrative in terms of a governmental nodal point from the previously 
hegemonic one. This differentiation is important because, allegedly, there were still 
“someones (birileri)” who considered democracy as a threat against the Republic 
(Hürriyet, 2010p). Democracy must be protected like the Republic (Hürriyet, 2010q) 
from those “someones”. In this case, even though the AKP mostly discursively 
separated democracy from the republic, it did not take a side sharply in this balance but 
presented itself as more of a middle ground between those two concepts. It is necessary 
to note here that this floating signifier of ‘someones’ appears often in Erdoğan’s 
speeches mostly indicating the opposite bloc or some other governments which he does 
not want to target directly. 
 The AKP politicians also adopted the strategy of balancing one ethnicity against 
another. Erdoğan declared many times that the AKP is against all sorts of ethnic 
nationalism by balancing Turkish nationalism with the Kurdish one: “We are against 
both Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms, and all other nationalisms. We love the created 
[people] because of the creator [Allah]. We want to become a united whole on the 
common ground of citizenship of the Republic of Turkey” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
2013m). In the former hegemonic discourses, Turkish nationalism was defined as the 
nationalism of all citizens – named as ‘the nationalism of Atatürk’ in the second article 
of the constitution – by being blind to the existence of cultural diversity within the 
country which is, thus, considered as assimilationist. However, the AKP discursively 
stripped the Kurdishness from Turkish nationalism and erected it as an equivalent by 
using the strategy of balancing in order to deconstruct the hegemonic discourse on 
national identity: “Nobody should stand against us neither with Turkishness nor 
Kurdishness. We stamped on [refused] all sorts of nationalisms… Do you know what 
we have in our nationalism? Patriotism and humanism” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
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2013n). Moreover, the AKP balanced the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların 
Demokratik Partisi, HDP - a legal political party having supposed ties with the PKK) as 
“the representative of Kurdish racism” and “the Baath Party of Kurds” against the 
Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) as “the representative of 
Turkish racism” and the CHP as “the Baath Party of Turks” (Hürriyet, 2010r, 2013p, 
2013q, 2016b). After balancing these political parties, the AKP isolated itself from both 
sides by depicting them as equally wrong and representing itself as the only all-inclusive 
party, thus the real representative of the entire nation (Hürriyet, 2014w, 2014x).  
 Besides, many other pairs of different entities were balanced against one another 
such as concepts, people, music types and even drinks. The security and freedom 
pendulum was used in order to claim that the old secular statecraft put more weight on 
the security side whereas the AKP administration knew how to balance them (Hürriyet, 
2010s, 2014y, 2015f). The Turkish Police – assumed to be more loyal to the elected 
governments historically than the TSK – was balanced against the TSK as “the 
guarantor of the regime”, which was an expression used for the army by the secular bloc 
(Hürriyet, 2009g). Nazım Hikmet Ran, a socialist/secular poet mostly appreciated by the 
secular people, was balanced with Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, considered as an Islamist poet 
(Hürriyet, 2010t), Rakı (a spirit which was supposed to be the national drink) was 
balanced with Ayran (a non-alcoholic drink made of yoghurt) as the national drink 
(Hürriyet, 2013r) or Frederic Chopin’s Funeral March used by the army is balanced with 
the 17th Century Ottoman-Turkish musician and composer Buhurizade Mustafa Itri’s 
piece entitled ‘Tekbir’(Hürriyet, 2016c, 2016d). A parallel national-self narrative 
presented itself in different aspects of life through balancing one thing against another 
that had value-laden connotations. This strategy of balancing contained elements from 
all nodal points within the discursive formation in order to transform the understanding 
of the national-self. Balancing one ethnic group with another, legislation with judiciary 
and one civilisational allegiance with another one were examples of discourses which 
coalesced around these three nodal points.   
148	
	
5.3.5 NEGATIVE REPRESENTATION OF THE NATIONAL-SELF  
Discourses challenging the established discursive order have to represent the 
present situation of the relevant space/country negatively in order to promote their own 
alternative discourses as legitimate. If the current order and its on-going deeds are not 
blamed, then, there would be no need for a change. Therefore, the antagonist bloc’s 
hegemony needs to be degraded with a critical perspective using negative aspects of the 
past, which is also reflected in the present. However, since it is the same national 
identity which is being re-narrated, the situation in the past and the present needs to be 
portrayed negatively as an aftermath of the antagonistic bloc’s hegemony. The political 
elites of the AKP have depicted the general situation in Turkey negatively, especially 
during their first years in power. In 2003, Mehmet Elkatmış, the then AKP Head of the 
Human Rights Investigation Commission of the Turkish Parliament, made clear the 
negative representation of the self: 
We cannot talk about complete human rights for a place in which there are 
gangs, mafias and corruption. It is impossible to say that there are human rights 
in a country where there are coups, military memorandums, shadow constitutions 
and laws. There are no human rights in a place where there are discrimination, 
social engineering and the West Working Group [an alleged clandestine pro-
interventionist secular clique in the army]. We need to overcome and abolish all 
these. Democracy and the rule of law need to prevail (Elkatmış cited in Hürriyet, 
2003e). 
The AKP elites condemned the contemporary order with very strong words in terms of 
human rights issues. The situation in the country was depicted as disastrous. To them, 
“thousands of fellow citizens were unhappy owing to obstacles in the way of religious 
freedoms” (Arınç cited in Hürriyet, 2005d). Both Muslims and non-Muslims were 
facing religious problems (Hürriyet, 2008i, 2012g). To the AKP, they had taken over a 
country full of mafias, gangs, criminal organisations, which influence politics, but the 
AKP had liberated the country not only from them but also from a ‘civilian dictatorship’ 
(Hürriyet, 2009h, 2010u). Erdoğan declared that ‘the deep-state tradition’, another way 
of expressing the gangs within the state mechanisms controlling the elected politicians, 
had always been a reality of the country since the Empire era, which needed to be 
minimised or obliterated (Hürriyet, 2007f, g).  
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These populist black and white portrayals of the national-self were mostly 
aiming at electoral triumphs to transcend the limits of election polemics. Not only were 
political opponents targeted but also statecraft and fundamental institutions were in the 
range of negative representations of the country. The high-ranking AKP officials 
depicted the country as a place in which people were arrested only because of writing 
articles and reciting poems (Hürriyet, 2005e), where unsolved political murders and 
torture existed (Hürriyet, 2008k, 2010v), people including children were kidnapped, 
executed extrajudicially and buried in ‘acid wells’ by shadowy state officials (Hürriyet, 
2009j), people were forced to leave their homes and their villages were burned by the 
state (Hürriyet, 2010x), and official mechanisms scared people and prevented 
development (Hürriyet, 2014z). Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2009i) described some 
previous actions of the Turkish state governing as taking a “fascist approach”. He 
praised his government in 2010 because of “taking the riot squad of the national police 
out of ‘these lands’” as if it was an illegitimate force in its own land (Erdoğan cited in 
Hürriyet, 2010w). However, in another speech in 2013, he said that the AKP would not 
allow the riot police to be exposed to anti-propaganda, ‘as long as it acts in a legal way’ 
(Hürriyet, 2013s). These remarks might seem contradictory but it is a discursive strategy 
to detach the new hegemonic order from the old one by still using the same institutions. 
In the same speech, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013s) described how people were 
afraid of the national police because of torture, beating and mistreatment but not today 
under the AKP’s rule.  
The Turkish nation-state was severely attacked by its own rulers in order to find 
a leeway which would help the challenging bloc to deconstruct the axioms, premises and 
pillars of the hegemonic secular bloc which was dominating the institutions and the 
statecraft. In 2016, Numan Kurtulmuş (cited in Hürriyet, 2016e), the then Deputy Prime 
Minister, defined the history of the Turkish republic as a “history of oppression” after 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire because of the secular elites were alienated from 
their own values. To the AKP politicians, the Turkish nation adopted immoral aspects of 
the West which were against its own values (Hürriyet, 2008l, 2008m), lost its self-
confidence (Hürriyet, 2013d) and was traumatised (Hürriyet, 2010y). Even though the 
nation or the contemporary national situation was represented pejoratively, the 
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antagonistic bloc was the one to be blamed for these negativities. The country’s past was 
degraded specifically in the cases of ethnic and religious affairs, economic 
underdevelopment, accusations of illegality and a strategy of self-victimisation. The 
following statement of Erdoğan is a good combined example of different themes in the 
negative representation of the national-self using extremely dramatic comparisons with 
the past. He employed the term ‘the old Turkey’ to define the secular/Kemalist period 
(Kocamaner, 2015, p. 1): 
You know how the ‘old Turkey’ was… There were prohibitions on cultures, 
even in prisons. There were bans on native languages. Religions were forbidden 
in the old Turkey…Propaganda in different languages on TV was forbidden. The 
old Turkey was a Turkey in which there was assimilation. Murdered [by state 
officials] people were thrown into ‘acid wells’. The headscarf was forbidden. 
The vocational imam schools were shut down… Working with headscarves in 
the state institutions was forbidden. We were insulted. The state was arrogant 
and disdaining. The state was discriminating against its own people. There were 
sorrow and blood in the old Turkey. People were dying. There were misery and 
poverty. We have fought to eliminate these for twelve years. We struggled to 
establish the ‘new Turkey’ (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014aa).  
Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013u) defined ‘the old Turkey’ as a “giant prison” in which 
religious people and the Kurds were pariahs despite the fact that it was their homeland. 
The AKP elites represented ‘the old Turkey’ negatively in order to demarcate the 
borders between the era of secular hegemony and their tenure. The AKP represented the 
national-self, Turkey, and the contemporary situation of the nation negatively and 
degraded it harshly, through which they lambasted the secular establishment and 
delegitimised it as means to construct a new national-self narrative with positive self-
representations which are analysed in the constructive strategies.  
5.3.6 REPRESENTATIONAL ILLEGITIMACY AND ALIENATION FROM 
SOCIETY 
The concept of legitimacy is what binds the governed and the government. The 
governing classes perpetuate their hegemony as long as their narratives are not 
challenged consequentially by alternatives. Since politics is a struggle to impose 
legitimate principles and categories of construction of the social world (Bourdieu, 2005, 
p. 37, 39, cited in Wodak, 2011, p. 1, 4), a historic bloc challenging the existing 
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hegemonic order and fighting to replace it needs to delegitimise these principles and 
categories. The discursive formation of national identity is one of the most crucial 
legitimising tools for a hegemonic bloc to impose its own vision over the public. The 
challenging bloc needs to deconstruct these national identity discourses by the 
accusation of representational illegitimacy. As Paul Chilton (2004, p. 47) states, this 
delegitimisation can manifest itself in discursive strategies such as “acts of blaming, 
scapegoating, marginalising, excluding, attacking the rationality, sanity or morality of 
the other” and even denying their humanity. The hegemonic bloc and its vision of 
national identity need to be depicted as parochial, sectarian, and lacking the popular 
consent of the victimised, so-called ‘silent majority’. According to this understanding, 
even though this silent majority comply with the hegemonic order explicitly, they are 
discontent with it implicitly. This presumption of representational illegitimacy moves 
the strategy to the self-alienation and dissonance claims. The challenging bloc 
presupposes that the hegemonic group or the national identity they form do not represent 
the ‘we’-group, namely the nation, because hegemonic privileged elites are alienated 
from society and there is a dissonance between the values and norms of the elites and 
the public/nation. Hence, the anti-elitist theme is generally very intense in this discursive 
strategy. This anti-elitist discourse also includes emphasis on socio-economic class 
antagonisms as well as the supposed value-laden contradictions. 
 In the Turkish context, The AKP conceived the hegemony of the secular bloc as 
the patronage of a privileged minority over the majority of the nation and the state 
apparatuses. They attributed an exclusionary attitude to the secular bloc regarding the 
representation of the Republic. To the AKP, the secular bloc has oppressed the nation 
and put it under ‘tutelage’ by considering themselves as ‘the real owner’ of the 
Republic, of the nation and of the regime, and the rest like an ‘adopted child’ (Hürriyet, 
2012h). These secular elites were illegitimate because they supposedly did not act 
inclusively to all citizens and sub-national groups, and favoured their bloc which 
disintegrated the unity of the nation: 
Where did you earn the right to be arrogant by wagging your finger at others 
while considering yourselves as the sole owner of the Republic? The Republic 
belongs to the 76 million [the estimated population of Turkey]… Nobody has a 
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right to say ‘stupid’ or ‘sheep’ to this nation. This nation established this 
Republic (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013v). 
As in this statement, the AKP has claimed that the Republic and its hegemonic elites 
disdained and derided the nation and did not represent it in its entirety. The supposed 
oppression by the secular bloc was imagined with the emphasis on their assumed 
understanding of being the ‘sole’ owner of the Republic. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 
2013k) stated that the interventions of “someones”, who considered themselves as ‘the 
only guardians of the Republic’, and their exclusion, humiliation and derision of certain 
parts of society took the essence of the Republic away and harmed the bonds of unity 
and fraternity. The hegemony of an imagined coherent elite group was denounced 
because, to the AKP, this elite group despised the nation and exclusively claimed the 
representation of the Republic and the nation without democratic legitimacy. To 
Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2007h), the hegemonic elites ascribed this non-democratic 
self-referential legitimacy to themselves because they thought that ‘they’ are the ones 
who exclusively established the Republic. However, to him, these fake, self-referential 
elites who were alienated from their own history and geography were not the ones who 
built the Republic. Rather it was built by all the components of the nation together 
(Hürriyet, 2010z). 
Since it is important to depict the antagonist bloc as an isolated minority lacking 
popular support in order to delegitimise the discourses disseminated by them, the AKP 
has invoked the theme of democratic/popular illegitimacy. This theme is crucial because 
it undermines the hegemonic subject position by pointing out the unpopularity of their 
narrative among the nation. Therefore, to the AKP, the ‘elites’ resisted the democratic 
transformation of the nation, which put them in an anti-democratic position: 
Who was smearing us while we were bringing a more advanced democracy to 
Turkey, making it more civilian [de-militarisation of politics], developing rights 
and freedoms through transformation? They were ‘status quo’ supporters who 
were disturbed by the change. They were ‘Jacobins’ who could not tolerate 
democracy. They were the ones who missed totalitarianism, that were not happy 
with rights and freedoms. In short, they were the ones who missed ‘one-party 
rule’ and the oppressive authoritarian state. They were the ‘elitists’ who derived 
material gains from this uniformity (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2010aa). 
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In this statement, Erdoğan used certain floating signifiers like ‘status quo’, ‘Jacobins’, 
‘one-party rule’ and ‘elitists’, which sometimes appeared in other speeches of the AKP 
politicians as linguistic tools of denunciation. The Jacobin analogy signifies the 
hegemonic secular elites’ supposed endeavour to transform society by force without the 
nation’s consent in accordance with their ideological agenda. The power of ‘one-party 
rule’ enabled ‘them’ to attempt to shape the nation’s fate. Therefore, ‘they’ miss ‘one-
party rule’, which refers to the early republican era (1923-1950), when many significant 
modernisation and secularisation reforms took place under the secular CHP. They are 
‘elitists’ because they supposedly consider themselves as the ‘guardians/tutelars’ of the 
nation and above ‘the national will’ (Hürriyet, 2010p). To the AKP, these elitists 
attempted to preserve the ‘status quo’ because they did not want to lose their privileges 
and were against the feelings and thoughts of the nation. The main division within 
Turkish politics was based on the contestation between these status quo supporters (the 
secular bloc) and the advocates of change (the conservative bloc) (Hürriyet, 2008n).  
 According to the AKP’s portrayal, these ‘elitists’ were not only prone to anti-
democratic leanings but also were dominant and arrogant in different ‘fields’ like art:  
‘They’ look down on the nation and claim that they produce ‘high art’… These 
‘elitists’ think that they own arts, science and thought as their political branch 
thinks that Turkey belongs to them… They are ‘elitists’, ‘Jacobins’. They do not 
let anybody enter their ‘caste system’… [As if] Only ‘they’ understand the 
theatre, cinema, music, sculpture, paintings or literature. They don’t like the 
nation, the labour of the nation, the culture of the nation, the preferences of the 
nation. They humiliated the nation with caricatures, through their columns, TV 
screens. They scorned the people who serve this country and religious men in 
their plays, films and writings (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2012i).   
Erdoğan conceived a cultural gap between the secular elites and the nation in this highly 
anti-elitist speech. The supposed ‘elitists’ were depicted as arrogant, pretentious, 
exclusionary and indifferent to ordinary people, specifically ‘religious men’. To the 
AKP, ‘they’ are ‘intellectual despots’ who think that intellectuality is not acquired by 
working but rather descends from their fathers (Hürriyet, 2011f). This strong anti-elitist 
discourse conglomerated around the governmental nodal point was also conflated with 
cultural alienation connotations that were linked to the civilisational nodal point. Numan 
Kurtulmuş (cited in Hürriyet, 2016e) articulated this ‘wrong’ mentality: “We have been 
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thinking with the borrowed ideas for 150 years. We were afraid of our own values. 
Anything related to the Ottomans was considered as reactionary, false and something 
preventing the nation to advance. The elites told it this way. The most important issue 
for Turkey is to re-form its imagination”.  In another speech, Erdoğan made the 
conservative bloc’s position clear: 
There has always been a group of people who are prone to take anything from 
the West without questioning because of their inferiority complex. This Jacobin, 
lazy, imitator group who has colonised minds and looks down on the nation, has 
controlled our state and social life for a long time. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar [a 
conservative poet, novelist] defines this approach aiming to cut the veins of the 
society as a denial of culture. I define it as a suicide as well as a denial (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2016f). 
Erdoğan’s definition of the modernisation/westernisation process conducted by the 
secular elites as a ‘suicide’ has a meaning beyond its rhetorical function. It envisages 
that a westernised Turkish nation actually is not itself anymore because westernisation 
destroys characteristics that make the Turkish nation. In another speech regarding 
alcohol regulations, he directly targeted this ‘suicidal’ modernisation: “This law [alcohol 
prohibition] is totally abolished because of the top-down and coercive modernisation 
mentality of the ‘one-party rule’ [1923-1950]. Alcohol consumption was encouraged 
and promoted with an imitation mentality to be modernised and civilised” (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2013r). The AKP portrayed modernisation/westernisation as an 
imposed transformation which is against the values of the nation. The secular bloc was 
blamed for being alienated from the national culture and spreading this alienation. The 
AKP emphasised that the secular bloc has always despised the religious values of the 
nation and the religious people are demonised as ‘reactionaries’ (Hürriyet, 2012h). To 
them, the secular bloc does all this because they are “alienated from their own culture 
and history” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2015i).   
Nevertheless, to the AKP, these alienation narratives about the nation were 
popularly rejected by the very same nation because the nation never denied its Islamic 
origins (Hürriyet, 2015g). Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2016g) stated, 
“Bureaucratic elitism has always clashed with the public. ‘We’ represent the nation 
against this ‘elitist bureaucracy’ which wages a war against all our historical values 
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including distorting the originality of the Azan of Mohammed”. The elitists were not 
only conceived as indifferent or ignorant to the national values but also as an enemy of 
the public/nation disguised as modern, progressive, intellectual, leftist or democratic 
(Hürriyet, 2016h). Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2015h) invited the secularists to make 
peace with the nation regarding cultural/civilisational values: “We say let’s make peace 
with our own history, civilisation and culture. There is no future for the rootless”. The 
AKP combines religious rhetoric with a cultural/civilisational discourse and uses them 
almost interchangeably, which makes the cultural understanding of the national-self 
exclusively Islamic. According to this national self-image, Islam or religiosity is what 
defines ‘the real’ nation, not the secularism or the West which are directly related to the 
civilisational nodal point within the national identity discourses.  
The AKP bolstered its discursive strategy of alienation with a socio-economic 
class antagonism theme aiming to portray the secular elites as the wealthy ones who 
exploited and abused the conservative masses (Hürriyet, 2009j). To the AKP, the 
alienated ‘elitists’ acquired this wealth at the expense of the nation. Erdoğan was open 
about that in this following statement: 
It was always the nation that is asked when something is necessary. If money 
was necessary, it was demanded from the nation. If any sacrifice was necessary, 
it was always demanded from the nation. However, the nation’s opinion has 
never been asked. The nation’s objections were neglected. The nation always 
suffered but a small elite faction enjoyed the benefited (Erdoğan cited in 
Hürriyet, 2014ab). 
To Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013b), the CHP [the secular elites] has always wanted 
all privileges in the country and condemned the nation to poverty. A group of elites in 
‘Istanbul’ was favoured but hard-working businessmen from ‘Anatolia’ were prevented 
from being successful in the market (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2010a). The ‘Istanbul’ 
economic elites, deemed as the secular business world, were discursively balanced with 
the conservative/religious ‘Anatolian’ businessmen. To the conservative bloc, the 
distribution of capital within the country has been rigged in favour of the secular 
bourgeoisie. This economic antagonism theme also contributed to undermining the 
legitimacy of the secular bloc and the discourse flowing from it through discourses 
mustered around the civilisational and governmental nodal points. 
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5.3.7 INTRA-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND HETEROGENEITY 
The standardisation of the cultural understanding of the national-self and 
homogenisation of populations is widely deemed necessary in order to construct a solid 
national identity (Rae, 2002). Daniele Conversi (2007, p. 372) states that political elites 
can wield different methods of social engineering in order to deliberately foster cultural 
homogeneity and uniformity among the people. Since hegemonic national identity 
discourses conceive national masses as a homogenous unity, a deconstruction attempt 
requires questioning this imposed assumption. A challenging/antagonistic bloc, subject 
position or discourses will always strive to deconstruct the hegemonic discourse of 
homogenous national identity by emphasising intra-national differences or vice versa if 
the hegemonic national identity is conceived as heterogeneous/plural. The 
deconstruction of homogenous perception of the national-self and promotion of a 
multicultural/ethnic perspective entails “a fundamental re-description of the nation away 
from racial and cultural homogeneity in the direction of ethnic and cultural diversity” 
(Ang and Stratton, 1998, p. 26). The hegemonic national identity can be blamed on the 
moral basis for assimilation of other cultures/ethnicities, disintegrative performances or 
being exclusionary. These normative arguments can contribute to the deconstruction of 
hegemonic national identity narratives.    
 Turkish national identity conceived by the hegemonic elites of the early republic 
epoch has been problematised according to the argument that the national identity was 
constructed exclusively to the Turkish culture and ethnicity, disregarded the diversity in 
the lifeworld. The AKP emphasised intra-national differences and heterogeneity of the 
nation to transform the cultural self-understanding. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013w) 
defined the Turkish nation as a diverse cluster of ethnicities which was supposedly 
denied before: “There is not only one race or ethnicity within the concept of the nation. 
We have brothers and sisters from many different ethnic backgrounds within the Turkish 
nation. Hereafter, we need to leave the monistic approach”. Erdoğan uttered repeatedly 




...Turkey is a country composed of these ethnic groups. There are Turks, Kurds, 
Lazs, Circassians, Georgians, Abkhazians, Albanians, Bosniaks and whatever 
comes to your mind. All these groups are closely involved with each other. 
There is a religion bond that connects our ethnic groups because 99% of Turkey 
is Muslim (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2005f). 
This kind of statement was very prevalent in the speeches of AKP politicians. They 
might seem to be integrative and constructive utterances because of the emphasis on the 
commonality of religion or citizenship. However, insistent emphasis on counting the 
ethnicities within discourses, consistently reminds the audience that they are different 
from each other in the cultural/ethnic sense, whereas the old hegemonic discourses 
mostly disregarded such differences by not mentioning them. Hence, perpetual emphasis 
on intra-national differences creates a cognitive separation between different groups and 
encourages them to define themselves through their ethnic identities, as if these 
identities are essential or given while the national identity is constructed or a matter of 
preference.  
Another deconstructive side of such statements is the discursive ethnicisation of 
‘Turkishness’. Even though Erdoğan has sometimes tried to distinguish the ‘Turkish 
nation’ from the ‘Turkish ethnicity’ by saying that the national one is a constitutional 
definition (Hürriyet, 2005g), constructing Turkishness as one of the ethnicities within 
the country along with constructing it as a term for citizenship has disintegrative and 
deconstructive implications. The construction of Turkishness as an ethnonym reduces 
the term to an intra-national particularity from an umbrella concept defining all citizens. 
This approach also sparks a controversy of ethnic hierarchy and makes the name of the 
nation a relativised floating signifier. It is a deconstructive strategy because it relativises 
what people understand by the word ‘Turkish/Türk’. This discursive ethnicisation of 
Turkishness is very apparent in many of Erdoğan’s speeches: “I am personally close to 
my citizens from ‘Kurdish descent’ as much I am close to ones of ‘Turkish descent’” 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2010ab). Talking about the ‘Turkish descent’ by balancing it 
with the Kurdish one is a directly particularising speech-act. Therefore, in some 
instances, the AKP politicians preferred using the term ‘citizen of Turkey’ rather than 
‘Turkish’ citizen which was conceived as an intra-national particularity. Moreover, 
owing to the same ethnicisation theme, the AKP elites attempted to replace the term 
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‘Türk’ (Turkish) with the term ‘Türkiyeli’ (From Turkey) for citizenship in their 
discourses (Hürriyet, 2003f), but it was not used pervasively.   
Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2007i) presented the Turkish nation in different 
instances as a conglomeration of ‘36 ethnic groups’ and praised this diversity as richness 
and good fortune. The AKP politicians glorified ethnic/cultural diversity, pluralism and 
the multicultural structure of society on a moral/normative basis over the supposed 
monistic approach of the past. To Mehdi Eker (cited in Hürriyet, 2007l), the then 
Minister of Agriculture, this past monist approach towards cultural differences harmed 
the unity of the country and citizens’ sense of belonging to the nation. To Erdoğan (cited 
in Hürriyet, 2013z), contrary to the secularists’ alleged cultural monism, what makes 
Turkey great is its capability of keeping cultural differences altogether within a country. 
Abdullah Gül emphasised that the Turkish nation founded successful states and empires 
in history thanks to its mentality of tolerance and an attitude that embraced differences 
(Hürriyet, 2009m, 2013aa). To him, cultural diversity is not only a historical attribute of 
the Turkish nation but also a necessity of being a democratic state: 
A democratic state does not melt differences in a pot or otherise them. If we look 
at our country, state, and nation under the light of ‘our’ historical experiences, 
from ‘our’ [national] angle, we will see that our differences are richness. If we 
look at in a self-alienated way, we will see differences as threats (Gül cited in 
Hürriyet, 2009n). 
The AKP politicians conceived cultural/ethnic diversity as immanent to the 
Turkish national-self. Therefore, the secular bloc’s presumed cultural/ethnic monism 
regarding the national-self was a historical deviation from the ‘real’ national identity.  
According to the AKP, this allegedly blasphemous approach of the secular bloc was also 
anti-democratic and counter-productive in terms of national unity because it disregarded 
the ‘reality’ which culminates in legitimation crises, such as the so-called Kurdish 
question. To the conservative bloc, their approach was anti-democratic because this self-
image was imposed on the nation via top-down mechanisms in spite of the national will. 
The AKP initiated a reform project in 2009-2010 called ‘the national unity and fraternity 
project/process (sometimes referred as ‘democratic initiative process’)’ (Hürriyet, 
2010ad) in order to remedy problems caused by this supposed anti-democratic and 
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‘unreal’ national self-identity formation of the secular bloc. The name of the project 
itself was a discursive apparatus presuming that national unity and fraternity within 
Turkey had problems, and thus the AKP was attempting to remedy it by depending on 
democratic reforms and public consent.  
The most apparent ethnic group is the Kurds within the AKP’s discourses 
regarding the cultural/ethnic nodal point, although they portrayed the Turkish nation as a 
rainbow (Hürriyet, 2009o) or mosaic (Hürriyet, 2005g) of many cultures. The AKP 
elites repeatedly dichotomised ‘Turks’ and ‘Kurds’ as the main pillars of the nation. 
Even though these two groups’ fraternity is usually highlighted, perpetual 
dichotomisation crystallised the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and, most importantly, the 
cognitive division between them. One of the most illustrative speeches of this 
dichotomisation was by the then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speech in 2016, in 
which he defined the nation as the unity of the children of ‘Alparslan’, the Seljuk-
Turkmen Sultan defeated the Byzantines at Manzikert in 1071, allowing Turks to sweep 
into Anatolia (Uyar and Erickson, 2009, p.1-2), and ‘Anatolia’ symbolising the Turks 
and the children of ‘Saladin’, a commander, ruler with Kurdish roots and the founder of 
Ayyubid dynasty, and ‘Mesopotamia’ representing the Kurds (Davutoğlu cited in 
Hürriyet, 2016i) . This statement both historically and geographically dichotomises 
Turks and Kurds as separate ethnic/cultural groups. ‘The Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood’ 
was one of the most common themes that was used to present these two groups as a 
united whole (Hürriyet, 2010ac, 2012j, 2015j, k, l, 2016i, j) However, defining the 
connection as ‘brotherhood’ discursively constructs them as two separate entities 
because the brotherhood metaphor is employed for other nations as well to express 
cultural closeness. Defining an in-group with a metaphor that is also used for out-groups 
is a way of emphasising intra-national differences. The dichotomisation theme has 
specifically destructive implications because it indicates the existence of two 
nationalities within one nation-state. 
The theme of territorial references is another tool used by AKP politicians to 
emphasise intra-national differences. Relating certain regions or cities with a separate 
cultural group marks these territories with an intra-national identity rather than the 
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nation as a whole. This supposed identity-territory nexus contributes to the discursive 
deconstruction of the national identity because it erodes the social cognition of the 
imagined national common space. Hüseyin Çelik (cited in Hürriyet, 2008o), the then 
Minister of National Education, stated that the AKP desired to build bridges between 
hearts of people from the ‘east’ and the ‘west’. This statement assumes a cognitive 
separation between nationals depending on spatiality which has ethnic/cultural 
connotations, since the ‘east’ symbolises the Kurds and the ‘west’ represents the Turks. 
Hinging upon this assumption, Egemen Bağış (cited in Hürriyet, 2008p), the then 
Deputy Chairman, said that they would go to the ‘east’ more often and ‘win those 
places’, as if the Kurdish majority cities had already been lost. The AKP elites suggested 
that the MPs of all the parties visit the ‘east’ more often to remind the people of the 
region of the fact that ‘those places’ are also part of this country, as if they had already 
forgotten and to meet with the people of the region as if they are strangers (Hürriyet, 
2008q, Hürriyet, 2008p). Furthermore, Erdoğan repeatedly used the term ‘beyond Sivas 
[a city located on the centre-east of Turkey]’ in election campaigns in order to indicate 
that the other political parties (except allegedly pro-PKK ones) could not get votes from 
the Kurds, and, thus, were not approved by them (Hürriyet, 2009 c, q, 2011j, k). 
Relating cities located on the east of Sivas with an ethnic group creates a discursive and 
cognitive separation regarding common territorial space based on intra-national 
differences. This strategy of emphasis on intra-national differences is mostly related to 
the ethnic/cultural nodal point within the national identity discourses which attempt to 
deconstruct the supposed monistic outlook of the secular hegemons towards the national 
identity regarding cultural/ethnic issues.  
5.3.8 INTER-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES  
The discursive dislocation of the national-self within the global matrix is an 
important strategy for a challenging bloc. The deconstruction of the hegemonic national 
identity discourses might entail distancing the national-self cognitively from 
international/civilisational allies or ideological comrades of the national hegemons. The 
discursive themes of othering or constructing binary relations internationally are very 
practical linguistic tools used to alienate the national-self from the existing hegemony. 
161	
	
The international actors akin to the national hegemons can be demonised, insulted or 
characterised pejoratively as the enemy of the nation, humanity, or universal moral 
values. Emphasis on inter-national differences can contribute both to discursive 
deconstruction internally and to identity dislocation externally. 
 The AKP politicians mostly emphasised differences between ‘our’ civilisation 
and the ‘Western’ civilisation in order to deconstruct the supposed pro-western national 
identity narrative of the secular bloc. The AKP’s statements on the supra-national 
greater ‘we’ coalesced around the civilisational nodal point in opposition to the Western 
civilisation. For instance, the AKP defined the possible Turkish membership of the EU 
as a “dialogue of civilisations” which “will bring harmony to inter-civilisational 
relations” because “Turkey is a Muslim country which embraces democracy” (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2004e, f). This type of ‘inter-civilisation’ statements does not have 
moral hierarchy connotations but conceives of Turkey as outside of Western civilisation 
and situates it in an amorphous Islamic/Muslim civilisation. The same theme can be 
seen in discourses surrounding Turkey’s 2004 ‘Alliance of Civilisations’ initiative under 
the UN in cooperation with Spain, that made Turkey the de facto representative of the 
Islamic civilisation (Koyuncu, 2014, p. 258). In the first years of their rule, AKP 
politicians took a more hesitant and cautious position towards the West and seemed pro-
western compared to the traditional Islamist movements in Turkey. However, the 
discourse towards the supposed unitary Western civilisation has evolved gradually and 
became a benchmark of national self-definition. For instance, the AKP politicians 
sometimes referred to the Christian roots of the EU project and the West in order to 
draw the line between ‘our’ civilisation and ‘them’. Erdoğan declared that the EU 
without Turkey’s participation would remain a ‘Christian club’ (Erdoğan cited in 
Hürriyet, 2004e, f) and that the legal system in the West was based on Christian 
morality (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013bj). He blamed the West for having a selective 
approach in the Syrian refugee crisis by prioritising Christians in order to protect their 
‘Christian roots’ (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2015m).   
In AKP discourses, the term Western civilisation is directly used in opposition to 
‘Islamic civilisation’. To Erdoğan, Western civilisation disregarded the achievements of 
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the golden age of ‘Islamic civilisation’ (Hürriyet, 2010ae). In another time, he said, 
“‘our’ civilisation and our people’s self-confidence declined against the ‘Western 
civilisation’” (Hürriyet, 2012k). These statements openly presume the Western 
civilisation to be a historical, cultural united totality vis-à-vis the Islamic/‘our’ 
civilisation. The AKP did not only emphasise the difference between ‘our’ civilisation 
and the ‘Other’ civilisation, namely the Western civilisation but also compared them on 
a moral basis (Hürriyet, 2011l, m, n). The AKP depicted the West as materialist and 
greedy, which makes the West morally inferior to the East. Erdoğan blamed the West 
for keeping its ‘orientalist’ logic and seeing the ‘east’ as inferior to themselves: 
Brothers! The mentality of ‘orientalism’ still determines the outlook of the West 
towards the East. To a significant portion of the Westerners, being an Easterner 
means being the representative of backward and reactionary ideas… The West 
will see you as inferior regardless of whatever you do or how much you improve 
yourself economically and culturally (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016k). 
These ambiguous ‘west’ and ‘westerners’ were portrayed as arrogant and biased. 
In fact, this kind of statement was mostly Erdoğan’s response to the critics of European 
politicians but the content of the speeches exceeded the limits of self-defence or political 
polemics. They contributed to the denunciation of the West whose values are supposed 
to be a component of the national self-image conceived by the secular bloc. The West 
appeared in AKP discourses as oppressors with reference to historical crimes and in 
comparisons with the supposed Turkish attitude: 
Our ancestors helped the local people of Eastern Africa with all their capacity 
against the European colonialists… All countries, who are attempting to give a 
lecture to us on human rights, have historical records in the continent [Africa] 
full of blood, tears, genocides and massacres… The whole continent was under 
the invasion of a few European countries. They exploited and pillaged the 
continent in the name of the civilising mission. If you scratch the magnificence 
of the today’s West, you will find sufferings of millions of Africans (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2016l). 
In this excerpt, Erdoğan depicted the West as genocidal imperialists whereas Turkish 
ancestors were portrayed in solidarity with the oppressed. This is a perfect example of a 
black and white representation of history in order to draw a line between the national-
self and the West. To the AKP, Europeans were lecturing Turkey on a moral basis while 
they had the blood of millions on their hands because “the West has always represented 
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hypocrisy” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013ab). In opposition to the West, the Islamic 
civilisation, “the civilisation to which the Turks belong”, is conceived as “the 
civilisation of peace” by the AKP (Hürriyet, 2009s). To Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2015o), the West’s shameful history is not only limited to the colonisation of 
Africa: “If we start talking about historical controversies, the most shameful things were 
in Europe. Turkey was the shelter for the Jews and Muslims who fled from the Spanish 
Inquisition”. In another speech, he stated that the Europeans were afraid of Muslims 
today because “the bloodiest religious wars happened in Europe” like the Thirty Years’ 
War (Davutoğlu cited in Hürriyet, 2015p). To him, while the Middle Ages mean 
‘darkness’ to Europe, those ages were the times when “the [Islamic] civilisation that 
defended honour and equality of humankind emerged” (Davutoğlu cited in Hürriyet, 
2014ac). Other historical cases for shaming the West and morally distinguishing it from 
‘our’ civilisation were the Holocaust, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and racism, which 
were part of European history and the present (Hürriyet, 2013ac, 2015q). These morally 
comparative statements are benchmarks of international differences in which the West is 
on the evil side. Since material superiority can hardly be claimed considering the 
development level of the West compared to Muslim majority countries and Turkey, 
AKP politicians apply moral/ethic inferiority or pejorative historiography is applied to 
Western civilisation.  
 The anti-western rhetoric of the AKP politicians also depicts the West as the 
enemy of Turkey and Muslims. Being Muslim and Turkish was conflated in this theme. 
Muslim majority countries were discursively included in the understanding of ‘We’ in 
opposition to the West: “Only ‘we’ can solve ‘our’ problems. I am telling it openly: The 
outsiders [implying the West] love oil, gold, diamonds and cheap labour of the Islamic 
lands. They like Muslims’ conflicts, fights, and disagreements with each other. Believe 
me; ‘they’ don’t like ‘us’” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014ad). Davutoğlu depicted the 
developments in the Middle East as a war between the ‘crusaders’ and ‘Saladin’ or 
‘modern Byzantium’ and ‘Alparslan’ (Davutoğlu cited in Hürriyet, 2016ag) that 
conceives the West and Muslims in a permanent conflict. This sort of statements has 
both deconstructive and constructive effects because while it undermines the hegemonic 
western understanding of the Turkish national-self, it simultaneously constructs the 
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Islamic understanding of the national personality. Since the West and its history are 
situated as a constitutive other to the Turkish identity, the penetration of Western values 
into the Turkish national identity is conceived as contamination which needs to be 
extracted in order to turn back to the ‘real’ national-self and glorious days of the past.   
Furthermore, to Erdoğan, the West seems like a friend but in fact, it does not 
want Turkey to rise (Hürriyet, 2013z, 2015r, 2013m). In Erdoğan’s discourses, the West 
is arming terrorist organisations against Turkey (Hürriyet, 2016n, q), presenting 
terrorists as ‘good guys’ (Hürriyet, 2016o) and providing a safe haven for anti-Turkish 
terrorists to organise freely in Western cities (Hürriyet, 2016p). To him, supporting 
terrorism is what distinguishes ‘us’, the Muslims, from the West as he said that whereas 
“the West’s hypocrisy is obvious” in the terrorism issue, “‘we’ as Muslims never 
supported terrorism” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2015s). This anti-Turkish endeavour of 
the West is not surprising for the AKP because, to Erdoğan, the West wanted to 
suffocate the Turks by isolating them in Anatolia and leaving them without a homeland 
during and after the First World War (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2015h). All these 
demonisation themes coalesced around the civilisational nodal point within national 
identity discourses in order to alienate Turkey from its internal western constituents and 
so, from the national self-image conceived by the secular bloc. This strategy of 
emphasis on inter-national differences relocates the Turkish national identity from being 
part of the Western civilisation to the Islamic/eastern civilisation.            
5.3.9 RELATIVISATION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PRAXIS OF THE 
FOUNDING GENERATION 
National identity formation always involves narratives of the nation’s founding 
generation (Said, 2000, p. 177), their principles and praxis. However, this narration of 
the founding generation is different from the mythical narration of the legendary genesis 
of a nation which “is often set so far back in time that it is lost in the fog of time and is 
no longer ‘real’, that is, it ‘exists’ somewhere in ‘mythical’ times” (Wodak et al., 2009, 
p. 24). Stefan Berger (2009, p. 493) expresses that the myths of origin not only hark 
back to the distant past but they might also refer to more recent re-foundational 
moments in national history like revolutionary moments, as in the examples of the 
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French revolution of 1789 and the Russian revolution of 1917. The desacralisation of 
principles, sayings or other sorts of the praxis of the founding generation exalted by a 
hegemonic bloc as a ‘golden age’ is necessary to dethrone the entrenched national self-
image. A challenging bloc can relativise and problematise the bedrocks of hegemonic 
national historiography like the founding treaty, principles, mottos, practices and so on. 
These linchpins of a national identity narrative generally create a field of legitimacy that 
has its own discursive habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). The relativisation of the founding 
generation’s deeds discards the supposed impeccability and immunity of the 
foundational narratives and gives a leeway to deviate from the hegemonic image of the 
national-self. The vacuum due to the deconstruction of the hegemonic founding 
narrative is filled with the challenging bloc’s historiographical articulations.       
 The AKP rhetorically questioned the validity of some of the founding 
generation’s reforms, also known as Atatürk’s revolutions, between 1923 and 1938.  
The reform dubbed ‘the language revolution’ is one of the most problematised reforms 
of the founding generation. This reform includes the replacement of the Arabic alphabet 
with the Latin alphabet. Arabic and Farsi-origin words and grammatical structures were 
replaced with ancient or invented Turkish alternatives. In the AKP’s interpretation, even 
though it seems that the reform aimed at linguistic purification/Turkification, it also had 
civilisational implications since Arabic is the original alphabet of the Holy Quran, and 
Arabic and Farsi are reminiscent of the Islamic/Eastern civilisation. Erdoğan blamed the 
reform for weakening the Turkish language and put it in a context of self-alienation by 
the secular founders: 
I underscore that a society which cannot be its own self would be a different 
entity. We experienced one of the biggest troubles in language. We used to have 
a language which is very favourable for conducting science but the language was 
obliterated overnight. And now, we became a country learning science with 
‘foreign’ languages… One cannot do philosophy with the vocabulary of 
contemporary Turkish. You need to invoke the Ottoman Turkish, English or 
French. We need to overcome these problems (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
2014ae). 
The language revolution was supposedly a continuation of a perverted understanding of 
the national-self which weakened the language of the nation against ‘foreign’ 
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(specifically Western) languages. The civilisational connotations can be captured in this 
statement because the words and concepts coming from Western languages like English 
and French are described as ‘foreign’ and malicious whereas the words with Arabic and 
Farsi origins are considered natural components of Turkish language. To Erdoğan (cited 
in Hürriyet, 2012l), the language revolution not only weakened the Turkish language but 
also disrupted the historical continuity of the nation: “Operations on the Turkish 
language cut the linguistic continuity between generations and the most important 
bridge between today and our history. ‘They’ cut ‘our’ ‘jugular vein’”. The metaphor of 
the ‘jugular vein’ indicates that the language revolution, and so the secular founders 
attacked the society to end its ‘real’ existence and transform it into something artificial. 
‘They’ (the secular founders) cut the ‘real’ nation’s relations with its own history in 
order to estrange the nation from its own self. However, to Erdoğan, Turkish language 
and nation are still standing in spite of two hundred years [including the pre-republic 
westernisation process] of oppression aiming to cut the nation’s ties with its roots 
(Hürriyet, 2014af) as in the example of the language revolution which means targeting 
the society’s religion, arts and literature (Hürriyet, 2014ag). The AKP also questioned 
the closure of the Madrasas which were historical Islamic educational institutions. 
Erdoğan stated that the closure of the Madrasas by the Republic caused an educational 
vacuum and new educational institutions failed to replace the thousand years of the 
Madrasa tradition (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016r).  
Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat said that ‘Atatürk’s revolutions’ in general were 
traumatic for Turkish society (Hürriyet, 2008r). To the AKP, the traumatic thing was not 
only the social reforms that were a deviation of the historical continuity of the nation but 
also ‘the monist [uniform-ist] understanding’ of the national identity of ‘one-party rule’ 
[the CHP rule between 1923 and 1950]. In 2013, Ömer Çelik, the then Minister of 
Culture and Tourism, made it clear: 
While the state [the Republic of Turkey] was being established, the foundation 
of a homogenising state was desired. A Turkish nationalism that had not been in 
the memories of Turks was invented… For us, the nation-state has appeared as a 
state-nation. Namely, the state wanted to invent a nation that it will govern later. 
This monist/uniform-ist understanding of the ‘one-party rule’ caused traumas for 
all parts of the society (Çelik cited in Hürriyet, 2013ad). 
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Çelik argued that the Turkish nation conceived by the secular founders caused traumas 
because what was in their minds did not fit the realities of the people and ‘they’ 
enforced an artificial/fake national identity refused by the nation itself. Thus, the AKP 
argued that this state-driven and invented national-self which caused cognitive 
dissonance among the population must be restored in accordance with the realities of the 
nation in the lifeworld.  
The AKP also harshly criticised some other practices of the founding generation 
besides Atatürk’s reforms. ‘The Kemalist regime’ (denoting the regime founded by 
Mustafa ‘Kemal’ Atatürk) was depicted as oppressive to Kurds, pious Muslims, Alevis 
(a heterodox Islamic sect), and racist and alienated from society. For instance, the severe 
response of the state against ‘the Dersim Rebellion’ which took place in 1937-38 was 
repeatedly deployed within AKP politicians’ discourses in order to denounce the actions 
and sanctity of the founding generation, which used to be a political taboo. Erdoğan 
verbally apologised to the people of Dersim on behalf of the state for the first time in the 
history of the Republic and blamed the CHP and officials of that time, targetting Atatürk 
implicitly since he was the President of the time (Hürriyet, 2011n) and İnönü explicitly 
(Hürriyet, 2014m). AKP politicians dubbed the Dersim incidents, in contrast to the 
hegemonic discourses, ‘the Dersim massacre’ which targeted Alevis (Hürriyet, 2014t). 
Mehmet Metiner (cited in Hürriyet, 2013ae), an AKP member of parliament (MP), 
defined the state’s severe reaction to the Dersim rebellion as “a massacre which was 
almost a genocide”. The derogatory arguments used against the CHP (Hürriyet, 2007j) 
sometimes turned into the accusations against the founding generation. Rhetorical 
attacks on the CHP using the words like ‘always’ or ‘never’ also targeted the founding 
generation, unless the founding generation was bracketed, since they were the founders 
of the CHP as well as the Republic. The AKP politicians avoid targeting Atatürk 
personally, instead using different linguistic implication techniques in the same way as 
they use the CHP to denounce certain aspects of the founding generation. In other cases, 
the AKP blamed ‘the CHP’, ‘İnönü’ or an ambiguous ‘they’ for the Turkification of ‘the 
Azan’ (which happened during the Atatürk’s era in 1932) (Hürriyet, 2011o, 2014f, 
2015t) or ‘converting mosques into stables [which means insulting Islam]’ (Hürriyet, 
168	
	
2015t), ‘forbidding the Holy Quran’ and ‘being against all national and moral values’ 
(Hürriyet, 2014f).  
One of the most important and defining principles of the new Turkish Republic 
was secularism (Laiklik/Laïcité). This defining tenet of the Republic added to the 
constitution in 1937. The AKP politicians mostly endorsed this principle in their 
speeches but they problematised how it has been operationalised in Turkey. On the one 
hand, this attitude kept the principle immanent to the identity of the state. On the other 
hand, it relativised its operational legitimacy. The most assertive statement about 
Laiklik/Laïcité was made by İsmail Kahraman, the then Speaker of the Grand National 
Assembly of the AKP in 2016: 
There shouldn’t be a description of Laiklik in the new constitution… Everybody 
interprets it arbitrarily. There shouldn’t be such a thing. Our constitution should 
not escape from religion. Why should we ‘purify’ ourselves from religion as a 
‘Muslim country’? ‘We’ are ‘a Muslim country’. Thus, we should draft a 
religious constitution (Kahraman cited in Hürriyet, 2016s).  
This statement openly defines the nation as Muslim and invites the Islamisation of the 
constitution. However, other AKP politicians did not fully embrace this statement. Some 
of them emphasised that they favoured a “liberal interpretation of Laiklik instead of an 
authoritarian one” (Hürriyet, 2016s, 2016u) because “if Laiklik is defined and 
operationalised as an anti-religion implementation, it is normal that people would 
object” (Hürriyet, 2016v). This debate was not the beginning or the only objection 
against the Turkish version of practising secularism. Bülent Arınç (cited in Hürriyet, 
2016s) stated that the secularists accepted Laiklik as a religion. In another speech, 
Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat (cited in Hürriyet, 2005h) said, “Laiklik is not a religion. The 
state cannot impose it as a state religion”. To Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014ah), 
Laiklik was used as “a tool of oppression and social engineering in Turkey”. This very 
core precept of the secular republic was not relativised as a bad idea per se but because 
it was supposedly operationalised by the secular bloc in an anti-democratic way.  
 The AKP problematised some mottos of the Republic which are aphorisms of 
Atatürk. For instance, Erdoğan criticised the supposed misunderstanding of the adage of 
“peace at home, peace in the world”. He said that this motto did not mean being inactive 
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or indifferent in world politics (Hürriyet, 2012m, n). Another relativised motto of the 
secular-dominated Republic is that “How happy is the one who says I am Turkish” 
(Hürriyet, 2013o). İhsan Arslan, then an MP of the AKP, stated that this statement 
offended Kurds (Hürriyet, 2009t). Erdoğan also said that this expression got negative 
reactions from citizens with Kurdish origins (Hürriyet, 2013o). Likewise, AKP 
politicians also used ‘the 10th Year March’ of the Republic, which was composed for its 
10th anniversary celebrations and often used by secularist-nationalist groups, for 
undermining some myths of the founding generation. Mehmet Metiner, an MP of the 
AKP, said, “The march is fully fascist, racist and modern idolatrous” (Hürriyet, 2013x). 
Erdoğan stated, “The 10th year March does not feed me”, which implied the 
obsoleteness and dysfunctionality of such an ideological position (Hürriyet, 2014l). This 
kind of statements discursively undermines some of the mystifying instruments of the 
secular bloc’s national self-image. 
 The founding treaties are important for national historiographies. They make a 
newly founded regime legitimate to be recognised by the international community. 
Therefore, the relativisation of such a treaty would have existential connotations for a 
nation. However, Erdoğan also discursively challenged the legitimacy of the founding 
treaty of the Republic of Turkey which was the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne: 
‘Someones’ tried to deceive us by representing Lausanne as a victory. You do 
see the Aegean Sea now, right? We handed in the adjacent islands in Lausanne. 
Is this a victory? Those places were ours. There are our mosques and shrines but 
we are still discussing the continental shelf in sea and air… Why? Because of the 
negotiators at that treaty table. Those who sat at that table failed. We are still 
having troubles because of their failure (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016w). 
The ambiguous “someones” in this statement directly targets the elites of the founding 
generation who were ‘at the Lausanne table’. Erdoğan represented the founding treaty as 
a diplomatic failure which conceded the territories conceived as ‘homeland’ in the 
national imagination because after the treaty, “the country shrunk from 3 million km 
square to 780 thousand km square” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016x). Mosques in the 
lost territories were shown as symbols of national ownership which directly makes the 
identity-territory connection via an Islamic identity. The denunciation of the treaty of 
Lausanne with a revisionist perspective deconstructs the secular bloc’s national history 
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narrative, which praises the treaty as the international birth certificate of the Turkish 
nation-state. The discursive strategy of the relativisation of the founding generation 
contained articulations that combined all three nodal points in order to undermine the 
secular bloc’s national identity formation.  
5.3.10 OTHER DECONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES 
Deconstruction strategies adopted by the AKP politicians are not limited to the 
ones discussed above. The AKP politicians employed some other different themes and 
discursive strategies. These other strategies are not exhaustive because any other 
researcher can detect alternative strategies within the national identity discourse of the 
AKP. The other strategies of destruction revealed in the following paragraphs are drawn 
mostly from Wodak and her colleagues’ work (Wodak, et al., 2009):  
 (1) Hetereronomisation: The contemporary national condition can be 
delegitimised through claims of dependency on some outer forces which will help the 
challenging bloc to portray the hegemonic order as dysfunctional and illegitimate. The 
opposite/hegemonic historic bloc can be illustrated as a kind of proxy, puppet or partner 
of malevolent outsider powers. For instance, in AKP discourses, the former Turkish 
government agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were depicted as 
begging the IMF to enter the country which meant economic enslavement and 
dependency (Hürriyet, 2003a, 2004a, 2006b, 2015b, f). The AKP also resorted to the 
strategy of heteronomisation in order to portray the antagonistic bloc as a fifth column 
of an external enemy within the country. The CHP, as the founding party of the Turkish 
Republic and the political representative of the secular bloc, was explicitly targeted 
because of being heteronomous and having ideologically common traits with some 
external agents like the Baathist –Syria, Iraq– (Hürriyet, 2011c, 2012c, 2012d) or anti-
democratic militarist regimes –Egypt– (Hürriyet, 2014h) of the Muslim world or 
speaking on behalf of the supposed external enemies like Israel (Hürriyet, 2011d, e, 




(2) Minimisation and Trivialisation: The hegemonic bloc can be represented as 
numerically insignificant or qualitatively weak in order to prove that it does not 
represent the nation either democratically or meritoriously. Trivialising or disparaging 
evaluations of the hegemonic bloc’s actions is also crucial to minimise its possible 
influence over the public sphere. Perpetually describing the hegemonic bloc as a 
‘minority’ is an important example of minimisation. This elite ‘minority’ supposedly 
dominates the ‘majority’ of the nation through bureaucratic institutions (Hürriyet, 
2007k). The AKP elites coded the secular bloc and its ideology as ‘marginal’ (Hürriyet, 
2008s, 2013ad) and described their contemporary situation as ‘shrinking’ and 
‘weakening’ (Hürriyet, 2009u), which enabled the conservative bloc to represent itself 
as the powerful and legitimate representative of the nation.  
(3) Legitimation Crisis: “Legitimation crises” (Habermas, 1992) are “moments 
of decisive interventions in the process of institutional change” (Hay, 1999, p. 320), 
which make national identity transformation more likely or easier for historic blocs 
challenging the national self-image of the hegemonic bloc. Legitimation crisis is also a 
discursively constructed assumption regardless of what is happening in the non-
discursive terrain. A challenging bloc might need a legitimation crisis in the lifeworld or 
to discursively construct one in order to deconstruct the hegemonic national identity 
discourses. In the discourses of the AKP, the two most salient crises were the so-called 
‘Kurdish question’ (Hürriyet, 2005i) and religious citizens’ presumed exclusion from 
the ‘public sphere’ (Hürriyet, 2005j) as the oppression of the ‘monist’ and ‘secularist’ 
statecraft. Besides, AKP politicians also put some particular bureaucratic or judicial 
interventions in a discursive legitimation crisis context. The AKP politicians represented 
the closure trial of the AKP in 2008 as a legitimacy crisis – “a coup with gowns” 
(Hürriyet, 2008v) – in which the judiciary was invading the realm of legislation and 
targeting the general (national) will (Hürriyet, 2008d, t, u). These examples of the 
discursive construction of legitimation crisis have ethnic/cultural connotations like the 
Kurdish question, civilisational like the headscarf question or governmental implications 
as in the closure trial case.   
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(4) Declaring Obsolete and Historicising: The discursive strategy of declaring 
something or somebody as obsolete, out-dated or dead is a way of dismantling the 
hegemonic discourses. According to this strategy, the legitimacy of the hegemonic order 
and discourses are historically and spatially contingent. The strategy undermines the 
validity of the hegemonic order, bloc and discourses using the argument that they are 
not functional, effective or cogent anymore considering the realities of today. For 
instance, the parliamentary system of the country was declared obsolete in favour of the 
presidential system (Hürriyet, 2015u). The AKP elites depicted the version of Turkish 
nationalism pursued by the secular bloc as “old-fashioned, third world isolationism” 
(Hürriyet, 2004g). The AKP portrayed the CHP, the political representative of the 
secular bloc, as “the remnants of the iron curtain era” (Hürriyet, 2006g), a “fossilised 
structure” and “out of time” (Hürriyet, 2006k). To the AKP, the CHP and its mentality 
“are stuck in the 1940’s world” (Hürriyet, 2006w, 2011p, 2012o). These statements 
contributed to the deconstruction of the national identity conceived by the secular bloc. 
The AKP elites historicised some actions of the hegemonic secular bloc by calling them 
‘anachronistic’ (Hürriyet, 2008f), and denounced the ‘mentality’ of it as out-dated. 
Therefore, the secular bloc’s ideas and national self-image were invalidated via this 
strategy.            
5.4 Discursive Construction of Turkish National Identity 
5.4.1 INTRA-NATIONAL SAMENESS/SIMILARITY AND HOMOGENEITY 
 A country’s hegemonic elites might conceive their nation as a 
culturally/ethnically diverse totality. Nevertheless, there still has to be a common 
denominator to draw the frontlines between the national-self and the rest of the world. 
Therefore, every national identity, by nature, presupposes intra-national sameness, 
similarity or standardisation to some extent. The mental construct of the nation as a 
uniform and homogenous body in terms of the preferred common denominator (which 
can be an ethnicity, political ideology, religion, geography etc.) might necessitate 
suppression or backgrounding of intra-national differences. Nevertheless, the 
suppression of differences is not a must as long as they do not significantly challenge 
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the hegemonic self-image of the nation because there can be also a simultaneous 
emphasis on subnational diversity and national model character (Wodak et al., 2009). 
 The AKP has constantly emphasised the multi-cultural/ethnic composition of 
Turkish society that undermined the secular bloc’s supposedly culturally homogenous 
understanding of national identity. However, this deconstruction initiative needed to be 
supported with alternative defining common features because, otherwise, there would be 
a discursive and cognitive vacuum. The AKP subjectively emphasised shared history, 
religion, citizenry, and cultural commonalities in order to construct a new hegemonic 
discourse of national identity. It is important to note that the AKP defined the Turkish 
nation in a pluralistic way but not as a ‘multi-national’ entity. They depicted Turkey as 
‘one nation’ with cultural diversity, namely “unity in diversity” (Hürriyet, 2015v). 
Erdoğan defined ‘Turkishness’ as citizenship of Turkey which is also congruent with the 
national identity discourses of the secular elites. However, he also used the term Turk as 
an ethnonym which deviates from the continuity in national identity discourses: 
One nation, one flag, one homeland, one state!...  We are one nation with 79 
million people including Turks, Kurds, Lazs, Circassians, Georgians, Abkhazs, 
Bosniacs, Romas. We are all citizens of Turkey. We define this as ‘the Turkish 
nation’ in a broader, constitutional sense. We cannot say that the expression of 
‘the Turkish nation’ does not include Kurds, Georgians, Romas, Abkhazs, 
Bosniaks. This concept includes all of them. (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016y). 
“One nation, one flag, one homeland, one state” is a recurring slogan of the AKP, 
especially of Erdoğan, which he turned into a motto (Hürriyet, 2008x, 2011q, 2013af, 
2014i, 2015w, 2016aa). To Erdoğan, people defying this quartet of ‘oneness’ are 
‘traitors’ and ‘separatists’ that will pay a price (Hürriyet, 2013ag, 2016z). To him, this 
expression of ‘one nation, flag, homeland, and state’ not only represents the ethnic 
Turks but all citizens from different backgrounds (Hürriyet, 2013n, 2015x). This theme 
of the uniformity quartet aims to construct the Turkish nation as a unity of an ethnic-
mosaic. According to this self-image, groups culturally separate from the mainstream 
can legitimately and proudly conceive and discursively form themselves as 
folkloric/cultural/ethnic groups but not as nations/nationalities.  
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 The AKP politicians emphasised ‘citizenry’ as one of the most important 
unifying principles of the ‘Turkish nation’. The term of ‘Turkish nation’ was designated 
as a linguistic signifier of the ‘constitutional citizenship’ of Turkey. In 2005, Erdoğan 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2005l) said, “We consider different ethnic groups as richness as long 
as the constitutional citizenship of Turkey is recognized… These identities are sub-
identities but the expression of ‘Turkish’ is our supra-identity which is the reflection of 
the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey”. To him, ‘the citizenship of the Republic of 
Turkey’ is the country’s common denominator (Hürriyet, 2005m, 2009s). This 
understanding of the expression of the Turkish identity-citizenship/ethnicity nexus has 
not changed over the years, since the parallel statements on the issue can be observed 
also in 2016: “Nobody should say ‘I am from another nation’. I am Turkish [in an ethnic 
sense] but we have only one nation. It is the Turkish nation. They can say ‘I am a Kurd 
but I am from the Turkish nation.’ Or ‘I am a Bosniac but I am a citizen of the Republic 
of Turkey” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016h). There is a clear continuity within the 
AKP’s discourses of citizenship over the years even though there are some episodic 
disruptions depending on specific institutional developments like the failed disarmament 
negotiations with the PKK (2012-2015).  
 The AKP perpetually distinguished the nationality-citizenship from ethnicity and 
Erdoğan showed his discontent with politicians who pursue an ethnicist agenda by 
blaming them for conducting ‘identity politics’, being racist and ethnic nationalist. He 
said, “Isn’t there a ‘Turkish’ race or ethnicity in the world? Yes, there is but the 
expression of ‘Turkish’ within the constitution is a definition of the constitutional 
citizenship” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2005g). This distinction between national 
citizenship and ethnicity validates Turkish nationalism as a form of 
constitutional/citizenship patriotism but despises any other sort of nationalisms 
including supposed ‘ethnicist Turkish nationalism’. Erdoğan declared that the AKP was 
against ethnic, religious and regional nationalisms (Hürriyet, 2013ah) and accused 
political parties and movements that he considered as ethnicist of being ‘ethnic 
nationalists’, ‘racists’, ‘Nazis’ and, ‘fascists’ (Hürriyet, 2013b, ai). He deemed political 
parties which supposedly pursued ‘identity politics’ to be traitors (Hürriyet, 2009i, s, v). 
This rhetorical animosity against the so-called ‘ethnicist’ or ‘identity-based’ political 
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views invalidates any alternative self-image of the nation. This theme aims to set the 
national identity discourses of the AKP as the default identity because the AKP’s 
‘particular’ approach to national identity is taken out of the identity context and 
naturalised as if it is the new ‘normal’ or ‘general’.  
 The AKP elites esteemed the Turkish language as a common denominator of the 
nation since it is the ‘official’ and ‘common’ language of the country even though 
existence and usage of different languages in public and official realms such as public 
broadcasting and education are also welcomed, which makes the national identity more 
inclusive linguistically. However, the AKP insistently refused to recognise any other 
language than Turkish as an official language at the national or a regional/local level and 
declared that demanding more languages to be ‘official’ would be a divisive/separatist 
deed. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2010ag) said, “My nation has one language which is 
Turkish. The common language is Turkish. Attempts to change this are not acceptable. 
Maintaining such a controversy is against national unity and fraternity”. He said that 
since it was a matter of social peace and unity, questioning the position of the Turkish 
language would not add anything positive to democracy and freedoms in the country 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2010ah). The Turkish language is seen as a defining feature 
of the national identity and problematising its ‘oneness’ as the official and common 
language is not thinkable. The other languages in the county are conceived in terms of 
folkloric diversity. In 2010, Abdullah Gül’s following statement summarises the 
emerging hegemonic position on language as a defining principle of the nation: 
…the language of the Republic of Turkey is Turkish. Turkish is the common 
language of everybody…  All different languages spoken by our citizens are our 
cultural heritage... Kurdish and Turkish are spoken languages. Some of our 
citizens speak it [Kurdish], it is also our language but the language of the 
Republic of Turkey is Turkish and it will always be (Gül cited in Hürriyet, 
2010ai). 
The freedom to speak vernaculars is imagined to be a matter of the private sphere 
(Hürriyet, 2012p) while Turkish language is conceived as the language of the public 
sphere. Therefore, for instance, to Köksal Toptan (cited in Hürriyet, 2008z), the then 
Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of the AKP, Kurdish-medium education in 
public schools (which should not be confused with Kurdish language classes currently 
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taught in Turkish public schools) is not acceptable. Since there are many different 
languages in Turkey, such an education policy would break the nation into pieces. This 
rhetorical approach to linguistic issues simultaneously emphasises sub-national diversity 
and sets the unity of the common and official language.  
Another discursive theme used by the AKP as part of the emphasis on intra-
national sameness is religious (Islamic) homogeneity of the nation. In a press conference 
in 2005, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2008aa) said, “There are roughly 30 ethnic groups 
in Turkey. You always write that. Religion is a ‘cement’ in a country like Turkey where 
99% of the population is Muslim”. He uses the ‘cement’ metaphor for religion in order 
to demonstrate Islam as a unifying denominator among the nation that informs the 
national identity. He defined Islam as the linchpin between different ethnic groups 
within Turkey (Hürriyet, 2005f). Therefore, the nation is supposed to be defined in a 
more Islamic fashion. Erdoğan referred to some speeches of Atatürk, especially to his 
expression of ‘components of Islam’ (anasır-ı İslam) used (only in early times of his 
rule) by the ‘founding father’ to define people who were living within the Turkish 
territory, in order to validate his argument that Islam is a defining hallmark of the 
Turkish nation (Hürriyet, 2009o, 2013aj).   
Erdoğan also emphasised that 99% of the population are Muslims, which 
portrays the nation as almost entirely homogenous in a religious sense. This kind of 
statistical representation has rhetorical face value which is more important than its 
empirical accuracy within discourses. Besides the question of how many people that are 
nominally identified as Muslim are genuinely Muslim, there is the issue of Alevism 
(Alevilik) which is generally regarded as a heterodox sect and rarely as a separate 
religious conviction. The AKP politicians emphasised the Islamic facet of Alevism and 
defined it as part of Islam in order to promote homogeneity among the nation. In 2012, 
Ömer Çelik, the then deputy chairman of the AKP refuted the non-Islamic Alevism 
assertions: 
Alevism is a part, tradition in Islam and ‘Cem Evi’ [the Alevi shrine] is a place 
where this cultural life and traditions are maintained… However, if somebody 
says that Alevism is a different religion and ‘Cem Evi’ is its temple, as the CHP 
representative said, this fabricates a fake religion without rules, prophet or Ali 
177	
	
[the son-in-law of the prophet Mohammed who is accepted as sacred by Alevis], 
which is also denied by ‘real’ Alevis… Today, Alevism is a dimension, stance, 
and lifestyle within the Islamic tradition (Çelik cited in Hürriyet, 2012q). 
Alevism was marked out as a cultural tradition within Islam rather than a separate belief 
system. The emphasis on the Muslimness of Alevis (Hürriyet, 2006h, 2013bh, w) and 
spelling it out as “Alevi Islam” (Hürriyet, 2014aj) sparked a discontent of some Alevis 
due to the controversy of assimilating Alevism into Sunnism. This approach 
backgrounds heterodox rituals and the credo of Alevism as a separate entity for the 
purpose of discursive homogenisation.  
 The AKP adopted the themes of common history, family kinships/inter-ethnic 
marriages, civilisation/Islam, wars fought together, etc. in order to emphasise intra-
national similarities and homogeneity. Erdoğan recapped these commonalities:   
We all live in the same homeland. We are walking towards the future as 77 
million under the same flag. Our nation, flag, homeland, and state are one. We 
are all descendants of the same ancestors, culture, civilisation and history. We 
may have different political views and lifestyles. We may have different beliefs, 
religious sects, ethnicities or languages but we are all children of this country. 
We are all under the shadow of this crescent and star and crescent spangled flag 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014ak).  
This is an illustration of patriotic and unifying rhetoric which can also be observed in 
different countries. This kind of typical themes is also prevalent in the AKP’s national 
identity discourses as part of a homogenisation strategy to foster the sense of unity under 
the banner of the new discursive hegemony which defines the Turkey civilisationally as 
a Muslim nation. Therefore, this unifying Islamic discursive theme is related to the 
civilisational nodal point. 
5.4.2 WILL TO UNIFY AND SHOW SOLIDARITY AGAINST THREATS 
 External or internal threats against the existence of a nation are very important 
factors that bolster unity among the public since an imminent danger or ominous risk 
would require solidarity to defend the national-self collectively. These threats do not 
have to be ‘real’ or ‘imminent’ in order to function as a unifying discursive strategy that 
disciplines and motivates society to work in harmony. Fictitious scenarios of threat 
might be a necessary tool to construct and perpetuate national identity. As Bill 
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McSweeney (1999, p. 2) argues, the absence of an enemy and other or threat and danger 
can be as dangerous as their presence because the lack of threats has the potential to 
loosen societal ties supposed to buttress national identity. Even if there is not a genuine 
threat against a nation, elites may still need to manufacture one in order to perpetuate or 
produce domestic concord and promote the sense of national identity. Alternative forms 
of nationalism to the hegemonic national identity might be demonised, discouraged and 
rhetorically portrayed as internal threats.  
 The threat of separation or partition has been the most central fear of the Turkish 
political mind owing to the historical experience of the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire. This historical ordeal made this fear immanent to the Turkish national self-
perception. Therefore, the PKK and what it represents became a focal point in the 
discursive strategy of solidarity against threats. The security threat of PKK terrorism and 
the potential partition of the country is a common theme among the secular and 
conservative bloc’s discourses because the PKK challenges the national self-image of 
both and causes the deaths of security forces and civilians in the lifeworld. The AKP 
elites portrayed PKK terrorism as a threat to the unity of the nation which could be 
defeated with national solidarity. The following statement of Erdoğan is a good and 
comprehensive illustration of solidarity discourses against the PKK threat:      
Turkey is fighting against terrorism that targets the unity, solidarity, friendship 
and fraternity of our nation… They think that if this fraternity is broken or 
children of this nation become enemies to each other, the unity of this country 
cannot be protected… However, traitor terror gangs cannot separate this country 
or create a conflict among the people. This nation which is ‘solid like a rock’ 
will not do what these separatists want…  I do not say this only to these terrorist 
proxies but also to ones who ‘direct them behind the scenes’ [foreign powers]… 
These sordid plans will fail when they are faced with the faith, sagacity, dignity 
and nobility of this nation which overcame troubles for centuries, founded the 
republic, developed democracy altogether (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2011r).  
Since the terrorist organisation [the PKK] was targeting the harmony and unity of the 
nation, the best response according to the AKP was maintaining national solidarity. The 
AKP rhetorically played on the traditional partition fear of the nation in order to 
underpin the idea of national cohesion among the public for a stronger national identity. 
Nevertheless, the theme of national cohesion through the PKK or partition threat did not 
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make the AKP depart from its multi-cultural/ethnic perception of the national-self 
(Hürriyet, 2009w) because the emphasis on unity against possible separation did not 
promote cultural/ethnic uniformity but shared history and religion. The problem with 
internal threats like the PKK or partition is that since it flourishes from intra-national 
sources, the discursive separation between people (Kurds) and the PKK is a must in 
order to include the former within national identity and demonise the latter. Thus, the 
AKP defined the PKK as a proxy of ‘foreign powers’, thereby aiming to alienate it from 
society and isolate it as a virus that contaminated some part of the Kurdish public.  
Likewise, Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2016j) said, “The ones aiming to divide 
this country with foreign plans and their collaborator gangs will definitely fail as the 
invaders [foreign/western] and their collaborator gangs who desired to steal by force the 
eastern parts of the country failed a hundred years ago”. To Erdoğan, the PKK has been 
surviving for decades because some foreign powers (specifically the West) turned a 
blind eye and embraced the PKK terrorism and massacres, provided safe havens and 
ammunition, gave media and financial support in order to prevent Turkey from 
becoming a powerful and peaceful country (Hürriyet, 2014al, 2015m, 2016p). To 
Davutoğlu, foreign powers do it because they want to hinder Turkey from having 
influence and claims on its historical hinterland, namely the Balkans, the Middle East 
and Central Asia (Hürriyet, 2015z) but they will fail whatever they do because of the 
Turkish state and nation which stand like ‘a fist’ [united] (Hürriyet, 2015aa). 
Nonetheless, this foreign threat theme is not exclusive to the PKK issue. To the AKP, 
‘foreign powers’ are attempting to realise their sinister plan that they postponed after the 
Independence War (1919-1922) (Hürriyet, 2016ac). This assumed sinister plan is the 
total annihilation of the Turkish existence from Anatolia (Hürriyet, 2016ab). Therefore, 
Erdoğan said (cited in Hürriyet, 2016ad), “We cannot fight among us while hyenas and 
vultures [indicating the foreign powers] are around us. The day is the day of being 
united… Thus we will be one, together, great, strong and brothers/sisters”. It is 
necessary to note that this anti-foreign powers rhetoric did not appear often in the early 
times of the AKP rule. This rhetoric has become prevalent especially after 2014 as a 
response to developments in the lifeworld such as the AKP’s consolidation of power or 
increasing political conflicts with the Western governments.  
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The AKP also operationalised some other threat themes within discourses in 
order to boost the sense of nationhood and unity among the population on the ground of 
national identity. For instance, the AKP has labelled the corruption scandal – alleged 
bribery, fraud in government contracts, money laundering, gold smuggling – that 
erupted on 17 December 2013, which involves some cabinet members of the AKP, as “a 
coup against the nation”, “treason against the state and the nation” and “treason project”. 
Allegedly, it was supported from ‘outside’ in order to ruin Turkey’s rapid economic 
development, national unity and pro-active foreign policy (Hürriyet, 2014am). The AKP 
has portrayed the Gulenist network, later dubbed as ‘Fetullahist Terrorist Organisation 
(FETÖ)’ whose members infiltrated state institutions were allegedly responsible for the 
investigations, as a proxy of foreign powers that were not only targetting the AKP 
government but also the national will (Hürriyet, 2013y). Since, to the AKP, this 
corruption investigation was an attack on the “independence of Turkey” (Hürriyet, 
2014an), the AKP glossed their fight against the Gulenists as a “war of independence” 
(Hürriyet, 2014ab). The active involvement of Gulen-loyalist soldiers and civilians in 
the failed coup attempt in 2016 strengthened this discourse of threat against the nation 
and its will. The fight against the FETÖ, the PKK, the YPG or DAESH, which were 
considered puppets of foreign powers (the West), was presented as “the second war of 
independence” (Hürriyet, 2016q, ae). The AKP elites externalised the internal threats 
through extra-national heteronomy claims that excluded the domestic sympathisers of 
such organisations from the ideal citizenry and thus, from the nation. This strategy 
reinforces the new emerging hegemonic national identity’s internal frontiers that 
necessarily exclude some insiders. Furthermore, the rhetorical theme of ‘new/second 
independence war’ is a discursive way of national myth creation for the emerging 
hegemony by warning the public of the potential loss of national independence. The 
threat discourses sometimes coalesced around ethnic/cultural and civilisational nodal 
points, as in the example of PKK, or governmental nodal point, as in the FETÖ example 
through the heteronomisation of these internal threats.     
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5.4.3 TRANSPOSITION OF NON-NATIONAL PARTICULARITIES ONTO THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
National identity construction might entail a foundational common denominator 
borrowed from certain intra-national peculiarities such as religion, religious sect, race, 
ethnicity, ideology etc. The transposition of a sub-national peculiarity onto the national 
level is contingent upon the ideological agenda of the hegemonic bloc which selectively 
promotes a certain aspect of the given ‘national’ society. This selection of sub-national 
peculiarity might hinge on a strategic choice due to historical and social circumstances 
in the lifeworld. A hegemonic bloc can use references to the chosen sub-national 
particularity in order to discursively transpose it onto the national level. This situation 
necessarily excludes individuals or groups which do not consider this particularity as 
their primary political identity. The AKP as a self-proclaimed ‘conservative-democrat’ 
political party and an offshoot of the main Turkish democratic Islamist movement 
transposed ‘Muslimness’ onto the national level as a common denominator of the 
nation. Islamic references are prevalent in national identity and other discourses of the 
AKP politicians. Erdoğan said that even though citizenship of the Republic is the 
primary political identity, Islam is the most important unifying factor of the nation 
(Hürriyet, 2005n) since 99% of the Turkish public is Muslim (Hürriyet, 2005f). The 
AKP denounced the ethnic, racial and sectarian differences and called for unity under 
the Islamic identity: 
Sectarianism… We recognise neither ‘Shi’ism’ nor ‘Sunnism’ as a religion. We 
have only one religion which is Islam. We will get together under the unifying 
roof of Islam… Secondly, racism… Our Lord commands on this topic in the 
chapter Hucurat [Quran]. It does not matter which race or ethnicity you are 
coming from. You can be a Turk, Kurd, Laz, Circassian, Abkhaz, Bosniac, 
Roma but there is something that unites us: Islam. We are all Muslims. We will 
be united on this ground (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016af).   
This call for Islamic unity not only resonates in the national context since Erdoğan 
makes similar calls for other Muslim-majority nations to unite across borders as well. 
Nevertheless, in the statements like this one, he directly addressed the domestic/national 
audience since the ethnic groups that he counts are the ones which supposedly compose 
the Turkish nation. The AKP, as the political representative of the emerging hegemonic 
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bloc, discursively trivialised other social identities belonging to the public in order to 
promote the Islamic sense of national identity as the primary political identity.  
According to Erdoğan, Turks, Kurds, and Arabs are brothers and sisters because 
Islam commands that ‘the believers [Muslims] are brothers and sisters’ and this 
fraternity cannot be broken as long as they cling to the Islamic belief and love each other 
‘for the sake of Allah’ (Hürriyet, 2013ak, 2014ao, 2015ab, ac). The old saying of 
‘loving the created [people] because of the creator [Allah]’ as an expression of national 
fraternity is prevalent within AKP discourses, which relates love for fellow citizens to 
love for Allah. Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2015ad) emphasised that the 
Crescent in the Turkish flag represents Islam, oppressed people, and oneness of God, as 
well as the Turkish nation itself. In another speech, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2015ag) 
defined ‘mosques’ metaphorically as seals or ‘title deeds’ of the Turkish nation, which 
mark the national territories. Furthermore, the AKP glorified the fight for the nation 
with the Islamic understanding of martyrdom: “Our people’s view of its soldiers is 
different. There is no other country in the Muslim world calling its soldiers ‘Mehmetçik’ 
which means ‘little Muhammad [the prophet]’” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2007l). On 
different occasions, Erdoğan recited these verses of Yahya Kemal Beyatli [a 20th century 
Turkish conservative poet]: “The storm that is breaking out is the Turkish Army, My 
Lord! / This is the army that is dying for your sake, My Lord! In order to raise your solid 
name / Bestow glory! Because it is ‘the last army of Islam’” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
2015ae, af). Even though expressions like these represent Turkish exceptionalism 
among Muslim nations, since religious identities mostly exceed national frontiers, the 
Muslim fraternity theme also resonates in a wider context of the Muslim World, as in 
this statement of Erdoğan in 2014: 
…The prophet said this in his farewell speech. Muslims! Listen to me. Muslims 
are brothers/sisters of each other. Blood and property of another Muslim 
brother/sister are not ‘halal’ to each other. Brothers/sisters do not harm, scorn 
each other or look in a bad way. They don’t build fortifications between each 
other by saying Kurd, Turk, Laz [an ethnic group in Turkey]. Palestine, Syria, 
Egypt, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan are your brothers/sisters. Muslims do not stab 
each other in the back. They do not complain about each other to the West. They 
do not work against each other. They do not cooperate with ‘infidels’ (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2014ap). 
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The Muslim-majority countries were described as ‘brothers/sisters’ whereas the 
West/infidels were portrayed as the constitutive other to this fraternity, which was a 
major deviation from the old hegemonic national self-perception of the secular bloc. 
Even though the majority of the Turkish public has always been Muslim, national 
identity has not been constructed through such a clear-cut Islamic perception before. 
Since the AKP conceived the Turkish nation as an essentially Muslim nation, the AKP 
politicians championed Islamic causes such as the fight against Islamophobia by using 
the pronoun ‘we’ for all Muslims vis-à-vis the West (Hürriyet, 2015s). Erdoğan 
articulated that it was their responsibility to praise the peace, love and justice message of 
Islam and to spread the words of the prophet [Mohammed] (Hürriyet, 2007m). 
Likewise, the AKP also championed the supposed common Islamic cause of Palestine 
that positioned Turkey as an ardent and primary defender of the cause (Hürriyet, 
2010aj).  
 The AKP discursively operationalised the Islamic belief as a justificatory tool for 
different topics like science, women’s rights, anti-racism etc. The Islamic belief is 
represented as the legitimation source of what is good or evil. For instance, in the 
following statement, Erdoğan used Islam to justify scientific development:  
The first command of Islam is read! We are members of a religion that 
encourages woman and man for doing science from birth to death. Our book [the 
Holy Quran] always addresses ones who are ‘reasoning’. Reason, science, 
thought… These three things are always mentioned altogether. We cannot 
ascribe our lack of science [as Muslims] to this [Islamic] civilisation and religion 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2008ab).  
In another speech, he addressed the women’s rights issue with reference to Islam: 
There is not discrimination between man and woman in our history, civilisation 
and family values. The one, who shows violence against women as a tradition 
and treats women and girls inhumanely, is representative of the era of Jahiliyyah 
[the era before the prophet Muhammad preached Islam], ignorant and inhumane 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013al).  
According to the AKP elites, they are serving the people because it is equal to serving 
God (Hürriyet, 2013am, 2014ao). People should show respect to their mothers 
(Hürriyet, 2013an) or welcome refugees (Hürriyet, 2013ao), be against racism (Hürriyet, 
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2013ak) and value human beings (Hürriyet, 2013ap) because Islam teaches so. These 
intense references to Islam and conceiving the Turkish people as a Muslim nation are 
closely related to the civilisational nodal point, since the themes of religion and 
civilisation are intertwined within the AKP discourses, and Islam is considered both as a 
religion and a civilisation.  
5.4.4 POSITIVE SELF-PRESENTATION AND NATIONAL UNIQUENESS 
The positive self-representation strategy aims to boost national self-esteem, 
dignity and allegiance to national identity. It is necessary for an emerging hegemonic 
bloc in order to justify its actions and the conceived national self-image. Hegemonic 
elites need to presuppose and put an emphasis on positive self-representation and 
national uniqueness to distinguish the national-self from the rest of the world. The 
positive self-presentation strategy of a hegemonic bloc is closely related to the location 
and image of the national-self within the wider context of the international public 
sphere. The AKP presented Turkey and the Turkish nation positively on different bases 
like foreign policy, economy, governance or ethics. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013an) 
used some of them in one statement: “Turkey is in a ‘distinguished position’ in the 
world today with its ‘strong economy’, ‘pro-active foreign policy’ and ‘democracy’”. 
This is a very straightforward and positive portrayal of the country. The AKP used 
different themes for various fields. Presenting Turkey as an economic success story is 
one of the widespread themes used within the strategy of positive self-presentation, not 
only to reinforce a certain understanding of a national-self, but also for ‘nation branding’	
(Jordan, 2014, p. 283; Bolin and Stahlberg, 2010, p. 82) aiming to attract international 
investments by defining it as a “magnetic field of international investment” (Hürriyet, 
2010ak). Turkey was defined as the ‘country of opportunities’ (Hürriyet, 2005o) thanks 
to the nation (Hürriyet, 2006i) and it would stay economically powerful as long as the 
nation has self-esteem, citizens trust each other and believe in the country (Hürriyet, 
2008ac). The economic success narrative was attributed to the nation’s positive features 
and ability. The national solidarity is espoused to perpetuate such a success.  
AKP politicians used the democratic model of governance of Turkey as a theme 
to present the country and the nation positively. In 2008, Ali Babacan (cited in Hürriyet, 
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2008f), the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, defined Turkey as a country whose 
democracy has been deepening and whose reforms are inspirational and admired by 
everybody. To Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2008ah), Turkish citizens should be proud 
since Turkey is a place in which all citizens live in peace, harmony, and confidence 
regardless of their religion, ethnicity and religious sect. Köksal Toptan (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2008x) said that Turkey is the strongest country in its region thanks to its 
democracy. Those statements are just simple illustrations of positive self-representation 
of Turkey related to the governmental nodal point, which embed democratic values into 
the self-understanding of the Turkish nation-state that makes Turkey unique among 
Muslim nations governmentally.   
The strategy of positive self-representation is particularly palpable within the 
AKP’s foreign policy discourses. The AKP conflated the Turkish nation’s supposed 
power in international politics with moralising rhetoric, as in Abdullah Gül’s coining of 
a term to define Turkey in 2012: “Virtuous Power” inspired from Al-Farabi’s (the 10th 
Century Muslim Scholar) utopia of “Virtuous City” (Hürriyet, 2012r). This definition 
presupposes and emphasises both morality and power at the same time. These two 
components are prevalent within this strategy as in the following statement of Erdoğan:  
There is not a Turkey anymore whose agenda is determined by others. Now, 
there is a Turkey which determines agendas… ’We’ [Turkey] are for peace, 
solidarity, laws and justice. ‘We’ are fighting for justice. Turkey accomplishes 
impossible missions. Turkey will advance anyway regardless of whether ‘we’ 
[the AKP] are here or not… I want you to show the world that we are an admired 
nation, not an admirer (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014aq). 
Erdoğan declares that the Turkish nation is now part of great power politics and has a 
vanguard role in the dissemination of moral values throughout the world. He ascribes 
such a role for the nation without binding it particularly to their bloc or party, which 
aims to extend this self-perception to the whole. The AKP defined Turkey and the 
Turkish nation as an “order establisher” in its region (Hürriyet, 2009y), an “agenda 
determiner” (Hürriyet, 2010al), a “world state” (Hürriyet, 2010am), a “global power” 
(Hürriyet, 2015ai), a “source of inspiration” (Hürriyet, 2011t), a “shelter and hope to the 
oppressed”, “the last bastion of the oppressed nations” (Hürriyet, 2014r, s, 2016ag) and 
“the hope of all Muslims” (Hürriyet, 2014aj). This kind of expression represents the 
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Turkish nation as morally superior, exceptional and politically powerful, which is a 
universally observable discursive pattern.  
Especially during the Syrian refugee crisis, the AKP presented Turkey and the 
Turkish nation as a ‘saviour’ figure. To Binali Yıldırım (cited in Hürriyet, 2016ah), 
since helping people who suffer regardless of identity is intrinsic to Turkish culture, 
Turkey hosted many refugees without any political expectations. Bülent Arınç (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2014at) said, “We are the Turkish nation. We are virtuous and honourable 
people. We have to embrace people who say ‘save me’, and ask for help from us. The 
Turkish nation has always done this throughout history”. The AKP attributes Turkey’s 
humanitarian approach in foreign policy to supposed essential features of the Turkish 
nation like its religion, culture, civilisation and history. Especially, the theme of 
‘historical responsibility’ is employed by the AKP to distinguish the Turkish nation 
from others: “There is a vast field of responsibility that we inherited from our history, 
civilisation, and culture… Turkey is the hope and source of illumination for huge lands 
from Balkans to Asia… We have to think big, dream big and achieve big” (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2015ak). To the AKP, Turkey has to reach every place in the world 
where there are victims and oppressed (Hürriyet, 2015al) because being a great nation 
entails thinking big (Hürriyet, 2010an). The AKP discursively constructs the new 
Turkish national identity through these moral arguments as an ethically exceptional 
nation which has responsibilities beyond its frontiers owing to intrinsic traits. 
This historiographical narrative of the Turkish nation is related to the theme of 
positive national uniqueness or exceptionalism. The AKP elites explicitly uttered that 
the Turkish nation “is not an ordinary nation” (Hürriyet, 2009z, 2010ao) and “does not 
resemble any other nation” (Hürriyet, 2013aq). Erdoğan expressed this sense of 
exceptionalism regarding historical heritage in the following statement: 
We cannot be disregarded since we are a nation which has historical depth. 
Therefore, the Republic of Turkey is not a periodic actor but a historical one. A 
nation like this cannot and should not escape from ‘historical responsibilities’. 
Many ethnic groups had lived in harmony like brothers/sisters [this word, 
kardeş, is gender-neutral in Turkish as it is the same case for he and she 
pronouns], maintained their religions, languages, identities and cultures until 
today on the ground of great tolerance provided by the Ottomans. Therefore, this 
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six centuries period dubbed as the Pax-Ottomana is still yearned for in the 
Balkans, Caucasia, the Middle East and West Africa… There is still the pursuit 
of stability in the post-Ottoman regions. These centuries of experience [Pax-
Ottomana] is still a source of inspiration for these areas of conflict (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2006j). 
According to this understanding, the Turkish nation is exceptional because it carries the 
responsibilities of the Ottoman ancestors, which is not the case for other nations. The 
AKP depicted the Ottoman Era as a ‘golden age’ for both the Turkish nation and the 
Post-Ottoman regions. Erdoğan related the Ottoman experience to contemporary politics 
by claiming that the solution to today’s conflicts in the Post-Ottoman regions resides in 
the peace model implemented by the Turkish Empire, which compels the Turkish nation 
today to act responsibly towards those regions. This approach puts Turkey at the centre 
of its region, which necessarily implies exceptionalism whereas surrounding countries 
are the periphery. Besides, to Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2009c), since Turkey is a 
country that has centuries of experience in which mosques, churches, and synagogues 
co-existed peacefully; it is the symbol of the alliance of civilisations, which makes 
Turkey positively unique.  
The AKP politicians also depicted Turkey’s hybrid identity (Western/Eastern, 
Asian/European, Secular/Muslim, etc.) as a positive national uniqueness. Erdoğan said 
that Turkey is not only a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Asia but also a ‘key’ and ‘centre’ 
country (Hürriyet, 2008j). To Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2010u), since the 
Turkish nation is both European and Middle Eastern, Turkey can look at issues from 
both perspectives. To the AKP, the Turkish nation’s geographical and civilisational 
peculiarity can also be tracked in its governance. In 2009, Egemen Bağış (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2009aa) said, “Turkey that incorporates the Islamic culture with the culture of 
democracy is a source of inspiration for many countries”. Likewise, Abdullah Gül (cited 
in Hürriyet, 2013aa) stated that what makes Turkey strong and a centre of attraction in 
the Islamic and Turkic World is its democratic governance as a Muslim country. 
According to Ali Babacan (cited in Hürriyet, 2008ad), Turkey is proving that Islam, 
democracy, and secularism can co-exist in a country. Since the discursive strategy of 
positive self-representation emphasises the governance and civilisational hybridity of 
the Turkish nation, discourses under this strategy are mainly related to the civilisational 
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and governmental nodal points within the AKP’s national identity discourses. These 
narratives discursively construct the Turkish nation as a ‘democratic Muslim’ nation 
instead of a ‘secular Western’ nation. 
5.4.5 REPRESENTATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND ELITE-SOCIETY 
COHERENCE 
 For an historic bloc, the vindication of national representational legitimacy in its 
entirety is an indispensable strategy in order to construct a new hegemonic national 
identity. Even though representational legitimacy might have different sources, 
democratic mechanisms are generally considered the main legitimation base in 
democratic countries. Democratic legitimacy manifests itself mainly through the 
approval of the public via electoral processes. Hence, electoral approval is an important 
rhetorical source to justify other discourses and manoeuvres in the lifeworld. Besides, a 
certain historic bloc can justify its disposition towards policy issues and national identity 
by using the claim of coherence between it and society. The presupposition of a cultural 
and historical consistency between the hegemonic elites and society would contribute to 
the legitimation of the conceived national identity. This supposed consistency enables 
the historic bloc to assert itself as the ‘real’ representative of the nation. 
 AKP politicians have always positioned themselves at the opposite pole to the 
supposedly self-alienated hegemonic secular elites who are considered as the 
‘bureaucratic oligarchy’ that limits the political sphere by using anti-democratic means. 
Therefore, the AKP principally established its legitimacy on the electoral support of the 
nation, rather than bureaucratic apparatuses. As a follow-up construction strategy to the 
deconstruction of the former hegemonic bloc, the AKP stood against the secular bloc as 
the democratically endorsed group which ‘genuinely’ represents the nation and its 
identity. Hence, intense emphasis on the discursive theme of majoritarian democratic 
legitimacy can be observed in AKP discourses. AKP politicians conflated the 
propagandist rhetoric of their party with discourses on the national-self, especially using 
the floating signifier of ‘the national will (milli irade)’. To Erdoğan, the nation has 
actually begun to determine its own fate with the AKP administration for the first time 
in the history of the Republic:  
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In our history of the republic and the last century, ‘the national will’ is for the 
first time reflected in the decision making processes under the rule of the AKP. 
‘The national will’ became stronger for the first time in history. The nation 
merged with its state for the first time… It is not acceptable for ‘someones’ 
[implying the secular bloc]. The nation, which was not treated as human and was 
not asked about its feelings and opinions, started to rule the country for the first 
time with the AKP administration (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014ab). 
Erdoğan equated the AKP administration with ‘the national will’ which was hampered 
before by the supposed sinister anti-democratic forces. The AKP administration was 
identified as the first political representatives who were actually able to run the country 
on behalf of the nation. The AKP politicians represented their political movement as the 
liberator of the nation and their rule as a critical juncture in the national history. The 
AKP sanctified the floating signifier of ‘the national will’ which is supposedly 
represented by them since they are getting elected by the people consecutively that gives 
the electoral processes more importance than its governmental function. In the AKP’s 
rhetoric, electoral approval as the manifestation of ‘the national will’ vindicates them as 
the ‘real’ representatives of the cultural values of the nation. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 
2008g, 2013ar) said that there is no superior power above ‘the national will’ but Allah. 
The AKP presented ‘the national will’ as the highest value and the legitimation source 
because “everybody has to obey ‘the national will’” (Hürriyet, 2008c).  
Since ‘the national will’ was equated to electoral procedures and results, the 
emphasis on ‘the parliament’ and ‘ballot box’ was widespread in discourses as the most 
fundamental source of legitimacy. To Erdoğan	(cited in Hürriyet, 2009ab), “there is not 
any other power above the Great National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) which is 
established depending on the preferences of the nation” and “since there is ‘the national 
will’ in parliament, everybody has to respect it” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2008ae). 
Therefore, parliament, where ‘the national will’ concretises itself, is the most central 
governmental institution regarding representational legitimacy compared to other 
national powers and institutions. In the 2011 opening ceremony of the TBMM, Abdullah 
Gül, the then President, summarised the primary legitimation role of parliament:  
It [the parliament] is the authority deriving its legitimacy from the nation and 
legitimising other institutions. It is the foundational base of our nation and the 
foundational source of our state… It is the roof concretising our nation’s shared 
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memory and conscience. It is the tangible expression of the will and 
determination of our nation that will lead our country to the level of 
contemporary civilisation and even beyond it. It is the symbol of our unity and 
solidarity. It is the institution where our people’s ideals and goals manifest 
themselves (Gül cited in Hürriyet, 2011t). 
Basically, Gül argued that the TBMM is the main institution that ‘makes’ and keeps 
intact the nation, and thus the primary source of legitimation that provides 
representational legitimacy to the AKP. The AKP pointed out ‘the ballot box’ besides 
parliament as the manifestation of ‘the national will’: “The spirit of parliament comes 
from elections, the ‘ballot box’ in parliamentary systems… The ‘will of people’ 
manifests itself in the ‘ballot box’ in democracies” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013as). 
To Erdoğan, “the ‘ballot box’ is the place of solving all problems because decisions of 
the nation are above everything” (Hürriyet, 2014au). The AKP specifically intensified 
the discursive usage of ‘the ballot box’ during the mass protests in the summer of 2013 
in Turkey in order to demonstrate that ‘the national will’ does not manifest itself in 
street protests or squares but in ‘ballot boxes’ because, to the AKP, otherwise it would 
be the tyranny of minority over the majority (Hürriyet, 2013t). This rhetorical strategy to 
denounce the street protests as an anti-democratic means of the minority to pressure the 
majority had a great emphasis on the majoritarian democracy arguments that almost 
equates democracy to electoral mechanisms and outcomes.  
 The AKP’s discursive strategy of representational legitimacy also contained the 
supposed consistency between social values and their movement. This consistency 
might be valid for conservative masses but extending these values to the national level 
as if this self-understanding of the nation is embraced by everybody is an attempt to 
transpose a particularity to the general/national status by hegemonising the field of 
discursivity. To Erdoğan, the AKP “was born from the heart and the spirit of the nation” 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2008t). He said, “This march [the AKP movement] is the 
march of the nation. It is the march of ‘the Turkish nation as a whole’… Our direction is 
the direction of the nation. Our desires are the desires of the nation” (Erdoğan cited in 
Hürriyet, 2008af). To him, the nation founded the AKP and thus, it is the party of the 
nation and it belongs only to the nation (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2012s). The AKP 
presupposed an ultimate coherence between the nation and themselves which makes 
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them the legitimate representative of the nation as a whole. The AKP elites used the 
elite-society coherence theme also in a historical context by claiming that the AKP is the 
contemporary carrier of ‘the historical cause’ of the nation. As Erdoğan (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2012t) put it: “This movement [the AKP], this cause has deep roots, which is 
as old as our civilisation. This cause [the AKP’s cause] carries the spirit, inspiration, 
principles, vision and mission of the history of our civilisation”. One of the goals of 
these representational assertions is the endorsement of the discourses on the national-
self that constructs the national identity discursively vis-à-vis the national self-image of 
the secular bloc. Ahmet Davutoğlu made it clear in a speech:  
“We [the AKP] are the representative of the ideological position that represents 
the national will, democracy and the public in the history of Turkey. 
Bureaucratic elitism [the secular bloc] and the public have always clashed with 
each other. We represent the public against the elitist bureaucracy which 
declared war against all our historical values. We are ‘the real’ republicans, ‘the 
real’ national ones and ‘the real’ defender of democracy” (Davutoğlu cited in 
Hürriyet, 2016g).  
The AKP portrayed their political party and bloc as ‘the real nation’ against the 
supposed oppressive self-alienated bureaucratic machine of the secularist state. Since 
‘the conservative bloc’ is ‘real’, they have the legitimate right to speak on behalf of the 
nation’s identity. This strategy of representational legitimacy has important emphases on 
the governmental nodal point because of intense majoritarian arguments to justify the 
representative position of the conservative bloc. It also has civilisational connotations of 
national ‘values’.  
5.4.6 INTER-NATIONAL SAMENESS/SIMILARITY/COMMONALITY 
A new hegemonic bloc might need to replace the old alliances of the antagonistic 
bloc in order to situate the national-self in an alternative cluster of nations that are 
identical to each other in certain aspects. The dislocated national identity via the 
deconstruction strategy of emphasis on international differences entails relocation 
through the emphasis on international commonalities between ideologically preferred 
nations. A nation always has multiple identities which are shared by other nations but a 
hegemonic bloc would pick the useful ones that fit with its political agenda and 
emphasise the social and political kinship between those privileged nations and their 
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own national-self. Just as the AKP discursively promotes and transposes the Islamic 
facet of Turkish society internally over the other qualities forming its identity, it also 
positions the nation within a wider international Islamic context that draws Turkey 
nearer to the Muslim-majority nations. AKP politicians often invoked the floating 
signifiers of the ‘Islamic/Muslim world’ and ‘civilisation’ within the discursive theme of 
the Muslim fraternity as if such a coherent cultural/civilisational/religious totality exists 
in the lifeworld. AKP politicians described all Muslims of the World as ‘brothers’ 
(Hürriyet, 2009ac) and expressed the Muslim World and Muslims with the pronoun 
‘we’ (Hürriyet, 2010ap). The Turkish nation was defined as “the representative of the 
1.5 billion population of the Islamic World within Europe” (Hürriyet, 2009ad). The 
AKP has often placed the “Islamic/Muslim World” in opposition to the “West” 
(Hürriyet, 2010ae) in a binary construction sense which makes the “West” the 
constitutive other of the Islamic world and the Turkish nation even though the AKP 
politicians sometimes situated Islam and the Turks within Europe (Hürriyet, 2013au, 
2015an) depending on audience and context. To the AKP, the Islamic countries should 
not fight against each other in order to stand strong in world politics, but should act 
collectively within the international arena and raise their voices like a chorus to be heard 
by others (Hürriyet, 2016ai, aj). The ‘Islamic World’ was invited to act like a monolithic 
and single actor in global politics in order to develop and empower those countries 
which were counted in the broader, supranational ‘we’ of the Turkish national identity. 
The AKP discursively re-imagined the Arab figure, which, allegedly, had been 
conceived pejoratively by the secular bloc. To the AKP, Turks and Arabs not only share 
the same geography and climate but also the feeling of the same culture and civilisation 
(Hürriyet, 2010aq). Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2010ar) stated that Turks and Arabs, 
whose friendship is very ancient, turned their backs on each other for a century because 
of sinister anti-propaganda and quoted a poem by the author of the Turkish national 
anthem (Mehmet Akif Ersoy); “The Turk cannot live without the Arab. Who says he can 
is mad. For the Arab, the Turk is his right eye and right hand”. In another speech where 
he addressed the Arabs, he said that the Turks are their brothers and Turkey is the 
Arab’s home (Hürriyet, 2012w). The AKP specifically defined different Arab or 
Muslim-majority countries and regions as ‘brothers’ or ‘relatives’ like Iraq, Syria, 
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Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Somalia, Afghanistan, East Turkestan, Saudi Arabia and 
Palestine. (Hürriyet, 2010ao, 2011v, w, 2012u, v, 2013av, aw, 2014ap, av, aw). Erdoğan 
even defined problems about Syria as Turkey’s ‘internal affair’ because of history, 
kinship and culture (Hürriyet, 2011x). This emphasis on social proximity by invoking 
vocabulary like ‘brothers’ or ‘blood relatives’ are distinctive for certain nations since 
although expressions like ‘friendship’ might be used for every other nation, utterances 
indicating ‘kinship’ targeted nations closer to the national-self.  
The Turkic peoples, which are conceived as ethnic relatives of the Turkish 
nation in spite of geographical distance, are an important aspect of the strategy of 
international sameness. Prevalent mottos like; “we are one nation but two states”, mostly 
used for Azerbaijan (Hürriyet, 2009ae), imagine citizens of the two states as one 
national ‘community’. In a meeting about the Turkic countries in 2011, Abdullah Gül 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2009ac), the then President, said that the Turkic republics 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey) should not 
act as six separate polities in the world politics but instead as ‘one nation’. In the same 
meeting, Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2009ac) stated that ‘the brother states’ 
should harmonise their identities of citizenship with their cultural and ethnic identities. 
The emphasis on the Turkic peoples did not become intense specifically during the AKP 
term but rather during the first years of the independence of the Turkic peoples after the 
collapse of the USSR. The AKP politicians did not promote distinctively and 
significantly this Turkic theme within national identity discourses but inherited and 
maintained it. This continuity was manifested in that the new multicultural 
understanding of the Turkish national-self did not nullify the Turkic aspect regarding the 
ethnic/cultural nodal point but diversified and broadened the self-perception. 
The AKP conceived of the Balkans and Caucasus as regions of ‘brother/sister’ 
nations (Hürriyet, 2012c). The affinity and kinship between Turkey and the nations of 
the Balkans and Caucasus does not only come from religious uniformity but also 
because the Turkish nation is composed of immigrants from those specific regions 
especially during the 19th and 20th centuries (Hürriyet, 2014ax) and the common 
historical heritage of the Pax-Ottomana era, which was dismantled by the interventions 
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of outsiders (the West) (Hürriyet, 2014ay, 2015ac). These regions are deemed parts of 
the common civilisational hinterland of Turks along with the Middle East and the 
Turkestan region (the Turkic-inhabited Central Asia). Erdoğan made it clear as follows: 
We cannot close our eyes to any case, problem or side in our geography. The 
Middle East and North Africa might be a quagmire for someones but those 
regions are ‘our parts’ in which we have one thousand year old memories. 
Regions like the Caucasus, Balkans, Central Asia, and the Valley of Fergana 
might be problematic places for others but these regions are the most valuable 
components of our ancient history and civilisation (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
2015ao). 
These regions mostly populated by Muslims are considered as ‘parts’ of the Turkish 
nation in the historical and civilisational sense. What makes these regions parts of the 
Turkish national identity conceived by the conservative bloc are ethnic kinship, cultural 
proximity, common civilisation/religion, and shared historiography. To the AKP, since 
these nations and the Turks are parts of the same whole, they share the same future and 
fate. Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2010as) stated it openly in a parliamentary 
speech in 2010: “The fates of Jerusalem, Baghdad, Bishkek, Samarkand, and Sarajevo 
are ‘our’ fate. If there is peaceful order in these places, Anatolian region [Turkey] can be 
a leader. If not, we cannot live peacefully in Anatolia”.  
City names are prevalently employed by the AKP politicians as the linguistic 
tool of synecdoche in order to emphasise the similarity between those nations and the 
Turkish nation. The AKP leadership habitually salutes certain cities believed to have a 
sense of shared identity. For instance, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2011z) saluted some 
cities in the victory speech of 2011 parliamentary elections: “Today, Sarajevo won as 
much as Istanbul, Beirut as much as Izmir, Damascus as much as Ankara, Ramallah, 
Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza [Palestinian cities] as much as 
Diyarbakır. Today, the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and Europe won as much as 
Turkey”. Besides these counted cities in this specific speech, the AKP elites mentioned 
Kabul (Afghanistan), Tripoli, Benghazi (Libya), Algiers/Cezayir (Algeria), Cairo 
(Egypt), Tunis (Tunisia), Skopje, Ohrid, Gostivar, Bitola/Manastır, Tetovo/Kalkandelen, 
Debre (Macedonia), Prizren (Kosovo), Mostar (Bosnia), Aleppo, Idlib, Raqqa (Syria), 
Mecca, Medina (Saudi Arabia), Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Tal Afar, Kirkuk, Mosul 
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(Iraq), Amman (Jordan), Gümülcine/Komotini (Greece/Turkish populated), Kardzhali 
(Bulgaria/Turkish populated), Bakhchysarai (Ukraine-Crimea/Turkic-Tatar populated), 
Batumi (Georgia), Baku (Azerbaijan), Lefkosa/Nicosia (Turkish Cyprus) etc., in a 
‘brotherhood/blood relative’ context (Hürriyet, 2011aa, ab, z, 2012s, x, y, 2013ax, 
2014aw, az, 2015ap, aq, ar, 2016ag, ak). This geographical and geopolitical narrative 
presented the extra-territoriality of the nascent hegemonic Turkish national-self in the 
making.   
Besides the Islamic fraternity, multiple social identities connect those cities and 
nations with Turkey, which gives us the national identity conceived by the conservative 
bloc. There are emphases on Muslim (Albanian/Bosniac/Roma)/Turkish populated 
places in Christian-majority countries in the Balkans, Turkic/Turkmen populated cities 
and nations and post-Ottoman regions. Equating the fate of those nations and regions 
with the Turkish nation by using the cities as synecdoche means that the AKP makes the 
Turkish nation part of a vague totality. This totality is not clear-cut since, for instance, it 
is rare to see Indonesia in these discourses although it is the most populous Muslim-
majority country or non-Muslim post-Ottoman nations. This sense of broader, 
supranational common identity is an ambiguous mixture of Ottoman and Turkic 
leitmotivs erected on an Islamic foundation. These emphases on international 
similarity/sameness/commonality on the grounds of Islamic, Ottoman and Turkic 
identities clustered around civilisational and ethnic/cultural nodal points that re-
imagined the Turkish national identity depending on the ideological positions of the 
conservative bloc.  
  5.4.7 POSITIVE HISTORICAL CONTINUITY AND EMINENCE 
The presupposition of a socially and historically coherent continuum is necessary 
even if there are political disruptions within the national past like foreign invasions that 
would be put into a historiographical context as ‘dark ages’. Hegemonic elites may need 
to link contemporary model national character with the moral and material superiority of 
forefathers. The assumption of historical eminence and continuity is a discursive 
justification mechanism to make claims on territories, to vindicate certain policies or to 
suggest how the national identity is embedded in the nature of individual citizens. 
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Episodic narratives from history, emphasis on notable figures, dates or events from the 
national past and correlating them with today, evoking the images of the national 
‘golden age’ era to project hope for the national future and the magnification of the 
supposed glorious and mighty past are some of the themes which can be observed within 
this historiographical strategy. The AKP’s national historiography mostly springs from 
the epoch after Turkey’s ethnic Turkmens’ arrival to the Anatolian peninsula, which 
dates back to the 10-11th centuries.  The Ottoman Empire era is the main referential 
source for the AKP elites in order to promote their understanding of the national-self. 
Nevertheless, the Turkmen-Seljuk dynasty period is also another important discursive 
treasure for the AKP. Hence, the AKP employed the floating signifier of ‘one thousand 
years’ as the bedrock of the national continuity on the Anatolian terrain. The following 
statement of Erdoğan is illustrative of positive continuity of the Turkish nation: 
We carry on our path with the same feeling as to how the Sultan Alparslan 
opened the gates of Anatolia to ‘us’ eternally in 1071 [the Battle of Manzikert]. 
We work with the same enthusiasm as to how the Sultan Mehmed conquered 
Istanbul in 1453. Gazi Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] entered the first parliament with 
prayers in 1920. We proceed with the same feeling. This nation has marched 
under the red flag [Turkish flag] in pursuit of peace and justice for one thousand 
years without disruption since 1071 and keeps marching. This nation made its 
chest a shield against the Crusaders coming from the West at a time when the 
Islamic lands were in turmoil. This nation opened the gates of Jerusalem. This 
nation considered bringing peace, friendship, solidarity and justice to 
everywhere it could reach from Mongolia to Vienna as a mission for itself… Our 
ancestors did not leave seas of blood behind them but a civilisation constructed 
with ink. (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2014p) 
Historical figures like Sultan Alparslan (A Seljuk Sultan), Mehmet the Conqueror (An 
Ottoman Sultan) and Atatürk (A Turkish President) were conceived as the links in the 
same historical chain. Erdoğan emphasised continuity and uniformity in mission and 
emotions between centuries of the nation’s past. In another speech, he said;  
Turkey is something bigger than Turkey. Turkey did not spring from a vacuum. 
It is wrong to separate 19 May 1919 [the beginning of the war of independence], 
23 April 1920 [the opening of the Turkish Parliament in Ankara], 29 October 
1923 [the declaration of the Republic] from 1017 the victory of Manzikert, 1299 
the foundation of the Ottomans and 1453 the conquest of Istanbul. These are all 
a continuation of each other… We will consider our history as a whole (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2016al).  
197	
	
Some AKP politicians considered the Republic era until the AKP rule as a ‘deviation’ 
from the historical continuity of the nation as shown in the deconstruction strategies. 
Nevertheless, the theme of historical disruptions and continuity appeared within the 
AKP’s national discursive historiography simultaneously depending on the context and 
rhetorical function. 
Even though there is an obvious stress on the history of ‘Turkmen’ dynasties 
(Ottoman-Seljuk) in AKP discourse, significant events like the battle of Manzikert were 
not only attributed to ethnic Turks/Turkmens who led the war but also specifically to 
Kurds and other ethnicities constituting the Turkish nation. For instance, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2014ba) saluted Sultan Alparslan “who marched with 
Kurds, Zazas and Turks on a 26th of August morning [referring to the battle of 
Manzikert’s date]”. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2015ac) said that Turks and Kurds 
fought against the Byzantines in Manzikert and the Crusaders together. In a meeting in 
2013, Erdoğan conceived historical battles as common events of the shared history of 
Turks/Turkmens and Kurds: 
Everybody should know that limiting the history of the Turk and the Kurd to the 
last 29 years [referring the PKK] is not right… People who cannot see our 
common past cannot understand our common future. I will not talk about 
Manzikert, Chaldiran, Kut Al Amara, Sarıkamış or Çanakkale (Gallipoli) 
tonight. The spirit, the will and, the brotherhood in the foundation of our 
Republic are more than enough (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013ay). 
To this understanding of the national-self, the modern day Kurds and Turks are the heirs 
of this common history and ancestors dating back to one thousand years ago. To the 
AKP, Turkey, as a country, nation, and state, has always thought big, taken big steps 
and followed big ideals and missions as how forefathers of today’s citizens stood against 
the crusaders under the same banner (Hürriyet, 2009o). The military conflicts with the 
‘other’ are what united different cultural groups under the same totality, namely the 
nation. The AKP discursively constructed this unifying and constitutive other within a 
historical continuum:  
I frankly say that those who are against our nation today are the same people as 
the ones in Manzikert. They were against Kılıçarslan and Saladin. They were in 
Gallipoli and our war of independence. Time, names and methods have changed 
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but the goal has never changed. The goal is to prevent our existence in this land. 
The goal is destroying our solidarity and fraternity, and defeating us, our noble 
cause (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2015af).  
To this national self-perception, standing against this ‘other (Western/Christian)’ 
collectively is one of the historical unifying forces that still reverberate in the 
contemporary context.  
 This shared history, ancient figures, principles, enemies and events are what 
make Turkey a nation and bestows ‘national consciousness’. Erdoğan put it explicitly 
when he addressed the nation on TV in 2009: 
We have survived for centuries with the national consciousness. We became a 
nation by trusting, relying on each other and dying on the same fronts for the 
sake of the same crescent [referring to the Turkish flag]. We overcame countless 
troubles with this consciousness and spirit… Many groups could not find peace, 
security, and clemency in any other place but under the umbrella of our unity 
and amity. The banner, which is hoisted by our people from the east, west, north 
and south altogether, was not only the banner of our nation’s great consciousness 
of independence but also the banner of the fundamental values and virtues of 
humanity. We reached today with our aptitudes, ideal of civilisation and the 
national consciousness which makes us ourselves (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
2009af).   
The AKP conflated the particularism of the Turkish nation with universality claims. 
This historiographical and universally ethical apologia of the Turkish nation and its 
civilisation attributed a global historical eminence to the nation as well as demarcating 
the frontiers of the national-self. This statement does not only presuppose a long-
standing and ancient ‘national consciousness’ but also puts universality and morality in 
it as if there was a coherent and permanent entity that has been struggling to reach 
certain moral goals for centuries. Erdoğan attributed noble missions and a self-assured 
hubris to the forefathers and moralised about the nation’s military advancements in the 
past. A historiographical whiggism was employed in the discourses in order to present 
the Turkish national consciousness as an inevitable final destination of an intentional 
and linear historical stream by re-reading history in a teleological way. To Erdoğan, the 
Turkish nation not only fought for peace and justice but also defended the Islamic world 
against foreign invaders. The Turkmen dynasties’ rule was glorified via comparisons 
with foreign powers (Hürriyet, 2014p). To the AKP, the Ottomans had a profound 
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tolerance for every religion within the Empire that is inherited by the Republic 
(Hürriyet, 2008ag). The Turkish historical state chain of the Seljuks, the Ottomans and 
the Republic in Anatolia (Hürriyet, 2015h) supposedly never committed discrimination, 
oppression, tyranny or othering (Hürriyet, 2012y), established the rule of peace, 
harmony, and brotherhood and constructed a great civilisation (Hürriyet, 2014bb).  
 The AKP exalted the Turkish state, country, and nation as historically noble and 
peculiar. To the AKP, the Turkish Republic is not a ‘tribal and tent state’ but a nation 
that constructed civilisation with its strongest state tradition and experience in its region 
which it has refined for one thousand years (Hürriyet, 2010p, 2014bb, 2016x). To the 
AKP, the historical eminence and moral superiority of the national past urge the nation 
to have responsibilities beyond its borders because of the supposed cognitive heritage of 
the forefathers’ model character. Erdoğan clarified Turkey’s contemporary position 
towards events in the world: 
We are following in the footsteps of Rumi [a 13th century Muslim poet] who 
stood against oppression and oppressors and cried out what was right. Because 
we are grandchildren of the Ottomans who sent a fleet to the Indian peninsula for 
the oppressed people. How can the grandchildren of such ancestors stay 
indifferent to oppression in the World?... We cannot say, ‘Jerusalem and Gaza 
are not our business’ because the great sultan of the Seljuk state, Kılıçarslan did 
not say, ‘Jerusalem is not my business’ (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2012z).   
According to this discursive theme of the AKP, history puts this burden on Turkish 
shoulders because Turkey is the successor of the Ottomans; Turks have the ‘great state’ 
logic in their genes and thus should think big as ‘the great state’ (Devlet-i Aliye) of 
Ottomans (Hürriyet, 2012aa, 2014bc). The AKP justifies its pro-active foreign policy 
with this national identity discourse of responsibility. To the AKP, supposed historical 
vanity and moral superiority leads Turkey to have international responsibility as the 
continuity of the national-self. This self-image of the nation pompously assumes that 
others see Turkey as a saviour and having global cachet: “We are well aware that 
oppressed and innocent children look for us. We are well aware of the world expecting a 
voice, a hand, a help from us. We are well aware of the responsibility that our 
civilisation, history, and culture put on our shoulders” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
2011aa). Therefore, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2010at) said, “We are acting with a 
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universal vision. We inherited this worldwide humanitarian vision and mission from our 
ancestors, history, culture and civilisation”. Discourses within the strategy of positive 
continuity and historical eminence generally cluster around the civilisational nodal point 
since national normative historical superiority is generally ascribed to the civilisational 
values granted by forefathers. Nevertheless, conceiving of historical events, specifically 
battles, as inter-ethnically shared memories has echoes in the ethnic/cultural nodal point.   
5.4.8 OTHER CONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES  
There were other constructive strategies located among the AKP politicians’ 
discourses: (1) Calming Down / Vindication of Institutions and Traditions: A new 
hegemonic bloc may need to clear up people’s doubts on existing national institutions 
and traditions in order to construct and perpetuate their perception of the national-self. A 
challenging bloc that discursively loosened citizens’ ties with the national institutions 
and traditions has to restore and reformulate these bonds with the ‘new’ order and its 
hegemonic national self-image. The AKP repeatedly refused such ‘regime crisis’ 
allegations to calm the public down about dramatic socio-political transformations under 
their rule (Hürriyet, 2007n, 2010au). To Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2015as), the regime 
concerns might have been cogent for the early years of the Republic but they are not 
valid anymore. The AKP politicians claimed that the people who assert a regime crisis 
are actually concerned about losing privileges that they enjoy under the status quo 
(Hürriyet, 2007o, 2010z). Likewise, the AKP strongly denied opponents’ ‘economic 
crisis’ or ‘security crisis against terrorism’ rumours (Hürriyet, 2006i, k, 2008af). In 
different times, AKP politicians assured people that there was no crisis in or between 
state institutions (Hürriyet, 2009x, 2010av, 2011ad, 2012s). The AKP, after their general 
consolidation of institutional power, repudiated the Kurdish question which they raised 
before (Hürriyet, 2015ac) and announced that there was only a terrorism problem in the 
country (Hürriyet, 2012ab, 2013az) because there was not a state imposing an identity, 
defining the ideal citizen and meddling in citizens’ ethnic roots, beliefs and world-views 
anymore (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013a). These themes exemplify the AKP’s 
discursive strategy of calming down and elevating the trust in institutions and traditions. 
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 (2) Parallelism/Continuity with the ‘Founding Generation’: An emerging 
hegemonic bloc can functionally invoke the model character of the founding generation 
by redefining and representing them in their own image. This discursive strategy would 
help the new hegemons derive individual consent from the opposition bloc and 
temporarily accommodate to the existing habitus (Bourdieu, 1990) of the hegemonic 
political field prior to transforming it. Vindicating actions and narratives with 
expressions like ‘if they were here, they would have done/said the same thing’ seek to 
provide a legitimation space for disruptions from traditional national discourses. The 
AKP elites have resorted to such a justificatory strategy while simultaneously 
undermining the legitimacy of the same founding generation. In 2015, Ahmet Davutoğlu 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2015at) defined the AKP as the third ‘Kuva-yi Milliye (National 
Forces)’ movement, which was the specific umbrella term for the nationalist irregular 
militias in Turkey’s independence. AKP politicians declared many times that their 
national raison d'être is elevating the nation above contemporary civilisation, as Atatürk 
pointed out (Hürriyet, 2008af, ah, 2010av, aw, ax, 2012ac, 2015au, 2016am), even 
though they mostly considered this goal to be a matter of infrastructural or technological 
development (Hürriyet, 2006l, 2013ba, 2014ao). Atatürk’s saying, “sovereignty 
unconditionally belongs to the nation” is another quote frequently invoked by AKP 
politicians as their fundamental principle in order to emphasise that the elected 
government conceived as the manifestation of ‘the national will’ precedes bureaucratic 
structures (Hürriyet, 2008ai, 2010af, ay, az, 2012ad, 2013l). Erdoğan put forward in 
different times that Atatürk conceived of a multi-ethnic and Islamic national identity as 
opposed to the secular bloc which pursued denial and assimilation policies after his 
death, by appealing to a speech of Atatürk delivered in the Turkish parliament on 24 
April 1920 (Hürriyet 2005n, p, 2009o, ai, 2011ae, 2013aj, ay). Hence, according to AKP 
politicians, they are the ones who ‘really’ represent the way of the founding generation 
and Atatürk today (Hürriyet, 2008aj, ak, 2009k, aj, 2014bd, 2015au). This recurring 
confirmative discursive theme of Atatürk and his legacy was not a contradiction with the 
deconstruction strategy of undermining the founding generation because the AKP 
instrumentally situated him and his ideational legacy in an unorthodox historiographical 
narrative that rhetorically validated the AKP’s extraordinary policies. The strategy of 
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emphasis on parallelism/continuity with the founding generation aimed to corroborate 
and rhetorically reinforce the discursive transformation of the national identity by 
interpreting the founders’ supposed image in a justificatory way. 
(3) Affirmation of “the New”, “Revolution” or “Change”: Drastic national 
transformations require discursive affirmation of novelties, alterations or fresh-starts in 
order to propound why ongoing changes are in favour of the nation. Therefore, it is 
expected from a challenging historic bloc or a new hegemon to invoke ‘progressive’ 
vocabulary like ‘the new’, ‘revolution’ and ‘change’ as positive notions rhetorically. 
According to the AKP politicians, the interests and unity of the Turkish nation do not 
reside in the secular bloc’s national status quo (Hürriyet, 2009ad) and thus, Turkey 
needs a mental transformation for the democratisation and civilianisation of politics 
(Hürriyet, 2010b, s, t, 2012ad, 2013bb). To them, Turkey underwent a ‘silent revolution’ 
towards democratisation under AKP rule with substantive reforms that led to 
overarching transformations in many different social fields (Hürriyet, 2005q, 2007p, 
2008ai, 2010aa, t, 2013bc, 2016n). The floating signifier of ‘silent revolution’ attributed 
to the AKP rule a positive disruption (or the end of a negative disruption caused by the 
secular bloc) and a beginning of a new phase (milat) (Hürriyet, 2013bd) within the 
nation’s centuries-long historiographical continuity. The floating signifier of ‘the new 
Turkey’ has become pervasive within the AKP’s national narrative, especially after their 
second term. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014ah) explained what they understood from 
the expression of ‘the new Turkey’, which was also used by Atatürk (Hürriyet, 2014bd, 
2016al), during his presidential campaign in 2014: “The new Turkey is the Turkey in 
which the state makes peace with its nation, history, and geography. We are building a 
Turkey which does not alienate itself from its own history, culture, language and 
geography but is proud of them. The new Turkey is greater, developed and powerful 
Turkey. The new Turkey embraces the plurality and diversity of society…” The AKP 
politicians made statements about ‘reconstructing Turkey’ or ‘constructing the new 
Turkey’ with positive connotations in various times which directly refers to a new 
national-self construction (Hürriyet, 2013l, ay, be, bg, 2014g, ah, ak, be, 2015aw). The 
AKP’s İbrahim Kalın (cited in Hürriyet, 2011af) briefly articulated the relation of the 
new Turkey to national identity: “If you ask what is the new Turkey, it is ‘the new 
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perception’, ‘the new self-imagination’. Surely, during the eight years of one-party rule 
[the AKP] contributed to this but this process is beyond that because the people of 
Turkey look at the world with this new self-perception”. Therefore, to them, the new 
Turkey is not only a matter of technical development and progress of the country but 
also the redefinition of the national-self. This discursive strategy of affirmation of 
change and novelty is pivotal for national identity formation in order to distinguish and 
underpin the new national self-image as can be observed in the statements of the AKP 
elites. 
5.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has unearthed the regularities in the AKP’s political elites’ national 
identity discourses. Discursive strategies seeking the re-definition of the Turkish 
national self-understanding have been laid out as ideal-types in order to analytically 
distinguish and map out haphazardly dispersed discursive data. This chapter guides the 
reader to apprehend the AKP’s Turkish national identity discourses between 2002 and 
2017 which also reveals a social cognitive structure in Turkey that made certain policies 
‘thinkable’ and enabled their implementation. This comprehensive display of the 
operationalisation of speech-acts within a strategic framework has sought to provide a 
panoramic view of the construction of a new hegemonic Turkish identity.  
This strategy-driven analysis of Turkish national identity discourses reached the 
conclusion that there is a general transformation in the semiosis of the identified three 
nodal points: (1) Ethnic/Cultural nodal point: The AKP elites conceived an 
ethnically/culturally diverse Turkish national-self instead of the supposed monistic 
narrative of the past. Basically, the Turkish nation was narrated as a heterogeneous 
totality which is an amalgam of various ethnic/cultural segments in AKP discourses. 
Nevertheless, this multi-cultural/ethnic national-self did not entirely sweep away this 
supposed ethnically Turk/Turkmen/Turkic understanding but broadened it. The AKP 
maintained the Turkic aspect of Turkish identity especially in the context of relations 
with other Turkic countries. (2) Civilisational nodal point: The conservative bloc’s 
approach to civilisational allegiances discursively situated the Turkish national-self 
within the presumed ‘Islamic Civilisation’ in opposition to the ‘Western civilisation’, 
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which was deemed as the secular bloc’s sense of belonging. Having said that, the AKP 
politicians also occasionally and contextually recalled Turkey’s deep historical and 
contemporary ties with the ‘Western world’. This occasional pro-Western rhetoric 
appears in the context of relations with the EU depending on the audience. (3) 
Governmental nodal point: The AKP’s combination of highly populist and anti-
elitist/bureaucracy rhetoric with extensive emphasis on electoral legitimacy constructed 
the nation’s governmental self-understanding as a ‘majoritarian democracy’ rather than 
the past’s strong ‘secular(ist) republicanism’. This overemphasis on ‘popular majority’ 
took the representational legitimacy away from principal/merit-based bureaucratic 
institutions and gave to the ‘electedness’ of politicians/parliament/presidency.   
The discursive formation of Turkish national identity whose empirical 
manifestations have been demonstrated is a stepping-stone to analysing discourses and 
foreign policies of the political elites of the AKP who also officially represent the 
Turkish nation within the international settings. The next chapter demonstrates the 
interrelation of the discursive nodal points (ethnic/cultural – civilisational – 
governmental) around which the AKP’s Turkish national identity discourses are 
clustered with the behavioural and discursive dispositions of the Turkish nation-state in 
the international system. The impact of the new hegemonic Turkish national self-













INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY 
FORMATION 
6. 1 Introduction 
 Visible oscillations in Turkey’s manoeuvres in international politics and almost 
paradigmatic level of change in foreign policy during the AKP rule is an indicator of a 
consequential transformation in the traditional settings of the country. There have been 
behavioural deviations from the traditional TFP in conjunction with a clear continuity of 
policy towards plenty of units and issues in the international system. The discursive 
formation of Turkish national identity via macro-strategies, which were elaborated in 
chapter five, ‘enabled’ or made ‘conceivable’ such irregularities (and faithfulness to 
conventional wisdom) in external state actions through the redefinition (partial/temporal 
fixations of the meaning) of nodal points within discourses. This chapter aims to situate 
the discursive Turkish national identity (re)formation during the AKP era between 2002 
and 2017 in an international politics context by using Turkey’s relations with three 
actors in the system. This empirical objective is realised by virtue of coupling the re-
defined nodal points with three relevant units in the international system. These three 
empirical sections begin with preliminary sub-sections introducing historical contexts of 
Turkey’s relations with selected units prior to scrutinising the discourse-driven analysis 
of the AKP’s tenure by combining chronological and thematic categorisation of 
narratives.  
 This extensive international politics chapter has three main sections devoted to 
the three case studies. These chapter-sized case studies are not designed as separate 
chapters in order to compile them under the international politics part of the thesis. 
Nevertheless, they can be considered and read as separate, independent sections. The 
second section of this chapter provides a brief and preliminary categorical review of the 
Turkish foreign policy (TFP) literature on the supposed paradigmatic shift in Turkey’s 
international relations and shows how this study distinguishes itself from other 
constructivist/identity-driven approaches. The third section explores Turkey’s political 
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relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq which exercises its 
agency in international relations as a semi-independent ‘sub-national’ polity. Turkey’s 
relations with the KRG exemplify the transformative medium of the ethnic/cultural 
nodal point within the AKP’s discourses on the Turkish national-self, which make 
policy changes ‘conceivable’ and thus add them into the box of policy options. Turkey’s 
unorthodox and benign discourses and policies towards the KRG along with unfaltering 
ontological security priorities under the AKP as an extension of the national-self 
transformation are unveiled. The fourth section delves into enduring but fluctuating 
relations of Turkey with the European Union (EU) which bears some hallmarks of a 
state and operates within the international system as a unique ‘supra-national’ polity. 
The AKP government’s redefinition of the civilisational nodal point through an Islamic 
prism re-drew the cognitive horizon of the Turkish national identity which made 
capricious relations on an unprecedented scale ‘thinkable’ concertedly with the insistent 
loyalty of both sides to Turkey’s exceptionally lengthy membership process. The fifth 
section investigates the role of the AKP’s national identity discourses which coalesced 
around the governmental nodal point in Turkey’s relations with Egypt. The section 
presents how this particular discursive construction of the Turkish national-self formed 
the basis that ‘enabled’ the consistently stable and balanced mutual relations to swing 
from one extreme to another after the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring.  
6. 2 Alternative Approaches to Change in TFP 
 There are different explanations produced by academics studying TFP to 
comprehend the transformation in TFP, especially since the AKP’s second term of 
incumbency (2007). Ascribing the paradigmatic change in TFP to one variable alone 
would be inadequate and non-viable since there are multifarious factors that paved the 
way for this transformation. Nevertheless, it is not feasible to incorporate the complete 
set of possible variables altogether into a single argument. Therefore, explanations 
generally feature certain aspects depending on their theoretical positioning or areas of 
interest. These various approaches in the TFP literature can roughly be sorted into four 
general categories:  
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 (1) Political economy explanations: Some academics have expounded on this 
salient shift by delving into political economy factors on TFP and the operationalisation 
of the logic of the trading state (Kirişçi, 2009; Babacan, 2011; Kutlay, 2011; Tür, 2011; 
Atlı, 2011; Kaya, 2011; Bank and Karadag, 2012; Öniş and Kutlay, 2013; Müftüler-Baç, 
2014; Tekin and Tekin, 2015). These explanations principally contended that the TFP 
literature did not pay enough attention to economic, financial, business, class relations 
and industrial dynamics in this transformation and argued that these factors played a 
major role in driving Turkey’s international relations towards unconventional directions. 
Some of these studies also revealed how the AKP elites instrumentally used the 
economy to reach some political ends. Even though the above-cited economic 
explanations are helpful to set out the economic possibilities and limitations of Turkey 
during the AKP era, making sense of Turkey’s general behavioural change and 
continuity within the international system through an economic perspective is not 
adequate by itself. Economic variables and the ‘trade logic’ do not have much to say 
about the change in Turkey’s national self-perception that cognitively relocated Turkey 
within the international order.  
Furthermore, the economic field is sometimes oblivious to the developments of 
countries’ political relations. For instance, Turkey’s economic relations with the EU 
were not meaningfully harmed from political tensions between the sides and Turkey’s 
de facto frozen membership process. Likewise, neither Egypt nor Turkey cancelled their 
free trade agreement even though both sides mutually withdrew their ambassadors from 
each others’ territories because of plummeted political relations during the years of the 
AKP’s tenure. In the same vein, Turkey and KRG did not stop trading after Turkey 
backlash against the KRG in the aftermath of independence referendum in 2017. 
Therefore, this work shows, there is not always a significant or direct correlation 
between the economic and political spheres of activity. Moreover, since this work’s 
theoretical interest lies in the national identity formation’s possible repercussions in 
foreign policy change, the economy-driven models are not particularly relevant to this 
study.       
 (2) Domestic actor-level ideational explanations: Some scholars have adopted 
domestic actor-driven ideational variables at the elite level in order to explain the 
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change in TFP (Walker, 2007; Murinson, 2007; Aras, 2009a; Altunışık, 2009; Aras and 
Görener, 2010; Sözen, 2010; Güner, 2012; Özpek and Demirağ, 2012; Aras, 2014; 
Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, 2016). The former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s ideas and his ‘strategic depth’ doctrine (Davutoğlu, 2012), 
which has been considered the mastermind behind AKP’s foreign policy until his 
resignation from the prime ministry in May 2016, were particularly highlighted as a 
factor that steered the foreign policy change and diversification in relation to ideational 
factors. His vision of national identity and TFP was critiqued and the limits of 
‘Davutoğlu-effect’ was analysed. Alternative geopolitical perspectives, strategic 
choices, different worldviews and national role conceptions of Turkish political actors 
were also analysed in order to explain the transformation.  
Since these studies are actor-specific explanations (either individual or political 
party level), their theoretical or empirical interests are limited to sub-national 
particularities. Although these domestic actor-level studies are empirically rich accounts 
and important contributions to understand the conjunctural differences made by 
individual actor preferences (e.g. religiosity or worldviews of certain political elites) in 
TFP, they do not afford a holistic perspective on the positioning and behaviours of the 
Turkish nation-state within the international system. For example, ‘the Policy of Zero 
Problems with Neighbours’ has been the sloganic hallmark of policies promoted by 
Davutoğlu, the most used actor as a subject of analysis, who even introduced a potential 
rapprochement with Armenia. However, when he left the prime ministry in May 2016, 
Turkey was in a foreign policy predicament that was described as ‘precious loneliness’ 
or ‘zero neighbour without a problem’. Therefore, these researches’ objectives are more 
specific and limited and so conclusions derived are in parallel with these limited 
objectives. Since this study aims to bring about a broader and panoramic picture of TFP 
in relation to Turkish national identity under the emerging hegemony of the conservative 
bloc, it does not focus on particular deeds and ideas of actors but on the overall 
transformation of Turkey’s national self-perception over time. 
 (3) Identity-driven/constructivist explanations: According to another academic 
view, the AKP government’s general pro-Islamic predilection beyond individual 
outlooks engendered a national identity transformation and perceptional shift which was 
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echoed in TFP (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008; Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011; Dal, 2012; Duran, 2013; 
Akıllı, 2013; Güney and Mandacı, 2013; Yeşiltaş, 2013; Kösebalaban, 2014; Ayata and 
Yücel, 2015; Hintz, 2015). The scholars, who expounded this change through identity, 
used social constructivist lenses and focused on discourses in most cases. Besides, 
critical geopolitics was another theoretical approach which was employed by scholars to 
analyse the change in TFP through re-narration of the national-self and geopolitical 
imagination of the international environment. In order to be fair, it is important to note 
here that, with some exceptions, the interests of these identity-driven researches are 
limited and case-specific compared to this thesis.  
The identity-driven explanations put main emphasis on Turkey’s civilisational 
relocation of itself between ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ ‘worlds’, which relocation mostly 
disregards ethnic/cultural and governmental re-definition of the national-self. This 
assumption of ‘from Western to Islamic’ change preaches that Turkey’s geopolitical and 
geographic imagination underwent significant transformation that culminated in 
deviations from the traditional path that the Turkish nation-state followed in its foreign 
affairs. The main objection of this study to previous works explaining the TFP change 
through the prism of national identity or civilisational re-orientation is that they 
predominantly take the national identity or civilisational allegiance as a condition, fixity 
or closure rather than a dynamic and never-ending process that can be analysed through 
spatiotemporal partial fixations that would be an outcome of the perpetual war for 
national hegemony (especially for culturally-torn countries like Turkey). Therefore, the 
alternative constructivist works investigate the ‘effects’ of assumed identity change 
rather than probing into how this national identity is formed simultaneously with and in 
relation to TFP changes. This presumption of a ‘closed’ identity necessarily overlooks 
the malleability, variability and fluidity of Turkish national identity, as an inescapable 
dimension of ‘causal’ research. Moreover, even though some works speak about this 
formation aspect in relation to TFP, the analyses of Turkish national identity discourses 
stay as unsystematic anecdotes and pragmatically chosen illustrations instead of 
comprehensive methodological analyses of substantial amount of discursive data 
demonstrating regularities and ruptures within the studied time span.  
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 (4) Structural (domestic-international) and realist explanations: Different 
academics have resorted to structural variables at the domestic level or in the 
international system. They adopted realist/strategic/rational assumptions in order to 
respond to the supposed transformation in TFP (Aras and Karakaya Polat, 2007; 2008; 
Oğuzlu, 2007; 2008; Danforth, 2008; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009; Kanat 2010; Altunışık and 
Martin, 2011; Renda, 2011; Müftüler-Baç, 2011; Gulmez, 2013; Kardaş, 2013; 
Hatipoğlu and Palmer, 2014; Oğuzlu, 2016). According to them, this seismic shift was 
also an outcome of conjunctural and structural changes in regional and international 
settings, along with notable reorganisation of domestic order and power relations by the 
AKP. According to some of these accounts, Turkey strategically reoriented its foreign 
policy against systemic developments beyond its territories and addressed the necessities 
of the international and regional order in a realist fashion. Some other structural 
outlooks contended that immense readjustments in the political design of the country 
prompted such an unorthodoxy in TFP. 
 The domestic structural explanations arguing that institutional transformations 
which shook the political landscape and presumed default settings of the country 
including foreign affairs are, in principle, in parallel with the main argument of this 
thesis pursuing this transformation in the discursive field of activity. At the end of the 
day, this work acknowledges the existence of institutional shifts beyond national identity 
discourses that enabled and empowered the conservative elites’ discursive enterprise. 
However, for instance, supposed normative institutional changes like ‘democratisation 
reforms’ driven by the EU membership conditionality, which is a widespread theme 
within this sort of arguments, showed fragile and sporadic nature of some assumed 
institutional transformations because, later, the EU conditionality became a source of 
‘Euroscepticsm’ in Turkey and souring political relations between both sides. The inter-
bloc power/hegemony shift, which can be put forward as another domestic structural 
transformation reflected on TFP, is also valid for this thesis’s argument as an axiomatic 
knowledge. However, this axiom does not speak by itself for TFP; thus, in this thesis, its 
reflection on the discursive field with regard to national identity appears as a medium 
which made TFP change conceivable.  
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 The arguments which can be categorised as rationalist, realist or international 
structural explanations take the supposed paradigmatic change in TFP as an ‘effect’ of 
systemic or regional ‘causes’ directing the Turkish nation-state act in a certain way. 
These propositions that generally consider changes in TFP as ‘reactions’ or 
‘readjustments’ according to system and regional level transformations have a typical 
insufficiency of ‘rational decision making’ assumptions that fail to address the role of 
ideas and ‘domestic’ components in the ‘interest’, ‘threat’, ‘danger’ or ‘security’ 
perception and construction processes. They may respond to the narrow questions about 
behaviours in specific incidents but unable to formulate the roots of changing general 
trend in Turkey’s external state actions. A particular example relevant to the identity 
question is the proposition that Turkish elites may ‘rationally’ manipulate identities and 
pragmatically assign the useful one among the set of multiple identities of the Turkish 
nation depending on the necessities of the contemporary international and regional 
realpolitik. This approach might be valid for political elites’ emphasis on one aspect of 
the nation at the expense of another according to the specific political context or 
incident. However, it is completely inadequate to explain general TFP tendencies and 
dispositions, especially during the AKP’s tenure when there is a regular and enthusiastic 
entrepreneurship of political elites to discursively and institutionally transform the 
Turkish national self-perception in a systemic way. Therefore, these domestic and 
international arguments fall short of sufficiently explaining changes in TFP. 
 All these approaches and studies are valuable contributions to the rapidly 
growing TFP literature. These alternative explanations do not necessarily contradict or 
invalidate each other but complement one another in most cases in order to make sense 
of the supposed remarkable change in TFP. The academic merits of these explanations 
are predicated on their own theoretical-methodological rigour and empirical scrutiny 
rather than their areas of interest. Moreover, most of the literature cited above are not 
comprehensive analyses of the supposed change but article-level, case-specific and 
sectarian evaluations. Therefore, expecting full-fledged and detailed transformation 
analyses from these works would be unjust as opposed to this thesis aiming at 
demonstrating overall change in TFP in relation to Turkish national identity. This 
thesis’s main aim is not to reveal causal mechanisms that drove the change in TFP but to 
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provide the discursive medium of Turkish national identity which ‘enabled’ this change. 
In this part of the thesis, the discourse analysis of AKP politicians’ national identity 
formation is situated into a historical-institutional analysis of Turkey’s relations with 
three international units paired with three discursive nodal points in order to achieve this 
goal. The post-structural constructivist framework applied here through the 
methodology of Ruth Wodak’s discourse-historical approach.   
6. 3 Ethnic/Cultural Nodal Point: Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government 
of Iraq  
 6.3.1 A GRUDGING RELATIONSHIP UNTIL THE AKP ERA 
  The territory of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has traditionally been a part 
of Turkey’s extraterritorial national self-understanding. Iraq’s greater Mosul region 
(including KRG’s territory) has been important for Turkish self-understanding since the 
region was a part of the 1920 ‘National Pact’ – a declaration made by the last Ottoman 
Parliament which was also adopted by the new republic as a principle – which 
demarcated supposed national borders assuming the Turkmen and Kurdish majority 
lands to be an indivisible national whole (Lundgren, 2007, p. 35; Gorentas, 2016, p. 50-
51) as Atatürk put it, “Kurds and Turks are true brothers and may not be separated” 
(Kemal Atatürk, cited in Mango, 1999, cited in Gorentas, 2016, p. 51). He defined the 
Mosul region as “Turkish lands” in an interview in 1922 (Sakin, 2007, p. 123). Mosul, 
Kirkuk and their vicinity (Northern Iraq) still resonate in many Turkish minds as a ‘lost 
homeland’, which is supposed to have unfairly been extorted from Turkey by ‘Western’ 
powers. These lands are conceived within the extraterritoriality of the Turkish national-
self also owing to the Turkish-speaking population (Iraqi Turkmens) in the KRI despite 
Turkey having never promoted an autonomous ‘Türkmeneli’ (the land of Turkmens) 
cause at the expense of the unity of Iraq (Lundgren, 2007, p. 90). Just as the Kurdish 
majority lands of Iraq are conceived as an integral part of the ‘greater’ Turkish national 
‘homeland’, the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey have been part of Kurdish ethno-
national aspirations (Lundgren, 2007, p. 3, 35). Therefore, we can argue that there are 
two conflicting irredentist national territory perceptions. Thus, possible conflict and 
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polarisation between Turkmen and Kurdish groups within the KRI have potential 
ramifications for Turkey-KRG relations (Somer, 2005, p. 123). 
  The Turkish Republic has traditionally perceived an autonomous Kurdish 
political enclave next to its frontiers as a grave threat to its national security and 
organised its foreign policy towards Iraq primarily through the lens of its own Kurdish 
issue (Barkey, 2010, p. 2). The so-called ‘Kurdish question’ in Turkey influenced TFP 
preferences (Karakoç, 2010) because the secular Turkish elites coded Kurdish 
separatism as an existential threat to the Turkish national-self (Bozdağlıoglu, 2003, p. 
139). Asa Lundgren (2007, p. 3, 32) argues that one can only understand why a Kurdish 
state has been such a nightmare for TFP by looking at the secular bloc’s Turkish 
national-building project, because TFP is an integral part of this project and such an 
entity was likely to contest the definition of the Turkish nation and cause “ontological 
insecurity” (Steele, 2008). This perception of threat is summarised in the following 
statement by Atatürk: 
Mosul [the greater region] is extremely important for us. Firstly, as an oil-rich 
region…Secondly, [because of the] equally important issue of Kurdism, Britain 
tries to create a Kurdish state there. If it does so, it [the idea of Kurdism] will 
also get spread out among the Kurds inside our borders (Kemal Atatürk, cited in 
Mumcu, 1991, p. 47, cited in Demir, 2015, p. 90)   
  After the solution of the Mosul case, Turkey and Iraq developed good relations 
starting from Atatürk’s time (Türkmen, 2010, p. 7). Turkey has been traditionally 
committed to the unity of Iraq in order to hinder the spill-over effect of ethno-political 
consciousness among its own Kurds. The extraterritoriality of the Kurdish issue prevents 
Turkey from exclusively determining its own Kurdish policy (Robins, 1993, p. 670). 
Turkey repeatedly declared a possible breach of the unity of Iraq as its ‘red line’. This 
stable foreign policy preference towards Iraq and the discourse of threat and danger 
constructed around it not only established an entrenched policy disposition but also 
served the purpose of constructing, consolidating and maintaining the Turkish national 
identity (Lundgren, 2007). The political developments for the Iraqi Kurds such as 
rebellions against the Iraqi Government in the 1950s and 1960s have had a direct impact 
on the Turkish Kurds (Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 48-50; Aslan, 2015, p. 122-125; 
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Robins, 2013, p. 670). Turkey occasionally launched incursions across the border and 
clashed with Iraqi Kurdish groups besides the PKK in the 1980s with Baghdad’s 
approval of ‘hot-pursuit’ (Natali, 2010, p. 27; Charountaki, 2012, p. 189). Moreover, it 
is also argued that Turkey sometimes helped certain Kurdish groups within Iraq in order 
to foster intra-Kurdish fighting (McDowall, 2013, p. 344-347; Voller, 2014, p. 82).  
 The first significant breakthrough from the hegemonic secular bloc’s foreign 
policy towards Iraq and Iraqi Kurds occurred during the era of Turgut Özal, who can be 
considered a representative of the conservative historic bloc, at the end of 1980s and the 
beginning of the 90s (Çandar, 2012, cited in Demir, 2015, p. 92; Gunter, 2011, p. 85; 
Robins, 1993, p. 669). Özal thought that Turkey needed to jettison its fear of the rise of 
Kurdish ethno-national identity in order to play an active and greater role in the Middle 
East (Marcus, 2007, p. 201; Charountaki, 2012, p. 187-188). Turkey allied with Iraqi 
Kurdish groups of Barzani and Talabani and conducted joint military operations against 
the PKK during this time (Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 50-51). Turkey accepted a 
significant number of Kurdish refugees who were escaping from Saddam’s military 
campaigns against them at the end of the 1980s (McDowall, 2013, p. 360-361; Voller, 
2014, p. 69; Barkey and Fuller, 1997, p. 66). Özal even declared that he would not be in 
opposition to establishing a federal structure in Iraq and the emergence of an 
autonomous Kurdistan (Barkey and Fuller, 1997, p. 74; Gorentas, 2016, p. 58). Even 
though the Turkish government withheld de jure recognition of a Kurdish government, 
it still gave millions of US dollars in aid to the Iraqi Kurdish officials, which was a sign 
of de facto recognition of such a reality (McDowall, 2013, p. 384). Özal invited the Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders to Ankara and recognised them as legitimate actors, acknowledging the 
legitimacy of Kurdish concerns in Iraq (Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 53; 1997, p. 72; 
McDowall, 2013, p. 371, Lundgren, 2007, p. 85; Voller, 2014, p. 80). Yet he also 
publicly declared that Turkey, Iran, and Syria were in agreement that a potential Kurdish 
enclave within Iraq should not be allowed to emerge, which was a sign of TFP 
continuity (McDowall, 2013, p. 370-371). This radical deviation caused discontent 
among the predominantly bureaucracy-based secular establishment (Wanche, 2002, p. 
236). Özal was accused of conducting foreign policy without consulting the military and 
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civil bureaucracy and was pressured by them. He was also blamed for strengthening the 
PKK by cooperating with Iraqi Kurdish leaders (Türkmen, 2010, p. 23).  
 The KRG emerged as a consequence of the American invasion of Iraq against 
Saddam Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait which was a dramatic leap forward for the 
Iraqi Kurds towards being an autonomous political entity (Ahmed, 2012, p. 7; Lundgren, 
2007, p. 73; Gunter, 2008, p. 14; Voller, 2014, p. 40; Gorentas, 2016, p. 47). The 
Western allies, with the active encouragement of the Turkish Özal administration, 
provided a safe haven and no-fly zone for the Kurds within the Iraqi soil. This 
‘humanitarian intervention’ caused a power vacuum in Northern Iraq and enabled Iraqi 
Kurds to have a de facto quasi-autonomous polity, which shows characteristics of a 
nation-state and even established its own external relations. Turkey, ironically, was one 
of the coalition partners that enabled these developments (Demir, 2015, p. 87-88; 
Lundgren, 2007, p. 74-75; Gunter, 1993; 2011, p. 91; Voller, 2014, p. 69-70; 
Chaoruntaki, 2012, p. 186; Barkey and Fuller, 1997, p. 67; Wanche, 2002, p. 49). The 
Iraqi Kurds relied on Turkey to maintain their status in the region and to connect with 
the world both socially and economically (Marcus, 2007, p. 201; Gunter, 2011, p. 91; 
Voller, 2014, p. 80; Natali, 2007, p. 1114). 
 Özal’s administration not only initiated a rapprochement with Iraqi Kurds but 
also challenged the monistic national self-understanding of the secular bloc by accusing 
the traditional policies of being ‘repressive and assimilationist’ (Ataman, 2002, p. 138; 
Wanche, 2002, p. 233-234). Özal believed in dialogue with the PKK to find a political 
solution to the problem (Lundgren, 2007, p. 48-49) and believed that the rapprochement 
with Iraqi Kurds would help address the domestic ethnic problem (Barkey and Fuller, 
1997, p. 75). Özal's leadership defied the secular bloc’s national identity formation 
regarding supposed cultural homogeneity and recognised the existence of the multi-
ethnic structure of the country. He attempted to promote “a more flexible 
conceptualisation of Turkish national identity” but it “failed to win sufficient sympathy 
on the ground” (Barkey and Fuller, 1997, cited in Somer, 2005, p. 119). It was a short-
lived initiative because the secular establishment was maintaining its institutional and 
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discursive hegemonic status during his era, which prevented him from reconstructing the 
Turkish national-self. 
 Nevertheless, following Turgut Özal’s death in April 1993, Turkish 
administrations pursued an updated version of the traditional foreign policy path 
towards the Iraqi Kurds which deteriorated relations instigated by the Özal 
administration (Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 135-137; 1997, p. 75; Lundgren, 2007, p. 
49; Gunter, 2011, p. 92). The Iraqi Kurdish leadership were depicted pejoratively by the 
Turkish state elites who called them ‘tribal leaders’ who collaborate with foreign powers 
for their own benefit at the expense of neighbouring peoples. Yet, the Turkish state and 
some Iraqi Kurdish groups maintained their cooperation against the PKK on the Iraqi 
soil, as in the Turkish intervention in May 1997. Even though Turkey and the Iraqi 
Kurdish groups conducted joint military actions against the PKK (Lundgren, 2007, p. 
79; Türkmen, 2010, p. 24), the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK 
(Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) were always reluctant to be dragged into a long battle 
(Marcus, 2007, p. 206). Özal’s salient deviation from the traditional policies and 
discourses stayed as an episodic venture for a while – especially until the AKP era – 
rather than a pivotal moment for a permanent, full-fledged transformation. Özal’s 
internal and external deviations were perceived as anathema to the Turkish national-self 
and its interests by the political and military establishment of the secular bloc (Marcus, 
2007, p. 201). Nevertheless, claiming that Özal’s avant-garde reforms and unorthodox 
approach, which also received cautious approval from different segments of the Turkish 
society (Gunter, 2011, p. 92-93), did not leave any enduring effect would be unfair since 
Turkey, after the Özal era, visibly eased its rigid posture on the Kurdish issue over time 
and tried alternative options towards the region.  
   The eroding authority of the central government over Northern Iraq as an 
aftermath of the international coalition’s intervention created a chaotic environment 
which was utilised by the PKK (Marcus, 2007, p. 145, 246;	 Ünver, 2015, p. 2, 59; 
Voller, 2014, p. 80; Wanche, 2002, p. 55). Hence, Turkey has mounted numerous 
military operations against the PKK in the lands controlled by the KRG at will and 
without Iraq’s permission (Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 23, 51, 112; Ataman, 2002, p. 
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139; Wanche, 2002, p. 239). Turkey has discursively and diplomatically remained 
committed to the territorial unity and sovereignty of Iraq at the expense of the Iraqi 
Kurdish groups and stood in the way of the birth of the embryonic Kurdish state 
(Robins, 1993, p. 674). Moreover, Turkey permanently stationed small numbers of its 
troops (arguably between 5.000 and 8.000) permanently in certain spots in the KRI 
(Lundgren, 2007, p. 81, 83-85; Ünver, 2015, p. 31; Voller, 2014, p. 81), which are still 
in operation today. Even though Lundgren (2007, p. 76, 78) fairly designates the 
Turkish approach towards the Iraqi Kurds’ nation-building as an ambivalent ‘parallel 
process of violating and maintaining’ after the KRG’s emergence as an international 
actor and Charountaki (2012, p. 188) asserts the lack of a structured or institutionalised 
foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurds, Turkey stayed firmly receptive to the 
developments in Northern Iraq which threaten its physical security and national self-
understanding, until the transformations initiated by the AKP’s conservative elites.  
6.3.2 A TRANSFORMATIVE COINCIDENCE: THE RISE OF THE AKP AND 
KRG 
  In 2002 and 2003, some of the most drastic developments that significantly 
transformed the nature of Turkey-KRG relations occurred consecutively; the AKP came 
to power in November 2002, and the 2003 American invasion of Iraq was launched, 
which consolidated the KRG’s sovereignty over its territory. At the end of 2002, 
Abdullah Gül, the then new Prime Minister, declared that Turkey wanted to solve the 
problem in Iraq without a war and desired peace and stability in the region, since Turkey 
shares many common traits with its ‘brothers’ and ‘relatives’ in the Middle East region 
(Hürriyet, 2002c). There was not a coherent outlook within the AKP government on the 
issue of joining the US for the invasion. Therefore, the Turkish Parliament rejected the 
government’s legislative proposal, which would have enabled American soldiers to 
occupy Iraq from the northern front via Turkish soil and the deployment of Turkish 
troops in Northern Iraq, due to a considerable number of AKP MPs voting against it 
despite the support of the party leadership. This development led the US to rely on the 
Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq rather than the TSK, which created a promising 
environment for the KRG to ascend politically. 
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  In the first years of its rule, the national identity discourses of the AKP 
government regarding the ethnic/cultural nodal point demonstrated close proximity to 
the conventional national self-perception of the secular bloc – though not the same – due 
to the enduring institutional/bureaucratic hegemony of the secular bloc which generated 
the habitus (Bourdieu, 1990) of the political field in Turkey. For instance, in December 
2002, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2002b) explicitly stated that there is not a ‘Kurdish 
question’ in Turkey. Since the hegemonic national self-perception of the secular bloc 
was still entrenched, during the initial phase of the American invasion, the AKP 
government maintained traditional foreign policy reflexes and discourses of the Turkish 
state towards developments in Iraq and specifically in the KRI. In January 2003, Yaşar 
Yakış, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, clarified Turkey’s position regarding Iraq 
and KRI before the invasion:        
“There (Northern Iraq) will be a power vacuum there if a war erupts. Turkey 
might need to take measures if this power vacuum influences Turkey’s 
legitimate security and strategic interests negatively… Firstly, now, there are two 
Kurdish political parties enjoying the rights of autonomy… If the authority of 
Baghdad abates more, they might strengthen this autonomy. We would be 
disturbed by this situation if it threatens the territorial integrity of Iraq… 
Secondly, there are our kinsmen, Turkmens in Northern Iraq. We don’t want to 
annex the lands inhabited by Turkmens. We merely want Turkmens to enjoy the 
same constitutional rights bestowed on all Iraqi citizens… Another case is Mosul 
and Kirkuk. These cities are traditionally Turkmen-inhabited lands. This was a 
problem that we couldn’t solve in [the treaty of] Lausanne …” (Yakış cited in 
Hürriyet, 2003g). 
This statement of the AKP’s Minister of Foreign Affairs demonstrates how Turkey 
perceived the developments in Iraq with an identity-centric lens which ethnically singles 
Turkmens out and discursively constructs them as ‘kinsmen’. The secular bloc’s 
traditional perception of threat from Iraq was reiterated by the AKP elites at the 
beginning of their rule. The rise of a possible Kurdish enclave that endangered the unity 
of Iraq, which has been a red line for Turkish foreign policy, was deployed within 
discourses towards the KRG as a national security concern. Yakış described the region 
of Mosul and Kirkuk within the extended territoriality of the Turkish national-self by 
referring to its supposed Turkmen-ness and the 1923 treaty of Lausanne. Moreover, as a 
clear continuity with traditional TFP practises and discourses, he declared that Turkey 
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does not have any irredentist plans for the region. Nevertheless, the AKP government 
preserved Turkey’s contacts with the Kurdish leaders by, for instance, hosting Masoud 
Barzani in Ankara before the invasion (Hürriyet, 2003h).   
  The AKP’s Turkey notified its interlocutors on several occasions about its 
concerns over a potential Kurdish state and the status of Mosul and Kirkuk for the post-
war period. However, after the US launched the war against Saddam’s Iraq, the first 
political crisis between Turkey and the KRG (and the United States) broke out when the 
Kurdish Peshmerga forces started to march towards Kirkuk in April 2003. It was 
reported that Abdullah Gül warned Colin Powell, the then US secretary of state, about 
the Kurdish advance by stating that Turkish people are extremely sensitive to Mosul and 
Kirkuk and thus the Turkish government might intervene if a de facto situation appears 
in the region (Hürriyet, 2003i). Even though Turkey insistently warned the US about the 
Kurdish advancement towards Kirkuk (Hürriyet, 2003j), the Kurdish Peshmerga forces 
of Jalal Talabani entered the city in April 2003. Following the Kurdish takeover of 
Kirkuk, the US and Talabani assured Ankara that Kurds would not stay in the control of 
the city (Hürriyet, 2003k). After the American troops started to arrive in Mosul and 
Kirkuk, Abdullah Gül announced that there was no reason for a Turkish military 
intervention in the region for the time being. Although this minor crisis was solved via 
American mediation and assurances, sending Turkish troops to Northern Iraq started to 
be discussed during the summer of 2003 (Lundgren, 2007, p. 103-104). However, since 
the Iraqis, except Turkmens (Hürriyet, 2003o), did not welcome Turkish troops on their 
soil, Turkey refrained from taking unilateral action. 
6.3.3 CONSTRUCTION OF IRAQI KURDS AS ‘KINSMEN/EXTENDED 
FAMILY’  
  While the AKP government was partly maintaining the discourse and policy of 
the secular bloc towards the KRG and Iraq during the initial period of the Iraq war, it 
also started to depart from the traditional path. For instance, in 2003, Bülent Arınç (cited 
in Hürriyet, 2003l), the then Speaker of Parliament, stated that the conditions of Iraqi 
Kurds would not be a threat against Turkey since developments in Iraq would not 
influence Turkey’s Kurdish issue. Such a statement from a high-ranking Turkish official 
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was an open deviation from Turkey’s traditional perception of threat from Iraq. In 
parallel with this statement, in July 2003, Abdullah Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2003m), the 
then Minister of Foreign Affairs, elucidated their positioning regarding ethnic issues in 
Iraq: “Everybody in Northern Iraq is our ‘kinsman’, both Kurds and Turkmens… We 
want everybody to live in peace and prosperity there… Turkey is already the protector 
of all of them”. Also in other speeches in September 2003, Gül said that everybody in 
Iraq; Turkmens, Kurds, and Arabs, are ‘brothers’ and ‘kinsmen’ to Turkey and Turkey 
has always protected the Iraqi Kurds (Hürriyet, 2003q, t). In August 2003, Erdoğan 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2003p) stated without singling out the Turkmens that Turkish and 
‘Iraqi’ people have ‘family/kinship’ relations because Turks and Iraqis have a shared 
history and geography. These complementary statements of AKP elites demonstrate 
their perception of the Turkish national-self regarding the ethnic/cultural nodal point and 
contribute to the construction of a more pluralist Turkish national identity which, in 
turn, also shapes the perception of national interests and external threats. The elites of 
the conservative bloc employed the discursive strategy of inter-national sameness or 
similarity for the Iraqi Kurds on an ethnic basis which makes them ‘kinsmen/extended 
family/blood relatives’ of the Turkish nation. This new understanding of the Turkish 
national-self defined the Kurds as ‘kinsmen’ in the same way as Turkmens and 
alleviated the Turkish concerns with a potential Kurdish enclave next to the Turkish 
borders. This loosened the red lines of the Turkish state, as an official of the Foreign 
Ministry reportedly put it in June 2003 (Hürriyet, 2003n). Nevertheless, the AKP 
government sometimes declared that they were paying special attention to Turkmens in 
Iraq during the initial phase of the Iraq invasion in compliance with the hegemonic 
discourses of the time (Hürriyet, 2003r, s).  
  Defining the Kurds as ‘kinsmen/extended family’ instead of a ‘threat to the 
national unity’ and portraying them nationally in the same way as Turkmens in relation 
to Turkey has remained as a recurring theme within the AKP elites’ discourses 
throughout the AKP rule. According to this self-perception, since the Kurds, Turkmens 
and Arabs are kinsmen of the Turkish nation and share the same history, culture, and 
beliefs, Turkey wants them to live happily and in prosperity (Hürriyet, 2007an, ar). The 
Turkish nation directly profits from stability and suffers from unrest in Iraq due to its 
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‘deep extended family relations’ (Hürriyet, 2014bs). It is a natural right of Turkey to be 
involved in Iraqi matters because of these ‘kinsmen’, which should not be understood as 
meddling with Iraq’s domestic issues (Hürriyet, 2007ao). In that regard, to the AKP 
politicians, Turkey supported the Kurds and Turkmens in times of difficulty without 
regarding ethnicity (Hürriyet, 2007ap) and thus Turkey is in communication with all 
cultural groups of Iraq (Hürriyet, 2007ai). This strategy of emphasis on inter-national 
sameness stemming from ethnic/cultural intra-national differences contributed to the re-
construction of the Turkish national-self and enabled alternative policies to be 
implemented towards Iraq and different Iraqi groups.  
 6.3.4 THE STATUS OF ‘MULTICULTURAL’ KIRKUK 
  The ethnic/cultural identity and legal status of Kirkuk have been among the 
crucial themes within the discourses of Turkey’s and KRG’s political elites after the 
American invasion. “The Kurds regard Kirkuk as a Kurdish city” from which they 
“having been systematically expelled by the Ba'ath regime” (Lundgren, 2007, p. 112). 
On the contrary, the Turkmens consider that the city bears a culturally Turkmen 
character which is the traditional perception of the Turkish state as well because the 
Turkmen population was in the majority of the Kirkuk urban areas as the most reliable 
census in 1957 displayed (Anderson and Stansfield, 2009, p. 43). After the Kurdish 
Peshmerga troops entered the city, it was argued that the Kurdish parties encouraged the 
Kurds to move to Kirkuk as part of a demographic battle over the ethnic composition of 
the city (Lundgren, 2007, p. 113) and tried to seize oil-rich areas. In September 2004, 
Masoud Barzani, the president of the KRG, declared that Kirkuk was the heart of 
Kurdistan and that Kurds were ready to fight for it (Hürriyet, 2004h). In another speech, 
he stated that geographical and historical facts showed that Kirkuk had Kurdish identity 
(Hürriyet, 2004i). 
  The AKP government’s discourse of neutrality towards the ethnic groups in 
Northern Iraq as a continuation of a more ethnically pluralistic national-self was 
demonstrated in the case of Kirkuk along with the occasional special attention given to 
the Turkmens, especially against the Kurdish efforts to dominate the city. In January 
2004, Erdoğan formulated Turkey’s position for the status of Kirkuk: 
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What the Kurds are doing in Kirkuk is not right. It is not fair for one ethnic 
group to dominate another one… Such an approach would damage Iraq’s unity. 
Secondly, what happens in Kirkuk opens a way of exploitation of oil in Kirkuk 
by one ethnic group. Naturally, the other ethnic groups would not welcome this 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2004j). 
In this statement, while Erdoğan preserves Turkey’s traditional commitment to the unity 
of Iraq, he recognises the multicultural heritage of the city rather than prioritising any 
ethnic group which is in line with ethnic/cultural nodal point within national identity 
discourses. Similarly, Abdullah Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2004k) urged the sides in 
Northern Iraq to urgently determine the status of Kirkuk and stated, “the case of Kirkuk 
is as important for the peace and stability in Iraq as it is in Turkey… We don’t say this 
only for Turkmens”. He specifically emphasised that Turkey did not favour Turkmens, 
which was becoming conceivable with the newly emerging ethnically pluralistic 
national self-image.   
  The dispute over Kirkuk was maintained during the process of the 2005 Iraqi 
parliamentary elections. Namık Tan (cited in Hürriyet, 2005r), the then Spokesman of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated in a press conference that Turkey had concerns 
about the election since it believed that hundreds of thousands of people, who did not 
have any historical connection to the city, illegitimately moved to Kirkuk and an 
artificial population transfer had taken place in order to influence the elections. 
Likewise, Abdullah Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2005s) declared that Turkey had concerns 
about illicit demographic transformation in Kirkuk. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2005t) 
also said that an Iraqi election depending on ethnic lines was detrimental to the 
territorial integrity of Iraq and was not democratic. The Kurdish parties won the 
majority in the elections for the Kirkuk Governorate, which strengthened the Kurds’ 
position in the city. The AKP chose to support the elections with minor complaints 
(Lundgren, 2007, p. 105) in spite of outcries from Turkmens and part of the Turkish 
public. This silent acceptance of the Kurdish domination in the historical Mosul-Kirkuk 
region, roughly the KRI,	along with resuming a strong commitment to the unity of Iraq, 
blurred the traditional red lines set by the secular bloc’s hegemony. The new pluralistic 
understanding of the national-self in construction did not necessarily perceive a Kurdish 
entity as a threat to its ontological security. Nevertheless, Northern Iraq remained a 
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threat to the physical security of the country because of the PKK’s terrorist activities 
stemming from there. 
  The disputes over Kirkuk city did not come to an end with the 2005 Iraqi 
election, which was welcomed by Turkey, and the approval of the new Iraqi 
constitution. The 140th article of the constitution mandated a referendum (plebiscite) in 
Kirkuk – and other disputed areas – to determine the status of the city before the end of 
2007. This was gladly embraced by the Kurds. However, a possible Kurdish annexation 
of Kirkuk via the envisaged plebiscite increased tensions between Turkey and the KRG. 
The KRG elites made strong statements condemning Turkey’s involvement in Iraqi 
politics and persistently emphasised the Kurdishness of Kirkuk. For instance, Masoud 
Barzani said that, if Turkey interfered with Kirkuk’s issues, they would interfere with 
Diyarbakir’s issues – a Turkish city in which ethnic Kurds and Zazas are the majority. 
He said that Turkey’s problem was neither with Kirkuk nor the PKK but the Kurdish 
people (Barzani cited in Hürriyet, 2007s). Even though the AKP elites strongly 
condemned the KRG’s provocative statements, they maintained their position on Kirkuk 
by describing it as a multi-cultural place rather than referring to it as a 
‘Turkish/Turkmen city’ amid fierce discussions over the city’s identity	 (Hürriyet, 
2007q). Erdoğan objected to calls for Turkey to refrain from involvement in Iraqi issues 
by restating Turks’ historical, cultural and family relations and stressing that Kirkuk 
belongs to all Iraqis (Hürriyet, 2007r). Turkey insistently urged for a ‘special status’ for 
Kirkuk city in accordance with its supposed pluralistic structure. This discursive 
emphasis on the multi-ethnic/cultural composition and intra-national differences of 
Kirkuk city and not portraying it as solely a ‘lost Turkish/Turkmen land’ was in parallel 
with the new ethnically pluralistic understanding of the Turkish national-self, which 
made this foreign policy and perception conceivable.   
 6.3.5 (NORTHERN) IRAQ AS ‘THE NEST OF TERRORISM’ 
  Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed founding leader of the PKK, called for a unilateral 
ceasefire, withdrawal from Turkish soil and declared the abandonment of the idea of 
‘independent Kurdistan’ after having been captured by the Turkish state in 1999. The 
PKK obeyed the orders of its imprisoned leader and withdrew its forces to the camps in 
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Northern Iraq, but did not disarm. The PKK’s violent activity in Turkey remained 
relatively low until 2006. However, the PKK dramatically increased its activity in 2006 
by using Northern Iraq (the KRI) as its springboard, which exacerbated tensions 
between Turkey and the KRG. Iraq or Northern Iraq started again intensively to appear 
as ‘the nest of terrorism’, namely a source of security threat, within Turkish political 
discourses. Turkey diplomatically pressured Iraq, the US, and the KRG hard to take 
actions to assist Turkey in its war against PKK terrorism stemming from Iraqi and KRG 
territory. The Turkish leaders repeatedly stressed that Turkey would take unilateral 
actions such as military incursions into Iraq where the PKK camps were located if the 
other sides kept giving lip service to Turkey and failed to dislodge this security threat.  
  In August 2006, Abdullah Gül put the fight against the PKK terrorism in an 
identity context and called on KRG politicians to cooperate with Turkey against this 
threat: 
Turks and Kurds were together throughout history in the Seljuk and Ottoman 
eras. We are inseparable parts of each other. The PKK is a seed sown to cause 
discord among us. The Iraqis and the Kurdish leaders should know that very 
well. They survived until today under the protection of Turkey. However, the 
PKK, unfortunately, prevents more solidarity and cooperation between us and 
the Iraqi Kurds. The Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq should not allow our 
cooperation and friendship to be hindered like this (Gül cited in Hürriyet, 
2006m). 
The emphasis on the ‘oneness’ of Kurds and Turks with historical references has strong 
identity implications. The AKP elites attempted to discursively isolate and de-Kurdify 
the PKK by describing it as an obstacle to the historical Turk-Kurd fraternity. This 
discursive strategy emphasises both inter-national sameness and internal differences. 
The ethnic plurality was promoted by defining the Kurds as part of the Turkish nation – 
as equal to ‘Turks’ – and the Iraqi Kurds were also defined as inseparable from the 
Turkish nation. These kinds of statements were identity-oriented and value-laden verbal 
motivations to persuade the KRG to take sides with Turkey against the PKK. Moreover, 
defining the PKK as a seed which is sown by somebody else refers to some ‘unknown’ 
evil third parties who are attempting to incite Turkish versus Kurdish strife. The Turks 
and the Kurds were called to show solidarity as a part of unifying discursive strategy 
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against the threats of evil third parties. Gül also discursively sets out a hierarchy 
between Turkey and the KRG, albeit a benevolent one, by depicting Turkey as a 
‘protector’ of Iraqi Kurds. 
  The AKP elites were disappointed with and reproached the behaviour of Iraq and 
the US because it failed to address the security concerns of Turkey in the region and the 
PKK intensified its attacks despite bilateral and trilateral contacts and agreements. In 
April 2007, Turkey officially defined Iraq as ‘the source of the ethnic terror’ and 
declared that Turkey would take all necessary measures within its capacity (Hürriyet, 
2007t). Starting from spring 2007, a possible Turkish military intervention into Northern 
Iraq began to be discussed loudly in the public sphere. Turkish officials’ recurring 
references to a possible military venture into Northern Iraq received a vociferous verbal 
backlash from the Kurdish leaders. They declared their firm opposition to a possible 
Turkish intervention by defining such a military incursion as a violation of Iraqi 
sovereignty as a whole, stating they would defend the territory of Kurdistan (Hürriyet, 
2007u, v, w). The KRG perceived the intervention as an action targeting them, their 
political gains and the Kurdish people as a whole. They blamed Turkey for using the 
PKK as an excuse (Hürriyet, 2007x, y, ab) in spite of Turkey’s insistent focus on the 
PKK and discursively framing it as a common threat with the KRG. Nevertheless, the 
Kurdish leaders also declared their discontent with the PKK’s presence on their territory 
and urged it to either leave Northern Iraq or stop using violent means for political gains 
because it gave Turkey a practical excuse to intervene (Hürriyet, 2007w, z, aa). The 
AKP government hardened its rhetoric against the KRG as a response. Even though the 
KRG officials refused such a claim (Hürriyet, 2007ad), Erdoğan slammed the KRG by 
even accusing it of harbouring terrorism (Hürriyet, 2007ac). 
  Eventually, Turkey launched airstrikes and a one-week ground incursion – 
Operation Sun – against the PKK in Northern Iraq between December 2007 and 
February 2008. Iraqi and Kurdish officials repeated their opposition to Turkey’s military 
activities within Iraq many times and even talked about armed retaliation. Erdoğan 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2007ae) clarified the limited objective of military operations and 
distinguished the ‘friends’ and ‘foes’: “We don’t have any negative approach towards 
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the Iraqi civilians, ‘friends’ and ‘brothers’ there. However, the terrorist camps of the 
PKK in Northern Iraq are Turkey’s enemy. This threatens our national unity”. Along 
with episodic and rhetorical offences against the Iraqi Kurds to pressure them for 
cooperation against the PKK, the AKP government discursively separated the PKK from 
the Iraqis and the Kurds. Cemil Çiçek (cited in Hürriyet, 2008al), the then Spokesman of 
the AKP government, put it clearly after the beginning of the ground incursion: “The 
target of these operations is directly the PKK terrorist organisation and its sheltering 
sites… We don’t have any problem with the people from either Southern Iraq or 
Northern Iraq. They are our ‘brothers’. We share lots of historical sorrow and happiness 
with them”. The Turkish military performed precise bombing raids against the PKK 
targets that caused minimal collateral damage in Northern Iraq (Barkey, 2010, p. 5) and 
kept the ground offensive short which mitigated the tension. Overall, the theme of 
terrorism and the PKK within the discourses of the AKP elites towards the KRG 
territorially defined the area as a ‘nest of terrorism’ by discursively constructing the 
local residents, mostly the Kurds, as ‘brothers’. This was in parallel with the plurality of 
the newly forming Turkish national-self that kept following détente and rapprochement 
between Turkey and the KRG within Turkey’s policy options. 
 6.3.6 THE KRG AS A ‘LEGITIMATE INTERLOCUTOR’ 
  The Turkish Armed Forces have been a strong bastion of the secular bloc 
through which the bloc has asserted its influence over the political sphere. The 
transformative discourse and policy of the conservative elites towards ethnic/cultural 
issues and the KRG sporadically caused discord with the secular elites, which had 
notable influence on the bureaucracy during the first term of the AKP government. This 
discord revealed itself on the issue of accepting the KRG elites as legitimate 
interlocutors. In February 2007, Yaşar Büyükanıt (cited in Hürriyet, 2007af), the then 
Chief of the Turkish General Staff, refused to meet with the Kurdish leaders, stating in 
strong terms: “…We know for sure that these two groups [the KDP and the PUK] in the 
North [Iraq] are the biggest supporters of the PKK. I cannot impose anything on 
anybody. I speak as a soldier. I cannot say anything about who meets them politically… 
What can I talk about with the ones who are supporting the PKK…”. In opposition to 
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the AKP elites who carefully distinguished the Iraqi Kurds from the PKK, Büyükanıt 
portrayed the Iraqi Kurdish groups as parts of the axis of evil against Turkey. The 
statement contained strong warnings about the government’s policy towards the KRG 
because the AKP elites publicly declared that they would talk with the Iraqi Kurdish 
leaders if it was politically necessary (Hürriyet, 2007ag). Likewise, Deniz Baykal (cited 
in Hürriyet, 2007ah), the chairman of the secularist CHP, stated that accepting the Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders who supposedly fuel terrorism as legitimate interlocutors was no 
different to accepting the PKK as legitimate.  
  As a part of the discursive strategy of vindication of national institutions, 
Abdullah Gül powerfully repudiated the claims of crisis or discord between the 
government and the armed forces (Hürriyet, 2007ai, aj) and sustained the government’s 
moderate position on political talks with the Kurdish leaders (Hürriyet, 2007ak). 
However, the AKP elites made inconsistent statements with their previous position amid 
tensions between Turkey and the KRG starting in spring 2007 because of the 
intensifying PKK attacks. In May, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2007al) stated, “our 
interlocutors are not the Kurdish leaders but the central government. I met with the 
President and the Prime Minister [Iraq]. I wouldn’t meet with ‘a tribal chieftain’ 
[implying Masoud Barzani]. I met with Talabani [another Kurdish leader but also the 
president of Iraq] because he is the president”. The expression of ‘tribal leader’ for the 
President of the KRG had strong derogatory implications and refused him as a 
diplomatically legitimate interlocutor. Likewise, Gül, as the then President, said that 
Masoud Barzani was not his ‘interlocutor’ (Hürriyet, 2007am). Even though the AKP 
elites came close to the position of the secular establishment within this specific context, 
their harsh tone within discourses towards the KRG began to change following the 
military incursion into Northern Iraq in February 2008 and the first visit of Jalal 
Talabani to Turkey as the President of Iraq.  
 6.3.7 DIALOGUE AND DÉTENTE  
  The year 2008 can be considered as a breakthrough for Turkey – KRG relations 
when the channels for dialogue were opened. Jalal Talabani’s first official visit to 
Turkey can be seen as the first step towards the upcoming détente with the KRG and a 
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pivotal sign of the upcoming rupture with the traditional Iraq-Kurdish policies of the 
secular bloc. The former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was a 
representative of the secular bloc in this position, had maintained his opposition to 
receiving him as his Iraqi counterpart on the grounds of his concurrent leadership of the 
PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) (Park, 2014, p. 8). This was because in the former 
hegemonic perception of Turkey, Talabani had been seen only as a suspicious Kurdish 
leader in Northern Iraq. Jalal Talabani’s friendly rhetoric during his visit eased the 
strained ties and helped the conservative bloc’s elites implement their rapprochement 
agenda: 
The Turkish people helped us a lot when we were in opposition. I express my 
gratitude to Turkish people, soldiers, generals and leaders… There are strong 
and historical ties between the peoples of Iraq and Turkey. These ties have 
depended on religious, historical relations for centuries (Talabani cited in 
Hürriyet, 2008am).  
In the same speech, he also emphasised that he took an oath to protect the unity of Iraq 
and did not want the PKK on their soil. During the dinner for Talabani in the Prime 
Ministry, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2008an) stressed the civilisational and 
ethnic/cultural ties with all Iraqis: “Every single Iraqi citizen is our brother, 
kinsman/blood relative. We cannot discriminate between our brothers and kinsmen. We 
always had happiness and sorrow together throughout history”. The easing of identity-
based and value-laden discourses from each side left the door ajar for imminent détente 
with the KRG. The discursive strategy of inter-national sameness through the 
historiographical medium of ethnic/cultural nodal point was employed in order to pave 
the way for détente.  
  The first direct high-level contact was the meeting of the KRG’s Prime Minister, 
Nechirvan Barzani with Turkey’s Special Envoy for Iraq Murat Özçelik, together with 
then chief foreign policy adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu in May 2008 (Charountaki, 2012, p. 
192). After the meeting, the KRG adopted a discourse towards the PKK and the unity of 
Iraq that Turkish elites wanted to hear although it maintained its militarily inactive 
stance in the fight against the PKK. For instance, Nechirvan Barzani declared that they 
did not approve of the activities of the PKK, rhetorically urged the PKK to leave their 
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soil and hoped for good relations with neighbours (Hürriyet, 2008ao). Masoud Barzani 
said that this meeting destroyed the psychological barriers between Turkey and the KRG 
(Hürriyet, 2008ap). However, he refused to recognise the PKK as a terrorist organisation 
and defined Kirkuk as part of Kurdistan (Hürriyet, 2008aq). These topics were still 
important in the Turkish agenda but were disregarded by the Turkish conservative elites 
to improve diplomatic and economic relations with the KRG. This positive atmosphere 
was sustained throughout 2008 despite the escalating PKK attacks. Ankara increased the 
frequency of direct contact with Talabani and kept its lower rank ties – specifically via 
Turkey’s Iraq special envoy – with the KRG officials. In opposition to the past, the PKK 
attacks on Turkish soil did not strain ties with the KRG but made the AKP elites invoke 
the KRG for assistance. Also, Turkey’s relations with the central Iraqi government 
developed rapidly in 2008.  
 6.3.8 RAPPROCHEMENT: FROM ‘NORTHERN IRAQ’ TO ‘KURDISTAN’  
  Turkish authorities have traditionally been labelling the KRI as ‘Northern Iraq’ 
rather than ‘Kurdistan’ and playing down the ethnic character of the category. The AKP 
government demonstrated continuity on this issue with the existing discursive hegemony 
and used a delicate language towards the KRG by referring to them as ‘the 
administration in Northern Iraq’ or ‘Northern Iraq Kurdish administration’. For instance, 
in 2005, Namık Tan, the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, officially stated, 
“We don’t recognise a region called ‘Kurdistan’. Everybody knows that there isn’t a 
region called ‘Kurdistan’” (Tan cited in Hürriyet, 2005u). The first breakthrough from 
this de-ethnicizing discursive construction strategy towards the region occurred in 2009. 
In March 2009, the then President Abdullah Gül had met with the Prime Minister of the 
KRG, Nechirvan Barzani during his visit to Baghdad, which was another cornerstone for 
the Turkey-KRG relations that enabled the official recognition and deviation from the 
traditional course of TFP. He used the term ‘Kurdistan’ to describe the KRG after this 
visit and meeting, which received noteworthy attention in the media. This was a leap 
forward for Turkey since it was a discursive taboo for the Turkish elites. He justified his 
vocabulary by saying that it is the legal name of the region in the Iraqi constitution, 
which Turkey recognises (Hürriyet, 2009ak). However, this exceptional usage of the 
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term did not become standard or hegemonic in the following years, but appeared 
occasionally within the discourses of the AKP elites. This discursive rupture towards the 
Kurds had parallels with the AKP elites’ deconstruction of the Turkish national-self into 
a sum of different ethnic groups, rather than the supposed domination of one cultural 
identity. While the ethnic Kurdish identity started to be constructed as an equal of the 
supposed ethnic Turkishness, especially with the reform process of the ‘Kurdish 
Opening’ which was initiated in 2009 in order to end the PKK terrorism by political 
means, Kurdistan and Iraqi Kurds were recognised as a national community, 
notwithstanding the AKP’s discursive inconsistencies depending on context and 
audience.    
  The diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and the KRG expedited 
after the discursive recognition of ‘Kurdistan’. The themes of the PKK terrorism or the 
status of Kirkuk, which were the most important causes of the frictions between Turkey 
and the KRG, became epiphenomenonal within the AKP elites’ discourses and policies. 
The PKK theme emerged within discourses when it organised significant attacks against 
Turkey. The AKP politicians started to discursively portray the KRG as a ‘partner’ 
against the PKK rather than a ‘harbourer’ of terrorism despite the fact that the KRG 
didn’t recognise the PKK as a terrorist organisation. ‘Economic integration’ and 
‘cooperation’ were the key terms for the era because of Turkish entrepreneurs’ flux into 
the region which mostly de-securitised relations with the KRG. The strengthening of 
economic ties went in parallel with political rapprochement, which intensified bilateral 
high-rank invitations and visits. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu 
visited the region in October 2009 together with Turkish businessmen. They were 
welcomed with Kurdish regional flags, which was another symbolic taboo for Turkey. 
These strengthening economic ties were sometimes put in an identity context. As Sinan 
Çelebi (cited in Hürriyet, 2009al), the then Minister of Industry and Trade of the KRG, 
put it during this visit: “We are neighbours. We have been together for one thousand 
years. Our traditions and rituals are similar. Either Turkish or Kurdish, our only aim is 
maintaining this brotherhood”. In a meeting in Mosul during the same visit, Nechirvan 
Barzani said that they perceived threats against Turkey as threats against themselves 
(Hürriyet, 2009am). The transformation of the Turkish perception of threat hinging on 
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the reconstruction of national self-understanding was reinforced by the KRG elites with 
their encouraging discourses and policies. 
   As part of this rapprochement, Masoud Barzani was officially invited to Turkey 
as the President of ‘Kurdistan’ Regional Government in May 2010 (Hürriyet, 2010bb). 
In the joint press conference after his meeting with Barzani in Ankara, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2010bc) stated, “Hereafter, bilateral visits will be 
intensified. The Turk, the Arab, the Kurd, the Sunni and the Shiite will be in the same 
basin [be together]. We perceive the regional Kurdish administration as one of the most 
important factors for the restructuring of Iraq”. Iraqi Kurds have officially been invisible 
for a long time for Turkey’s secular establishment. Davutoğlu’s statement and similar 
statements of the AKP elites not only revealed the new perception and recognition but 
also discursively constructed the image of Kurdishness as an equivalent of Turkishness 
that reflected the ethnically pluralistic national identity re-construction within Turkey.  
 6.3.9 NEW POLITICAL POSITIONING AND ALLIANCE 
  The opening of the Turkish consulate in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish ‘quasi-
state’, in 2010, fully cemented relations (Park, 2014, p. 10) and was a major step for an 
emerging political and economic alliance. In March 2011, Erdoğan became the first 
Turkish Prime Minister to officially visited Erbil. He said during his visit that Turkey 
was pleased with the increasing welfare of the Kurdish people and reminded the Iraqi 
Kurdish audience that the AKP government was ending the traditional identity denial 
policy, attributed to the secular elites, in Kurdish majority places in Turkey (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2011ag). The discourse he employed before the Iraqi Kurdish audience 
and officials demonstrated how Turkey’s rupture from a supposed culturally monistic 
self-understanding of the secular bloc was intermingled with the discourse and policies 
produced towards the KRG. He asserted that fellow ethnic brothers of Iraqi Kurds in 
Turkey were also recognised by the Turkish state, emphasising the end of the supposed 
denial of old secular hegemons. Discourses adopted towards the KRG emphasised inter-
national sameness externally whilst pointing out cultural differences internally since the 
recognition of an ethnic group constituting the Turkish nation was also accepted as an 
equivalent and external national community. It was the main reason behind the secular 
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bloc’s ontological insecurity. Such an understanding might spark the sense of a common 
trans-border Kurdish national identity to undermine Turkish Kurds’ allegiance to the 
Turkish state and orientation towards the emerging Kurdish quasi-state.   
  The PKK’s attacks against Turkish civilians and soldiers sometimes caused 
episodic fluctuations between Turkey and the KRG. Turkey insistently asked the KRG 
to eliminate the PKK camps from Northern Iraq and urged the Kurdish Peshmerga 
forces to join the fight (Hürriyet, 2011ai). Even though the KRG officials delivered their 
condolences, announced solidarity and defined the PKK attacks as against the common 
interests of the Kurdish and Turkish ‘nations’ (Hürriyet, 2011ah), the KRG maintained 
its militarily inert position towards the problem. Nevertheless, the AKP elites did not 
enslave the relations with the KRG to the PKK problem. In a press conference together 
with Barzani in Istanbul after a bloody PKK attack, Ahmet Davutoğlu declared Turkey’s 
commitment to the KRG using identity discourse despite the terrorist attacks coming 
from Northern Iraq:  
The biggest factor that threatens our fraternity is the activities of the terrorist 
organisation… Turks and Kurds will be together against the enemies of this 
brotherhood. It is our natural right to expect behavioural certainty [implying the 
KRG] against terrorism. We expect certainty and active support. Your country is 
our country. Our house is your house. The brotherhood will live forever 
(Davutoğlu cited in Hürriyet, 2011aj). 
The AKP elites, by carefully distinguishing their ‘brotherly/sisterly’ relations with the 
Iraqi Kurdish ‘nation’ from the terrorism problem, kept good relations with the KRG 
intact. Besides, it is also important to note here that every speech that addresses the Iraqi 
Kurds also resonates domestically. The category of nation used for Iraqi Kurds in 
discourses is also employed as ethnonyms within Turkey. Every emphasis on the inter-
national sameness of ‘Turks’ and ‘Kurds’ is discursively promoting intra-national 
differences because the usage of terms like ‘Kurd’ and ‘Turk’ as counterparts within 
discourses makes Turkish Kurds an extra-territorial extension of the equivalent ‘Kurdish 
nation’ or ‘Kurdistan’. The connotation of the term ‘Kurds’ turns domestically into a 
‘nationym’ rather than an ethnonym.   
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  Turkey and the KRG elites even deepened relations and intensified diplomatic 
visits throughout 2011 and 2012 because of a possible chaotic political environment 
after the US withdrawal from Iraq. The KRG was Turkey’s main partner and paid 
frequent bilateral visits along with some Sunni groups. Even though the Shiite-
dominated Iraqi central government declared their discontent with Turkish involvement, 
Turkish leaders repeatedly declared that they positioned themselves at an equal distance 
from all Iraqi groups. In 2012, Turkey drifted away from Baghdad and drew closer to 
Erbil during the discontent between them (Cagaptay and Evans, 2012, p. 1). This 
political positioning became more salient in the 4th AKP Ordinary Congress on 30th 
September 2012. Even though both were invited, whereas Masoud Barzani attended the 
congress, Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq, preferred not to join in. It was 
also a remarkable incident for relations with the KRG since President Barzani delivered 
a speech in front of the Turkish public that was welcomed by spectators with chanting. 
This was an exceptional development since the Turkish government that was still strictly 
committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq sided with the Iraqi Kurds, who were once 
seen as an existential threat, against the central Iraqi government. Such a tremendous 
change in policy preferences became thinkable via hegemonic identity discourses. 
  Masoud Barzani’s visit to Diyarbakır, a stronghold of the Kurdish ethnicist 
movement in Turkey, and his public speech in front of a predominantly Kurdish crowd 
together with Prime Minister Erdoğan on 16th November 2013 was the symbolic 
pinnacle of the paradigmatic change in Turkey – KRG relations. Barzani and Erdoğan’s 
‘Diyarbakır encounter’ was also considered a milestone in Turkey’s ‘political solution 
process’ with regard to its domestic PKK problem (Pusane, 2016, p. 23). Erdoğan 
delivered a historic speech that gave the principal points of emerging hegemonic 
national identity discourse. These strong ‘performative utterances’ on national identity 
specifically coalesced around the ethnic/cultural and civilisational nodal points: 
Welcome to your brothers’ land… I salute you and our brothers in Northern Iraq 
‘Kurdistan’ region… As the great poet from Diyarbakır Sezai Karakoç says, 
‘Diyarbakır doesn’t belong only to Turks, Kurds or Arabs. Like Erbil [the capital 
of the KRG], Diyarbakır belongs to all of us’. We feel at home in Erbil, you 
should feel at home in your own city [Diyarbakır]… The borders of these lands 
were drawn with a ruler 100 years ago [referring to British – French colonialism 
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in the region]. They cannot put borders to our love for each other, our civilisation 
and common future… They cannot separate the Turk and the Kurd… We are 
building the ‘new Turkey’ with the same ‘real’ spirit of how the Kurd, the Turk, 
the Arab, the Laz, the Circassian established the Republic together... My 
Kurdish, Turkish, Zaza brother! This is your republic. From now on, any culture 
and identity cannot be denied. There is no discrimination in the ‘new Turkey’. 
There will be no othering, despising, denial, rejection or assimilation (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2013be). 
Erdoğan employed various discursive strategies that bundled the Turkish Kurds and 
Iraqi Kurds together, separated them from the Turks as a distinct cultural group and 
emphasised the Turks and Kurds’ common traits, which should make them come 
together. He used the deconstructive discursive strategies of emphasising intra-national 
differences and heterogeneity regarding the cultural/ethnic nodal point and scapegoated 
the secularist hegemony by the strategy of ‘perpetrator inversion’ that put the blame for 
the supposed Kurdish question on the shoulders of the Turkish state rather than the 
PKK. On the other hand, Erdoğan also resorted to the constructive discursive strategy of 
inter-national sameness in an ethnic/cultural and civilisational sense and called for unity 
against threats coming from the West. He emphasised the imagined territorial integrity 
of Turkey and the KRG that conceives a common space like a trans-national homeland 
for Turks and Kurds. The emphasis on the common fate and civilisation performs two 
functions. Firstly, it recognises two discrete cultural entities and secondly, it unifies 
them on different bases for national unity, such as civilisation. This discourse 
distinguishes Turks and Kurds from their common other (Western civilisation) which 
infamously attempted to separate them.  
  Erdoğan, for the first time, used the term ‘Kurdistan’ to define the region in front 
of the public instead of ‘Northern Iraq’, which was warmly welcomed by the Kurds and 
the KRG. He later defended his rhetorical choice with reference to some ‘Kurdistan’ 
quotes of Atatürk and the Iraqi Constitution as a response to criticism from the secular 
bloc and nationalists (Hürriyet, 2013bj). The AKP elites started to use this expression 
more widely in their speeches (Hürriyet, 2014v). The strong stress on intra-national 
ethnic plurality, separating the ‘New Turkey’ from the ‘old’ one by accusing the latter of 
crimes like otherisation or assimilation of Kurds, were other strategies for 
deconstructing and constructing Turkish national identity and relating it to the people of 
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the KRG. Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2013bi) said that Turkey should conceive 
of the KRG as it perceived Bosnia or Albania, which were traditionally accepted as 
‘brother nations’. It is also important to note here that this political alliance was going 
hand in hand with economic relations. Ankara and Erbil signed a multi-billion dollar 
energy deal in late 2013 and crude oil from the KRG began filling the pipeline in late 
December (Taşpinar and Tol, 2014, p. 6), which enabled the KRG to pursue more 
independent policies from Baghdad and maintain their regional stability. 
 6.3.10 THE QUESTION OF NORTHERN SYRIA 
  An authority vacuum throughout the Syria-Turkish border grew out of the Syrian 
Civil War which erupted with the unrest in 2011 against the Baathist Regime. According 
to a report of The International Crisis Group (2013, p. 2), the PKK’s Syrian branch, the 
outlawed Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, People's 
Protection Units (YPG), exploited this power vacuum and started to dominate the area 
with tacit modus operandi with the Assad Regime. Even though Assad and the 
PYD/YPG were not political allies, they had common enemies: Turkey and Islamist 
rebels (Gunes and Lowe, 2015, p. 5). This development highly aggravated Turkey’s 
national security concerns. The AKP government has been an adamant supporter of the 
Syrian rebels against the regime and wanted the Syrian Kurds to be part of national 
opposition instead of pursuing their narrowly ethnicist agenda. Erdoğan (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2012p) revealed this position clearly: “We don’t want the territorial integrity 
of Syria to be damaged or an ethnic and sectarian conflict. Northern Syria is not only 
composed of our Kurdish brothers but also Turks and Arabs”. He emphasised that 
Turkey did not look at Syria through ethnic lenses and keeps itself at equal distances 
with Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Arabs or Turkmens as in the Iraq example (Hürriyet, 
2012af). The AKP elites shared their concerns about the YPG/PKK in Northern Syria 
with the KRG officials and urged them to stand against the PKK’s ambitions in Syria. 
However, the KRG-funded Kurdish National Council (ENKS) in Syria preferred not to 
militarily antagonise the dominant PYD/YPG. They signed the Erbil Agreement with 
them that	prevented a Kurdish infighting (Tanir, Wildenburg and Hossino, 2012, p. 9). 
This move towards a united Kurdish front surprised and disappointed Ankara since the 
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AKP elites wanted the Kurdish movements in Syria to be incorporated into the ‘Free 
Syrian Army’ (FSA), the main armed opposition body which was fostered by Turkey’s 
efforts.  
  Even though the AKP elites strongly supported the territorial integrity of Syria 
and opposed the PKK’s Syrian branch PYD/YPG, they invited Salih Muslim, the co-
president of the PYD, to Turkey several times and have maintained a dialogue with the 
organisation. This dialogue could have happened in the context of the ‘political solution 
process’ whereby the Turkish government had indirect contact with the PKK. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu conveyed moderate messages to the Syrian Kurds in general, and the PYD in 
particular:  
All Syrian groups regardless of ethnicity or religion are friends of Turkey. We 
defended the rights of our Kurdish brothers in Syria when they were exposed to 
injustice… We don’t perceive any group in Syria as a threat. All sides should 
refrain from taking unilateral steps. We are in contact with Barzani about the 
issue and will sustain this (Davutoğlu cited in Hürriyet, 2013bk).  
Again, even in the case of the YPG/PKK, the AKP officials were deploying ‘the Kurds’ 
discursively in a ‘brotherly’ context that put unexpected foreign policy moves into 
Turkey’s set of possibilities. However, this initiative did not provide a rapprochement 
between Turkey and the PYD (Gunes and Lowe, 2015, p. 9) which was still accepted as 
a terrorist organisation because Turkey’s pressures failed to convince the PYD/YPG to 
join the national opposition instead of acting unilaterally and not cooperating with the 
Assad regime. Therefore, Turkey maintained its position to keep the KRG on its side in 
Northern Syria against the YPG/PKK that strained the ties between those groups. This 
statement of Davutoğlu, again, reflected the multi-ethnic/cultural discursive construction 
of the Turkish national-self in the Syria context.     
  The siege of Ayn al-Arab (Arappınar/Kobani), a Kurdish majority town in the 
North of Syria, by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (DAESH), in September 
2014 carried Turkey – KRG relations one step forward. Turkey stayed militarily inactive 
during the siege even though it provided humanitarian relief and immediately accepted 
almost all Kurdish civilians, estimated at around two hundred thousand, who fled from 
Ayn al-Arab and the vicinity of the town. The YPG fighters, considered officially as 
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terrorists by Turkey, even received medical treatment in Turkish hospitals (Hürriyet, 
2014bi). Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2014bj) defined the Kurds from Ayn al-
Arab, using its Kurdish name (Kobani), as ‘brothers’ of the Turkish nation several times, 
despite the fact that the town was under the military control of Turkey’s public enemy 
number one, namely the YPG/PKK. He declared that Turkey allowed the Syrian Kurds 
in Turkey who wanted to join the YPG against DAESH but not Turkish citizens. In this 
context, Yalçın Akdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014bf), the then Deputy Prime Minister, 
portrayed the Syrian Kurds as a natural part of Turkey: “Regardless of de facto 
cooperation [with Assad], the Kurds there are historical friends and natural allies of 
Turkey because of kinship and neighbourhood relations… You ask for help from your 
friends and natural allies”. He urged the Syrian Kurds to support Turkey’s position in 
Syria and portrayed them as an organic extension of the Turkish nation since they are 
relatives of the Turkish citizens. Along with being a clear political message to the 
Kurdish groups in Syria, this statement and similar ones were speech-acts that 
constructed the Syrian Kurds in a close approximation of the ethnically pluralistic 
Turkish national-self. In October 2014, Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2014bg), explicitly 
stated that the AKP government did not code the PYD as an enemy in the beginning but 
the PYD cooperated with the Assad Regime and attacked the FSA. This new hegemonic 
ethnically/culturally pluralistic self-understanding of the Turkish nation has not only 
enabled a paradigmatic change in relations with the KRG but it also reshaped the 
perception of Kurds in general as in the example of Syria.  
  Even though the Turkish authorities refused to supply logistics to the YPG 
against DAESH or intervene in Syria unilaterally, it declared that it would allow the 
KRG’s Peshmerga Forces to enter into Ayn al-Arab through Turkish soil. Kurdish 
Peshmergas marching in Turkish towns with the approval of the Turkish Government 
was not conceivable before because the Iraqi Kurdish leaders used to be conceived as an 
ontological threat to the Turkish national-self, as constructed by the secular bloc. While 
the Ayn al-Arab crisis was on-going, Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2014bh) 
clarified the reason for Turkey’s close attention to extra-territorial Kurdish issues: “We, 
as the Republic of Turkey which has citizens from different ethnic backgrounds, 
supported Bosnians in the 90s, sheltered the Kurds who fled from Iraq and embraced 
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everybody who asked for help from Syria regardless of ethnicity or religion since the 
beginning of the war”. The new understanding of the Turkish national-self assessed the 
Kurdish matters in the same way as its policy towards other ethnic relatives of Turkish 
citizens, thereby turning the KRG’s Peshmerga forces into a power which is reliable 
enough to open its borders to, instead of a threat.  
  Since the AKP elites considered the KRG forces as an ally in the field, they 
supported the Peshmerga presence in Kurdish-majority areas that might balance the 
PKK’s hegemony there. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014bk) said that he personally 
suggested the Peshmerga forces’ transfer to Ayn al-Arab and the PYD refused this 
policy in the beginning. Likewise, Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2014bl) stated that 
Turkey authorized the Peshmerga to move into Northern Syria instead of risking the 
lives of Turkish soldiers. The perception of Iraqi Kurdish forces as a substitute for the 
Turkish Armed Forces was a clear sign of transformation in national self-understanding. 
Ironically, the Turkish support for the KRG’s presence in Syria also bolstered a Pan-
Kurdish fraternity narrative that was not a desirable consequence for Turkey. 
Nevertheless, Davutoğlu saluted the Ayn al-Arab resistance with identity-laden remarks:  
Turkish and Kurdish brothers will work together for the freedom of Jerusalem 
and Damascus… I salute Kobani [Ayn al-Arab]. I kiss all my brothers’ foreheads 
in Kobani. The history left Kobani to us to protect… We will keep representing 
Islam that is represented by the crescent [Turkish flag]… We want a new Middle 
East established by Turks, Kurds, and Arabs (Davutoğlu cited in Hürriyet, 
2015ad). 
Davutoğlu put the Ayn al-Arab resistance in a civilisational context that discursively 
deployed the Turkish, Kurdish and Arab plurality within an imagined Islamic totality. 
As we can observe in this example, the ethnically pluralistic understanding of the new 
hegemonic Turkish national identity is also closely tied with an Islamic multiculturalism 
that helps conceive of extra-territorial Muslim groups like Kurds as akin to Turkishness.  
  Nevertheless, the PYD/YPG’s expansion in the region after the Ayn al-Arab 
crisis, like capturing Arab-majority Tel Abyad, exacerbated the concerns of Turkish 
elites about being contained by a PKK belt/corridor from the south. The US and anti-
DAESH coalition’s decision to use the YPG as a proxy against the DAESH and the 
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supposed indirect armament of the PKK through YPG alarmed Turkish officials because 
of serious national security concerns about a potential ‘Kurdistan’ in Syria under the 
control of the PKK. However, the AKP officials repeatedly stressed that Turkey’s 
problem was not with the ‘brother’ Syrian Kurds but with the YPG/PKK that was a 
threat against Turkey and Kurdish people themselves (Hürriyet, 2015h, ax, ay, az, 
2016an, ao, ap, aq, ar, as). It is crucial to remember here again that this changing 
national self-understanding and perception of the outside world do not necessarily direct 
the government elites to certain and precise policies but make those policies conceivable 
and implementable. Therefore, one Kurdish group, the KRG, was perceived as a close 
ally, whereas another one, the PKK/PYD/YPG, remained a fatal threat to Turkey’s 
national security. 
 6.3.11 A RECURRING THEME: THE NATIONAL PACT 
  In June 2014, DAESH shockingly seized Mosul and occupied the Turkish 
Consulate in the city. It also captured Tal Afar, a Turkmen-majority town, which made 
Iraqi Turkmens flee to the KRG’s territories as refugees. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 
2014bm) saluted Barzani for the KRG’s aid to Turkmens: “Your attention to people who 
fled from Tal Afar by providing shelter to refugees is valuable. The people who fled 
from Tal Afar are mostly our Turkmen brothers… There is no doubt that these precious 
steps deepened Kurdish – Turkmen brotherhood. I am sure that the rights of Turkmens 
will be protected in the new term of your leadership”. Ascribing the guardianship of 
Iraqi Turkmens to the KRG with the ‘brotherhood’ theme was another external 
reflection of internal national-self transformation. The KRG’s Peshmerga forces entered 
Kirkuk city, which was militarily vulnerable because of the DAESH turmoil in June 
2014. Even though the status of Kirkuk used to be an important theme of the Turkish 
foreign policy discourses, the AKP government did not problematise the Kurdish control 
of the city, which was a significant rupture from the traditional posture. The AKP elites 
shared their opinions directly with the KRG officials about the status of Kirkuk and the 
unity of Iraq behind the scenes instead of public utterances (Hürriyet, 2014bn, bo) 
despite the Iraqi Turkmens’ outcries (Hürriyet, 2014bp).  
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  The Turkish Special Forces had started to train the Kurdish Peshmerga as part of 
anti-DAESH endeavours along with Arab and Turkmen volunteers from Mosul. This 
move by the Turkish government elevated the alliance with the KRG to a security level. 
Turkey established new military camps in Northern Iraq with the consent of the KRG as 
a sign of mutual trust. Even though the training process was initiated with the approval 
of the Iraqi central government, Ankara’s reinforcements and additional troop transfers 
to the Bashiqa Camp (Mosul) in Northern Iraq strained ties with Baghdad through to the 
end of 2015. The Iraqi Government problematised the new reinforced Turkish military 
deployment and declared it a violation of international law and Iraq’s sovereignty 
(Hürriyet, 2014bq). The Prime Minister Davutoğlu refused the irredentism claims and 
reminded his Iraqi counterparts that Turkey’s commitment to the territorial integrity of 
Iraq was stronger even than that of some Iraqi groups (Hürriyet, 2014br).  
  As aforementioned, Mosul city has been perceived by the Turks as a ‘lost 
homeland’ which is in ‘the national pact’ that draws a particular imagined ‘national’ 
borders. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2016bb) invoked this ‘national pact’ theme in the 
context of the Bashiqa Camp and the Mosul Operation against the DAESH in order to 
underline Turkey’s supposed historical responsibility towards the region. He said that 
people could understand Turkey’s responsibility in Mosul well if they knew what ‘the 
national pact’ was. To him, Turkey could not have pursued its ‘national pact’ goals 
because of the circumstances of the 1920s but disregarding the extra-territorial lands in 
the National Pact was no longer acceptable because it would mean the Turkish nation’s 
alienation from its own past (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016bc). The Turkish nation 
should not stay passive in international relations with the psychology of 1923 (the 
foundation year of the Republic) but should be more assertive as in the glorious past of 
the nation and thus, Turkey has to be part of the solution in Mosul (Hürriyet, 2016bd). 
Erdoğan’s identity-laden and politically revisionist rhetoric in the context of Mosul were 
deemed as an irredentist showdown. Hence, he clarified his intentions: “…some people 
question if we have irredentist plans on Iraqi territory. We don’t crave for others’ soil. 
We are just trying to prevent new clashes. The borders of our hearts are very different 
from our physical borders. I repeat; Turkey will be involved in any development in Iraq 
and Syria for sure” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016be). Even though he emphasised 
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that Turkey does not have any irredentist intention, he included Mosul within ‘the 
borders of our hearts’, which refers to an imagined national appropriation of extra-
territorial space. Likewise, Numan Kurtulmuş, the then deputy prime minister, said that 
even though Turkey will perceive an attack on the Bashiqa Camp as an attack on 
Ankara, they do not have a plan to annex Mosul and Kirkuk (Hürriyet, 2016bf). Again, 
Turkish elites defined an international crisis within Northern Iraq via national identity 
lenses, which is what makes Turkey’s military intervention in the region conceivable. 
6.3.12 THE SOCIAL COGNITIVE HORIZON OF MULTIETHNIC SELF-
PERCEPTION 
  The tension between Turkey and the Iraqi Government increased at the end of 
2016 because of the Mosul Operation to take the city back from DAESH. Mutual 
rhetorical attacks took place between Iraqi and Turkish officials. The KRG did not take 
a clear side but did not defy the Turkish presence in the region. In October 2016, Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2016at), the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, repeated 
Turkey’s zealous dedication to the unity of Iraq: “We value the unity and independence 
of Iraq a lot. A possible division or instability of Iraq is primarily against Turkish 
interests. Bashiqa Camp has only one aim which is training and equipping the locals in 
order to take the lost Iraqi lands”. Erdoğan emphasised at different times that Turkey 
could not simply sit and watch what was happening in Iraq because there were the 
Turkish nation’s ‘kinsmen’, Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens with whom Turkey had shared 
the same geography, fate, and sorrows for the last one thousand years (Hürriyet, 2016au, 
av). Turkey’s insistence on participation in the Mosul Operation was mainly related to 
the possible domination of the region by the Iran-backed Shiite Militias after recapturing 
Mosul city, along with the PKK’s newly established hegemony around the Sinjar 
District in Northern Iraq, which was also opposed by the KRG. Turkish officials warned 
against the possibility of a sectarian war in post-DAESH Mosul and Northern Iraq many 
times, which was perceived as Sunni Islam sectarianism that the AKP politicians 
strongly refused (Hürriyet, 2016ak, aw, ax, az, ba). The KRG appeared as a Sunni 
Muslim ally to Turkey in order to balance the Shiite-dominated Iraqi central government 
and Iran-backed Militias. Nevertheless, Erdoğan declared that Turkey did not perceive 
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the people of the region as Sunni or Shiite Turkmens but ‘Muslims’, at the same time 
stating his concerns about the possible terrorist activities of Hasd Al-Shaabi (‘Popular 
Mobilization Forces’ - A Shiite Militia including Shiite Turkmens) (Hürriyet, 2016bg). 
The perception of the people of Tal Afar as ‘Muslims’ rather than ‘Turkmens’ also 
demonstrates how an understanding of the national-self transforms the perception of 
outside groups. Even though Turkish elites seemed to have unexpectedly sided with 
Kurdish groups against the Shiite-dominated central government, the indivisible unity of 
Iraq remained a strong discursive theme within AKP’s discourses, thereby 
demonstrating an inter-bloc continuity in TFP and discourses. Turkey’s multi-
ethnic/culturally constructed national-self was projected onto Iraq as a multi-national 
unity that paved the way for alliances with Kurdish groups, but the unity of Iraq stayed 
as a social cognitive horizon that limited the scope of Turkey’s relations with the KRG 
at the expense of Iraq for the future.  
6. 4 Civilisational Nodal Point: Turkey and the European Union 
 6.4.1 PROTRACTED BETROTHAL OF LOVE OR CONVENIENCE?  
  Turkey’s relations with ‘Europe’ as a ‘modern’ supranational unitary actor began 
with the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. Turkey joined 
the Council of Europe in 1949 and applied for associate membership of the EEC in July 
1959. The aim of the membership became an ‘official state policy’ regardless of 
different administrations from then on. According to the Turkish elites, membership of 
the EEC would have improved Turkey economically and been complementary to the 
Republic’s aspiration for westernisation, guided by the principles of Atatürk (Balcı, 
2013, p. 122; Eralp and Torun, 2015, p. 16; Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2015, p. 133; MacLennan, 
2009, p. 22). The negotiations between Turkey and the EEC resulted in the signature of 
the Ankara Agreement in September 1963, which was the first step on a path to full 
membership that has yet to be concluded. The agreement set out three stages 
(preparatory-transitional-final) on the way to full membership. The Ankara Agreement 
was supplemented by the Additional Protocol in 1970, which finalised the preparatory 
phase. Political developments in Turkey such as coup d’états, financial crises, street 
violence in the 1970s and the Cyprus crisis among others have influenced Turkey’s 
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relations with European countries and the EEC. Besides, Turkish elites were sceptical 
about the EEC’s possible effects on Turkish industrial development in the 1970s 
because the notion of economic self-reliance was a core value of the Turkish state. This 
situation caused tension between two major national principles which are Westernisation 
and self-sufficient development (Eralp, 2000, p. 178; Eralp, 1993, p. 198; Eralp and 
Torun, 2015, p. 18). In 1982, The EEC froze relations with Turkey due to the 
undemocratic aftermaths of the 1980 coup d’état. Nevertheless, relations between 
Turkey and the EEC were gradually restored after the civilian authority was re-installed 
by the 1983 general elections. In September 1986, the EEC-Turkey Joint Committee 
reactivated relations.   
  In April 1987 the Özal administration, enthusiastic about relations with the EEC, 
applied for full membership under the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome instead of the 
Ankara Agreement. The Özal administration committed to economic and political 
liberalisation that approximated Turkey to Europe, as well as redefining Turkey’s 
international position in a more balanced way between the Western world and Turkey’s 
historical and traditional hinterlands like post-Ottoman and Turkic regions. Özal’s 
pragmatist approach was supplemented with identity-driven discourses. His avant-garde 
approach in foreign affairs, as a representative of the conservative historic bloc, faced 
resistance from traditional secularist hegemons because it also aimed to weaponise the 
conditionality of the membership process to undermine the dominance of the secular 
bloc (Kösebalaban, 2014, p. 237-249; Balcı, 2013, p. 184-185). In February 1990, after 
two years of examining Turkey’s application, the EEC turned it down for several 
political and economic reasons but still left the membership door ajar for the future if 
Turkey solved political and structural problems and modernised and liberalised its 
economy (Aksu, 2015, p. 19-26). The objective of the Western security community 
shifted from “collective defence against an identifiable threat to the promotion of the 
Western values of democracy, free markets and human rights” (Aybet, 1999, p. 105) in 
the post-Cold War era (Dağı, 2001). Turkey’s stability could not be jeopardised for 
‘democracy’ in the delicate international settings of the Cold War (Usul, 2003, p. 142). 
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  Even though there was no major positive progress in the relations between 
Turkey and the EEC during the first half of the 1990s, Turkey joined the Customs Union 
in March 1995. This development was perceived by public opinion as a leap forward on 
a roughly 200 years-old ‘Westernisation’ path, which created an optimistic atmosphere 
in Turkey. The Customs Union membership was eulogised as the realisation of an 
enduring national ideal (Ateş, 2014, p. 135; Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2015, p. 145-147). It is 
crucial to note here that, as the Customs Union membership took place under a right-
wing party, conservative-liberal political parties in Turkey backed by the mainstream 
conservative bloc have put significant importance on the pro-European path of 
traditional TFP. This helped them weaken the supposed ‘anti-democratic’ influence of 
the secular establishment (The TSK as the guardian of the secular regime) in the 
political sphere through EU conditionality. For example, the secularist Turkish military 
has long been defining itself as “the mystical embodiment of the Turkish nation” and the 
guardians of the secularism and integrity of the Republic (Jenkins, 2007, p. 354 cited in, 
Güney, 2015, p. 109). However, the EU has considered the autonomous role of the 
secular Turkish military in the political sphere as a major impediment to democratic 
consolidation in Turkey (Güney, 2015, p. 108). Therefore, EU conditionality facilitated 
to the retreat of the military from the realm of politics. 
  After the refusal at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit of the EU Council, Turkey 
was recognised as an EU candidate country in the 1999 Helsinki Summit. This Summit 
represented a paradigmatic change in relations and the EU started to function as a lever 
to actively and decisively promote democracy in Turkey (Usul, 2003, p. 302; Özbudun, 
2015, p. 35). International relations with the EU began to overwhelm Turkey’s external 
agenda and domestic affairs after Helsinki. In the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the EU 
declared that Turkey could start accession negotiations only if it fulfilled the political 
requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria, which are a prerequisite for all states wishing 
to accede to the EU. Normative principles like minority rights or democratisation and 
political preconditions such as the Cyprus question or conflicts with Greece were 
brought to the table by the EU. This approach was perceived by some Turks as a pretext 
to exclude Turkey from the EU. The EU’s interest in Turkish internal affairs also 
resurrected traditional fears of ethnic separatism in Turkey inherited from the Ottoman 
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experience. Progress in the process of EU accession crystallised an ontological 
contradiction or a dilemma for the hegemonic secular bloc. While the EU was a natural 
continuation of their modernisation project, it was also an undermining force for both 
principles of the unitary Turkish nation-state and the enduring hegemonic position of the 
bloc (Kösebalaban, 2002; Sugden, 2004; Yavuz, 2001, p. 18; Müftüler-Baç and	Gürsoy, 
2010, p. 419) because the EU conditionality required regulations which emasculated the 
bureaucratic power of the secular bloc over Turkish politics. According to Euro-sceptic 
Turks, the EU accession process was undermining the viability of self-confident Turkish 
national identity and Turkish pride (Günes-Ayata, 2003; Spiering, 2007).  
  The recognition of Turkey’s candidacy in the 1999 Helsinki Summit became a 
stimulus for Turkish domestic politics and facilitated the development of a powerful 
civic pro-EU coalition, including NGOs and the business world (Keyman and Öniş, 
2004, p. 182). While a significant part of the Turkish elites perceived the EU accession 
process as a way of also enhancing Turkish security, others considered the Post-
Westphalian order supposedly offered by the EU and the promotion of ethnic minority 
rights (specifically Kurdish) as a threat against the territorial integrity of the Turkish 
state (Oğuzlu, 2002, p. 579, 592; Ateş, 2014, p. 165) and its identity-driven ontological 
security. The Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), Nationalist 
Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), Homeland Party (Anavatan Partisi, 
ANAP) coalition government (1999-2002) did not have a coherent outlook on the 
perception of threat regarding the EU requirements and thus they followed the 
membership process hesitantly. However, social and economic pressures made them 
legislate three constitutional amendment packages and a new civil code in order to 
address the Copenhagen Criteria until they passed political power to the one-party AKP 
administration with an early general election in November 2002 (Aksu, 2012; 2015; 
Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Avcı, 2004). Turkey undertook significant reforms, especially in 
the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in order to comply with the 
conditionality of membership during after the 1999 Summit (Keyman and Düzgit, 2007, 
p. 73). The EU played an important role, particularly after 1999, in shifting the power 
relations between historic blocs (Gülseven, 2010, p. 103) in favour of conservatives via 
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the instrumentalisation of the EU conditionality that emasculated the secular-dominated 
military and judiciary vis-à-vis elected actors. 
6.4.2 THE NATIONAL PROJECT AS A BASIS OF INTER-CIVILISATIONAL 
HARMONY   
  The AKP came to the power in Turkey on 3rd November 2002, just before the 
Copenhagen Summit of the European Council on 12-13th December of that year, which 
was a pivotal event because Turkey was awaiting a date to start membership 
negotiations with the EU. Even though the AKP had an Islamist political bedrock, its 
elites championed the EU membership at the beginning of their rule. The main domestic 
reason for such an ambition was that EU conditionality, which could not be easily 
refuted by the secular elites since the project was in parallel with their ideological 
stance, challenged the hegemony of the secularist Turkish state elites. After the 2002 
election, Abdullah Gül, the first Prime Minister of the AKP, clearly promulgated his 
government’s prospective positioning vis-à-vis the EU and expectation from the 
Copenhagen Summit: 
What is our ultimate goal? It is exalting Turkey beyond the level of 
‘contemporary civilisations’… We need two things for that: firstly, developing 
democratic standards and making Turkey an advanced democracy. Secondly, we 
need to make Turkey wealthier… I want to say this to European leaders: We 
want to show that a ‘Muslim country’ can be democratic, transparent and 
modern, and in harmony with the world… An EU member Turkey would be a 
great example for all Muslim countries… If EU leaders strategically want to 
ascribe greater functions to the EU, Turkey would make the EU stronger (Gül 
cited in Hürriyet, 2002d). 
Gül directly related the on-going membership process to the founding father’s well-
known vague national objective of “elevation of national culture above the level of 
contemporary civilisations”8. Erdoğan also defined potential EU membership as an 
important step for the Republic’s modernisation project (Hürriyet, 2002e). Even though 
it was not specified precisely, ‘the contemporary civilisation’ evokes the idea of an 
advanced and modern ‘Western’ civilisation (Kirisçi, 2004, p. 93). However, the 
																																								 																				
8	Video: “Atatürk’s Speech that Recreated a Nation | Bir Milleti Baştan Yaratan Nutuk (10. Yıl 
Nutku)”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQPtkbAiRrU&frags=pl%2Cwn  
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floating signifier of ‘civilisation’ here was not articulated as a matter of culture or values 
but as a level of material advancement. Gül emphasised democratisation as an extension 
of such advancement and the importance of furnishing the ‘Muslim’ Turkish nation with 
democracy that would make Turkey a ‘nationally unique’ example in the World. Yet 
Gül did not portray the Turkish nation within the European/Western civilisation but as 
an (Muslim) outsider whose strategic aim of membership might enhance harmony 
between Muslims and Europe.   
  The AKP leaders emphasised the rewards of Turkey’s possible accession in 
order to persuade EU leaders to set a date for accession negotiations. To them, Turkey’s 
membership would be a moderating, transforming, democratising force and an example 
for the Muslim World (Hürriyet, 2002f, k), strengthen the EU as a global power 
(Hürriyet, 2002g, k), prevent the ‘clash of civilizations’ (Hürriyet, 2002h), reinforce 
inter-civilisational dialogue (Hürriyet, 2002i), change the ‘Christian Club’ image of the 
EU and make it more ‘multicultural’ (Hürriyet, 2002j). To Abdullah Gül (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2002l), if the EU refused Turkish admission, Turkey would go its own way 
because Turkey has been a ‘civilisation-builder’ country in its own right that has a 
lenient, tolerant and human-rights friendly tradition. In the Copenhagen process, the 
AKP elites argued for the inclusion of Turkey in the EU based on its Muslim identity, in 
contrast to the publicity of former governments which had based the membership 
application on Turkey’s supposedly Western identity (Gülseven, 2010, p. 130).  
   The AKP legislated two more constitutional harmonisation packages days before 
the Summit, maintained the narrative of their secularist predecessors and lobbied for a 
starting date of negotiations (Martin, 2012, p. 171). However, the Copenhagen Summit 
failed to give a definite perspective on Turkey’s membership track and only asserted 
that the EU would open accession negotiations without delay if the European Council in 
December 2004 decided that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria 
(Suvarierol, 2005, p. 66). Even though the outcome of Copenhagen was a 
disappointment for the AKP elites, still their overwhelming response was to meet EU 
conditionality. This decision provided Turkey with the prospect that full EU 
membership was a real possibility for the first time, triggering subsequent democratic 
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reform packages (Öniş, 2010; Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva, 2015, p. 244). The AKP 
government maintained the reform momentum and passed a fourth and a fifth 
harmonisation package in January 2003 (Sugden, 2004, p. 256).  
  The AKP elites invoked different rhetorical strategies between the 2002 
Copenhagen and the 2004 Brussels summits of the European Council in order to 
dissuade the EU from countering the Turkish membership along with rapidly realising 
harmonisation reforms and requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria. The symbiotic 
relationship between Turkey and the EU was one of the themes within Turkish elite 
discourses during this process. According to Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2003u), the 
EU’s ambition to be a global powerhouse would be crippled without Turkey’s 
membership because Turkey’s myriad qualities had the potential to influence the EU’s 
security and political and economic stability. Cemil Çiçek (cited in Hürriyet, 2004l), the 
Minister of Justice at the time, stressed that the EU needed Turkey in order to become a 
strategic power and an influential actor in international politics. Therefore, to the AKP 
elites, preventing Turkey from becoming a member would be harmful to the EU’s 
interests (Hürriyet, 2003u, 2004m). Besides, the AKP elites also depicted the EU as a 
potential impetus to empower Turkey’s economy, security and democracy (Hürriyet, 
2003w, 2004n, o). The AKP elites’ discourses conceived possible EU membership as a 
strategic, rational choice rather than an inevitable or natural merger of global units 
sharing the same identity. On the contrary, “Turkey’s approach towards the EU has 
traditionally rested on ideological grounds, rather than on a rational cost-benefit 
analysis” (Oğuzlu, 2006, p. 84). This kind of instrumental representation of 
interrelations discursively constructed the EU as a party in a marriage of convenience 
contingent upon strategic reasoning rather than shared civilisational values and identity. 
Therefore, when the ‘realist’ incentives of such a civil union begin to die out, there 
would not be value or identity-laden aspirations to maintain good relations between 
units – such as solidarity against hardships together – as could be observed during the 
internal crisis of the EU in the subsequent years.  
  One of the strategic advantages of Turkish membership promoted by the AKP 
elites was Turkey’s civilisational identity’s potential contribution to Europe’s pluralistic 
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cultural vision (Hürriyet, 2004p). The AKP elites repeatedly depicted Turkey’s possible 
admission to the EU as a pre-emptive remedy against potential threats of a ‘clash of 
civilisations’, sometimes with direct references to Samuel Huntington (Hürriyet, 2003x, 
y, 2004q). According to them, Turkey’s membership would send a strong positive 
message to the Muslim World in order to construct inter-civilisational harmony thanks 
to Turkey’s Islamic legacy and identity, and the EU would become a political venue in 
which civilisations lived together peacefully (Hürriyet, 2003u, 2004n, r, s, t, u). 
Although AKP politicians promoted positive aspects of the Union and showed 
unexpectedly effective performance on reforms, emphasis on the ‘inter-civilisational 
harmony and peace’ theme within discourses did not construct Turkey as part of the 
European-Western civilisation. On the contrary, this strategy situated the EU at the 
opposite pole of the civilisational perception. According to this understanding, Turkey is 
supposed to be a part of the EU, not because it is an essential constituent of the 
European civilisation but because it represents the ‘other’ (Muslims), which eventually 
become an impediment to a possible violent conflict resulting from this binary self-
perception. This discursive strategy emphasised ‘international differences’ and 
dichotomised Turkey’s civilisational allegiances and European civilisational self-
understanding. This benevolently depicted dichotomy would crystallise in a more 
malign way when the political ties between Turkey and the EU/European countries 
became strained in the following years.  
  The AKP politicians argued at different times that the EU without Turkey’s 
admission would be a ‘Christian club’. This description was in keeping with the 
traditional Turkish Islamist perception of the EU (Bahcheli, 2006, p. 167) except that the 
AKP’s depiction bore conditionality. In order to pressure the EU to obtain a date for 
accession negotiations before the 2004 Brussels Summit, the AKP politicians declared 
on different occasions that turning Turkey down from the accession would mean that the 
EU wanted to be or stay as a ‘Christian club’ (Hürriyet, 2003z, 2004f, s, v). To the AKP 
elites, the exclusion of Turkey from the EU would espouse radicalism and anti-
European sentiments in the Muslim World since people would conclude that the EU 
refused Turkey on the basis of religious divergence (Hürriyet, 2003aa, 2004w). The 
discursive representation of ‘the EU without Turkey’ as a ‘Christian club’ invigorated 
250	
	
the civilisational ‘other’ image which opened the way for the construction of a binary 
relations narrative vis-à-vis Europe and the West. Promoting and presuming the 
‘Christianity’ of Europe as a cultural/civilisational motive behind the EU’s negative 
external actions towards Turkey also implicates the way in which the AKP elites 
symmetrically perceived and constructed the Turkish national-self as primarily Islamic. 
This discursive strategy, in which performative utterances coalesced around 
civilisational nodal points, transposes a sub-national particularity (religion/Islam) onto 
the national level and ascribes a national representation function to it.  
  The AKP’s political elites frequently highlighted as leverage that the EU was not 
an indispensable political goal for Turkey’s national interests. AKP politicians 
persistently underlined that Turkey did not perceive EU membership as an absolute must 
and Turkish people would not ‘die’ or naively ‘cry’ if the EU refused Turkey’s 
application (Hürriyet, 2003v, y, 2004l, x, y). Even though the conservative bloc’s 
political elites including the AKP occasionally appropriated the EU process as a natural 
predilection of the enduring national modernisation project in parallel with the secular 
establishment (Hürriyet, 2003ac, u, x, 2004g), this image of EU membership presented 
this goal as an optional, strategic choice. In that sense, the AKP elites declared that 
giving up the prospect of EU membership would not mean dropping the modernising 
reforms because they were primarily in the interests of Turkish people rather than an 
imposed homework. Therefore, Erdoğan repeated that if the EU process came to a halt, 
Turkey would convert the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ into the ‘Ankara Criteria’ and continue 
modernising, democratising reforms without the EU (Hürriyet, 2003ab, 2004aa, s, z). 
This representation detaches the national modernisation project from possible EU 
membership, which makes abandoning the membership bid without contradicting the 
founding principles of the country conceivable.   
  The European Council decided in the Brussels Council on December 17, 2004, 
that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and consequently allowed the 
Commission to start accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005, in line with 
the framework that they laid out (Usul, 2014, p. 292). Since Turkey had fulfilled its part 
of the political accession conditionality deal (the Copenhagen Criteria), the EU member 
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states were trapped and could not legitimately deny the accession negotiations (Martin, 
2012, p. 29-30; Schimmelfennig, 2009 p. 427). However, the accession negotiations 
were going to be ‘open-ended’ and the EU pointed to the possibility of suspending the 
negotiations if Turkey failed to maintain adequate progress in the reforms along with 
inserting “the possibility of permanent restrictions in such areas as freedom of 
movement of persons, structural policies, and agriculture” (Kütük, 2006, p. 279-280). 
Nevertheless, the Cyprus problem has remained one of the most troublesome political 
complications between Turkey and the EU, and a prevalent discourse theme of the 
Turkish elites towards the EU, because Turkey’s recognition of the Greek authority in 
Cyprus as the sole representative of all Cypriots has become a political condition for EU 
membership (Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2015, p. 197). 
6.4.3 ‘PACTA SUNT SERVANDA’: EITHER CYPRUS CAUSE OR 
EUROPEANISATION PROJECT  
  There have been two main discursive themes towards the island of Cyprus in 
Turkey: Its strategic importance for the security of the mainland and the ‘Turkish’ 
Cypriot population as a fringe of the Turkish national identity. Therefore, a synthesis of 
national identity and security themes has been widespread among the discourses of the 
secularist elites towards Cyprus. Even though there had been almost a consensus over 
Cyprus affairs between the conservative and secular blocs, as the 1974 intervention was 
carried out by a secular-conservative governmental coalition (Uzer, 2011, p. 108), the 
Cyprus problem became a discursive battlefield between the historic blocs, specifically 
after the beginning of the AKP rule (Kaliber, 2005). It has been argued that the 
Europeanisation of the Cyprus problem under the AKP administration was a major 
breakthrough from the hegemonic bloc’s traditional perception and policies towards the 
island (Çelenk, 2007, p. 350; Kaliber, 2012, p. 384). Ankara had been denying the 
linkage between the EU membership process and the Cyprus problem, until the AKP 
came into power in November 2002 (Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2015, p. 222).  
  In the early years of its rule, the AKP seemed to be ready to make concessions to 
the Greek side in return for the prospect of EU membership under the counter-pressure 
of the secular-nationalist bureaucratic hegemony (Uzer, 2011, p. 152). The AKP was 
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visibly enthusiastic in adopting an anti-status quo position and acknowledged the 
linkage between the Turkish bid for EU membership and the Cyprus question (Uluğ-
Eryılmaz, 2015, p. 229). The AKP elites favoured the Cyprus reunification plan 
proposed by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In December 2002, Yaşar Yakış, 
the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that if the dispute was not solved on the 
basis of the Annan Plan, the Turkish military’s presence in the island would turn into an 
‘invasion’ (Hürriyet, 2002m). The AKP minister’s description of the Turkish army as a 
potential ‘invader’, even if conditionally, was an unprecedented utterance demonstrating 
an unorthodox perception of the issue. The AKP elites occasionally expressed their 
discomfort with the status quo in the island. However, the AKP was faced with a 
backlash from the secularist establishment with accusations of geopolitically 
endangering Turkey and deviating from a ‘national cause’ (Hürriyet, 2003ae, af). 
Erdoğan refuted such claims and declared that a solution would guarantee the survival 
of the Turkish Cypriot community (Hürriyet, 2003ag). He criticised the Foreign Affairs 
bureaucracy for being hardliners and not offering him alternative policies to him 
(Hürriyet, 2002n), and for pursuing obsolete policies (Hürriyet, 2003ah).  
  Nevertheless, the AKP administration did not entirely sway away from the 
traditional policies and rhetoric of the Turkish state. The AKP politicians emphasised 
that the settlement of the Cyprus problem was not in the Copenhagen Criteria and 
therefore it could not be forced upon Turkey as a component of the EU conditionality 
(Hürriyet, 2003ad, ak, al). Besides, they also criticised the EU for accepting the Greek 
Cypriots as a member without a full-fledged settlement in the island which was 
discriminatory against Turkey (Hürriyet, 2003ab, am, an). The AKP elites kept pushing 
to solve the problem on the basis of the Annan Plan before the Greek side’s promised 
EU membership (1 May 2004) as the sole legal representative of the island. The AKP 
elites stated on different occasions that they were in favour of a ‘just and stable’ solution 
and that they did not perceive the existing supposed deadlock as a solution in itself 
(Hürriyet, 2003ad, ai, 2003aj, am). The Turkish and Greek sides finally reached a 
consensus on a comprehensive settlement draft for separate and simultaneous 
referendums in March 2004. However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan with an 
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overwhelming majority (75.83%), while Turkish Cypriots cast a strong affirmative vote 
(64.91%) for reunification (Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2015, p. 237).  
  AKP elites conceived these results as a factor putting the Turkish position 
morally and legally higher than the opponents, which bestowed on Turkish elites a 
legitimate argument to terminate the isolation of Turkish Cypriots and to eliminate the 
EU’s Cyprus pretext in Turkey’s accession process (Hürriyet, 2004e, m). Following the 
referendum, the AKP administration turned back to the original discursive position of 
the Turkish state on the EU – Cyprus problem linkage that separates them as particular 
issues. In November 2006, Abdullah Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2006p) openly said, 
“making connections between the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s EU membership is 
absolutely wrong. The Cyprus problem should not be used against Turkey’s accession 
process to the EU”. The AKP elites repeatedly uttered that Turkey desired to solve the 
Cyprus problem on the UN basis, not within the EU context (Hürriyet, 2005v, w, 2006p, 
r, 2008ar) because the EU was perceived as partisan in favour of the Greek side in the 
problem (Hürriyet, 2006q, 2008as). 
  Following the failure of the Annan Plan due to the Greek Cypriot veto, the AKP 
elites invoked the theme of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ (agreements must be kept) within 
discourses towards the EU in relation to Cyprus. The AKP elites repeated their 
expectations that the EU was going to lift embargoes and political isolation on the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti, KKTC) or even 
to recognise it as a sovereign entity (Hürriyet, 2004g, ab, ac). The AKP administration 
rhetorically used the EU’s subsequent inertia towards the Turkish Cypriots in order to 
portray the Union as a Janus-faced, unreliable unit to interact with. Abdullah Gül (cited 
in Hürriyet, 2006n) stated, “in the beginning, the whole world was blaming and 
punishing Turkey. Turkey was freed from this and showed the world how Greek 
Cypriots are uncompromising and malevolent… The EU is feeling ashamed because it 
did not keep its promise”. The AKP politicians have repeatedly emphasised that even 
though Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots kept their promises in the reunification 
referendum, the EU did not stay loyal to its words and guarantees to the KKTC by 
unjustly not lifting isolation and embargoes (Hürriyet, 2004ad, 2005x, y, z, 2006o). 
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Therefore, to Gül, the EU had been losing its prestige and credibility (Hürriyet, 2006p). 
The AKP politicians used the discursive strategy of negative representation of their 
interlocutor (EU) in order to delegitimise its actions and cast doubt on the neutrality of 
the EU as a supranational institution. This theme of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ violation also 
portrayed the EU as a villain that victimises Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. This 
discursive theme promoted the sense of discrimination against Turkey in favour of 
Greeks, which paved the way for the AKP elites to construct Turkish national identity in 
a binary relation with the EU in the following years.    
   After the Greek Cypriots had joined the Union on 1 May 2004, the EU began to 
pressure Turkey to extend the 1963 Ankara Agreement to the EU’s ten new members 
including the Greek authority in Southern Cyprus. Even though Turkey signed the 
Additional Protocol on 29 July 2005, it issued a declaration saying that its signature did 
not denote the recognition of the so-called Republic of Cyprus and declined to 
implement the Protocol by refusing to open its harbours and airports to Cyprus-flagged 
vessels and aircrafts. However, the EU issued a counter declaration which made 
Turkey’s recognition of the Greek authority in Southern Cyprus a condition of Turkey’s 
bid for EU membership (Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2015, p. 196-197). This approach of the EU 
sharpened the tone of the AKP politicians’ discourse regarding the theme of ‘pacta sunt 
servanda’ in relation to the Cyprus issue. The AKP politicians repeated on many 
occasions that the EU did not honour its promises to Turkey and Turkey would not open 
its harbours and airports to the Greek Cypriots as long as the EU refused to lift 
embargoes and isolation on the Turkish Cypriots. To them, the EU unfairly victimised 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, and kept punishing the rightful side in the island by 
asking Turkey to recognise the Greek side as the representative of the whole island 
(Hürriyet, 2006p, t, u, v, w, x, y, 2008i, 2009an, ao). Erdoğan accused the EU of 
blaming the victim [Turkey and the KKTC] (Hürriyet, 2010y), and said, “the EU 
victimised the Turkish Cypriots, it clearly deceived Turkey and was not honest to us” 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2011al). Again, the AKP politicians rhetorically harmed the 
credibility of the Union within the national public sphere and kept discursively 
constructing it as a malevolent entity vis-à-vis Turkey.  
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  The AKP elites discursively promoted the idea that Cyprus and the Turkish 
Cypriots are more valuable to Turkey than EU membership. In June 2006, Erdoğan 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2006s) said, “we will never concede from our country’s interests and 
never lose our dignified stance. Cyprus is our dignity. We will never sacrifice the KKTC 
for the EU”. The AKP politicians occasionally stated that if the EU put Turkey into a 
dilemma between the KKTC and EU membership, Turkey would absolutely prefer 
Turkish Cypriots over membership (Hürriyet, 2006s, t, 2009r, 2011ak, f). The AKP 
politicians discursively portrayed the EU as an institution struggling to extort the 
Turkish part of Cyprus from Turkey. The EU was situated on the ‘other’ side of the 
Cyprus issue. The Turkish Cyprus cause was defined as a matter of national dignity 
which conceives and constructs Turkish Cyprus within the extraterritoriality of the 
national-self and thus cannot be abandoned. In the AKP discourses regarding Cyprus, 
there was a relatively less clear emphasis on the identity-laden or civilisational 
confrontation with the EU and more on the ethnic/cultural understanding of the national-
self conceiving of Turkish Cypriots as within it. Nonetheless, depicting the Union as an 
untrustworthy villain contributed to the construction of the ‘West’ as the constitutive 
other of a self-other binary. Besides, these pejorative narratives towards the EU also 
fostered discontent among the Turkish people with the EU membership process, as well 
as their sense of victimisation.  
 6.4.4 THE RECESSION AND RECURRING THEMES  
  Since Turkey-EU relations were put on a relatively stable trajectory with the 
negotiations and there was not a significant turning point in the relations during the 
following few years, the AKP elites began to focus more on different matters in the 
foreign policy realm along with realising some harmonisation reforms domestically. The 
negotiations slowed down after 2006 and the EU was lingering over opening new 
negotiation chapters (Kösebalaban, 2014, p. 303). The EU has frozen some negotiation 
chapters as a response/leverage to Turkey’s refusal to open its harbours and airports to 
Cyprus-flagged vessels and aircrafts. The rise of right-wing parties in Germany and 
France and the decline of AKP politicians’ need to the EU for weakening the secular 
bloc’s institutional-bureaucratic hegemony were the other reasons for the stagnation in 
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the relations (Balcı, 2013, p. 271-272). Besides, Turkey’s stably growing economy 
without EU membership initiated a gradual drop in the Turkish government’s and 
public’s enthusiasm for membership (Ateş, 2014, p. 253) since membership was mostly 
conceived as a ‘strategic’ choice from the very beginning of the AKP rule. Nevertheless, 
the AKP politicians furthered and repeated certain discursive patterns and themes during 
the years of political stagnation regarding the EU. There are a few significant recurring 
themes during these recession years briefly mentioned above: 
(1) Inter-Civilisational Harmony/Peace and the Christian Club 
  The AKP politicians furthered their narrative of Turkey’s EU membership as an 
inter-civilisational peace project which discursively excluded Turkey from the ‘Western 
civilisation’ as an outsider which would supposedly diversify the civilisational 
homogeneity of the Union. Erdoğan repeated at different times that, if the EU approved 
Turkey’s membership bid, the EU would become a venue where inter-civilisational 
harmony/alliance/cooperation would be established (Hürriyet, 2005aa, ab, ac, ad, ae, 
2006o, 2007aq). The AKP elites discursively constructed the Turkish nation as a 
representative of an alien civilisation to the West that emphasised international 
differences regarding the civilisational nodal point. In September 2009, Erdoğan (cited 
in Hürriyet, 2009ad, ap) clearly situated Turkey within ‘the Islamic World’ vis-à-vis the 
EU. He stated that Turkey would be part of the EU as ‘a representative of the Islamic 
World’ whose population was estimated as 1.5 million, and that it would become an 
empowering factor for the EU if Turkey was accepted as a full member.  
  Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2006z) uttered, “we don’t want the conflict of the 
‘Islamic World’ and the ‘Christian World’. We want them to display solidarity under 
this roof [the EU]”. As aforementioned, the AKP politicians used the ‘we’ pronoun for 
the ‘Islamic civilisation’ rather than the ‘Western civilisation’ and they even uttered 
them in an antagonistic/binary/otherising way (Hürriyet, 2009at, 2010ae, 2012k). The 
Christian roots of Europe and the West were underscored for this civilisational ‘we’ – 
‘they’ binary. The ambiguous category of ‘the Christian World’ was put to the opposite 
pole of ‘the Muslim World’. This understanding of the national-self perceives and 
constructs the West and specifically the EU through the prism of religion-led 
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civilisations. This representation of the floating signifier of the ‘Christian World’ is 
more related to the civilisational concept of ‘Western Christendom’ used by Arnold J. 
Toynbee (1948) than the theological implications of the term. The discursive strategy of 
emphasising international differences was employed in relation to the EU even though it 
was used in a benign way to promote inter-civilisational harmony. This construction is 
coherent with conditionally designating the EU as a ‘Christian club’ which was 
occasionally reiterated by the AKP politicians (Hürriyet, 2005af, ag, ah). The AKP put 
the nominal or real Christianity of an overwhelming majority of the EU citizens or 
Christian-dominated European history to the forefront as the defining token of the Union 
in relation to the Turkish nation which, as being in the opposite civilisation, was 
primarily connected with its Islamic character. This discursive strategy through the 
civilisational nodal point both deconstructed domestically the civilisational alliance of 
secularist hegemony and situated the Turkish national-self within the circle of the 
supposed opposite civilisational pole (Islamic) internationally. Therefore, the 
deterioration of Turkey’s foreign relations with the EU and Eurosceptic policies in the 
following years became conceivable through this antagonistic civilisational positioning 
of the ‘new’ hegemonic Turkish national-self formation.       
  (2) Symbiotic Relations: Turkish Membership as a Strategic Win-Win Game 
  The AKP elites furthered their rhetoric on the strategic and material benefits 
which could be gained by both Turkish and European sides if Turkey became a member 
of the Union. As the representatives of two different civilisations, the Turkish-European 
partnership would become a marriage of convenience that would empower the political 
positions of both in the global sphere (Hürriyet, 2005y). Egemen Bağış, Turkey’s then 
chief EU negotiator, also repeatedly emphasised this symbiotic and ‘win-win’ 
relationship between Turkey and the EU during the recession years (Hürriyet, 2009aq, 
2011am). These supposedly mutually beneficial relations were emphasised by the AKP 
politicians on different occasions (Hürriyet, 2009ad, 2012ag, 2013bl). This recurring 
discursive theme of symbiotic relations between Turkey and the EU not only define the 
relations via an instrumentally material perspective but also constructed the sides as 
morally and hierarchically equal units. It is important to draw attention to this discursive 
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equality because whereas Turkey is a national entity, the EU is a supranational 
institution to which Turkey applied to be a member. This benevolent binary discourse 
facilitated the construction of ‘Europe’ or ‘Europeans’ as a monolithic interlocutor for 
the ‘new’ hegemonic Turkey national-self.  
  The AKP politicians featured Turkey’s importance for the EU over the EU’s 
value for Turkey. They discursively demoted the EU membership bid to an optional 
external state action rather than the most enduring foreign policy enterprise of the 
Republic as a natural extension of its Western-oriented identity. Erdoğan (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2005aa, ag) argued that the EU would become a ‘superpower’ or ‘global 
power’ if it allowed Turkey to join the Union and underscored that Turkey was powerful 
anyway and could keep following its own way without the EU. During the recession 
years, the AKP politicians overwhelmingly and repeatedly emphasised that Turkey’s 
membership would amplify the strategic and geopolitical power of the Union in 
international relations (Hürriyet, 2005v, ai, 2007at, 2008au, 2009an, ar, as, 2010m, 
2011an). Nonetheless, the AKP politicians also frequently repeated the advantages of 
the membership process and reforms for Turkey and the daily lives of the Turkish 
people (Hürriyet, 2006aa, 2008av, 2011ao, 2012ah). Indeed, the discursive strategy of 
positive self-representation vis-à-vis the EU was deployed here as a rhetorical technique 
of negotiation, but it is critical to be aware that these speech-acts were also eulogising 
the Turkish national-self and pumping up national pride against the civilisational other 
(Europe/West). This theme of a symbiotic relationship would gradually and largely 
wane in the following years as Turkey proceeded to move away from the EU and the 
membership course. 
      (3) The National Project of ‘European’ Turkey 
  The discursive theme displaying a salient continuity with the hegemonic 
formation of the Turkish national-self by the secular bloc is Turkey’s EU membership 
bid as a natural extension/project of the Turkish Republic’s ‘founding settings’. In 
various occasions during the stagnation years, Erdoğan repeatedly emphasised with the 
same words that Turkey’s EU membership bid was the contemporary reflection of “the 
founding ideal of the Republic”, and a means to move democratic and living standards 
259	
	
of Turkey upward (Hürriyet, 2005ab, 2006aa, ab, ac, 2007aq, 2008aw). The EU was 
occasionally portrayed as a phase and reflection of Turkey’s modernisation process 
(Hürriyet, 2005v), strategic objective and a functional instrument by which Turkey 
underwent democratic transformation (Hürriyet, 2005ai, 2010s). According to the AKP 
politicians, since the EU is not an ultimate end in itself but a means, Turkey can turn the 
Copenhagen criteria into Ankara criteria and move on (Hürriyet, 2005v, ag, ak). This 
discursive strategy of the supposed parallelism/continuity with the founding generation 
was inserted into discourses towards the EU in order to validate the EU membership 
process which was making the secular historic bloc’s hegemony retreat from the 
civilian, military and judicial bureaucracy that was their stronghold. The structural 
reforms driven by the EU membership were realised in due course and provided 
leverage to the conservative bloc to institutionalise its hegemony gradually over politics, 
society, state and the economy. This theme mostly disappeared from the AKP discourses 
over time in parallel with their consolidation of institutional power. Besides, the possible 
material gains of the EU mentioned together with this theme made it easier to lose 
interest in the membership track when these incentives vanished.  
  The ‘Europeanness’ of Turkey sporadically made appearances within AKP 
politicians’ discourses (Hürriyet, 2015bd). For instance, Abdullah Gül said that Turkey 
is a part of the West ‘politically’ and ‘strategically’ (Hürriyet, 2010bd). Likewise, 
Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2005ak) stated, “Turkey is a European country with its 
identity, values, people and potential… We had a civilisational way which accepted 
diversity as richness and enabled living together with them [a recurring theme of the 
supposed Ottoman tolerance for different cultures] in ages when diversity was 
annihilated [evoking the dark ages of Europe]”. The AKP politicians singled Turkey out 
civilisationally, even when they defined Turkey within the notion of Europe. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, in particular, underscored the Turkish nation’s embeddedness in European 
history (Hürriyet, 2013bl, 2015ba, 2016bh) and desire to stay within it (Hürriyet, 2015t). 
Similarly, according to Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2005aj), Turkey has been in Europe for 
1000 years, in European political institutionalisation for 200 years and in various 
relations with the EU for 50 years. They situated Turkey within the historical framework 
of Europe. Yet, to them, this historically interwoven status did not frame Turkey 
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civilisationally as an organic element of Europe because they still distinguished 
Turkey’s cultural features from the rest of Europe.  
6.4.5 TURKISH INBETWEENNESS: AXIS SHIFT OR MULTI-DIMENSIONAL 
IDENTITY?  
  The traditional Western-oriented foreign policy attitude had also been valid for 
the early years of AKP rule. It has been argued that “Turkey’s foreign policy axis has 
shifted under the AKP by moving away from the West over time” (Başer, 2015, p. 2). 
The political debates of ‘reform fatigue’ or ‘axis shift’ began to become prevalent within 
both the international and Turkish national public spheres, particularly after 2007. Social 
and political developments in the Muslim World had become more significant subject 
matter than European ones in TFP milieux. Turkey started to pursue a multi-dimensional 
and active foreign policy including in its relations with BRICS countries (Öniş, 2011, p. 
47, 48; Bacik, 2013). Meanwhile, the EU blocked eight chapters of accession 
negotiations due to Turkey’s failure to implement the additional protocol to Cyprus 
following the December 2006 summit (Adam, 2012, p. 142) which thwarted the AKP 
politicians’ initial zeal for the membership. 
  The AKP’s political elites had countered these allegations with three 
fundamental arguments. Firstly, the diversification of Turkey’s policy options in world 
politics does not necessarily mean swaying away from the EU/Western bloc. Secondly, 
Turkey does not distance itself from the West but pursues more independent external 
policies which are not at odds with the EU. Thirdly, the unique, pluralistic nature of 
Turkey’s historical/cultural identity makes multi-dimensional policy inevitable. Besides, 
the AKP administration elites blamed the EU for slowing Turkey’s EU membership 
down by blocking negotiation chapters with political excuses, along with unfairly 
accusing Turkey of ‘axis shift’ (Hürriyet, 2010bg, bh). The AKP elites had been using 
the discursive strategy of positive representation of national uniqueness before such 
claims. Turkey was presented as an exceptional ‘Muslim country’ which internalised 
democracy and the values of the EU. This was seen as an example to the other ‘Muslim 
nations’ and an opportunity for the Western countries because it proved that Islam and 
democracy were reconcilable (Hürriyet, 2005ai, al, am, 2006o, 2007at, 2008ax). The 
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ability to do so is what makes Turkey inherently unique and multi-dimensional 
regarding its identity and external state actions. This theme situates Turkey, again, 
within the civilisational framework of Islam in opposition to the supposed Western 
civilisation, even though it approaches its ‘other’ with benevolent intentions. Therefore, 
supposedly, Turkey’s political entanglement with the nations sharing common features 
with Turks becomes plausible and more likely.       
  In November 2009, Abdullah Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2009ar) countered the ‘axis 
shift’ rumours by saying that Turkey’s strikingly independent, multi-dimensional and 
influential foreign policy derived from its unique position caused respect, jealousy and 
discontent within the West. Likewise, Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that these ‘axis shift’ 
rumours were ill-intentioned and designated to tackle a rising Turkey. To him, Turkey’s 
‘axis’ was only Ankara (Hürriyet, 2009ah, 2010ba). He made Turkey’s approach to such 
claims clear:  
…nobody can instruct us to turn our back on our near abroad while we fulfil our 
commitments and maintain our [Western] alliance. These debates on ‘axis shift’ 
appear mostly when Turkey increases its level of activity/influence… Our ‘axis’ 
is our history and geography. And our identity. Our solemnity. And we look at 
the world 360 degrees around this axis… What we aim with all these is forming 
a new image and perception regarding Turkey in the World and lifting the 
barriers in front of our people (Davutoğlu cited in Hürriyet, 2010be). 
Davutoğlu presented ill-intentioned ‘others’ who were against Turkey as a rising power 
and thus blaming Turkey for leaving the Western bloc (Hürriyet, 2009ah). He 
discursively portrayed Turkey as a unique polity whose historical and geographical 
identity determined its ‘axis’, which enables it to develop relations with the rest of the 
World. To him, Turkey cannot be shackled to a narrow, only pro-Western course in 
foreign affairs and imposing on Turkey otherwise is not acceptable (Hürriyet, 2011ak). 
The AKP politicians employed the discursive strategy of positive self-representation and 
national uniqueness in order to counter axis shift arguments. Davutoğlu also claimed 
that multi-dimensional diplomacy was in the rational interests of Turkey (Hürriyet, 
2010s) and its rising interest in geographies, where Turkey had historical bonds, was not 
a foreign policy alternative to European integration (Hürriyet, 2011aq). The AKP elites 
repeatedly emphasised that Turkey’s developing relations with the non-Western World 
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were a reflection of a complementary multi-dimensional foreign policy rather than an 
alternative comprehensive project for a replacement of the EU (Hürriyet, 2010bf, bi), 
although exceptionally the possible Turkish membership of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) appeared as an alternative in the AKP’s discourses (Hürriyet, 
2013bp) which could also be considered as political leverage to persuade the EU to 
approve the membership.  
  The AKP politicians not only related this pluralisation of foreign policy choices 
to a rational interest-based, multi-dimensional approach but also to national identity-
driven perception. In October 2010, Abdullah Gül, the then President, stated, 
We cannot sit idly by important developments in our near abroad. We cannot 
turn our back on the regions which directly related to our security and interests, 
and peoples with whom we have close kinship, ancestral, brotherly and friendly 
bonds. On the contrary, the expectations of our nation and our historical 
responsibility oblige us to pursue more active and constructive policies in this 
vast geography (Gül cited in Hürriyet, 2010ax).  
Similarly, Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2009ah) expressed that Turkey’s 
qualifications compelled it to care about non-Western societies in its vicinity. These 
identity-laden explanations of Turkey’s enrichment of the foreign policy agenda portray 
Turkey as a kind of big brother who has a responsibility towards other members of the 
family. The vocabulary borrowed from the terminology of family relations, as discussed 
previously, constructs Turkey’s immediate vicinity and geographies beyond that as 
natural extensions of the new hegemonic Turkish national-self. Thus, as Gül expressed, 
Turkey’s interest in these regions discursively becomes an inevitable ‘historical 
responsibility’ of the Turkish nation(al-self). The AKP politicians emphasised that 
Turkey was not only part of Europe but also the Middle East and Asia, which gives 
Turkey a broader perspective in international politics (Hürriyet, 2011u, 2015bb, bc). 
Europe is discursively constructed as only one equal, not dominant, segment of the 
Turkish national-self composed of pluralistic cultural factors. Nevertheless, 
Europeanness as a segment of Turkish national identity is more conceived of here as a 




6.4.6 RISING TURKISH DISCONTENT: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
DISCRIMINATION  
  Especially after 2007, the Turkish public’s and elites’ enthusiasm dropped 
dramatically due to a growing perception that Turkey was facing double standards and 
discrimination from the EU during the accession process (Tocci, 2014, p. 4). This 
perception of the EU and the West in general was already entrenched in some circles of 
the Turkish public and political elites (Kirisci, 2004, p. 90, Koprulu, 2009, p. 189, 
Gülseven, 2010, p. 62, Dağı, 2005, p. 26, Diez, 2005, p. 632), including the CHP 
(Canyaş and	Gümrükçü, 2015, p. 156) as the main political representative of the secular 
bloc. The Turkish officials’ claim and discursive theme of double standards against 
Turkey also targeted the excessive slowness of the negotiations (Adam, 2012, p. 145), 
which was technically caused by the EU’s block on negotiation chapters and weakened 
the credibility of the EU conditionality on Turkey (Ilbiz, 2014, p. 262). The AKP elites 
often attributed the EU’s supposed double standards and discrimination towards Turkey 
to the EU’s unwillingness to have a Muslim country in the club (Aydin and Çakır, 2007, 
p. 10-12) which relates the theme to national identity-driven discourses regarding 
civilisational, cultural and religious incongruities. This discursive theme also facilitated 
the process, making political antagonism between Turkey and the EU in following years 
conceivable. 
  The AKP elites regularly repeated the claims that the EU was not being just and 
objective towards Turkey and developments in the country. The EU’s hesitant and foot-
dragging approach towards Turkey’s membership made the process tedious for the 
Turkish political elites. In November 2007, Cemil Çiçek (cited in Hürriyet, 2007at, 
2009as) stated that the EU must keep its promises and have relations with Turkey in 
equity and justice. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2008ay) emphasised that the EU had been 
applying double standards to Turkey by implementing different policies than other 
countries and Turkey had never demanded favours from the EU but just keeping its 
promises to Turkey. He contended that the EU was unjustly blocking the negotiation 
chapters with a political motivation (Hürriyet, 2009ar, 2012ai). Turkish politicians 
portrayed the EU as an unreliable institution which conducted discriminatory policies 
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specifically against Turkey. The motivation behind these double standards was depicted 
as arbitrarily political rather than due to the technical requirements of the negotiation 
chapters. 
  The same theme was applied to various reports and decisions of the EU 
regarding Turkey. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2010y) addressed the ambassadors of the 
EU countries in February 2010 and stated that the European Parliament was unfairly 
acting like a blind person and should open its eyes and ears to the reality and speak the 
truth. On different occasions, he declared the reports and decisions of the EU institutions 
to be bewildered, treacherous, spineless, biased, subjective and unfair because, to him, 
the EU officials were writing these reports without knowing the facts on the ground in 
Turkey and were trying to represent Turkey in line with their own prejudices, lies and 
slanders (Hürriyet, 2011j, ar, as, 2013bm). This quite harsh rhetoric towards the EU 
institutions or reports was deployed and functioned within the totality of national 
identity discourses as a segment of the demonisation and scapegoating of a 
tangible/institutionalised ‘constitutive other’, namely the EU itself and not like an 
abstract idea of ‘the West’. The AKP politicians also used this discrimination theme in 
the negotiations to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens in Schengen countries. For 
the AKP political elites, it is unfair and a clear double standard to impose a visa 
requirement on Turkish citizens, especially when comparing contemporary conditions in 
Turkey with visa-free countries (Hürriyet, 2009at, 2011at, au, av, 2012ag, 2013bn, 
2016bj, bk, bl). This discriminatory visa policy rhetoric discursively strengthened the 
malevolent image of the EU within the Turkish public sphere as a reflection of the 
single, coherent system of the discursive formation of the EU as the civilisational other. 
The AKP politicians occasionally reminded their audience and the EU that Turkey had 
been on the waiting list of the EU for roughly five decades as proof of the discrimination 
against the Turkish nation (Hürriyet, 2010bi, 2012ai, 2016bn). The EU has been 
hypocritically stalling Turkey for all those years although Turkey was one of the first 
applicants (Hürriyet, 2014bt, 2016bm, bq). The exceptional length of Turkey’s EU 
membership bid was also discursively framed as a reflection of the EU’s 
selective/discriminatory approach, which alienates Turkey from the Union and its 
supposed values.  
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  A similar case invoked by the AKP elites in order to discursively otherise the EU 
is the Union’s attitude towards the Arab Spring and specifically Egypt. The AKP elites 
emphasised that the EU contravened the principles of democracy and its own supposed 
values, and applied double standards by staying silent on the overthrow of Egypt’s 
elected president, Mohamed Mursi, by the Egyptian military, and failing to call it a coup 
d’état (Hürriyet, 2013bb, bo, 2014bu). Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014t) underscored 
the EU’s supposed ubiquitous indifference towards atrocities in the Muslim World: 
“Look at the coup d’état in Egypt. Europe could not call it a coup d’état. They did not 
even take the humanitarian crisis in Syria into consideration. The tragedy in Palestine 
had already been ignored for decades… Their discriminatory demeanour towards 
Turkey would not harm us but cripple the European values”. As illustrated this 
illustrative excerpt, Erdoğan situated Europe’s supposed double standards and 
discriminatory policies towards Turkey in a broader Islamic context by using analogies 
from Muslim majority countries. The presumed apathy of Europe was consistent with 
the expected behaviour of the supposed civilisational other.  
  The AKP politicians, on several different occasions, explicitly and directly 
related all these double standards and discrimination themes to the supposed Islamic 
essence of the Turkish national-self. In January 2013, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 
2013bp) stated that, even though Turkey had institutionally better conditions than 
several other EU member countries, the EU put a barrier on the membership course of 
Turkey due to the fact that it was a Muslim-majority country. He asserted similar claims 
at different times: “The EU, you do not admit us [into the Union] because the 
overwhelming majority of the country [Turkey] is Muslim” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
2016bo). In another speech, he said, “The treatment [by the EU] that Turkey is facing 
now is Islamophobic. That’s why they are late to admit us [into the Union]” (Erdoğan 
cited in Hürriyet, 2016bp). These direct references to the Islamic identity of Turkey 
have become apparent in more recent times when the ties between Turkey and the EU 
were strained and the conservative bloc consolidated its institutional power and 
discursive hegemony more firmly. The AKP politicians invoked the discursive strategies 
of self-victimisation and inter-national differences regarding long-postponed EU 
membership, which depicted the EU as a villain or indifferent in relation not only to 
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Turkey but also the whole Muslim World. The reluctance of the EU towards Turkey’s 
membership bid and the AKP politicians’ discursive framing of the situation as an ‘anti-
Muslim/Islamophobic’ stance facilitated the discursive transformation of the Turkish 
national identity regarding civilisational nodal points that situates the Turkish nation 
within the ‘Islamic Civilisation’ as opposed to the ‘Western Civilisation’ that made the 
deterioration of relations conceivable.        
 6.4.7 EUROPE AS A HARBOURER OF TERRORISM AGAINST TURKEY 
  Traditionally, the Turkish bureaucratic secular establishment, elected 
administrations and the vast majority of the public have been repudiating and resisting 
the EU’s involvement in Turkey’s ethnic/cultural rights and the PKK problems via 
normative conditionality as malevolent interference into Turkey’s internal issues, or 
even support for the PKK in order to separate Kurds from Turkey (Aydinli, 2002, p. 
212-214; Tekin, 2010, p. 128;	 Alexander, Brenner and Krause,	 2008 ; Piran, 2013 ; 
Kösebalaban, 2002; Kirisci, 2004, p. 88). The PKK and the Kurdish case have remained 
a hot topic and source of friction between Turkey and the EU after the AKP started to 
rule the country even though the EU began to make, at least formally, a distinction 
between the PKK and the so-called Kurdish issue by recognising the PKK as a terrorist 
organisation in 2004 (Oǧuzlu, 2002, p. 593; 2007, p. 88). The AKP was enthusiastic and 
active on the EU reforms including de-securitisation of the PKK/Kurdish question 
thanks to the permissive political environment. Even though the PKK-EU nexus was not 
a common theme in the AKP’s discourse during the initial years of their rule, it became 
salient later in parallel with the EU’s failure to anchor Turkey to the membership 
process by blocking the negotiations.  
  The EU and European countries were not accused of arming the PKK and other 
terrorist organisations, except the YPG/PYD question in Syria and very exceptional 
utterances of individual MPs, but of providing safe sanctuary for them (Hürriyet, 
2005an, 2010bj, 2011aw), letting them perform their illegal economic activities and 
transactions (Hürriyet, 2008az, 2016cj), facilitating their propaganda in the media by 
whitewashing terrorists (Hürriyet, 2007au, 2011ap, 2016o), not fighting them properly 
(Hürriyet, 2007at), and not arresting and extraditing terrorists to Turkey (Hürriyet, 
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2009au, 2013br). In a press conference in October 2010, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 
2010bk) enunciated these complaints: “Some [European] countries, unfortunately, 
support it, from harbouring terrorists to acting as an accessory regarding financial 
issues… If the EU countries all together declared that the separatist terrorist organisation 
PKK in Turkey is a terrorist organisation, we need to fight collectively. We cannot see 
this in the policies of some EU countries”. As in this extract, the AKP elites emphasised 
the untenable approach of EU countries and discursively represented them as 
hypocritical and malicious when they handled terrorism issues regarding Turkey. These 
discourses in the relatively early years of the AKP rule (some of them can also be 
tracked to later years) mostly underlined the assumed ‘passive’ support, inert position or 
apathy of the EU and its member states towards the terrorist organisations fighting 
Turkey, which is another discursive tool of demonisation of the civilisational other. 
  The AKP politicians hardened their rhetoric towards the EU regarding the 
discursive theme of harbouring and exporting terrorism to Turkey over the years. In 
2012, Cemil Çiçek (cited in Hürriyet, 2012aj), the then Minister of Justice, said, “You 
provide assistance to terrorists and then shamelessly tell us that ‘there is no freedom in 
Turkey’. Europe is like a peacock today. It is known to the outside world by the colour 
on its tail… But if its feet are examined, we will understand it better”. In an interview in 
September 2012, Erdoğan explicitly pointed to the role of European countries in 
terrorism in Turkey:  
Primarily the West does not want us to solve the terror problem… Germany and 
France do not want it. They let the terrorist leaders wander around in their 
countries. Their financial sources are there. Scandinavian countries are acting as 
an ‘accessory’ to this job… They call it a terrorist organisation but harbour them. 
Millions of Euros are funding terrorism from there… (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 
2012aj) 
In these rhetorical fragments, the AKP politicians discursively portrayed the ‘West’ and 
Europe as an enemy force that intentionally and actively undermined Turkey’s national 
security. Calling the EU countries ‘accessories’ of terrorism is an explicit allegation of 
active participation in terrorist crimes against Turkey, which is a discursive tool to 
exacerbate the loathing towards those countries. On different occasions, Erdoğan 
expressed that it was a proof of the EU’s double standards towards Turkey and that, 
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while the European officials criticised Turkey about democracy and freedoms, they 
tolerated terrorists and failed to distance themselves from terrorism (Hürriyet, 2013bq, 
bs). AKP politicians repeated similar hypocrisy and double standards claims on various 
occasions (Hürriyet, 2016bi, bs, bt, bu, cd, k). According to the AKP elites, the EU 
officials were opening their doors to terrorists who had fled from Turkey (Hürriyet, 
2016k), hosting terrorist leaders in their countries (Hürriyet, 2014v), refusing to 
extradite terrorists to Turkey in a legal way (Hürriyet, 2014w), letting them conduct 
public demonstrations (Hürriyet, 2015ax), tolerating and guarding the organisations 
(Hürriyet, 2016bq, bx, by, bz, cc), surrendering to terrorism	 (Hürriyet, 2016bw) and 
meeting with organisations related to terrorism (Hürriyet, 2016bv). 
  Some specific incidents had granted immense opportunities to the AKP elites to 
instrumentalise these putatively inimical events within their systemic, pejorative 
discourse towards the EU. For instance, the EU’s demand for narrowing counter-terror 
laws from Turkey as a criterion of visa-exemption for Turkish citizens was deployed 
within discourses for the negative portrayal of the Union regarding the terrorism issue. 
According to Binali Yıldırım (cited in Hürriyet, 2016ca), the EU is telling Turkey with 
this stipulation to ‘let the terrorists operate freely’. Erdoğan related the demand of the 
EU to the arguments of the PKK and stated that Turkey would look at those people who 
defended the PKK’s arguments in the same way that it looked to the PKK (Hürriyet, 
2016cb), which rhetorically equates the EU to the PKK. The AKP elites slammed the 
EU countries (Hürriyet, 2016ce) with allegations of empathising with terrorists rather 
than victims (Hürriyet, 2016cf), attempting to corner Turkey in its fight with the PKK 
(Hürriyet, 2016ch), adopting the PKK’s discourse towards Turkey (Hürriyet, 2016cg) 
and aiding and abetting terrorism in order to discourage Turkey’s fight against terrorism 
(Hürriyet, 2016ae). Binali Yıldırım (cited in Hürriyet, 2016ci) declared that, “the EU 
further damaged our nation’s already decreasing confidence [in the EU]… The EU 
should first decide whether it will cooperate with Turkey or terrorist organisations 
running rampant throughout Europe”. Even though the AKP politicians rhetorically and 
continuously announced their adherence to the EU membership goal, they also kept 
portraying the EU as a source of terrorist evil. The AKP and other Turkish elites’ 
discursive theme associating terrorism in Turkey with Europe is not ‘directly’ related to 
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the civilisational nodal point but to the national security discourse which defined the EU 
and some European countries as a threat to Turkish people’s peace and security, thereby 
the Turkish citizens needed to show national solidarity and unity. This formidable 
national security narrative constructed the EU as a perilous foe targeting the Turkish 
nation rather than a supranational institution to which Turkey applied. This theme did 
not emphasise civilisational discrepancies but widened the political chasm between the 
sides.            
 6.4.8 DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS AND THE REFUGEE DEAL 
  The AKP administration’s and the EU’s mutually conflicting stance and 
inculpatory discourse against each other torpedoed already stagnant and thorny relations 
throughout the late years of AKP rule. European countries’ and institutions’ severe 
criticism and reactions in order to counter supposed anti-democratic domestic political 
developments in Turkey and the backlash that they received from the Turkish side 
exacerbated the tension. The enduring impasse in accession negotiations and EU 
officials’ confusing messages on the desirability of Turkish membership have 
significantly weakened the EU’s power of conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey as a 
normative power (Aydın-Düzgit, 2017, p. 2; Müftüler-Baç, 2016; Saatçioğlu, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the refugee crisis, mainly driven by the humanitarian tragedy of the Syrian 
civil war, led to exceptionally intense diplomatic traffic between Turkey and the EU on 
all levels between September 2015 and June 2016, since the EU was facing a crisis that 
required third party assistance (Yenel, 2017, p. 33; Bostanci, 2017, p. 24) This made 
Turkey’s partnership inevitable and “the cornerstone of the European system to manage 
migration” (Marcilly and Garde, 2016, p. 1). The EU proposed some concessions like 
visa-free travel, opening additional negotiation chapters and financial compensation to 
Turkey in return for the refugee deal (Hristova, 2017, Bostanci, 2017, p. 24;	Toygür and 
Benvenuti, 2017, p. 2). The deal was concluded in March 2016. However, mutual 
accusations of not fulfilling requirements of the deal and the EU’s critical stance 
towards the vast purge after the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey showed that this 
rapprochement was a false spring. The reinvigoration of the tension put the continuation 
of the deal at stake (Adam, 2017, p. 8). Turkey-EU relations mainly reduced the role of 
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Turkey to a neighbouring strategic partner and a container buffer zone to prevent the 
flux of refugees into Europe (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017, p. 1; Keyman, 2017, p. 457).  
  The AKP politicians, again, employed severely critical rhetoric towards the EU 
in the refugee crisis and deal. In September 2015, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2015ax) 
accused the ‘West’ for the refugee crisis and blamed European countries for turning the 
Mediterranean Sea into a graveyard because they supposedly say that they did not care 
what happened to refugees as long as refugees did not come to their countries. 
According to him, European countries have never behaved honestly towards humanity 
(Hürriyet, 2016cm), their policies towards refugees are ‘unprincipled’ (Hürriyet, 
2016br) and they shamelessly affront the refugees since this is “in the character of the 
West” (Hürriyet, 2016ck). Erdoğan hardened his rhetoric towards the EU about the 
refugee issue:  
Has ‘Western conscience’ that supposedly lecture us on human rights and 
democracy recently ever cried for people who were losing their lives for years in 
the dark waters of the Mediterranean and Aegean seas?… They shamelessly 
make Nazi analogy to us without looking at blood dripping from their hands and 
their own heartlessness. You are the Nazis… The Nazi mentality did not stem 
from the East but from the West and caused catastrophes. The idea of the mass 
annihilation of people because of their beliefs and roots did not come from the 
East but from the West. The people who were ostracised by ‘them’ were rescued 
and embraced by ‘our’ ancestors (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2016k). 
In this excerpt and other examples, Erdoğan draws a clear binary and historical ‘us’-
‘them’ distinction in order to emphasise international differences as a discursive 
strategy. The West and Europe were depicted as the wellspring of evil, both in 
contemporary and historical senses. The rigid dichotomous construction of the West and 
the East by demonising the former facilitates the discursive formation of Turkish 
national identity as an antagonist of the supposed monolithic category called ‘the West’ 
via rhetoric towards the refugee crisis. The characterisation of the West as 
‘unprincipled’, ‘shameless’, ‘genocidal’, ‘heartless’, etc. in opposition to the benevolent 
‘ancestors’ or ‘the East’ discursively draws a normative frontline and hierarchy between 
the supposed civilisational side of Turkey from Europe and the ‘West’. Erdoğan said 
that, as a Muslim, the situation of Muslims vis-à-vis the West made him ashamed and 
the hypocritical ‘Western mentality’ enraged him. In the context of a sinking refugee 
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boat in the Mediterranean, he added, “Who put them in this position?... 60-70 people in 
boats. When will we sink the ‘Western mentality’ which sunk this boat?” (Erdoğan cited 
in Hürriyet, 2016cl). Erdoğan blatantly scapegoated the ‘Western mentality’, which 
should supposedly be defeated or eradicated, as being responsible for the deaths of 
refugees. The emphasis on Muslimness regarding refugee issues, again, discursively 
forms this constitutive binary positioning vis-à-vis Europe in accordance with the 
religio-civilisational identity of the Turkish national-self.      
       Likewise, Ahmet Davutoğlu strongly condemned how European countries 
mistreated and displayed apathy towards refugees, and stated that even though Turkey 
was economically poorer than European countries, Turkey’s ‘heart was richer’ than 
Europeans. This implies moral superiority since, whereas Turkey had been successfully 
taking care of refugees, European countries failed to do so (Hürriyet, 2016a). Also 
Binali Yıldırım (cited in Hürriyet, 2016cn) chastised the European countries about the 
crisis and said, “Humanism is in Turkey, Turkey is a country in which humanity 
[humanitarian values] did not die out”. These discourses are strategies of positive 
representation of the national-self vis-à-vis the civilisational other and emphasised 
international differences which coalesced around the civilisational nodal point. 
Discursively granting a national representation role to Islam was also a strategy of 
transposition of a sub-national particularity to the national level in order to otherise the 
targeted global unit.   
  The AKP elites emphasised that the EU countries had not shown an interest in 
the humanitarian crisis in Syria, that they did not get in touch with Turkey until they felt 
threatened by the refugee flow (Hürriyet, 2015bd, 2016co, cp, cq) and that their limited 
support for the refugees did not, for that reason, stem from their compassion but rather 
self-interested threat perception, which makes the EU countries morally inferior. The 
AKP elites rhetorically and diplomatically urged the EU countries and officials to help 
Turkey in its endeavour to handle refugee flows because the crisis puts too much of a 
burden on Turkey’s shoulders, economically in particular, which is not sustainable for 
Turkey (Hürriyet, 2015be). In May 2016, Yalçın Akdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2016cq) 
articulated this position: “What did superpowers do for this humanitarian crisis?... 
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Everything is expected from Turkey. Turkey is doing this [embracing refugees] for the 
sake of ‘Allah’, not because they asked. Let’s share this burden”. Against criticisms that 
the Turkish Government is seeking money and taking advantage of the crisis, the AKP 
politicians repeatedly highlighted that Turkey proudly took care of the refugees and did 
not want financial assistance for itself but for sharing the economic and moral 
responsibility of a humanitarian crisis which was hardly bearable, and invoked the 
rhetorical tool of shaming the Western countries (Hürriyet, 2016cr, cs, ct, cu, cv). Again, 
while comparatively, Turkey was portrayed as a compassionate and altruistic saviour, 
the EU was represented as egoist and merciless.  
 6.4.9 LOOSENED TIES AND REALIST ANCHOR 
  After Turkey and the EU finally struck a refugee deal in order to regulate the 
flow in March 2016, the AKP elites rhetorically pressured the EU countries and officials 
to implement their responsibilities in the deal, like the promise of financial aid or visa-
free travel to Turkish citizens. They reiterated on various occasions that, if the EU failed 
in its responsibilities, this behaviour would nullify the deal and Turkey would not stay 
loyal to its promises as well (Hürriyet, 2016bk, bm, bq, cv, cw, cx, cy, cz, d). Erdoğan 
and Binali Yıldırım rhetorically threatened the EU countries in a straightforward way by 
declaring that if the EU did not keep its promises, Turkey would ‘open the gates’ for 
refugees which would harm the EU substantially (Hürriyet, 2016bi, bm). Since the 
supposed apathy of the EU towards humanitarian tragedy did not change much in 
response to this emotionally charged rhetoric, the AKP elites swiftly shifted their 
rhetoric to a more menacing tone. Although these refugee-themed discourses were 
primarily and tactically aimed at short-term political gains and financial assistance for 
the burden of the crisis more than identity-construction, they were complementary 
segments of a single system of discursive formation of national identity through 
hegemonisation of the field of discursivity. They facilitated the discursive demonisation 
of the civilisational other, which inform present and prospective conceivable 
possibilities in foreign policy preferences towards this supranational unit. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the AKP elites maintained the discourse of Turkey’s 
commitment to EU membership, the strong anti-EU rhetoric through a civilisational 
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prism set the discursive scene for a rupture from the membership process. However, this 
contradictory attitude can be ascribed to a political and rhetorical strategy aiming to 
pressure the EU to terminate the membership process rather than Turkey’s 
abandonment, which would put the political and moral burden of the split on the 
shoulders of the EU, not Turkey, and give the AKP elites a reason to rhetorically expose 
the EU as intransigent and biased against Turkey and/or Muslims. Nevertheless, this 
probable strategic reasoning of the AKP does not eclipse the role of the tedious 
membership process, as rendered by the EU’s unwillingness or hesitance in granting the 
membership to Turkey in the lifeworld. By the end of 2016, even though Turkey’s 
departure from the EU membership path became ‘conceivable’, material incentives and 
economic intertwinement were likely to keep Turkey anchored in the process. Other 
international institutions like the SCO which was scarcely mentioned as a replacement 
for the EU membership in AKP discourses, were far from being an alternative policy 
option for Turkey by the end of 2016. Therefore, Turkey and the EU interrelations could 
be expected to run through the discursive medium of a partnership dependent on ‘realist’ 
mutual interest narrative, regardless of the ups and downs of the membership process 
itself.  
6. 5 Governmental Nodal Point: Turkey and Egypt  
 6.5.1 MUTUAL RESPECT AND MILD RIVALRY 
  Turkey and Egypt established diplomatic relations in 1926 along with gradually 
growing economic and cultural relations. Notwithstanding this, they also had serious 
episodic fluctuations and tensions in the relations during the Atatürk era mainly because 
of Egyptian shelter provided for the opponents of the new Turkish Republic and 
discrepancies between the countries’ governmental regimes (Baş, 2015). The 
secularisation of the Turkish regime caused discontent among Arab countries including 
Egypt, as deviating from the Islamic path (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 53; Karpat, 2015, p. 
190). Whereas some Egyptian intellectuals, youths and journalists were interested in 
Atatürk’s ‘Turkish Revolution’, the Egyptian government’s hostile attitude towards the 
policies of the new regime in Turkey and the corresponding discomfort of the Turkish 
side caused insecurity and volatile relations between the two countries (Çolak, 2010, p. 
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32). Even though the characteristics of the regimes of each country caused friction 
between them, they carefully refrained from the total deterioration of relations since 
these two nations were indispensable to each other as the major powers in the Middle 
East (Bulut, 2010). This ‘realist’ mutual respect and mild rivalry have endured as the 
defining themes of Egypt and Turkey’s interrelations. 
  The political developments during and after World War II propelled Turkey to 
play an active part in the Western security bloc in order to protect itself from Soviet 
expansionism in line with its Western-inclined national self-perception. Notable 
incidents occurred between Turkish and Egyptian Governments during the Cold War 
era. Turkish desires to play an active role within the Muslim World as a representative 
of the Western Bloc and Egypt’s struggle to assume the Arab leadership driven by the 
1952 Egyptian ‘revolution’/‘coup d’état’ were the governments’ drivers. In the initial 
period of the 1952 ‘military intervention’, the leaders of the Movement and the first two 
Presidents of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammed Naguib, 
publicly declared their admiration for the ‘Turkish Revolution’ and its leader Atatürk 
(Baş, 2015, p. 60, 61; Karpat, 2015, p. 190). Nevertheless, “following the arrival of the 
Free Officers to power, the Egyptian regime expelled the Turkish ambassador in Cairo 
and confiscated the Turkish residents’ properties” (Magued, 2016, p. 12). After Nasser 
overthrew President Naguib in 1954, Turkish – Egyptian relations started to sour 
significantly.  
  The British and the US had intentions to form a defence front in the Middle East 
including Turkey and Egypt in order to contain a possible Soviet penetration into the 
region (Ateş, 2014, p 259). However, whereas Turkish political elites were passionate 
about such a regional pact, the Egyptian government was not zealously in favour of such 
a front. Egypt opposed any other military cooperation initiatives in the region which 
would jeopardise its supposedly indispensable role for the defence of the region and 
loosen Arab nationalism/solidarity under its leadership (Yesilbursa, 2005, p. 48-58). The 
Egyptian government held Turkey responsible for the new Western attempt at 
hegemony in the region, and the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, MB), 
which became an ally of Turkey during the AKP era, even blamed Turkey for being a 
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‘second Israel’ and called for its destruction (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 118; Karpat, 2015, 
p. 202). Turkey and Iraq signed a treaty of mutual cooperation, which is called the 
Baghdad Pact, on 23 February 1955 that was considered by Egypt as a challenge against 
their supposed leadership and domination in the Arab World and a blow against the 
Arab unity which would possibly undermine its realist interests and identity-laden 
designs for the region.  
  Nasser’s initiatives to counter the Baghdad Pact, including establishing 
alternative security pacts with other Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Syria, 
excluding countries which are non-Arab or allying with non-Arabs (Iraq) as a pre-
emptive strike to halt the possible enlargement of the agreement to other Arab states, 
were perceived as an anti-Turkish campaign and a war against Turkey (Yesilbursa. 
2005, p. 92; Bishku, 2012, p. 38). The UK, Iran and Pakistan later joined the alliance of 
the Baghdad Pact, which turned it into the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) – 
eventually officially dissolved in 1979 officially. It was an evidently unsuccessful and 
even defunct military cooperation venture because the pact pushed Egypt and some 
other Arab states to bandwagon with the Soviet Union rather than distancing themselves 
from it (Karpat, 2015, p. 202). The alliance could not convince any other Arab state to 
join the Organisation because the initiative was widely considered by Arabs as a means 
of colonial penetration into the region for the Western powers. This process was a 
salient instance of Turkish – Egyptian rivalry and contest for the leadership of the region 
(Karpat, 2015, p. 191) that surfaced in the Middle East in an interest-based/realist and 
national identity-driven (the cultural/ethnic Arab – Turkish division) manner, which was 
different from the frictions of the governmental preferences of the past.  
  Turkey diplomatically sided with the United Kingdom, France, and Israel against 
Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis and even though, later, Turkey declared that the British 
and French aggression was unlawful and condemned Israel’s expansion, it put the crisis 
blame on Nasser which aggravated Turkey-Egypt relations (Balcı, 2013, p. 96; 
Kösebalaban, 2014, p. 169; Duran and Karaca, 2013, p. 124; Rüstemoğlu, 2008, p. 37). 
Turkey’s participation in the Western bloc with NATO reinforced the image of Turkey 
as the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the colonialist West within the Middle East. Turkey’s pro-
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Western stance at the Bandung Conference in 1955, its supposed anti-Egypt position in 
the Suez Crisis, the presumed pro-Israel posture (as the first Muslim country recognising 
Israel) in the Palestine problem and not voting for the independence of Algeria in the 
United Nations cemented this perception of Turkey in the Muslim World, including 
Egypt. For instance, Nasser publicly stated that Turkey was disliked by Arabs because 
of its Israel policy (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 65, 117). On the other hand, Turkey 
considered Egypt under the enemy bloc’s, namely the Soviets, influence (Bozdağlıoğlu, 
2003, p. 67) and even some officials in the Turkish Government perceived Nasser as a 
communist agent (Bishku, 2012, p. 39). Nevertheless, Turkey rapidly recognised the 
United Arab Republic (the Union of Egypt and Syria) led by Nasser in 1958 in order to 
have better relations with Arab states (Duran and Karaca, 2013, p. 123).   
  Specifically, after 1965, instead of being merely a regional semi-proxy of the 
Western bloc, Turkey had begun to strive for better relations with the Arab-majority 
countries including Egypt in order to reclaim its independent agency in the international 
arena. In 1965, Turkey and Egypt mutually appointed ambassadors. In 1967, The 
Turkish Foreign Minister paid an official visit to Egypt and the Egyptian Foreign 
Minister reciprocated the visit (Rüstemoğlu, 2008, p. 39; Köse, 2017, p. 105). Turkey 
had avoided antagonising Egypt and other Arab countries in the 1967 Six-Day War 
against Israel (Magued, 2016, p. 13), declaring that the US could not use Turkish-NATO 
airbases against Arabs in favour of Israel (Daşdemir, 2006, p. 206; Duran and Karaca, 
2013, p. 130). Turkey also provided humanitarian aid to Arab-majority countries after 
the battle, supported the Arab position in the UN and condemned Israel for invading 
Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula (Bishku, 2012, p. 42; Rüstemoğlu, 2008, p. 40; Aslan, 
2013, p. 152; Karpat, 2015, p. 219). These initiatives echoed positively and were 
appreciated by the Arab-majority countries including Egypt (Köse, 2017, p. 84; 
Daşdemir, 2006, p. 206; Aslan, 2013, p. 150; Kösebalaban, 2014, p. 205). The dramatic 
military fiasco of Egypt and other Arab countries in the Six-Day War emasculated the 
Arab nationalist ideology (Özkan, 2013, p. 402; Ateş, 2012, p. 58; Rüstemoğlu, 2008, p. 
44) which was the primary ideological/identity-driven barrier for Turkish-Egyptian 
reconciliation. Egypt’s (specifically Nasser’s) claim of Arab leadership which was also 
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an ideational obstacle to reconciliation was attenuated by the humiliating defeat (Özkan, 
2014, p. 9; Ateş, 2012, p. 58).     
  Egypt’s foreign policy priorities gradually and considerably changed during the 
1970s under the Anwar Sadat administration. After the death of Nasser, the Egyptian 
government sought to ease relations with the West and Israel, leading to the 1978 Camp 
David Accords that deteriorated Egypt’s relations with some other Arab countries (Ateş, 
2012, p. 83-84; Çaylı, 2012, p. 10-11; Kösebalaban, 2014, p. 219). Turkey consistently 
took side with Arabs during this period along with avoiding antagonising Israel as much 
as possible. For instance, during the 1973 Arab-Israel War, Turkey had allowed Soviet 
air forces to use Turkish airspace in order to convey military equipment to Arabs and 
hindered the US from supporting Israel militarily via NATO bases in Turkey (Aslan, 
2013, p. 162; Kösebalaban, 2014, p. 219; Balcı, 2013, p. 149; Bozdağlıoğlu, 2005, p. 
126). These developments during the Sadat era and Turkey’s soft pro-Arab policy 
opened a path for deepening future relations between the two countries. 
  The primary concern of Egypt in foreign affairs under Husni Mubarak during the 
1980s was to restore Egypt’s image and position within the Arab and Islamic World 
which was devastated by the 1978 accords with Israel and the pro-Western policies of 
Anwar Sadat (Eliküçük, 2013, p. 36; Özkan, 2013, p. 403; Magued, 2016, p. 14). The 
Mubarak administration and Turkish governments established stronger ties and pursued 
stable relations with each other. Turkey furthered its mildly pro-Arab policy during this 
time, which also reflected itself in the relations with Egypt. High-level diplomatic visits 
took place during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Husni Mubarak played a constructive 
mediator role between Turkey and Syria in the 1998 PKK crisis when Turkey and Syria 
came to the brink of war (Bengio and Özcan, 2001, p. 78). Political, social, cultural, 
military and economic relations between Turkey and Egypt rapidly and significantly 
intensified after this crisis (Daşdemir, 2006, p. 272-277). Even though there were small-
scale disagreements on various issues (Magued, 2016), Turkish-Egyptian political 
relations had not run into a notable crisis during Mubarak’s tenure until the Arab Spring 
(Köse, 2013, p. 107; Akgün and Gündoğar, 2014, p. 4).    
278	
	
6.5.2 PERPETUATION OF TRADITIONAL ‘REALIST’ POLICIES AND 
DISCOURSES 
  During the initial years of the AKP rule, the Turkish foreign policy agenda was 
mostly dominated by the EU membership process and the US occupation of Iraq. Egypt 
did not appear in AKP politicians’ daily discourses very often, especially with regard to 
national self-image, since Egypt was not an important matter of discussion in Turkey’s 
foreign agenda until 2011. The AKP’s general policies and discourses towards Egypt 
until the break-out of the Arab Spring were more or less consistent with Turkey’s 
traditional ‘realist’ outlook which accepted Egypt as a major player in the Middle East, 
while trying to avoid political antagonisms as much as possible. When the AKP came to 
power in November 2002, Turkey and Egypt already had stable and slowly growing 
relations. The number of mutual high-level official visits and the volume of international 
trade between these countries gradually increased over the years until the political 
turmoil in Egypt which erupted in 2011. For instance, in a visit of Husni Mubarak to 
Turkey in 2004, both countries’ politicians expressed their desires for closer cooperation 
between their states and took similar positions towards contemporary political 
developments in the region such as the protection of Iraq’s integrity and the Arab-Israel 
peace process (Hürriyet, 2004ae, af). In December 2005, Turkey and Egypt signed a free 
trade agreement which boosted already growing economic interactions. After gradual 
rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt during the Mubarak years, Turkish elites 
have been designating Egypt in discourses as an important ‘friendly’ country using 
historical references. The speech delivered by Ahmet Necdet Sezer (cited in Hürriyet, 
2004ao), the then secularist President of Turkey, in Cairo during this visit displayed this 
traditional apprehension of Egypt: “We saw that our approaches towards regional and 
international issues are similar as two ‘friend’ and ‘brother’ countries. Turkey and Egypt 
are both in leadership positions to establish peace and stability in the region [the Middle 
East]”.  
  During Mubarak’s visit to Ankara in March 2007, Sezer praised Mubarak’s 
leadership in Egypt and growing interrelations, emphasised the importance of Turkish-
Egyptian cooperation for the stability of the Middle East and promoted Egypt as a 
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strategic ally of Turkey in the region. Turkey and Egypt had “decided to establish a new 
strategic dialogue and partnership focusing on energy cooperation and, regional 
security” because they share same strategic position (Taspinar, 2008, p. 26). It is 
important to note that even though the AKP government complied with the secular 
president’s active and friendly approach to the Egyptian government, the AKP was 
ideologically at odds with the Egyptian regime under Mubarak and approximated more 
to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) which was under the pressure from the Egyptian 
regime. The AKP’s democratic success urged Egyptian ‘moderate’ Islamic political 
movements to pursue a similar trajectory in order to seize political power (Altunişik, 
2010). This ideological positioning and chasm between the Egyptian regime and 
Erdoğan’s government surfaced later, during the Arab Spring. Since Egypt was 
politically torn between roughly secularists and conservatives like Turkey, Turkey’s 
secularist hegemonic elites’ quest for an alliance with Egypt under Mubarak was 
coherent with the secular bloc’s ‘secular republicanism’ as a governmental 
understanding of the national-self. The AKP furthered close economic and political ties 
with Egypt during the Mubarak’s tenure although there has always been a veiled conflict 
between the sides over the leadership role in regional matters like the Israel-Palestine 
conflict in which the AKP’s Turkey started to engage deeply (Magued, 2016, p. 19-21; 
Köse, 2013, p. 108). The AKP politicians reiterated hackneyed formal and diplomatic 
‘friendship’ rhetoric and emphasised the irreplaceable weight and leading role of both 
countries in regional stability.    
6.5.3 THE GAZA WAR: PARTIALLY SURFACED IDENTITY-DRIVEN 
ANTAGONISM 
  A latent political-ideological friction between Turkey’s conservative elites and 
the Egyptian regime, which was eclipsed for a while by growing symbiotic economic 
relations surfaced partly during and after the Israeli military assault on the Gaza Strip 
(Operation Cast Lead) in 2008-2009 against Hamas. Since Hamas had won the majority 
of seats in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Erdoğan stated during the Gaza 
crisis that disregarding Hamas’s electoral victory and attacking it were not coherent with 
democratic principles. He rhetorically urged everybody to respect Hamas’s legislative 
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political legitimacy (Hürriyet, 2009av). Hamas was discursively constructed in the 
Turkish public sphere as a legitimate pro-Islamic Palestinian political party fighting for 
the Palestine cause which was also shared by Turkey’s conservative elites as an 
extension of more Islamic Turkish national-self. Hamas’s political legitimacy was 
deployed in discourses with regard to the governmental nodal point of majoritarian 
democracy more than the supposed common Islamic civilisational bonds. However, 
since Hamas had widely been seen as an extension of the main Islamic opponent MB, 
which had been making significant political gains within Egypt, the Egyptian 
Government was biased and suspicious about the organisation (Schenker, 2008, 
Akpınar, 2015, p. 7) and stayed close to the pro-secular Fatah. This antagonistic 
perception of Hamas by Turkey and Egypt was a salient manifestation of an identity-
driven chasm between the AKP elites and the Egyptian government. 
  Mubarak’s Egypt adopted a cautious and balanced rhetoric and policy during the 
Gaza crisis and even imputed responsibility to Hamas along with Israel (Erkmen, 2009, 
p. 12; Aras, 2009b, p. 18; Köse, 2013, p. 97). This was mainly because of its 
commitment to Egypt’s enduring peace with Israel and wariness vis-à-vis Hamas, and 
contradicted the AKP’s explicit pro-Palestinian/Hamas narrative (Aras, 2009b, p. 8). 
This was an explicit divergence of discourse and policy on the issue which had deeper 
connotations for the regional balance of power and leadership role perception. Erdoğan 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2009aw) defined the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip as ‘cruelty’, 
‘disproportionate use of force’ and ‘humanitarian tragedy’ while portraying Turkey’s 
pro-Palestinian diplomatic struggle as ‘Turkey’s historical mission’ that rhetorically 
attributed a ‘historical’ responsibility to the Turkish nation regarding the Israel-Palestine 
issue. According to him, Israel’s military actions were a ‘crime against humanity’ 
(Erdoğan cited in Altunişik and Cuhadar, 2010, p. 386) and turned Palestine into an 
‘open-air prison’ (Erdoğan cited in Warning and Kardaş, 2011, p. 134).  
  Turkey’s mediation initiative between Palestine/Hamas and Israel prior to the 
Israeli assault, and between Hamas and Fatah after the assault were already matters of 
concern for Egypt due to their fear of handing over its regional role to Turkey. Even 
though the AKP elites discursively ‘nationalised’ the Turkish involvement in the 
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Palestine issue as a supposed ‘historical responsibility’ towards Palestinian ‘brothers’, 
Turkey intentionally tried to refrain from causing anxiety in Egypt about Turkish 
engagement in ‘Arab affairs’ in ways that might shift the geopolitical balance because of 
its active role in the Gaza crisis (Dinç, 2011, p. 69). During the negotiations for a 
ceasefire, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2009ax) said that Turkey would not intervene in 
issues under Egypt’s control like tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. Even though Turkey 
declared that “Turkey is not trying to steal a role from Egypt” in 2009 (Davutoğlu cited 
in Altunişik, 2010, p. 15), the weakening of Egypt’s leadership role under Mubarak in 
the shared sphere of influence enabled Turkey to fill this vacuum by constructing itself 
as the main defender of Muslims in international platforms (Altunişik and Martin, 2011, 
p. 577; Altunişik and Cuhadar, 2010, p. 373; Çandar, 2009, p. 9). Turkey’s openly pro-
Palestine/Hamas stance required distancing itself from Mubarak’s Egypt (Bank and 
Karadag, 2013, p. 297) and Mubarak’s Egypt stayed sceptical about Turkey’s regional 
intentions (Magued, 2016, p. 19).  
  Turkey continued to make joint efforts with Egypt to solve regional problems as 
in the Gaza crisis and furthered close political and economic relations despite fractured 
identity-laden positions because the AKP perceived Egypt as a major player in the 
region. Prime Minister Erdoğan toured major Arab countries including Egypt during the 
hot days of the Gaza crisis. Before his visit to Egypt, Erdoğan (cited in Aras, 2009b, p. 
8) stated, “The Palestinian and Gaza people, our ‘brothers’, can only be saved from their 
isolation when these embargoes are lifted”. Defining Palestinian people as ‘brothers’ 
with the discursive strategy of international sameness and designating lifting embargoes 
on Gaza as an objective indicated deeper Turkish involvement in the issue. There was an 
intense diplomatic traffic between Turkish and Egyptian officials for the post-war 
solutions in Palestine (Hürriyet, 2009ay, bb, bc, bd). The Turkish side strongly 
emphasised the necessity of a coalition between Fatah and Hamas during these mutual 
visits (Hürriyet, 2009az) and appreciated the efforts of Egypt in initiating such a 
coalition, although Mubarak preserved Egypt’s traditional, pro-Fatah position (Hürriyet, 
2009ba). In later days, Turkey urged Egyptian officials to reopen the Egypt-Gaza border 
for humanitarian relief, and some Turkish political parties and NGOs protested against 
Egypt for oppressing the Palestinian people (Hürriyet, 2009bl, bm, bn). Overall, the 
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AKP elites improved Turkey’s traditional ties via bilateral visits and meetings and 
declared their intention to establish a ‘High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council’ with 
Egypt just before the Arab Spring erupted (Hürriyet, 2009bo). 
  Even though the AKP’s ideological proximity to the Islamic elements in Egypt 
partially surfaced during the Gaza crisis, the AKP elites maintained Turkey’s ‘realist' 
approach towards Egypt (Hürriyet, 2009be). This understanding of Egypt and policy 
during the Gaza crisis was stated by Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2009ba): “We 
approached the problems in Gaza ethically and realistically. We approached them 
ethically because we did not stay silent to this humanitarian tragedy. Our joint peace 
efforts with Egypt throughout the war were an example of our realist policy”. A 
statement like this one manifested that Turkey cooperated with Egypt during the crisis 
due to the ‘realities’ of the field in which Egypt was a highly influential actor despite 
ideational divergences between Turkish and Egyptian officials. These divergences were 
going to be revealed retrospectively in future discourses of the AKP politicians after the 
fall of Husni Mubarak. Even though Egypt was discursively portrayed as within the 
civilisational circle of the shared Muslim identity, it generally appeared through a realist 
prism in Turkish discourses accompanied by economy-driven ‘realist’ policies. Hence, 
Egypt did not appear in the daily speeches of the AKP politicians so often and the AKP 
elites employed a cautious and diplomatically respectful rhetoric towards it despite the 
fact that there was a semi-veiled ideological antagonism.   
6.5.4 THE AKP ELITES’ DEMOCRACY NARRATIVE DURING THE ARAB 
SPRING 
  The so-called Arab Spring symbolically erupted “in Tunisia on 17 December 
2010 when Muhammed Bouazizi, a street vendor self-immolated in protest of 
maltreatment by the local police” (Başkan, 2017, p. 3), which ‘narratively’ ignited the 
on-going mayhem in the Middle East. Turkey took a cautious stance and used prudent 
rhetoric during the very early days of the nascent transformative events (Hürriyet, 
2011ax). However, even though “Turkey had been developing close ties with the 
‘autocratic regimes’” of the Arab World before the uprisings (Alessandri and Altunışık, 
2013, cited in Ayata, 2015, p. 96), the AKP government started to adopt a conspicuously 
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pro-opposition position towards the incidents in the Arab World when the public 
clamours also began to shake Egypt’s streets. Taking a clear and categorical side during 
the disorder in the ‘Arab World’ reoriented Turkey’s modus operandi in the region 
consequentially.   
  In his first statement about the protests in Egypt, Erdoğan called on Husni 
Mubarak to address and satisfy people’s humane demands and the desire of change 
without hesitation or delay. He emphasised that Egypt was a multi-cultural country of 
civilisation which deserved the best democracy and freedom and any bloody suffering of 
the Egyptian people would deeply hurt the Turkish nation as well (Erdoğan cited in 
Hürriyet, 2011ay). In another speech, he said, “Defying the will of the people is like 
reversing the flow of a river. Whatever this river requires will eventually happen… We 
do not have any intention to interfere in the domestic affairs of Egypt but people have 
been suffering for decades in the Middle East. We are not a country to watch the Middle 
East from a tribune” (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2011bg). This ‘protestor-friendly’ 
strong rhetoric that legitimised the unrest and discursively constructed the opposition as 
the rightful side signalled Turkey’s subsequent close and partisan engagement in the 
Middle East during the so-called Arab Spring.  
  It is essential to situate the AKP elites’ discourses towards Egypt in their broader 
‘democracy’ (majoritarian) narrative in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ in order to 
analyse more holistically how certain of Turkey’s policies towards Egypt and other 
‘Muslim nations’ became conceivable and implementable. In February 2011, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2011az), the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, defined the 
uprisings and potential democratic transformation in the region as the ‘normalisation of 
history’ because the Western colonisation and the Cold War artificially separated the 
Middle Eastern nations, including Turkey, from each other. He added that Turkey 
considered the fate of those countries as its own fate and vice versa. Davutoğlu strongly 
associated the authoritarian regimes with the disunity and disorder in the region: “It is 
our desire that the peoples of the Middle East are not separated from each other under 
new authoritarian structures” (Davutoğlu cited in Başkan, 2017, p. 10). In another 
speech, he positively stated, “a common regional awareness beyond nation-states has 
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started to rise, this is the beginning of a historical transformation” (Davutoğlu cited in 
Hürriyet, 2011ba). He discursively portrayed the Arab uprisings and transformations as 
“natural reflections of the natural flow of history” (Davutoğlu cited in Başkan, 2017, p. 
9). Ahmet Davutoğlu articulated this ‘natural’ democracy-regional integration 
correlation succinctly:  
A democratic Syria will integrate with Turkey much more than before. A 
democratic Egypt will be much more integrated with a democratic Libya because 
this is the peoples’ will. These peoples do not want iron walls to be built between 
one another, do not want Berlin walls to be built. They want to unite and return 
to history together (Davutoğlu cited in Başkan, 2017, p. 10). 
He declared that Turkey would work tirelessly in order to realize people’s legitimate 
aspirations in a stable and peaceful fashion (Davutoğlu cited in Altunışık, 2013, p. 4).  
  The potential transition to democratic regimes was discursively portrayed as the 
abolition of artificial borders between peoples. This narrative of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
depicted ‘democracy’ as a regionally unifying ‘floating signifier’ and discursively 
approximated the Turkish national-self with the Middle Eastern nations. This 
deconstructive discursive strategy alienates ‘anti-democratic’ ancien régimes of the 
region including the hegemony of the secular bloc in Turkey from ‘real’ nations, which 
were ‘naturally’ akin to each other. The Middle Eastern countries were conceived under 
the banner of a common Islamic Civilisation and, now with the Arab uprisings, 
democracy was presented as the ‘essential’ governmental means of achieving such a 
civilisational integration in the lifeworld. The enthusiastic Turkish political support for 
the opposition movements throughout the ‘Arab Spring’ years was discursively 
rationalised and made implementable via these civilisational and governmental prisms 
of the conservative bloc’s understanding of the Turkish national-self.  
  Abdullah Gül, the then President of Turkey, adopted this ‘emancipatory’ 
discursive representation of the ‘Arab Spring’ and signified it as a historic transition to 
democracy through which the Arab peoples of the Middle East seized their own fates 
(Hürriyet, 2011bb). He made the Turkish government’s position clear in a speech that 
addressed Egyptian youth in June 2011: 
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As you can see, the torch which was lit in Egypt after Tunisia enlightens the 
whole ‘Islamic World’. Now, all peoples went beyond the wall of fear 
everywhere and are struggling for a proper and respected government in their 
countries… I want to remind the officials in the Muslim Arab World of that they 
should be realistic, perceive the world in a better way and see that there is no 
place for authoritarian regimes anymore in the ‘Islamic World’ for sure… (Gül 
cited in Hürriyet, 2011bc) 
Gül discursively constructed a new potential and ‘genuine’ subjectivity which was 
supposedly arising from the uprisings and transformations in the ‘Islamic World’ that 
would change the political landscape of the region permanently. Therefore, he made an 
analogy with the revolutions of 1848 and 1989 in Europe and stated, “The people of the 
region… decided to determine their future by themselves… This struggle is for 
regaining national honour and self-confidence as well as freedom and justice” (Gül cited 
in Hürriyet, 2011t). In another speech in April 2012, he discursively portrayed the ‘Arab 
Spring’ as a continuation of ‘democratic waves’ in Europe and South America after 
1989, and emphasised that these movements were the evidence of Islam’s reconcilability 
with democracy and were not ignited by outside forces, thus they were genuinely 
indigenous occurrences (Hürriyet, 2012r). Hence, to him, this wind of change was not 
reversible (Hürriyet, 2013bt). This discursive approach constructed a powerful 
democratic and authentic narrative of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ which was 
domestically in parallel with ‘majoritarian democracy’ theme within the Turkish 
national identity discourses with regard to the governmental nodal point. This ‘logical’ 
extension of the governmental understanding of the national-self reflected itself in the 
case of the ‘Arab Spring’ in support for the Arab opposition which was perceived and 
constructed as ‘democratic forces’.  
  As elaborated in the constructive strategies of international similarities, the AKP 
elites discursively constructed the ‘Muslim-Arab nations’ as akin to the Turkish nation 
and thus the developments in the Arab streets became a rhetorical source for domestic 
consumption as well. Since the ‘Arab Spring’ discursively attributed to the democratic 
demands of the ‘Islamic World’, which was constructed by the conservative bloc as a 
supranational imagined community to which the Turkish nation civilisationally adhered, 
these movements received particular attention from the AKP politicians and were 
situated in discourses accordingly (Hürriyet, 2011bd, c). According to Erdoğan (cited in 
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Hürriyet, 2011be), since Turkey has inseparable bonds with this geography, it cannot 
stay away from these events. He declared in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ that Turkey 
was not seeking interests in the region but bore a great mission as a great and 
responsible state (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2011s). Besides this normatively saturated 
narrative, he also stated, “We, Turkey, need to monitor these major transformations in 
these friendly and brotherly countries. The emancipation of peoples and establishment 
of democracy and justice in these countries are crucial for our regional stability” 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2011bf). Turkey’s assumed national identity-driven special 
bonds with these countries compel Turkey to take action towards these developments 
which is also in its national interests. 
  The AKP elites overcame the ethics/norms versus self-interest/stability dilemma 
in the region (Öniş, 2012, p. 46; Tocci, 2011) by discursively constructing ‘democracy 
promotion’ among the Arab countries as in Turkey’s ‘national interest’. The AKP 
politicians presented democratisation as a remedy for the chaotic situation and thus in 
the national interests of Turkey. Democratisation was presented Turkey’s identity-driven 
ideological preference, which also informed the discursive construction of its national 
interests with regard to developments in the ‘Muslim’ countries. The AKP government 
expected to see its ideologically related political parties’ (generally referred to as 
‘moderate Islamists’) electoral victories in those countries which would advance their 
civilisational construction of the Turkish nation and the regional integration on the basis 
of this common civilisational understanding, and Turkey would materially benefit from 
this situation. These potential developments might have made Turkey play its supposed 
‘historical leadership role’ in the region through the soft power of the emulation of the 
so-called ‘Turkish model’ by like-minded governments in Arab-majority countries (Aras 
and Yorulmazlar, 2016, p. 6; Ayata, 2015, p. 95; Yorulmazlar and Turhan, 2015, p. 4). 
If we put the AKP’s general narrative during the ‘Arab Spring’ in a nutshell, the AKP 
elites adopted a democratic revisionist discourse towards the established order in the 
Middle East with a strong emphasis on ‘electoral democracy’ which knitted these 
discourses to their governmental understanding of the Turkish national-self along with 
civilisational commonality emphases. 
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 6.5.5 ‘A TURKISH MODEL’ OR ‘INSPIRATION’ FOR EGYPT AND OTHERS? 
  The so-called ‘Turkish model’ or ‘Turkish experience’ (Öniş, 2012, p. 45) was 
an important theme within the AKP elites’ discourses towards Egypt and the Arab 
uprisings. Discussions on the Turkish model that became prevalent in the early days of 
the Arab uprisings date back to the end of the Cold War and re-emerged after 9/11 
because the US represented Turkey as a model to other Muslim-majority countries 
(Altunışık, 2005, p. 45-46). There were two main dimensions to this supposed emulative 
Turkish model: The AKP experience as a successful blueprint of ‘democratic Islamic’ 
party politics and the Western-friendly secularist Turkish Republic as a regime/state 
model. Even though these two were presented generally as mutually exclusive, they are 
not strictly separable from each other if the trajectory of the Turkish modernisation is 
taken into consideration (Göksel, 2012). The aspect of the ‘Turkish model’ that was 
relevant to the ‘Arab Spring’ was the AKP experience (Kuşoğlu, 2014, p. 66-67; 
Özdemir, 2012, p. 131; Uysal, 2013), albeit the model’s controversial viability. The new 
hegemonic conservative bloc in Turkey pioneered a shared ‘Islamic’ cause like Palestine 
and distanced itself from Israel in a way that already fascinated the Arabs prior to the 
uprisings (Samaan, 2013, p. 62; Tol, 2012, p. 352). The AKP discursively highlighted 
the Islamic character of the Turkish nation which ‘civilisationally’ linked Turkey’s 
governmental example to other ‘Muslim’ nations. This discursive theme towards Egypt 
and some other Muslim-majority countries was a direct reflection of the constructive 
discursive strategy of presupposing/emphasising a positive national uniqueness that 
links civilisational (Islamic) and governmental (democratic-majoritarian/electoral) nodal 
points within the national identity discourses. 
  The AKP politicians adopted an ambiguous and cautious rhetoric towards the 
debates on the ‘Turkish model’ for Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. While 
they did not explicitly acknowledge the idea of being a ‘model’ for other countries, they 
deemed Turkey to be a source of ‘inspiration’ (Ülgen, 2011, p. 3), which is an extension 
of the national uniqueness narrative in international settings. In the early days of the 
Arab uprisings, Ahmet Davutoğlu articulated the AKP government’s position: 
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The example of Turkey shook some entrenched ideas in the region. It 
demonstrated a political environment in which freedom and security could 
flourish simultaneously. Turkey governed with democracy and took a hard 
stance against Israel when it was necessary… Turkey did not do this in order to 
become a ‘model’ or ‘example’… The masses’ ‘inspiration’ from Turkey is the 
normalisation of history. They accept Turkey as one of them (Davutoğlu cited in 
Hürriyet, 2011az).  
By using the example of Israel Davutoğlu emphasised that being an operating 
‘democracy’ is not an impediment to defending an ‘Islamic cause’. Turkey’s being a 
democratic ‘inspiration’ for the ‘Muslim nations’ was depicted as ‘natural’ because 
Turkey and those nations composed a historical and civilisational totality. İbrahim Kalın 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2011af) stated that Turkey influenced the wave of change in the 
region by being an example through the democratisation and economic development led 
by the AKP government. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2011l) stated that the ‘Islamic 
World’ was saying that democracy and Islam were reconcilable thanks to the Turkish 
experience. In February 2011, he put the AKP’s position precisely: “We are not seeking 
to be a ‘model’ whatsoever, but we can be a source of ‘inspiration’ since Turkey has 
shown that Islam and democracy can co-exist perfectly” (Erdoğan cited in Sailhan, 
2011). 
  This choice of labelling Turkey as an ‘inspiration’ rather than a ‘model’ 
stemmed from the concerns of potential and actual allegations of Turkey’s ‘Neo-
Ottoman’ expansionist hidden agenda. This ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ claim was insistently 
denied by the AKP officials (Samaan, 2013, p. 65) in order to prevent a possible 
backlash. The AKP politicians were vigilant towards the discursive formation of the 
contemporary Turkish nation in the Middle East as a Neo-Ottoman ‘villain’ which had 
already been constructed with the discursive theme of the old ‘Turkish yoke’ in the 
historiographical narratives of the Arab nationalist regimes (Yilmaz and Ustun, 2011, p. 
87). For instance, in 2011, Cemil Çiçek explicitly stated, 
Recently, there are some people saying that ‘Turkey should be a model’ due to 
the events in the ‘Islamic countries’. We don’t have any intention whatsoever of 
being a ‘model’ and ‘big brother’ to anybody or an imperial country. These three 
countries and others can share our democratisation experience but we would not 




  In another speech in February 2012, Çiçek said that the AKP government was 
only trying to govern Turkey in the best possible way through democracy and did not 
have to make any effort in order to make others emulate them. He also emphasised that 
they were open to sharing their experiences with the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ [Egypt] and 
the other countries (Çiçek cited in Hürriyet, 2011bi). Likewise, Davutoğlu (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2011bj) stated in an interview in September 2011 that they had never 
considered the situation in the Middle East as an opportunity to export ‘A Turkish model 
of democracy’ to those countries. The AKP politicians discursively downplayed the 
active promotion of its governmental model because of ‘regime export’ or ‘imperial’ 
connotations but passively constructed the Turkish way of governance as a unique 
national feature which could inspire other civilisationally ‘brother’ nations. These 
discourses both contributed to the national identity construction at home as a 
‘majoritarian/electoral democracy’ with regard to the governmental nodal point and 
made much closer relations with Egypt conceivable and possible in the following years.    
6.5.6 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION TOWARDS THE MB RULE AND THE 
GOLDEN AGE OF RELATIONS 
  Turkey’s supposed ‘normative popular leadership’ and AKP officials’ close 
interest in Egypt by using a pro-revolutionary rhetoric drew the Egyptian public and 
political groups’ attention (Sabra, 2013, p. 100). Turkish-Egyptian relations saliently 
deepened and turned into a sort of political alliance after the resignation of Husni 
Mubarak on the 11th of February 2011. However, it was not a historically political 
rupture because when the unrest in Egypt surprisingly erupted, there was already a 
rapidly growing political and economic positive trend in the relations of the two 
countries based on a ‘realist’ mutual respect despite the traditional semi-tacit 
‘leadership’ competition and ideological divergences between the hegemonic groups. 
Abdullah Gül, the then President of Turkey, visited Cairo on the 3rd of March 2011, 
which made him the first head of a state to have visited Egypt after the ‘January 25 
Revolution’ and to have met with the Egyptian Supreme Council (Tol, 2012, p. 354; 
Ozkan and Korkut, 2013, p. 170). After his meeting with Gül, “Mohamed Hussein 
Tantawi, acting president and chairman of Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed 
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Forces, declared: ‘The Turkish experience is the closest experience to the Egyptian 
people. Turkey is the model to take inspiration from’” (Ülgen, 2011, p. 3). This visit 
bore a symbolic meaning showing Turkey’s very welcome support for the political 
changes in Egypt that heralded an upcoming closer alliance. 
  Erdoğan paid a visit to Egypt in September 2011 with a large number of Turkish 
businessmen and investors in order to sign a number of economic and trade agreements 
between the two countries (Khalifa, 2017, p. 105). Turkish and Egyptian officials signed 
an agreement on the formation of the ‘High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council’, 
which was planned before the ‘revolution’, between their countries. During his visit, 
Erdoğan (cited in Telci, 2011, p. 236) saluted the uprisings as the ‘victory of peoples’ 
and stated that Turkey and Arab countries were parts of the ‘same body and spirit’. 
Turkey’s identity-driven discursive shift which conceived of Egypt and Turkey as the 
segments of the same civilisational totality also fed the AKP elites’ geostrategic rhetoric 
and discursively constructed Egypt as an ally who needed to be strong rather than a 
latent competitor. Abdullah Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2011bn) emphasised that the 
security, stability, and powerfulness of Egypt were crucial for Turkey as a brother and 
friend country. In September 2011, Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Altunışık, 2013, p. 4) 
stated, “For the regional balance of power, we want to have a very strong Egypt. Some 
people may think Egypt and Turkey are competing. No. This is our strategic decision. 
We want a strong Egypt now”. In an interview during the same month, he said that the 
Turkish-Egyptian alliance would not be an axis against any other country, but an axis of 
‘real democracy’ (Davutoğlu cited Ozkan and Korkut, 2013, p. 171-172).  
  The potential Turkish-Egyptian axis in realist/national-interest terms was not 
only constructed via a civilisational prism but also a shared governmental self-image. 
Similar ideological positions would facilitate joint endeavours on common ‘Islamic 
causes’ (Yilmaz and Ustun, 2011, p. 92). Considering the fact that Turkish and Egyptian 
nations had been sharing the same supposed civilisational qualities in the past, what 
drove this change is mainly governmental self-understanding and the AKP 
government’s expectation of like-minded parties rising to power in the Arab-majority 
countries. Even though the AKP government was claimed to have organic political ties 
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with the MB in Egypt besides sharing a similar ideology, Erdoğan’s emphasis on 
‘secularism’ on an Egyptian TV channel during the aforementioned visit in 2011 caused 
a severe backlash from the inner circles of the MB since the concept had been perceived 
as heresy and godlessness (Gardner, 2012, p. 369). He advised Egyptians not to be wary 
of secularism (laïcité/laiklik), expressed his desire to see a secular Egyptian state and 
underlined that secularism does not mean a lack of religion since he is a non-secular 
prime minister of a secular state (Yılmaz, 2012, p. 365). This exceptional rhetorical 
emphasis on ‘secularism’ and the harsh reactions that it received demonstrated how a 
governmental self-understanding of a nation has a capacity to inform relations in 
international settings. Nevertheless, this governmental ‘secular republic’ narrative 
remained an exceptional case and did not display noteworthy continuity within the 
discourses of the AKP politicians.  
  One of the discursive themes employed within the AKP politicians’ discourses, 
particularly towards Egypt during the ‘transition process’, was historical empathy 
through governmental analogies. Egypt supposedly has a politically and socially 
conservative-secular dualism like Turkey, which has been working in favour of the 
secularist establishment and victimising conservatives. This supposed antagonist 
domestic structure in Egypt provided the AKP politicians with an opportunity to 
discursively revoke analogies which linked the social groups in both countries to each 
other. The AKP politicians deployed the very same floating signifiers that were used in 
order to governmentally delegitimise the hegemony of the secular bloc in Turkey via 
deconstructive discursive strategies to portray the situation in Egypt. One of Erdoğan’s 
speeches in February 2011 was a very illustrative case: 
We acted in a way the rules of brotherhood, neighbourhood, the common history 
and civilisation require. Because we know the ‘status quo’… We know by 
experience how the mentality of ‘tutelage’ and mentalities which are indifferent 
to the demands of people cause substantial damages to a country. We 
experienced how a country develops and grows economically when the nation 
reflects its will via ‘ballot boxes’… Therefore, we are one of the nations who 
understand well the feelings of Egyptian people... We know very well that 
nothing can stand in the way of the demands of ‘change’ and the ‘status quo’ and 
‘oppression’ cannot dominate forever. (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2011bk) 
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This strong analogical narrative closely connected the domestic national identity 
discourses regarding the governmental nodal point with the ‘democratic transition’ in 
Egypt. The pejorative floating signifiers like ‘status quo’, ‘tutelage’, ‘oppression’ and 
affirmative vocabulary like ‘change’, ‘ballot boxes’ and democracy’ were used in the 
very same manner and with the same rhetorical function towards the Egyptian 
‘establishment’ as it was discursively weaponised against the secular bloc internally 
(Hürriyet, 2011bl). This discursive strategy aimed to construct the ‘new’ Egypt as a 
‘natural’ ally of the new Turkish national identity. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2011bm) 
also invoked the floating signifiers frequently employed in the domestic context like 
‘elitists’, ‘the voice of people’, ‘double standard’ or ‘contemptuous’ in order to delineate 
the situation and the political composition in Egypt.  
  The paradoxical issue here is that the AKP government had strong ties with the 
government of Mubarak who they rhetorically and retrospectively rebuked after the 
resignation and labelled a dictator (Hürriyet, 2011bp). This retrospective reprimand was 
also related to the case of the ‘Palestine cause’ and Gaza. The positional conflict 
between the AKP’s Turkey and Mubarak’s Egypt was swept under the carpet during the 
2008 Gaza Crisis and these two countries kept cooperating with each other. Erdoğan 
(cited in Hürriyet, 2011bo) later admitted that they intentionally concealed the implicit 
conflict between Turkey and Egypt for the sake of the political realities of the time. The 
fallen Mubarak government was delineated as indifferent to ‘brothers’ in Gaza in line 
with the general discursive theme of delegitimisation of the ancien régime. This rhetoric 
heralded the Turkish government’s expectations from the next government in Egypt 
after the transition process regarding the case of Gaza which was already normatively 
portrayed as a common cause.    
  Turkey also became involved in the transformation of Egypt and other Arab 
countries “by providing technical assistance, political advice and economic help” 
(Altunışık, 2013, p. 5) during and after the ‘democratic transition’ phase. Turkish-
Egyptian relations had gained a new momentum with the electoral victory of the MB’s 
Muhammed Morsi as the first democratically elected president of Egypt in June 2012. 
This result bolstered the AKP’s intention to “build a regional partnership with Egypt, 
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with the goal of establishing a new axis of power in the Middle East” (Ozkan and 
Korkut, 2013, p. 171) via like-minded governments which shared the same 
governmental (majoritarian democracy) and civilisational (Islam) national self-
perceptions. Turkey increased its foreign investment and financial assistance to Egypt 
after the election of Morsi. Business partnerships, financial loans and bilateral projects 
including a joint military defence project were rapidly realised, which demonstrated that 
Turkey could back up its rhetoric with its economic power (Ayata, 2015, p. 105; 
Altunışık, 2013, p. 4). “The AKP government was quite supportive of President Morsi 
and the Muslim Brotherhood in general, extending political, economic and technical 
assistance to ensure its success” (Altunişik, 2014, p. 11). The Morsi government’s 
connections with the MB groups across the region were very useful for the AKP 
government in order to further its political influence in the Middle East (Pala and Aras, 
2015, p. 11).  
  The Morsi government also warmly welcomed Ankara’s significantly supportive 
approach and substantial contributions. The Egyptian and Turkish governments’ 
perspectives on regional matters became more harmonious. For instance, Egypt under 
the MB adopted a similar stance and rhetoric as Turkey towards the common Palestine 
‘cause’, Israel and Hamas which was once considered as a national security threat to 
Egypt (Agdemir, 2016, p. 227-228). Egypt took a clear and strong pro-Palestine position 
against Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip in October 2012 (Özkan, 2013, p. 407). 
Turkey and Egypt also shared an approximate position and anti-Assad discourse in the 
Syrian civil war quagmire (Hürriyet, 2012ab). As Rashid al-Gannouchi, the leader of the 
‘moderate Islamist’ Ennahda Party of Tunisia, puts it, Morsi’s Egypt and Erdoğan’s 
Turkey shared a majoritarian understanding of democracy (Kirişçi, 2013) along with the 
common civilisational national self-perception. This unprecedented level of good 
relations between Turkey and Egypt was very promising for these states as a strong 
political axis since both are historically leading countries in the region. However, the 
2013 Egyptian ‘coup d’état’ changed this highly expected course 180 degrees because of 
the drastic and overarching power shift between the competing groups in Egypt.   
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6.5.7 THE FALL OF THE MB: TURKEY’S HYBRID CAUSE OF ISLAM AND 
DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT 
  Turkey’s relations with Egypt since the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring’ can 
roughly be divided into two main periods by taking the 2013 Egyptian ‘coup d'état’ as 
the pivotal point. Whereas the pre-coup era could be considered as the pinnacle and 
‘golden age’ (Özkan, 2014, p. 23) of Turkish-Egyptian international relations history, 
the post-coup period was one of the lowest moments. “The overthrow of Morsi by the 
military in July 2013 was a major blow to Turkey’s policy towards Egypt” because of 
“the AKP government’s unwavering support for the MB and severe criticism of the 
military intervention” (Altunişik, 2014, p. 11). The AKP government’s clear rhetorical 
affiliation with the MB and severe criticism of the 2013 ‘coup d’état’ reversed the 
relations towards a highly conflictual course. The ‘golden age’ of relations was 
discursively constructed on the governmental and civilisational narrative of national-self 
proximity. Since the civilisational allegiance of the Egyptian nation was supposed to be 
entrenched, the very same governmental proximity narrative which made the two 
countries allies enabled the sudden deterioration of the relations due to the instant 
governmental transformation which was ushered in by the ‘putschist Egyptian army’. 
Almost all conflicting factions of the Turkish political landscape took a similar ‘anti-
coup stance’ against the Egyptian military’s intervention, which was a clear indication 
of the internalisation of the new governmental understanding of the Turkish national-
self by almost all the segments of the Turkish society to a certain extent. However, the 
conservative bloc’s ideological favouritism towards the MB remained a matter of 
divergence in Turkish domestic politics.   
  The AKP elites immediately defined the intervention of the Egyptian army as a 
‘coup d’état / darbe’, which had very strong negative connotations in the domestic 
public sphere. Whereas the ‘coup’ government was demonised discursively, the 
Egyptian people and the MB were strictly distinguished from it as the victim of this 
intervention. The first verbal reactions to the ‘coup’ laid out the AKP’s consistent 
discursive approach towards the military-dominated Egyptian government in the 
following years. During the first week of July 2013 when the ‘coup’ happened, 
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Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 2013cc) stated that the overthrow of a democratically 
elected government of Egypt, which was an inspiration to the ‘Islamic World’ and an 
important pillar of the common culture, was not acceptable. Egemen Bağış (cited in 
Hürriyet, 2013cd) said that Turkey expected and ‘prayed’ that Egyptian ‘brothers’ 
would build ‘democracy’ again and demonstrate to the World that ‘the national will’ 
could not be defeated by tanks and rifles. Bülent Arınç (cited in Hürriyet, 2013bv) 
described the intervention as a clear direct intervention and coup to democracy, and 
betrayal of the Egyptian people. Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013ce) emphasised that the 
Egyptian military’s intervention was constitutionally illegitimate and the only way of 
‘democracy’ was the ‘ballot box’. Abdullah Gül (cited in Hürriyet, 2013cf) defined the 
intervention as an ‘interruption’ of democracy and declared his wish that Egypt to be run 
by ‘elected governors’.  
  The floating signifiers like ‘ballot box’, ‘national will’, ‘coup’, ‘legitimacy’ etc. 
employed within the national identity discourses in relation to the governmental nodal 
point were also operationalised in the discourses towards Egypt. There was a very clear 
continuity between the governmental self-perception of the ‘new’ Turkey and discourses 
towards pre and post-coup Egypt. As a response to the coup, Erdoğan stated,  
The ballot box is the honour of democracy. One who does not respect the ballot 
box does not either respect his/her own people. Insulting the ‘majority’ is an 
attempt to annihilate democracy. The ballot box is not everything for sure. 
However, nobody can deviate from the path of democracy with this pretext. 
What is happening now in Egypt is the oppression of the ‘majority’ by the 
‘minority’ (Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013bo).  
According to him, the Egyptian ‘putschists’ killed ‘democracy’ under the pretext of 
saving democracy (Hürriyet, 2013bz) and thus the ‘coup government’ of Egypt was not 
‘legitimate’ (Hürriyet, 2014cb). He defined Turkey’s struggle in Egypt as a ‘cause of 
democracy’ (Hürriyet, 2013ch, 2014ca) and as a result of a democratic and humanitarian 
disposition (Hürriyet, 2014bv). Erdoğan’s normatively saturated expressions, 
specifically the majority-minority dichotomy, were the illustrative articulations of the 
‘majoritarian democratic’ governmental understanding of the national-self reflected onto 
the Egyptian case. 
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  Besides the dominant governmental narrative, the AKP elites also furthered the 
brotherhood theme in the Islamic civilisational sense (Hürriyet, 2014cc). Erdoğan 
discursively painted resisting the Egyptian people’s struggle against the intervention of 
the military with an Islamic brush. In June 2013, he stated, “Our ‘brothers’ in Egypt are 
struggling against the injustice that they face… There is no despair or surrender against 
hardship for a person who believes in Allah and who is a real Muslim. Allah helps his 
subjects and opens the door of salvation to them in the hardest times and situations” 
(Erdoğan cited in Hürriyet, 2013ci). From the Islamic point of view, Turkey had a 
historical and moral responsibility towards Egypt (Hürriyet, 2013bw). In August 2013, 
Abdullah Gül said (cited in Hürriyet, 2013cj), “What is happening in Egypt would 
influence not only Egypt but the whole Arab and Muslim World”, and these incidents in 
Egypt were dividing the Muslim World (Hürriyet, 2013ck). On another occasion, he 
urged the new regime in Egypt to have fair elections, particularly without excluding the 
MB which would reflect the ‘national will’ (Hürriyet, 2013cl). There is also a clear 
continuation between national identity discourses regarding the civilisational 
understanding for domestic consumption in Turkey and discourses towards post-coup 
Egypt. The discursive Islamisation of the struggle against the ‘coup regime’ through 
references to a historical solidarity between the two nations associated the conservative 
bloc in Turkey with the ‘victimised’ religious conservatives of Egypt, which in return 
made the deterioration of the relations after the coup possible and conceivable.  
  One of the notable discursive themes operationalised by the AKP politicians in 
Egypt is the anti-Western narrative situated in the context of the 2013 military 
intervention. This anti-Western rhetoric was already present within the AKP discourses 
with regard to the ‘Arab Spring’ in a general but less systematic way. The AKP elites 
occasionally accused European governments of staying silent in the face of human 
tragedies and of even backing the autocrats (Bin Ali, Assad, Mubarak, and Gaddafi) in 
the region (Hürriyet, 2011bq, br, bs, 2012ak, al). Nevertheless, this accusatory tone 
towards Western countries became more severe, starting from the very first day after the 
take-over of the Egyptian army on 3rd July 2013. Right after the military intervention, 
Hüseyin Çelik (cited in Hürriyet, 2013bu), the then Spokesman of the AKP, stated, 
“This coup was externally backed. Some ‘Western’ countries could not digest and did 
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not want to digest the rule of the MB movement. Firstly, they incited the public 
demonstrations, then they gave a memorandum and now they did the military coup”. 
The supposed civilisational other, the ‘West’, was rhetorically scorned and held 
responsible for the coup and the emphasis on the Islamic identity of the fallen Egyptian 
government perpetuated this conflictual and antagonistic picture of the ‘West’ and 
‘Islam’ in the case of Egypt.  
  Even though there was a clear emphasis on the ‘civilisational antagonism’, the 
AKP’s anti-Western themed discourses regarding the Egyptian ‘coup’ mainly 
conglomerated around the governmental nodal point. The AKP politicians constantly 
and regularly reiterated that Western governments did not designate the military 
intervention as a ‘coup d’état’ and their supposed hypocritical position when it came to 
the democratically-elected Islamic-leaning governments. According to them, the West’s 
support for democracy in other countries is conditional and selective (with ifs and buts) 
and they back democracy if the countries remain under their guidance/control (Hürriyet, 
2013bo, bv, bw, bx, by, ca, 2014bx, by, 2015bf, bg). The democratically-elected nature 
of the Morsi government preceded its Islamic character within the AKP’s discourses. At 
different times, Erdoğan highlighted that, if the ‘West’ remains insincere and fails this 
test of democracy, the idea of democracy itself would become controversial and 
questionable (Hürriyet, 2013ab, bz). According to him, ‘the West’ could not tolerate the 
democratic regime in Egypt which came after 70 years of a ‘despotic regime’ and ‘the 
national will’ of the Egyptian people (Hürriyet, 2013cg). Turkey’s position towards 
Egypt was situated on the side of ‘democracy’, and the ‘West’ was discursively placed 
in the opposite front which was ‘anti-democracy’. The ‘new’ Turkey’s majoritarian 
governmental understanding of the national-self clearly reflected itself in this discursive 
theme because the ‘street’ support behind the military intervention and critiques of the 
MB’s governance were almost completely missing from the AKP’s discourses. The 
AKP merely focused on the majoritarian/electoral side of the Morsi government as the 
sole base for democratic legitimacy.  
  Nevertheless, not only the ‘West’ was held responsible and disparaged but also 
Israel, which was overwhelmingly portrayed as another ‘other’ for the universal Islamic 
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identity. In November 2014, Yalçın Akdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014bz) stated, “I think 
that the mentality which was an obstruction for the development of democracy in the 
region until the Egyptian coup is Israel… Israel cooperates with these regimes and sails 
its boat through it. The authoritarian regimes and Israel are against the advancement of 
democracy and the reflection of people’s will in the region”. Also some other AKP 
politicians related the coup and ‘anti-democratic’ developments in the region to the state 
of Israel and its interests on different occasions (Hürriyet, 2013cb, 2015bh). This strong 
rhetoric portrayed the new government in Egypt as a proxy/puppet of the supposed 
nemesis of the Islamic civilisation and discursively alienated it from the people both in a 
civilisational and governmental sense. The AKP elites discursively constructed a binary 
opposition of us/democratic/pro-Muslim (pro-Islamic civilisation) and them/anti-
democratic/anti-Muslim (pro-Western civilisation) in Egypt, which reflected their 
cognitive structure with regard to the Turkish domestic political realm. As in the Turkish 
domestic narrative, the military/judiciary-based bureaucratic hegemony in Egypt was 
rhetorically alienated from the ‘real/authentic/genuine’ Egyptian society via the 
discursive strategy of governmental illegitimacy. The emphasis on governmental 
illegitimacy through a majoritarian democracy discourse, which also re-defined the 
Turkish national-self as constructed by the conservative bloc, paved the way for the 
crisis of the political relations between Turkey and Egypt after the ‘coup’.  
6.5.8 ANALOGOUS THEMES AND THE PROJECTION OF THE TURKISH 
NATIONAL-SELF ONTO EGYPT 
  As opposed to the AKP governments’ consistent endorsement of the MB, the 
military-backed interim Egyptian government declared the organisation a terrorist 
group, constructed it as an existential threat and launched a regional campaign against it 
(Darwich, 2017, p. 1-2). The bitter rhetoric of the AKP elites vis-à-vis the ‘coup 
government’ and their pro-MB narrative caused an inevitable backlash from the 
Egyptian side as meddling in its internal politics.	 “Turkey’s positioning on the 
international stage was also perceived in the Arabic press as direct interference in 
Egyptian domestic affairs” (Samaan, 2013, p. 67). On the 23rd of November 2013, the 
Egyptian government declared the Turkish ambassador in Cairo persona non grata, and 
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Turkey reciprocated this action by expelling the Egyptian ambassador. The AKP 
government not only rhetorically rebuked the Egyptian ‘putschists’ and the ‘hypocritical 
West’ but also some of the Gulf countries which backed the intervention of the Egyptian 
military. This verbal confrontation cooled Turkey’s relations with the Gulf countries as 
well (Pala and Aras, 2015, p. 11-12). Since the AKP government could not adopt a 
balanced approach between the segments of Egyptian society due to its clear and strong 
support for the MB and Morsi (Öniş, 2014, p. 213), both before and after the 2013 
‘coup’, the relapse in the two countries’ relations became inexorable. As a response to 
the AKP elites’ pejorative portrayal of the ‘coup government’, the Egyptian government 
depicted the Turkish state as a bullying ‘enemy’ (Özkan, 2014, p. 21).	 “Turkey risked 
extensive political and economic investments when it turned Egypt from a friend to foe 
following the military ousting of Morsi” (Ayata, 2015, p. 100). According to opinion 
polls, the Egyptian people’s sympathy towards Turkey showed a salient decline after the 
AKP elites’ harsh rhetoric. Even though economic transactions and trade between the 
two countries did not collapse, there was a noteworthy decrease in numbers (Köse, 
2017, p. 206-209).      
  Alongside the Egyptian military’s consolidation of its hegemony, “the Turkish 
Government shifted its rhetoric from a promoter of democracy to the guardian of a lost 
revolution in Egypt” (Ayata, 2015, p. 109) and the adamant defender of the ‘victims’ of 
the ‘militaristic regime’. The violent intervention of the Egyptian military in the anti-
coup protests, jailing and death penalty sentences handed down to Morsi and other 
various MB affiliates hardened the AKP elites’ rhetorical tone towards the Egyptian 
interim government and later the rule of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Turkey opposed Morsi’s 
eviction and sentence, called for sanctions against the ruling ‘coup’ regime, and 
provided political asylum to MB members. The military-backed Egyptian government 
considered these actions “a blatant intervention in its domestic affairs and a derogation 
from diplomatic norms” (Magued, 2016, p. 2). Erdoğan accused President el-Sisi of 
killing thousands of Morsi supporters in the Rabaa and Nahda sit-ins and considered 
Morsi the legitimate President (AbdelGawad, 2014; Magued, 2016, p. 2). These 
developments during the years following the 2013 ‘coup’ exacerbated political tensions 
between the two governments and pushed them to take geopolitical steps and make 
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strategic alliances (such as Egypt’s growing cooperation with Greece and the Greek 
authority in Southern Cyprus) in order to undermine each other’s position.  It was even 
reported that the Egyptian government under Sisi held covert meetings with the PKK in 
2015 and 2016 (Hürriyet, 2016dd). Two governments’ ‘realist’ perception of each other 
in the past which led to a mild rivalry, non-interference, balance and mutual respect as 
regional major powers were reinvigorated and turned into an identity-driven hard 
rivalry. 
    One of the prevalent discursive themes within the AKP elites’ narrative towards 
Egypt after the ‘coup’ is recurring analogies with Turkey’s internal socio-political 
dispositions and historic blocs’ infighting. As pointed out earlier, pejorative vocabulary 
borrowed from the Turkish domestic field of discursivity like military/judiciary 
‘tutelage’, ‘status quo’, ‘anti-democracy’, ‘elitism’, ‘authoritarianism’, ‘national will’, 
etc. were operationalised against ‘pre-revolution’ (2011) and ‘post-coup’ (2013) Egypt 
as part of a linguistic arsenal. The AKP elites had begun to resort to direct analogies 
between Turkey and Egypt more frequently after the 2013 ‘coup’ in order to 
discursively construct the domestic landscape of Egypt within Turkey and abroad. These 
analogies had two discourse-practical functions which were the consolidation of the 
national identity formation domestically, and demonising the Egyptian ‘coup’ 
government in the outside world. These two-dimensional speech-acts directly influenced 
the non-discursive foreign policy realm and played a major role to discursively construct 
the incumbent Egyptian government in a pejorative way within the Turkish national 
public sphere. These discourses not only made the deterioration of relations conceivable 
or implementable but as ‘performative utterances’ directly contributed to their 
deterioration.  
  The AKP politicians repeatedly emphasised that since Turkey experienced 
several military coups throughout its history, the Turkish people could genuinely 
comprehend the situation in Egypt, know its possible devastating consequences and 
empathise with the Egyptian people. Hence, Turkey did not want Egyptian people to 
undergo the same processes and passionately opposed the 2013 Egyptian ‘coup d’état’ 
(Hürriyet, 2013bo, bv, ce, cm). In July 2013, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013by) stated, 
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“We suffered from these military coups in this country a lot. Our concern is that we do 
not want our Egyptian brothers to suffer in the same way and that we know that there is 
no victor on this earth but only Allah”. They enriched their analogy-themed narrative 
with direct references to particular interventions by the Turkish military which 
performed two discursive functions. They rhetorically kept undermining Turkey’s 
secular bloc’s gradually fading domestic hegemony and demonised the military-backed 
Egyptian government as the ‘enemy of their own people’ by discursively constructing 
internal antagonistic binary oppositions. For instance, Erdoğan compared the 28th 
February intervention and the 27th May 1960 junta to the Egyptian ‘coup’, and 
Necmettin Erbakan and Adnan Menderes (the leaders in the two eras) to Mohammed 
Morsi (Hürriyet, 2013cn, co). They discursively applied the same antagonistic pattern to 
the political picture in Egypt through these analogies which coded the Egyptian 
government as the ‘enemy’ camp that enabled worsening relations.  
  The AKP elites also used the linguistic tool of analogy in a grand conspiracy 
narrative against Turkey and Egypt. They discursively situated these two nations amidst 
major and coherent devilish international conspiracies and political designs. For 
instance, they associated the 2013 Egyptian ‘coup’ and protests which were considered 
the spark of the ‘coup’ with the 2013 Gezi Park Protests in Turkey and claimed a clear 
continuation between them (Hürriyet, 2013cp). Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2014ce) 
declared that the Gezi Park protests were a plot targeting Turkey via the mobilisation of 
the youth as in the Egyptian case, which culminated in a military coup. The international 
conspiracy narrative that knitted Egypt and Turkey into the same storyline was 
sometimes discursively operationalised in a more Islamic fashion which almost always 
constructed the ‘West’ as the villain responsible. In August 2013, in a speech regarding 
Egypt, Erdoğan (cited in Hürriyet, 2013bz) stated, “Look! There is a constant 
conspiracy against the Islamic World [including happenings in Egypt]. These plots are 
also against us. Nobody wants a strong Turkey but we have to be”. According to him, 
external ‘enemies’ were disturbed by the global projects of Turkey and wanted to play 
the same drama which they acted out in Egypt and to turn Turkey into Egypt or Syria 
with the cooperation of the domestic opposition in Turkey (Hürriyet, 2014cd, cf). The 
AKP politicians sometimes made rhetorical ad hominem attacks on the CHP, the main 
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political representative of the secular bloc, by accusing it of taking sides with Egyptian 
‘putschists’ (Hürriyet, 2013cq). In December 2014, Ahmet Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 
2014h) directly targeted the CHP: “We do not have any problem with the Egyptian 
people but with putschists as we have a problem with you [CHP] because you are also 
putschists”. The supposed anti-democratic means which were operationalised through 
supposed local collaborators who allegedly shared the same ideological agenda in order 
to fight Turkey and Egypt were repeatedly emphasised within this analogical 
international conspiracy theme which constructed two nations as the ‘victims’ of the 
same internal and external foes. The AKP elites’ discursive strategy of heteronimisation 
was discursively binding the contemporary rulers of Egypt with the secularist opposition 
in Turkey. Since the supposed proxy of external villains was in power in Egypt, this 
seemingly Egyptian-friendly narrative actually strengthened tensions between the two 
governments and enabled the downward spiral in relations. 
  Muhammad Morsi was sentenced to death by an Egyptian court in May 2015. 
Erdoğan and the AKP government criticised this verdict severely. They inserted 
personal analogies with former Turkish politicians into discourses towards Egypt. The 
protagonist of these analogies was the former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes – 
constantly depicted as a hero of democracy throughout the AKP rule – who was 
executed after the 1960 coup d’état (Hürriyet, 2015ap). Davutoğlu (cited in Hürriyet, 
2015at) stated, “We can talk about ‘democracy’ and the ‘national will’ today thanks to 
Adnan Menderes. I mention it today intentionally. As you know, the putschists in Egypt 
sentenced the democratically elected president Morsi to death. We know these plots. 
They also plotted with such coups and tutelage to imprison the ‘national will’ in 
Turkey”. Erdoğan rhetorically personalised the conviction and accused some groups in 
Turkey of desiring a coup in Turkey and the same end for him. He used this analogical 
theme in order to associate himself personally with Morsi and his victimhood (Hürriyet, 
2015a, bi, bj, bk). In May 2015, he uttered, “The case of Morsi and these unjust steps 
show us that if Morsi is executed, a friend, who fights against the terrorist organisation, 
will become a ‘martyr’. If the same thing happens to me, I believe that Allah will bestow 
on me the same honorary position [shahid / Islamic martyrdom]” (Erdoğan cited in 
Hürriyet, 2015bl).  
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  These strong personal and collective analogies projected the dualist socio-
political composition in Turkey onto Egypt with the very same value-laden discursive 
strategies. The MB and the conservative segment of Egyptian society associated with 
the conservative bloc in Turkey and the ‘coup regime’ with the secular bloc which 
enabled the souring of political relations. Within the circle of the analogical themes, it is 
important to note that the Rabia (four) sign/salute (four fingers raised), which was the 
symbol of solidarity with the MB and the reminder of the ‘Rabia massacre’ committed 
by the Egyptian army in order to disperse anti-coup protesters gradually became the 
official hand gesture/salute of the AKP in the years following the incident. The Rabia 
salute was defined in a more universal way by Erdoğan in the beginning as a symbol of 
resistance (Hürriyet, 2013cr). Later, however, the sign started to be used by the AKP 
politicians as the token of the four principles or motto of the AKP: “One homeland; one 
state; one flag; one nation”. This motto was officially adopted in the AKP’s internal 
bylaws and Erdoğan declared that the Rabia salute signified these principles (Hürriyet, 
2017a). Transferring even the party salute from the MB and Egypt demonstrated how 
the AKP closely identified the Turkish national-self with Egypt and their own 
ideological position with that of the MB. This governmental and civilisational discursive 
construction of Egypt in the Turkish public sphere made national self-identification 
highly relevant to the relations with Egypt and made today’s still frozen relations 
conceivable.  
  Finally, the AKP elites sharpened their rhetoric against the military-backed 
Egyptian government regarding the Egyptian military’s violent measures against the 
anti-coup protestors and the MB affiliates. The AKP politicians defined the Egyptian 
military’s misconduct causing hundreds of civilian deaths as ‘barbarity, savagery, 
cruelty, tyranny, planned/intentional massacre’, etc. (Hürriyet, 2013ab, cs, ct, cu, 
2014cf). They sanctified the Egyptian civilian victims as ‘shahids/Islamic martyrs’ who 
were defending ‘democracy’ and their rights (Hürriyet, 2013am, cv). They also 
discursively Islamised the character of victims and de-Islamised the perpetrators by 
emphasising that the victims were ‘martyrised’ while they were performing prayer 
(salah) (Hürriyet, 2013cw, cx). Furthermore, the Pharaoh-Moses binary metaphors were 
also occasionally used within the AKP discourses in order to depict the ‘resistant’ side 
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as morally superior to the ‘oppressive’ side (Hürriyet, 2013bz, cg, 2014cg, 2015ap, bm). 
Again, the AKP elites identified Turkey with a segment of Egyptian society, 
demonstrated solidarity with them and severely demonised the ruling faction in a moral 
sense.	 The reflection of national self-perception and projection of it onto Egyptian 
society caused seriously negative consequences between the states and enabled hostile 
policies towards each other. 
 6.5.9 DISCURSIVE POSSIBILITIES OF A PROSPECTIVE RESTORATION 
  Unlike other major actors in the international system, Turkey mostly sidelined its 
material motivations after the 2013 Egyptian ‘coup’ and took an identity-driven 
normative stance that focused on the ballot box in terms of democracy and illegitimacy 
of a military overthrow (Yegin, 2016, p. 4-5), that caused its its relations with Egypt to 
plummet. In a prospective power shift in Egypt, the AKP government’s morally 
saturated and partisan demeanour in foreign policy might be harvested by Turkey as a 
political investment for the future. However, by the end of 2016, international relations 
between Turkey and Egypt did not display any consequential impression of détente. 
Nevertheless, during 2016, voices from the AKP elites which held out an olive branch to 
the Egyptian government timidly began to reverberate in the Turkish public sphere 
(Hürriyet, 2016da). Binali Yıldırım said that Turkey could not cut all its ties with Egypt 
even if it so desired (Hürriyet, 2016db) and that there were not many reasons to have a 
conflict with Egypt (Hürriyet, 2016ac). The most explicit and strong declaration of the 
will to restore the relations came from Yıldırım in August 2016. He declared, “The 
Egyptian and Turkish peoples are brothers. We have numerous common values like 
faith, culture, and region. The current condition of our relations is not sustainable. It is 
not sustainable for both of us but we have political problems” (Yıldırım cited in 
Hürriyet, 2016dc). The two countries’ foreign ministers held a short meeting during the 
Summit of Non-Alignment Movement in September 2016. However, even though 
economic incentives, the pressure of other regional powers likes Saudi Arabia, the 
Egyptian government’s infrequent signs of softening restraints on the MB as a social 
constituent of Egypt, the demand of both countries’ business community and tumultuous 
circumstances in the region were encouraging forces for such a rapprochement, political 
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relations between the two countries were still far from being restored by the end of 
2016. Besides, there was not a prevalent discourse in the Turkish public sphere to 
construct the image of the Egyptian government in a positive way that might make this 
restoration conceivable. Unexpected and/or dramatic transformations in the domestic 
political stages of both countries might give way to a fundamental change in the 
relations. In the absence of such drastic changes in the lifeworld, the AKP elites might 
invoke a ‘national interest’ discourse and rationalise a possible restoration by 
discursively portraying it as an ‘inevitable and temporary evil’ imposed by cumbersome 
conditions, alongside with historical and civilisational ‘brotherhood’ narratives. A 
rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt is inevitable but a preparatory and 
transitional discursive framing is vital to make such external state actions ‘conceivable’ 
and to put it into Turkey’s box of policy options unless an unpredicted intra-national 
power shift occurs in one of these countries.  
6. 6 Conclusion   
  This chapter unveiled the interplay between TFP towards selected international 
actors and the AKP government’s national identity discourses in a chronological and 
thematic way. The paradigmatic changes and continuities in Turkey’s external state 
actions in relation to the transformed Turkish national self-understanding were analysed 
through a post-structural constructivist framework. The international politics of Turkish 
national identity (re-)formation was pursued via the discursive nodal points 
corresponding to each of the case studies. The discourse-historical analysis of Turkey’s 
relations with the KRG in the third section demonstrated that the pluralisation of the 
ethnic/cultural understanding of the Turkish national-self enabled Turkey to 
dramatically improve its bonds with this sub-national unit. The KRG, once an 
ontological threat to Turkey, turned into an ally that Turkey could rely on in regional 
geopolitics and balances. The section also highlighted that Turkey’s traditional 
perception of threat from Iraq did not entirely disappear because the AKP elites 
perpetuated the strong discursive emphasis on the territorial unity of Iraq, which set the 
horizon of cooperation with the KRG in the foreseeable future. Besides the 
ethnic/cultural approximation of Turkey and the KRG in the AKP discourses that 
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constructed the Iraqi Kurds as ‘kinsmen’ of the Turkish nation, this rapidly growing 
interrelation was also discursively painted with a civilisational brush that situated the 
Turkish nation and the Iraqi Kurds into the same imagined civilisational (Islamic) 
community.  
  The fourth section explored Turkey’s increasingly volatile relations with the EU 
through the angle of the discursive transformation in Turkish civilisational allegiances. 
As opposed to the customary pro-Western self-perception of Turkey, the AKP 
established Turkey’s ties with the EU as a ‘Muslim nation’ that promised cultural 
diversity to the Union from the very beginning of their rule when interrelations were 
unprecedentedly positive. Situating Turkey within the Islamic civilisation in a 
binary/antagonistic/hostile way with the ‘Western’ civilisation and emphasising on the 
material incentives of EU membership over ideational commonalities made subsequent 
deterioration of relations conceivable and even put the termination of Turkey’s 
entrenched national objective/cause of EU membership among foreign policy options. 
Epiphenomenally, the EU’s democratic principles were discursively promoted by the 
AKP elites in an instrumental way to corner the secular bloc that approximated the 
Turkish national-self to the EU’s self-understanding regarding the governmental nodal 
point especially during the initial years of the AKP’s tenure. 
  The fifth section broached the subject of Turkey’s problematic relations with 
Egypt by the end of 2016. Firstly, Turkish-Egyptian relations which traditionally hinged 
upon a stable mutual respect out of mild rivalry and equilibrium were put on the table. 
The discourse-historical trajectory of the relations that swinging between positive and 
negative extremes depending on the transformation of the Turkish national self-
understanding (and its perception by Egyptian dominating elites) was unravelled. The 
section examined the latent ideational chasm between Turkish and Egyptian elites until 
the so-called Arab Spring and the discursive medium of the governmental nodal point 
that enabled this foreign policy pendulum between Turkey and Egypt after the uprisings. 
The AKP elites projected their ‘majoritarian democracy’ understanding of the national-
self onto the Egyptian society and conceived antagonistic historic blocs in Egypt which 
mirrored the political composition in Turkey. The supposed Egyptian 
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Islamic/conservative bloc and the MB were discursively singled out as the good guys of 
Egypt which knitted this governmental nodal point to the civilisational nodal point as 
the secondary medium. The AKP politicians’ discursive portrayal of Egypt and the 
conservative groups as comrades under the banner of Islamic civilisation was another 
discursive conduit that made oscillating relations conceivable.  
  In conclusion, this chapter applied a post-structural constructivist approach to the 
interplay between the discursive partial fixations within the discursive formation of 
Turkish national identity and the extra-discursive ‘field’ of foreign policy via a set of 
germane case studies. The new hegemonic Turkish national identity discourses, which 
were put in a comprehensible and broad strategy-driven pattern in the fifth chapter, 
enabled and made ‘thinkable/conceivable/implementable’ certain policy shifts despite 
the fact that they did not direct the ‘policy and discourse maker’ political elites precise 
external state actions. The chapter did not detail ‘why’ specific policy changes and 
choices occurred but ‘how’ these policies became alternative ‘thinkable’ options in the 
first place. The following chapter concludes the thesis with the summary of its main 
arguments, discussing the implications for the future of Turkey’s international relations, 
the feasibility of applying a modified version of this particular post-structural 











7. 1 Introduction 
Turkish society and state were subjected to significant and complex social, 
economic and political transformations in a short time span between 2002 and 2017. 
These seismic changes also projected themselves in the national self-perception and 
foreign affairs of the Turkish nation-state. This study aimed to provide an account of 
the discursive transformation of the Turkish national self-image using a substantial 
amount of discursive data and its relation to Turkey’s international relations. It 
responded to the question of how the discursive (re-) formation of the Turkish 
national identity made certain paradigmatic changes in the field of foreign policy 
conceivable. In order to answer this question, and after setting the theoretical and 
methodological scene in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, this thesis, firstly, conducted an 
analysis of the AKP elites’ national identity discourses via adopted discursive 
strategies. Secondly, this discursive (re-) formation was placed into the international 
politics context by orchestrating discourse analysis and historical/institutional 
analysis. Three discursive nodal points were deployed on case studies of the KRG, 
the EU and Egypt in order to illustrate the interplay between Turkish national identity 
discourses and the institutional (extra-discursive) field of TFP. This conclusion 
chapter aims to provide a short summary of this thesis, along with the current 
situation and the future of TFP, and the prospective avenues for further research. 
After this introductory part, the second section presents a very brief review of 
empirical findings. The third section casts a glance at Turkey’s contemporary 
relations with the KRG, the EU and Egypt. This section also briefly evaluates 
prospective developments in the foreseeable future. The fourth section concludes the 
thesis with a discussion on potential research platforms for further empirical study 
and the universal applicability of the modular post-structural constructivist 
framework with possible context-depended modifications.  
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7. 2 Cumulative Snapshot of Empirical Findings  
The discursive medium of Turkish national identity which was strategically 
constructed by the AKP elites reconfigured the social cognitive horizon of Turkey in 
terms of conceivable policies in international politics. These discursively enabled 
policies were neither thinkable nor implementable due to cognitive limitations/taboos 
that were entrenched by the former hegemonic national self-understanding. 
Discursively broadening or narrowing the perceptional horizon of the Turkish 
national-self produced new thinkable options, possibilities, obstacles, moral 
responsibilities, obligations or exemptions in the realm of international relations. This 
study was, therefore, an attempt to address this problematic of the interface between 
the discursive Turkish national identity formation and Turkey’s international 
relations through a post-structural constructivist approach. As empirically elaborated 
in Chapter 5, the AKP elites, the political representatives of the conservative historic 
bloc, discursively transformed the Turkish national identity through the redefinition 
of ethnic/cultural, civilisational and governmental nodal points within national 
identity discourses. They adopted semi-systematic deconstructive and constructive 
discourse strategies in order to realize this purpose. These semiotically and 
discursively conquered nodal points were matched with relevant units in the 
international system in order to illustrate the interplay between the discursive 
formation of the Turkish national identity and TFP. Turkey’s international relations 
with the KRG, the EU and Egypt are subjected to discourse and 
historical/institutional foreign policy analysis, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. This re-
definition of nodal points in national identity discourses by the AKP politicians and 
its reflexions in Turkey’s external state actions can be encapsulated briefly and 
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This table shows the foreign policies which were made conceivable by the AKP’s 
discursive enterprise for transposing the conservative historic bloc’s once subaltern 
Turkish national identity narrative onto the nationally hegemonic status through the 
semiotic conquest of nodal points, thereby constituting a single discursive system of 
formation. Recasting the ethnic/cultural, civilisational and governmental perception 
of the Turkish national-self became a medium through which the AKP enabled itself 
to drive Turkish statecraft in the desired direction in the activity field of international 
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relations. These novel conceivable policies were exemplified and elaborated in 
Chapter 6 via these three relevant case studies. 
7. 3 Possible Ramifications and Prospects of Changing TFP 
 At the time of writing in June 2018, TFP in relation to the national self-
perception does not display a significant break from what has been built until the 
beginning of 2017 under the auspices of the one-party rule of AKP governments. 
However, there have been some conjunctural policy changes:  
 (1) Kurdistan Regional Government: Turkey’s relations with the KRG 
underwent a noteworthy fluctuation due to the KRG’s independence referendum on 
the 25th of September 2017. The referendum was doomed to be practically defunct 
because of the joint punitive efforts of the surrounding Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish 
governments (Raza, 2017; Ozcan, 2017, p. 4). Even though Turkey had developed 
strong bonds with the KRG until that time through the discursive medium of multi-
ethnic/cultural national self-perception, regardless of the internal political 
polarisation of both societies (Özpek, 2018), it ardently made political efforts to 
derail potential independence, which shows clear inter-bloc foreign policy continuity 
for Turkey. The Turkish government diplomatically attempted to dissuade the KRG 
from holding the referendum but could not avoid it being held, and applied mild 
sanctions on it by closing airspace and cancelling direct flights to the cities in the 
KRI. This event was, indeed, a significant blow to the high level of alliance between 
the parties that was made conceivable by the AKP’s new hegemonic national identity 
discourses. This stiff objection was an ostensible contradiction with the very positive 
trend of the relations, and may also appear to rebut the argument of the thesis. 
However, on the contrary, the AKP elites’ discourses and policies were very much 
consistent with their previous attitude towards the KRG and Iraq in general 
(Meintjes, 2018). There was a political atmosphere assuming “that Turkey might 
embrace the KRG’s bid for independence due to Ankara’s close ties with Erbil” 
before the referendum (Ustun and Dudden, 2017, p. 7). However, the KRG officials 




 Firstly, even when Turkey’s relations with the central government in Iraq 
plummeted and with the KRG hit a new high, the AKP elites repeatedly emphasised 
that the territorial unity of Iraq was a ‘red line’ for Turkey, which is an entrenched 
state policy shared by the main antagonistic Turkish national self-perceptions (Ozcan, 
2017, p. 5). The KRG’s passionate initiative to become an independent state was an 
incontrovertible violation of this red line, which would destabilise the region even 
more (Ustun and Dudden, 2017, p. 9). The territorial integrity of Iraq had been 
discursively constructed in discourses within the Turkish public sphere for a very 
long time as a vital national interest, and a potential disintegration has been 
constructed as an existential threat. Therefore, acquiescence to such a development 
was beyond the social cognitive horizon of Turkey’s understanding of its immediate 
vicinity through the prism of its national identity. An unwavering continuity on this 
political stance as an established TFP principle should be expected to remain in the 
foreseeable future since there is no indication of a discursive medium for a change. 
Secondly, the AKP politicians deviated neither from their multi-ethnic/cultural 
national identity narrative, nor from their ‘kinsmen’ and ‘brotherhood’ discourses 
towards the KRG, in spite of Turkey’s obstructive attitude in the referendum crisis. 
Nevertheless, potential independence, in line with the Islamic civilisational Turkish 
self-perception, was denoted as a ‘Zionist plan’ or a ‘second Israel’ project (Uyanik, 
2017), which discursively alienated the independence possibility without estranging 
the Kurdish people themselves. Although Erdoğan and Binali Yıldırım very 
exceptionally called the city of Kirkuk a ‘Turkmen city’ during this period, which 
was the traditional position of the Republic, this expression did not display a 
continuity because the AKP elites kept emphasising the diversity and unity of Kurds, 
Arabs and Turkmens in the region (Uyanik, 2017) as a projection of the multi-ethnic 
Turkish national-self onto Iraq and Kirkuk. Finally, the impasse of this referendum 
did not burn the bridges between the parties because Turkey did not close the Habur 
border gate between the KRG and Turkey; mutual trade kept flowing and Turkey was 
the first country to respond to the earthquake in the KRI on November 12 (Uyanik, 
2017). Besides, the KRG’s elites were aware that their economic well-being heavily 
relies on good political relations with Turkey (Sumer and Joseph, 2018). Therefore, 
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as long as the KRG remains a sub-national unit legally within Iraq and tames its 
maximalist political ambitions, Turkey’s relations with the regional Kurdish 
government can be perfectly expected to fully recover and turn back into an alliance 
level in near future.    
 (2) European Union: By mid 2018, Turkey’s relations with the EU seem 
steadily stagnant but for episodic events without consequential outcomes. In July 
2017, the European Parliament urged the EU to formally suspend Turkey’s 
membership, which was already de facto frozen. Nevertheless, there was no 
consensus among European countries on suspending or terminating Turkey’s 
membership process. Furthermore, Turkey’s partnership and cooperation are 
fundamental for the EU countries in order to handle refugee crises and terrorism 
issues, secure energy supply lines and maintain deep economic bonds (Bayraklı, 
Güngörmez and Boyraz, 2017; Müftüler-Baç, 2017). Even though the AKP elites 
increased the harshness of their anti-EU (and member countries) rhetoric, for 
example, by using Nazi analogies (Werz, 2017) in response to legal bans on 
organising election campaign events for the Turkish diaspora in European countries, 
Turkey has never officially declared that it has lost interest in the EU membership. 
During 2017 and 2018, the AKP elites declared that Turkey still desired to be a 
member of the EU (Rettman, 2018) as a ‘strategic goal’, thereby defining it in realist 
terms. However, Erdoğan repeated that Turkey would not wait at Europe’s door 
forever if the supposed hostility towards it persisted (Emmott, 2017). He also 
announced that Turkey no longer had a need for EU membership but added: "We will 
not be the side which gives up” (Erdoğan cited in Batchelor, 2018). “Yet neither side 
wants to be the first to walk away from the altar”, as “there would be a political and 
economic cost for both sides in ending the accession process” (Sloat, 2018, p. 21). 
Nevertheless, the discursive medium established by the AKP elites through a national 
self-understanding, which othered the EU has already made a potential termination of 
the membership process conceivable for Turkey. Structural limitations and 
interdependence like Turkey’s level of trade with the EU countries, and the EU’s 
immigration problem, make the Turkish elites and the EU officials refrain from 
deteriorating the relations entirely. As Sinan Ülgen (2017) argues, even in the 
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hypothetical absence of the membership bid, Turkish membership in the Customs 
Union might provide a structural framework, and an institutional anchor for future 
relations since the EU has been discursively constructed by the AKP elites in 
realist/strategic terms. The current political landscape between Turkey and the EU 
suggests that the parties will maintain a transactional partnership in different fields 
along with the de facto frozen membership process in the foreseeable future. 
 (3) Egypt: Even though some tepid voices from political and business elites 
were heard after 2017 to restore and revive political relations (Hürriyet, 2017b, c; 
Zamel, 2017), there is not a notable sign of an upcoming Turkish-Egyptian 
rapprochement by the middle of 2018. On the contrary, these two governments are 
still pursuing foreign policies that would balance and contain each other via alliances 
with other countries. The discursively demonised ‘post-coup’ Egyptian government, 
discursively demonised by the AKP elites, is still in power and Al-Sisi, the leader of 
the 2013 military intervention, was reelected as the president in March 2018 with 
more than 97% of votes, in elections widely reported to have been rigged (Miller and 
Hawthrone, 2018; Duclos, 2018; Khorshid, 2018). Egypt sought cooperation with 
Turkey’s traditional archenemies of Greece and the Greek authority in Southern 
Cyprus, especially regarding the energy fields (gas and oil) in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. This resulted in a hard backlash from Turkish officials and the 
Egyptians declared Turkey’s intervention as undermining Egyptian sovereignty 
(Aleem, 2018, Helmi, 2018, Abdulhamid, 2018). Besides, the Egyptian government 
took steps to eradicate the symbols reminiscent of the Turkish-Ottoman past of the 
country like changing street names (Galal, 2018), conducting joint military drills with 
Greece in 2017 (Awny, 2017) and strongly condemning Turkey’s Olive Branch 
Operation to the Syrian city of Afrin in 2018. Turkey developed strong ties with 
Egypt’s southern neighbour, Sudan, including military cooperation and agreements 
on gigantic construction projects at the end of 2017. The Sudanese government 
handed over the Suakin Island in the Red Sea to Turkey for a period of 99 years in 
return for this construction project, which added to the simmering tensions between 
Turkey and Egypt (Mackenzie, 2018; Maguid, 2018). By 2018, Turkey’s relations 
with Egypt turned back to their pre-Arab Spring realist terms and became even worse 
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than the default settings, which was a mild rivalry with mutual respect to each other’s 
power, prior to the AKP government. Both sides, now, consider each other as a 
‘strategic’ enemy. Besides, Egypt mostly disappeared from the AKP elites’ 
discourses. However, since this rivalry is conjunctural and strategic, and the Egyptian 
people are still defined as a victimised ‘brother’ nation suffering under evil 
governors, a rapprochement is inevitable in the future depending on domestic factors 
or structural pressures. However, as of 2018, there is not a discursive medium to 
make this possible restoration of relations conceivable.  
7. 4 Contribution, Future Research and Modular Applicability  
 This thesis’s contribution to TFP and IR literature is twofold: theoretical and 
empirical. At the theoretical level, the thesis proposed a post-structural constructivist 
theoretical model derived from the Turkish example as a critical single case study for 
theory-developing. This theoretical design makes this study’s constructivist approach 
more amenable to the peculiarities of the Turkish case than the application of 
established theories as they stand. This theoretical framework also presents a model 
that can be applied beyond the Turkish case because it offers a modular/modifiable 
framework for the IR-national identity nexus. It eclectically combines nationalism, 
discourse and IR literature along with empirical observations from the Turkish 
experience in order to reach a “discourse-historical” analysis tool for international 
studies. At the empirical level, the work provides an elaborate and systematic 
analysis of the AKP elites’ national identity discourses and correlates it to Turkey’s 
relations with the within-case variations (the KRG, the EU and Egypt). This makes 
the work an empirically original study because the alternative constructivist/identity-
driven works generally take the identity change as given/closure/condition instead of 
an unstable ‘process’ and so delve into ‘effects’ of this supposedly fixed identity. It is 
also important to note that the discursive data collected in this study was not limited 
to few periodical discourses like commemorative speeches or annual official 
celebrations. The thesis took every single speech of the AKP’s political elites within 
its range, that is found in its methodologically located textual source. Not merely 
focusing on monotonous, diplomatic, ritualistic ‘official’ utterances provided 
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panoramic and dynamic view of the change in AKP elites’ national identity and 
foreign policy discourses. Therefore, the thesis can potentially be a reference source 
for future scholars working on Turkey.  
This study’s theoretical chapters (Chapter 3 and 4) are open to modifications 
depending on the peculiarities of targeted case studies, and the empirical chapters 
(Chapter 5 and 6) are viable for heuristic enhancement of potential future research. 
The study’s post-structural constructivist theoretical framework was devised not only 
idiosyncratically for the Turkish example, but also as a post-structural form of 
theory-developing critical case (Somer, 2014). It was built in a modular way in order 
to make it applicable to other countries with revisions depending on the peculiarities 
of alternative countries or case studies. For instance, Turkey’s conflictual socio-
political landscape does not permit analysing the national identity-international 
relations nexus through a ‘consensual’ inter-bloc framework. However, in a ‘non-
torn’ country, national identity discourses and their role in foreign affairs do not have 
to be agonistic. For such cases, discursive dialogues between different groups within 
a given society can be an input for an alternative post-structural constructivist 
framework. Likewise, in a country in which civil society is more autonomous and 
strong vis-a-vis the state, the political arena and elites featured in this study might be 
replaced by more relevant alternative platforms and actors. Nodal points located in 
national identity discourses and discursive strategies employed by the AKP 
government are amenable to modular substitution with alternatives depending on the 
specificities of the case or country intended to be studied. Especially since discursive 
strategies are highly context-dependent culturally, discursive strategies would flow 
from and vary in relation to the necessities of local socio-political landscapes. 
Therefore, the modular post-structural constructivist model and its meta-theoretical 
approach presented in this thesis can be appropriated by potential future works on the 
national identity and IR nexus in order to apply it to other cases. 
 The empirical data of the study is also open to enhancement and future 
research. Firstly, if the political hegemony of the conservative bloc stays intact in the 
future, these case studies can be updated with prospective developments in relations 
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with the analysed units. Secondly, Turkey’s national identity is not only germane to 
the international units used in this thesis. Future research can apply the same 
theoretical framework to other international actors that are relevant to the Turkish 
national identity narrative such as Israel, Iran and the Turkic Republics, in order to 
illustrate the change in TFP through the medium of discourses. Thirdly, alternative 
locations, planes and actors in Turkey can be subjected to discourse analysis to 
illustrate the national self-perception in Turkey. Newspaper editorials, op-eds, novels, 
artistic performances, TV programmes, academic works, official history books, 
contents of curricular education, and so on, can be alternative research platforms for 
the extension, triangulation and verification of this study’s both theoretical and 
empirical aspects. Fourthly, the history of TFP during the Republic era can be 
subjected to the post-structural constructivist analysis in order to demonstrate the 
interplay between the Turkish national identity which was discursively constructed 
by the secularist bloc and Turkey’s international relations. This academic enterprise 
has a potential to give historical depth to the discursive medium established by 
former hegemons and make sense of TFP until the AKP era. Fifthly, the particular 
form of Turkish national identity constructed by the AKP elites can be pursued in 
citizen-level investigations. Interviews with the wide and various segments of 
Turkish society have the potential to reveal the cognitive penetration of these new 
hegemonic discourses at the micro level. Finally, comparative discourse analysis 
technique can be employed to enhance this study’s empirical findings. The 
comparative approach can be used between hegemonic and subaltern Turkish 
national identity discourses in order to demonstrate the points of approximation and 
differentiation between these two orders of discourse. Moreover, the comparative 
discourse analysis might also be a technique to show universal regularity and patterns 
among the political elites of various countries. The discursive parallelism and 
disjunctions can be located between the Turkish politicians’ and other countries’ elite 
discourses in order to reach a general nomothetic pattern of national identity 
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